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Abstract
This dissertation is on conditionals and causation. In particular, we (i) propose a method of how an
agent learns conditional information, and (ii) analyse causation in terms of a new type of conditional.
Our starting point is Ramsey’s (1929/1990) test: accept a conditional when you can infer its conse-
quent upon supposing its antecedent. Inspired by this test, Stalnaker (1968) developed a semantics
of conditionals. In Ch. 2, we define and apply our new method of learning conditional information.
It says, roughly, that you learn conditional information by updating on the corresponding Stalnaker
conditional. By generalising Lewis’s (1976) updating rule to Jeffrey imaging, our learning method
becomes applicable to both certain and uncertain conditional information. The method generates
the correct predictions for all of Douven’s (2012) benchmark examples and Van Fraassen’s (1981)
Judy Benjamin Problem. In Ch. 3, we prefix Ramsey’s test by suspending judgment on antecedent
and consequent. Unlike the Ramsey Test semantics by Stalnaker (1968) and Gärdenfors (1978), our
strengthened semantics requires the antecedent to be inferentially relevant for the consequent. We ex-
ploit this asymmetric relation of relevance in a semantic analysis of the natural language conjunction
‘because’. In Ch. 4, we devise an analysis of actual causation in terms of production, where production
is understood along the lines of our strengthened Ramsey Test. Our analysis solves the problems of
overdetermination, conjunctive scenarios, early and late preemption, switches, double prevention, and
spurious causation – a set of problems that still challenges counterfactual accounts of actual causation
in the tradition of Lewis (1973c). In Ch. 5, we translate our analysis of actual causation into Halpern
and Pearl’s (2005) framework of causal models. As a result, our analysis is considerably simplified
on the cost of losing its reductiveness. The upshot is twofold: (i) Jeffrey imaging on Stalnaker con-
ditionals emerges as an alternative to Bayesian accounts of learning conditional information; (ii) the
analyses of causation in terms of our strengthened Ramsey Test conditional prove to be worthy rivals
to contemporary counterfactual accounts of causation.
Précis
Philosophers have devised various theories of the relation between cause and effect. Few of the the-
ories have occasionally been popular. Today, none is widely agreed upon. So far, any account of
causation is plagued by counterexamples. In addition, it is hard to tell whether some account tallies
best with our common sense of what causes what. Hence, it is safe to say that no philosophical account
of causation has yet succeeded. This is astonishing – given how pervasive and familiar causation is.
Causes help us to understand and explain what is going on around us. Causes help us to intervene in
the course of events to bring about certain effects, or prevent others from occurring. As thinkers and
agents, we are – quite naturally – interested in causal relations. We wonder why the coffee machine
is not working, why our colleague seemed so gloomy today, whether a certain diet would support
our health. Everyone values knowledge of what causes what. The more surprising that there is no
unanimous theory of causation at our disposal.
The importance of causation is not restricted to anyone’s everyday life, but extends to the special
sciences. The goal of biology, neuroscience, medicine, economics, and history – to name just a few –
is to discover the causes of their respective target phenomena. Within philosophy alone, the research
on causation in metaphysics and epistemology impacts contemporary debates on mental causation,
action theory, decision theory, learning theory, semantics, scientific explanation, and moral and legal
responsibility. The ubiquity of causation awards the prospect of a successful account of causation
with a broad interest.
Our ordinary concept of causation exhibits two truisms. First, causes produce certain effects.
Second, causes make a difference. That is, things would be different if the causes of some effects
were absent. This difference-making idea underlies Lewis’s (1973c) analysis of causation in terms of
counterfactual conditionals. These conditionals are of the form ‘if the cause had not been, the effect
never had existed’. Lewis says that an event causes another if both events occur, and if the former
had not occurred, so would not have the latter. Since Lewis’s proposal counterfactual accounts have
risen to some prominence in the contemporary debate on causation. Most of these accounts are meant
to provide a theory of actual, singular, or token causation. The goal of such a theory is to figure
out whether this particular event caused that particular event. In this dissertation, we put forth a novel
analysis of actual causation in terms of a conditional that differs in kind from counterfactuals. Thereby,
we achieve an analysis of causation in terms of production rather than counterfactual dependence.
After all, causes bring about certain effects, they do not only make a difference.
Analyses of causation in terms of certain conditionals reveal that causal relations have a con-
ditional structure. This observation, unfortunately, does not help much to analyse causation. For
conditionals are as controversial as causation itself. And for a good reason: conditionals seem to be
intimately tied to causation, even if we do not know exactly how. One indication for this conjecture is
that conditionals, like causal relations, play a central role in reasoning and learning. However, there is
no consensus emerging on what conditionals, and for that matter causal relations, mean. It is not even
agreed upon whether conditionals have truth conditions, and thus express propositions at all (see Edg-
xi
ington (1995)). This makes it easy to predict that conditionals will continue to puzzle philosophers,
epistemologists, logicians, and cognitive scientists alike.
In spite of the controversies surrounding conditionals, much research has originated from the
same source, viz. Ramsey’s (1929/1990) test for the acceptance of conditionals. The idea is that you
accept a conditional ‘if A then C’ when you can infer its consequent C upon supposing the antecedent
A. Inspired by this test procedure, Stalnaker (1968) has developed a semantics of conditionals by
replacing (hypothetical) belief states by a (set of) possible worlds. Roughly, the Stalnaker conditional
A > C is true just in case C is true in the possible world that satisfies A and is otherwise most similar
to the actual world. In a slogan, A > C is true when the most similar A-world satisfies C. Adams
(1975) has developed another semantics of conditionals. He has taken seriously Ramsey’s phrase
that the evaluation of a conditional requires to fix your degree of belief in the consequent given the
antecedent. Accordingly, you accept ‘if A then C’ when your “degree of belief in C given A” is
high. Yet another influential Ramsey Test semantics has been developed within Gärdenfors’s (1988)
theory of belief revision. You accept a conditional ‘if A then C’ if a minimal change of your beliefs to
accommodate A makes you believe C as well. However, Gärdenfors (1986) showed that this version
of the Ramsey test is inconsistent with his theory of belief revision under a mild assumption of non-
triviality. It was Hansson (1992) who defended the Ramsey Test against Gärdenfors’s inconsistency
theorem. In part, Hansson saves the Ramsey Test by an alternative representation of belief states: he
has used belief bases rather than belief sets to model the dynamics of belief. In contrast to belief
sets, belief bases are in general not closed under logical consequence. Hence, belief bases are a less
idealised model of a belief state allowing for a distinction between explicitly held beliefs and merely
derived beliefs. Up to now, the Ramsey Test inspires work on conditionals and belief changes (see,
e.g., Bradley (2007), Leitgeb (2010), Rott (2011), Rott (2017)).
Following Ramsey (1929/1990), Adams (1975) represents degrees of belief by a probability dis-
tribution P. He goes on to stipulate the probability of an indicative conditional as the conditional
probability of the consequent given its antecedent, i. e. P(if A then C) := P(C | A). Lewis (1976)
has shown that this stipulation does not hold for Stalnaker’s Ramsey Test conditional >. Apart from
trivial cases, the probability of a Stalnaker conditional does not equal the corresponding conditional
probability, that is P(A > C) , P(C | A). Lewis’s result may be seen as a special case of Gärden-
fors’s inconsistency theorem, when belief states are modelled by probability functions and belief states
change according to the rule P′(C) = P(C | A). The setting of this special case describes the two core
tenets of orthodox Bayesianism, where P is called the initial or prior degrees of belief and P′ the
final or posterior degrees of belief, and the rule changing the degrees of belief goes by the name of
conditionalization. By conditionalization on A, a Bayesian agent learns a piece of evidence A with
certainty. Jeffrey’s (1965) generalisation of conditionalization allows a Bayesian agent to update her
degrees of belief when the information A is learned with uncertainty. So far so good.
As compared to the learning of factual information, it is less clear how the norms of Bayesian
epistemology apply to the learning of indicative conditionals (see Douven (2015)). How should you
change your beliefs when you learn ‘if A then C’? Virtually all Bayesian accounts agree that learning
a conditional imposes some constraint on the posterior degrees of belief for the consequent given the
antecedent. Reminiscent of Adams’s stipulation, to learn ‘if A then C’ is often assumed to imply that
P′(C | A) equals approximately 1 (see, e.g., Evans and Over (2004, Ch. 8) and Oaksford and Chater
(2007, p. 118)). In case a Bayesian agent learns uncertain conditional information, the constraint on
the posterior takes the form P′(C | A) = a ≤ 1. Then Bayesians usually apply Jeffrey conditional-
ization. A more sophisticated alternative has been proposed by Van Fraassen (1980a) and Williams
(1980). The proposal is to model the learning of conditional information by minimising the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence between prior and posterior degrees of belief. When you learn uncertain
xii
conditional information, and so the constraint takes the form P′(C | A) = a for 0 < a < 1, min-
imising the KL divergence may yield different results from Jeffrey conditionalization. Van Fraassen’s
approach leads thus beyond the confines of orthodox Bayesianism.
Shortly after, Van Fraassen (1981) and Van Fraassen et al. (1986) have challenged the KL diver-
gence minimizer and the orthodox Bayesian alike. They do so by putting forth a scenario of learning
uncertain conditional information, the Judy Benjamin Problem. To say the least, this learning sce-
nario has since proven to be a severe challenge for Bayesians of all varieties. And not only Bayesians
are troubled. Douven and Romeijn (2011) and Douven (2012) survey the extant accounts of learning
conditional information and observe that there are no satisfactory accounts of learning conditional
information. All accounts – ranging from simple conditionalization on the material implication, over
possible worlds accounts, to advanced Bayesian perspectives – fail to provide the correct results for
Douven’s benchmark examples. He concludes that a general account of learning conditional informa-
tion is yet to be formulated. We aim to remedy this situation.
In light of Lewis’s (1976) triviality result, it is dubious whether conditional probabilities, or at
least constraints on conditional posterior degrees of belief, are the right tool to model the learning of
conditional information. Luckily, an alternative to Bayesian conditionalization is not far to seek. In
the same paper, Lewis has found a probabilistic updating rule, which he named imaging. Imaging
on A transfers the probability shares associated to ¬A-worlds to the respective most similar A-worlds.
We may interpret imaging on A as another way to learn A with certainty. Notably, the probability of
a Stalnaker conditional equals the probability of its consequent after imaging on the antecedent, that
is P(A > C) = PA(C). By replacing the updating rule of conditionalization with imaging, Adams’s
stipulation becomes a theorem for Stalnaker’s conditional. Unlike standard conditionalization, imag-
ing can be applied when the antecedent has probability 0 and it can be applied to nested conditionals.
For instance, the image on the Stalnaker conditional A > C, PA>C(E), is well-defined and equals the
probability of the nested conditional (A > C) > E. Hence, imaging seems to be a promising candidate
to provide a rather general account of learning conditional information.
In Chapter 2, we put forth a method of learning conditional information. Roughly, an agent learns
‘if A then C’ by (Jeffrey) imaging on the Stalnaker conditional A > C. Imaging on A > C amounts
to (i) learning that the most similar A-world satisfies C; and that (ii) the probability share of each
¬(A > C)-world is transferred to its most similar (A > C)-world. Jeffrey imaging is our generalisation
of Lewis’s imaging that mirrors Jeffrey’s generalisation of Bayesian conditionalization. In contrast to
Lewis’s imaging, our generalisation does not transfer the whole probabilistic mass – but only a part
thereof – to the respective most similar worlds. Thereby, Jeffrey imaging opens the door to apply our
learning method to uncertain information. Unlike extant Bayesian accounts, our method generates
the correct predictions for Douven’s (2012) benchmark examples and Van Fraassen’s (1981) Judy
Benjamin Problem. Finally, we adapt our method of learning conditional information to a method
of learning causal information. The combination of the two methods provides a unified framework
which allows us to clearly distinguish between conditional and causal information.
In Chapter 3, we strengthen Ramsey’s test. The idea is to prefix Ramsey’s test by a suspension of
judgment:
First, suspend judgment on the antecedent A and the consequent C. Second, add A hypo-
thetically to your stock of beliefs. Finally, test whether you can infer C.
The resulting strengthened Ramsey Test semantics of conditionals requires that the antecedent is infer-
entially relevant for its consequent, unlike the semantics of conditionals due to Stalnaker (1968) and
Gärdenfors (1978). Using Hansson’s (1999) framework of belief bases, the relevance exhibited by our
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strengthened semantics is often asymmetric. No wonder, then, that we can analyse the conjunction
‘because’ of natural language by our strengthened Ramsey Test semantics.
In Chapter 4, we analyse actual causation in terms of our newly developed strengthened Ram-
sey Test conditional. The strengthened conditional is meant to express a relation of production. C
produces E just in case being agnostic on C and E, you can infer C by supposing E. Roughly, we
propose that C is a cause of E if C produces E and ¬C does not also produce E. Hence, we reduce
causation to (beliefs about) events (or facts) and generalisations. Our analysis solves the problems of
overdetermination, conjunctive scenarios, early and late preemption, switches, double prevention, and
spurious causation – a set of problems that still challenges counterfactual accounts of actual causation
in the tradition of Lewis (1973c).
In Chapter 5, we carry over our analysis of actual causation to Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) frame-
work of causal models. Thereby, our analysis simplifies considerably on the cost of losing its re-
ductiveness. We compare the resulting analysis to the account of Halpern and Pearl (2005) and its
modification due to Halpern (2015). Both accounts define actual causation in terms of contingent
counterfactual dependence. Roughly, contingent counterfactual dependence says that even if E does
not counterfactually depend on C in the actual situation, E counterfactually depends on C under cer-
tain contingencies. Their definitions of actual cause still struggle with any set of problems including
both overdetermination and conjunctive scenarios, unlike our analysis in the framework of causal
models.
In Chapter 6, we refine Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition of actual causation to allow for
disjunctive causes as discovered by Sartorio (2006). She argues, against the verdicts of Lewis (1986b)
and Halpern and Pearl (2005), for the existence of disjunctive causes. The switching scenario she
considers suggests that a disjunctive fact or event can be a cause without one of its disjuncts being a
cause. We show that our refinement of Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition can take such disjunctive
causes into account.
In Chapter 7, we impose properties of causation, as assumed in cognitive neuroscience, upon
Woodward’s (2005) interventionist account of causation. Within the resulting framework, we investi-
gate to what extent we are justified to derive causal relations between mental properties and properties
of the brain, if certain methods are used in the neuroscientific studies. The upshot is that, for methods
as diverse as Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, cogni-
tive neuroscientists should dare to interpret their findings as establishing genuine causal relations.
In Appendix A, we apply our method of learning conditional information to Douven and
Romeijn’s (2011) Jeweller Example. Appendix B contains the proofs of Chapter 3. Appendix C
provides the precise definitions for the belief changes underlying the analysis of causation in Chapter
4. Appendix D contains a proof showing that, under certain assumptions, a notion of counterfac-
tual dependence is sufficient for causation according to our definition of Chapter 4. A more detailed
summary of each chapter may be found in Section 1.5 of the Introduction.
In sum, we have moved from the Ramsey Test in two directions. First, we have proposed a method
of learning conditional information. This method is based on Stalnaker’s semantics of conditionals
and Jeffrey imaging. As compared to extant Bayesian accounts, our framework does justice to the
many facets of learning conditional information. We have gone in a second direction by strengthening
the Ramsey Test. This has led us to a new conditional semantics amenable to an analysis of actual
causation. In fact, we have analysed actual causation in terms of our strengthened Ramsey Test condi-
tional twice over. The first analysis uses belief bases, while the second is embedded in a framework of
causal models. In these guises, our strengthened Ramsey Test conditional gives rise to two analyses
of actual causation that do not fall short of contemporary counterfactual accounts. The paths we have
gone show the on-going fruitfulness of Ramsey’s ideas.
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Sources. Chapter 2 of this dissertation builds on the publications Günther (2018) and Günther
(2017a). Chapters 3, 4, and 5 build on the publications Andreas and Günther (2018), Andreas and
Günther (2019), and Andreas and Günther (2018), respectively. Chapter 6 builds on Günther (2017b).
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Introduction
This is an investigation between the learning of conditionals and conditional analyses of causation.
We have three principal aims. First, we aim to provide a method of learning conditional information.
This method is based on Stalnaker’s Ramsey Test semantics for conditionals. Second, we formally
elaborate a strengthened Ramsey Test semantics for conditionals, which we then use for an analysis of
‘because’. Third, we aim to analyse causation in terms of our strengthened Ramsey Test conditional.
We see already that conditionals, in particular Ramsey Test conditionals, will take center stage in this
investigation. A conditional can be expressed in natural language by “If A, (then) C”, where A and C
are place-holders for two clauses, the antecedent A and consequent C. An example of a natural lan-
guage conditional is “If Paris shoots this fatal arrow, Achilles dies young.” Our strengthened Ramsey
Test semantics will allow us to sensibly evaluate such conditionals, and sentences like “Because Paris
shot this fatal arrow, Achilles died young.” Observe that the conditional and the because sentence
can be uttered to say: Paris’s shooting the fatal arrow was a cause of Achilles’s early decease. This
suggests that a semantics of conditionals can be used in an analysis of causation.
Throughout the investigation, we will test whether our theoretical proposals fit our common-sense
judgments about different examples. That is, we agree with the methodology laid out by Lewis (1986b,
p. 194):
When common sense delivers a firm and uncontroversial answer about a not-too-far-
fetched case, theory had better agree. If an analysis [...] does not deliver the common-
sense answer, that is bad trouble.
Hence, we will test our analyses against not-too-far-fetched examples. Sometimes, for instance when
we develop an analysis of ‘because’ based on our strengthened Ramsey Test, certain examples will
even play a guiding role in constructing the analysis. In the case of learning conditional information,
our method will be tested against a set of examples which has – as of yet – not been captured by any
other method.
This introduction is meant to set the stage for the investigations in the following chapters. We
review previous work on conditionals and causation, and point out what we aim to contribute. We
begin with some remarks by Hume on causation. Our perhaps idiosyncratic interpretation of Hume’s
remarks is very much in line with Ramsey’s regularity analysis of causation. This analysis is given
in terms of a certain kind of conditional. For these ‘variable hypotheticals’ Ramsey provides a test
according to which we accept ‘If p, then q’ just in case assuming p makes us infer q. Early research on
Ramsey’s test has been carried out by Stalnaker (1968) and Gärdenfors (1988). The former used the
idea of the test to develop a possible worlds semantics of conditionals. The latter linked the acceptance
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of conditionals more explicitly to belief changes. A brief overview of the accounts of Stalnaker and
Gärdenfors shall suffice as a background for the following chapters. It should be noted, though, that
the Ramsey Test continues to form a lively area of research.1
In another Humean spirit, Lewis (1973c) establishes an analysis of causation in terms of so-called
counterfactual conditionals.2 Counterfactuals, for short, are conditionals in the subjunctive mood,
where it is somehow known, assumed, or implicated that the antecedent is contrary to the facts. Let us
assume that Mary broke a window by throwing a rock. Then we can sensibly assert the counterfactual
“If Mary had not thrown the rock, the window would not have broken.” If Mary actually broke the
window by throwing a rock, the truth of this counterfactual implies, on Lewis’s analysis, that Mary’s
throwing a rock through the window is an actual cause of the window shattering. His idea that a cause
makes a difference as regards the effect is intuitively quite appealing. However, as we will see, there
are some examples (such as late preemption and overdetermination) that resist to be correctly analysed
by Lewis’s (1973c) counterfactual analysis. To capture these recalcitrant examples, Lewis modified
his analysis twice. A problem remains, though, no Lewisian analysis can solve at the same time both,
cases of late preemption and cases that became to be known as ‘double prevention’.
Towards the end of this introduction, we contrast Lewis’s (1973c) counterfactual analysis of actual
causation with regularity analyses. Roughly, the latter say that effects regularly follow their causes.
While counterfactual dependence seems to be sufficient but not necessary for actual causation, reg-
ularities seem to be necessary but not sufficient. Of course, a regularity analysis can be amended in
several ways, in particular by a so-called best system analysis of regularities, as we will see. We in-
clude a few remarks on how our final analysis of causation will relate to both, Lewis’s counterfactual
analysis and typical regularity analyses of causation. We end the Introduction by a brief preview of
what is to come.
1.1 Hume and Ramsey on Causation
We may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects,
similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words,
where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.
This is Hume’s (1748) definition of causation. Before the ‘other words’, his stipulation sounds like a
regularity analysis that attempts to define causation in terms of regularities, that is invariable patterns
of succession. The core idea is that causes are regularly followed by their effects. In fact, Hume
(1739/1978, p. 170) says more specifically:
A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the
idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of
the one to form a more lively idea of the other.
Here, Hume says that the connection between cause and effect is determined by the mind. Only
because the mind forms the ideas, the objects in the world are thought to be connected. To the
mind, this causal connection appears to be ‘necessary’. Hume (1739/1978, p. 165) clearly states
that “[n]ecessity is something that exists in the minds, not in objects”. Consequently, there be no
necessary connection in the world between a cause and its effect which would go beyond their regular
1See, e.g., Bradley (2007), Leitgeb (2010), Rott (2011), Hill (2012), Bradley (2012), Chandler (2017), Bradley (2017),
Rott (2017).
2The term ‘counterfactual conditional’ was coined by Goodman (1947).
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association. Rather causation as imposed by our mind, so Hume (1739/1978, p. 73), can “produce a
connexion” between objects that goes “beyond what is immediately present to the senses”. In this
sense, causal reasoning may extend our knowledge – based on our mind’s habitual regularities –
beyond our experience.3 On this picture, causation is an epistemic relation imposed on two objects
that allows the mind to ‘determine’ the effect when perceiving its cause. Put differently, the mind has
a habit to expect an event after observing another, and we call this expectation causation. Our memory
provides us with finitely many instances of objects that occur jointly, or in ‘constant conjunction’, and
from which our mind forms inferential habits. These inferential habits make our mind to expect the
effect upon observing its cause. Hence, the epistemic relation of causation is primarily inferential, as
Hume (1739/1978, p. 159) suggests:
[A]fter the discovery of the constant conjunction of any objects, we always draw an infer-
ence from one object to another, [...]. Perhaps ’twill appear in the end, that the necessary
connexion depends on the inference, instead of the inference’s depending on the neces-
sary connexion.
Agreeing that the ‘necessary connection’ depends on the inferential habits, Ramsey (1929/1990)
sketches a regularity analysis in a Humean spirit. Both claim that there is no causal relation in the
world that goes beyond regularities. In particular, there be no causal necessity in the world. It is the
mind that imputes regularity to the world, and only for this very mind the imputed regularity might ap-
pear of causal ‘necessity’. For Ramsey, a regularity is expressed by a generalisation such as ‘All men
are mortal’ or ‘Arsenic is poisonous’. These generalisations, so Ramsey, express not merely a sum-
mary of certain conjunctive facts, but also an expectation for the future. His analysis of causation thus
follows Hume in not being purely descriptive. Rather his analysis may be called a forecasting analysis
of causation. The idea is the same, viz. that, upon repeated observation of an invariable pattern of
succession, the mind forms a habit to expect certain effects following certain causes. Importantly,
these expectations apply also to future, as of yet unobserved instances of the regularity.
Ramsey names the generalisations expressing a mind’s habitual regularities ‘variable hypotheti-
cals’. These variable hypotheticals are ‘rules of judgment’ that guide a mind’s or, in more modern
terms, an agent’s inferences. Suppose an agent endorses the variable hypothetical ‘All men are mor-
tal’. Then, if the agent encounters a man, she expects him to be mortal. In general, an agent’s variable
hypothetical encodes an expectation: if she encounters an instance of the antecedent, she expects the
consequent. Hence, variable hypotheticals have a conditional structure.
The endorsed set of variable hypotheticals are “the system with which the speaker meets the
future” (Ramsey (1929/1990, p. 241)). Hence, the set of variable hypotheticals corresponds to the
rules according to which an agent changes her epistemic states. Suppose an agent believes a set of
variable hypotheticals and a set of facts. If the antecedent of a variable hypothetical is in the set of
believed facts, the agent believes its consequent as well.
The set of variable hypotheticals is divided in causal laws and accidental generalisations. Causal
laws support counterfactual conditionals whose consequent does not occur earlier than its antecedent.
3We should acknowledge that this is our interpretation of Hume which emphasizes the mind-dependency of causation.
Hume’s regularity theory of causation is typically (or at least has often been) interpreted to be a realist theory. The reason
is that there really are regularities between events. That is, there really are jointly and repeatedly occurring events that are
spatially contiguous and some temporally precede others. The regularities are then mind-independent in the sense that they
would still be there, even if nobody observed them. However, this realist interpretation of regularities does not seem to apply
to causation. Rather the role of the ‘non-realist’ mind has not been considered. On the one hand there are mind-independent
regularities; on the other the mind infers causal relations from these regularities. But then, should Hume’s analysis not
reduce causation to regularities and the mind (or its inferences)? We think this is about right, but will not try to resolve this
tension here.
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Hence, Ramsey imposes a Humean constraint of temporal precedence on causal laws. In contrast, the
variable hypotheticals that are not causal laws are just accidental generalisations. Before we move on
to Lewis’s analysis of causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals, we will have a closer look at
Ramsey’s variable hypotheticals.
1.2 The Ramsey Test and Stalnaker’s Conditional
Suppose an agent believes the conditional ‘If she eats the cake, she will have a stomach ache’, and so
does not eat the piece of cake in front of her. We might disagree with the agent by believing that if she
had eaten the cake, she would not have had a stomach ache. Our difference is then that she believes
if she had eaten the cake, she would have had a stomach ache. These “assertions about unfulfilled
conditions”, so Ramsey (1929/1990, p. 247) about the two conditionals, do not make a difference as
to the facts we believe. We both agree that she did no eat the cake. The basis of the dispute is rather
that each of us is guided by different variable hypotheticals. Ramsey (1929/1990, p. 247, fn. 1) says
about such situations of a hypothetical argument:
If two people are arguing ‘If p will q?’ and are both in doubt as to p, they are adding p
hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q; so that in a
sense ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, q’ are contradictories.4
This procedure confers conditionals a role in the practice of hypothetical reasoning: although uncer-
tain whether p is the case, they suppose p in order to argue about q. In such a Ramsey Test situation,
hypothesizing p opens up a context which serves as basis for their reasoning and discussing about
q. Note that the sense in which ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, ¬q’ are contradictories is according to Ramsey
not truth-conditional. Ramsey does not think that conditionals have truth values, but that there are
rational conditions for accepting and rejecting conditionals, and the notion of acceptance cannot be
reduced to belief in the truth of any proposition. The cited procedure is meant to provide a test for
such acceptance conditions.
Let us consider another example of a Ramsey Test situation. Two people have doubts whether God
exists, and consider the question ‘If God exists, is Jesus His son?’. Although they have both doubts
whether God exists, they may come to different conclusions when reasoning on the hypothetical basis
that God exists. One of them could argue as follows: Suppose God exists. Then we have reason to
believe the Bible’s story about Virgin Mary, and thus Jesus is the son of God. The other could argue
along the following lines: Suppose God exists. Then, since the Bible is not written by God, we have
no reason to believe the miraculous story about Mary’s immaculate conception, and thus Jesus is not
the son of God. In the context they enter by the God hypothesis the first person could respond that,
indeed, the Bible is written by men, but still these men were inspired by God, and so on. Again, the
two may fiercely disagree on what follows from the God hypothesis because their inferences are lead
by different variable hypotheticals. And they can do so even if they believe the same class of facts.
Stalnaker (1968, p. 101) provides a simple paraphrase of Ramsey’s test procedure: “add the an-
tecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of knowledge (or beliefs), and then consider whether or not
the consequent is true.” He goes on to extend his paraphrase in order to cover the cases where an
4q is Ramsey’s notation for the negation of q, which we denote by ¬q. The quote continues: “We can say they are fixing
their degrees of belief in q given p.” Adams (1965, 1966, 1970, 1975) takes the continuation serious and develops a logic
of conditionals in terms of conditional probabilities. The basic idea is that a conditional If p, then q should be accepted just
in case the conditional probability P(q | p) is high. Adams’s criterion for his logic is that the improbability of its conclusion
cannot exceed the sum of the improbabilities of the premises.
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agent is not in doubt as regards the antecedent but believes it to be true or false, respectively. If the
agent already believes the antecedent to be true, she does not need to change her beliefs. If the agent
believes the antecedent to be false, she is forced to change her beliefs which contradict the antecedent.
Stalnaker (1968, p. 102) thus proposes to evaluate a conditional as follows:
First, add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs; second, make whatever
adjustments are required to maintain consistency (without modifying the hypothetical
belief in the antecedent); finally, consider whether or not the consequent is then true.
From here and based on Kripke’s (1963) modal-logical framework, Stalnaker (1968) develops a possi-
ble worlds semantics for conditionals.5 The idea is that adding the antecedent to your stock of beliefs
moves you to a possible world, in which the antecedent is true and otherwise differs minimally from
your actual stock of beliefs. Then you can check whether the consequent is satisfied in this most sim-
ilar world, where the antecedent is true. Thereby, a possible world models your hypothetical beliefs.
‘True’ in possible worlds roughly corresponds to ‘believed to be true’ by the agent. In this sense, “a
possible world”, so Stalnaker (1968, p. 102), “is the ontological analogue of a stock of hypothetical
beliefs.” As a consequence, Stalnaker uses the concept ‘possible world’ not so much to ‘transition’
from acceptance or belief conditions to truth conditions, and thus does not propose a “transition from
epistemology to metaphysics” as claimed by Arlo-Costa and Egré (2016).6 Rather he models belief
or acceptance conditions for conditionals by truth conditions in a possible worlds framework.
Admittedly, the concept of a possible world sounds metaphysically laden. However, possible
worlds might just be regarded as a useful technical tool to model possibilities. This aligns with the
view of Stalnaker (1984, p. 57):
Possible worlds are primitive notions of the theory, not because of their ontological status,
but because it is useful to theorize at a certain level of abstraction, a level that brings out
what is common in a certain range of otherwise diverse activities. The concept of possible
worlds that I am defending is not a metaphysical conception [...]. The concept is a formal
or functional notion, like the notion of an individual presupposed by the semantics for
extensional quantificational theory. [...] The theory leaves the nature of possible worlds
as open as extensional semantics leaves the nature of individuals. A possible world is
what truth is relative to, what people distinguish between in their rational activities.
Possible worlds thus understood are simply a means to model ways the world might/could be, or
might/could have been. Possible worlds represent alternative scenarios according to which things
might happen or might have happened, even if they actually did not happen.7 In this sense, if we are
about to eat a cake and wonder whether we will get a stomach ache, we may consider two possible
worlds: one in which we eat the cake, and another in which we do not. If we did not eat the cake,
we can still entertain the thought that we could have eaten the cake. The possibility that we could
have eaten the cake is true in a possible world. In this way, we can use a possible world to model the
5Indeed, Stalnaker (1968) and Stalnaker and Thomason (1970) put forth a logic of conditionals consisting of a semantics
and a corresponding proof theory. They have shown that Stalnaker’s (1968) semantics of conditionals is sound and complete
with the axiom system C2. Interestingly, the inference rules of C2 agree with those of Adams’s logic for conditionals. See
previous footnote.
6This being said, it seems in many text passages following Stalnaker (1968, p. 102) that he actually makes a transition
from epistemology to the pragmatics and semantics of natural language. There is, of course, a relation between our cognitive
habits and natural language. Here is not the place to discuss it, but in Chapter 3 we show how the Ramsey Test may bear on
an analysis of one natural language usage of the connective ‘because’.
7For more details on Stalnaker’s view what possible worlds are, see Stalnaker (2003).
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thought about a possibility. Hence, the concept of a possible world is a useful theoretical device that
allows us to model thinking about various possibilities, including models of conditional or hypotheti-
cal beliefs. For this reason, a possible worlds semantics seems well-suited for analysing the meaning
of conditionals.
Stalnaker (1968) proposes roughly the following semantics for conditionals. A conditional is true
just in case its consequent is true in the possible world that satisfies the antecedent and is otherwise
most similar to the actual world. Apparently, he thinks that this semantics fits both indicative and
subjunctive conditionals. In other words, he assumes that a conditional’s mood does not affect its
propositional content (ibid., p. 99, fn. 3).8 Adams (1970) argues for the opposite, viz. that a condi-
tional’s mood makes a difference to its semantic characterisation. To bolster his claim, he presents the
following pair of conditionals:
(1) If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.
(2) If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else would have.
Suppose you are convinced but not entirely certain that Oswald actually killed Kennedy. At the same
time, you are sure that Kennedy has been assassinated. Then you accept the indicative conditional (1):
under the assumption that it was not Oswald someone else did it, because you are still convinced that
Kennedy has been killed. In contrast, if you suppose that Oswald had not killed Kennedy, it seems to
be an open question whether or not someone else would have killed Kennedy. Your actual conviction
that Kennedy has been assassinated does not determine that the consequent of the subjunctive condi-
tional (2) is true under the supposition of its antecedent. If you utter (2) you make the dubious claim
that Kennedy’s assassination was inevitable, perhaps because you think that Kennedy’s actions and
policies provoked an assassination. But then you think that Kennedy did not act alone, or you even
adhere to some conspiracy theory. Hence, if you accept (1), you might still reject (2).
In the indicative case, it seems that the most similar possible world in which Oswald did not kill
Kennedy must still conform to the proposition that Kennedy has been assassinated. Now, Kennedy
has been assassinated, only if Oswald did it or someone else. Hence, we are either in a world where
Oswald killed Kennedy or where someone else did it. If Oswald did not do it, someone else did. In
other words, in the indicative case, we are not free to move to a most similar world where neither
Oswald nor someone else killed Kennedy, because we firmly believe that here in the actual world
Kennedy has indeed been assassinated. This constraint does not seem to be imposed on its subjunctive
version (2). Moving to the most similar world from the actual where Oswald had not killed Kennedy
may well be a world where Kennedy has not been assassinated. This possibility illustrates that the
evaluation of subjunctives is somewhat more independent from the actual context than the evaluation
of indicatives. So, even if you are certain that Oswald did in fact kill Kennedy, you can believe to
be true that if Oswald had not, nobody else would have. But then you do not adhere to a conspiracy
theory.
Now, if Stalnaker’s possible-world semantics captures both indicatives and subjunctives, we need
to amend it in order to explain why two different possible worlds can be, respectively, most similar
from the actual, depending on the mood of the conditional. We will provide a sketchy answer in Chap-
ter 2 to the question how the similarity order between worlds might be constrained so that the most
similar world of an indicative conditional and the one of the corresponding subjunctive conditional
come apart.
8As we will see in Chapter 2, the propositional content of a Stalnaker conditional is identical to the set of possible worlds
in which the conditional is true.
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In general, the question “How to specify a similarity order between possible worlds?” is tricky. A
good answer still seems to be elusive. Even Lewis (1979), the realist about possible worlds, accepted
that a measure of similarity is context-sensitive in the sense that there is no unique true measure of
similarity between possible worlds. Nevertheless, he gave a rough recipe for how to determine a
default measure of similarity that we use unless there is a reason to avoid it. Up to this day, however,
most authors agree that semantics based on a similarity order remain a quite schematic framework,
to be filled in with contextually relevant considerations for assessing similarities. Many authors such
as Fine (1975) challenged the idea of similarity with respect to possible worlds.9 To give an example
– an unsophisticated one as compared to the mood of a conditional – consider: ‘if this stone were a
man, it would be mortal.’ To figure out whether we should accept this conditional, we move to the
most similar world (from our actual world) in which the stone is a man and check whether it is then
mortal. Now, you might move to a most similar world where the stone is a man and mortal. However,
somebody else might move to a most similar world in which the stone is a ‘man’ in the sense of a stone
sculpture of a man. In this world, the stone is not mortal. Between different agents, the constraints
on similarity may well differ. Worlds which are similar for her may not be similar to you. Such a
difference may lead to a Ramsey Test disagreement.
The situation as regards the similarity order is even worse. Even one agent may have no clear-cut
judgment on what is more similar to what. Is Tom’s right thumb more similar to the agent’s left thumb
than his father’s right thumb? Is a quiche more like a pizza or like a cake? Many of us do not have a
clear answer, but are prompted to ponder when asked such questions. The problem is that similarity
is multi-dimensional. If two worlds are each similar to the actual world in a different respect, which
is most similar to the actual world all things considered?
Relatedly, what if there are two possibilities that appear to be equally similar? Can we always
decide which world is the most similar world to the actual? Formally, Stalnaker makes this uniqueness
assumption: for any non-contradictory antecedent and any world, there will be a unique most similar
antecedent world. This uniqueness assumption is challenged by pairs of conditionals such as the
following due to Quine (1959, p. 15):
(3) If Verdi and Bizet had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Italian.
(4) If Verdi and Bizet had been compatriots, Verdi would have been French.
Only knowing that Bizet was French and Verdi Italian, it seems that we cannot decide which world
should be singled out by the common antecedent.10 If Stalnaker’s uniqueness assumption is in place,
exactly one of (3) and (4) would be true according to his semantics. Alas, both seem dubious.
Stalnaker’s uniqueness assumption ensures the validity of the principle of Conditional Excluded
Middle (CEM). Writing > for Stalnaker’s conditional operator, this principle says:
(A > C) ∨ (A > ¬C) (CEM)
In words, either if A,C or if A,¬C. Surprisingly, this validity seems to persist even in the problematic
Bizet-Verdi case:
(5) Either if Verdi and Bizet had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Italian, or (if Verdi and
Bizet had been compatriots), Verdi would have been French.
9For a review of the discussion, see Bennett (2003, chs. 11 and 12).
10If you have any reason to break the tie between Verdi and Bizet with respect to their nationality, you can of course
decide for one most similar world. If so, just replace the example by one where you cannot break the tie between two (or
more) worlds.
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Stalnaker (1981) suggests that (3) and (4) are semantically indeterminate, because resolving the sim-
ilarity tie between the two candidate worlds be context-dependent. (5) is true nevertheless because it
would be true under any reasonable resolution of the similarity indeterminacy.11
Like Stalnaker (1968), Lewis (1973a,b) provides a semantics for conditionals based on the concept
of a possible world and a similarity order. However, Lewis’s semantics, meant for counterfactual
conditionals only, does not satisfy Stalnaker’s uniqueness assumption. For any two propositions A
and C, so claims Lewis, the proposition ‘if A were true, then C would be true’ can be evaluated. Let
us call a possible world that satisfies A an A-world. Then, the Lewis counterfactual A C is true (at
a world w) iff either there are no possible A-worlds, or some A-world that satisfies C is more similar (to
w) than any A-world that does not satisfy C. If there are no possible A-worlds, then the counterfactual
is vacuously true. A counterfactual is non-vacuously true just in case “it takes less departure from
actuality to make the consequent true along with the antecedent than it does to make the antecedent
true without the consequent” (Lewis (1973c), p. 560).
Lewis’s semantics allows for a set of equally similar possible worlds. In the Bizet-Verdi case, for
example, there are two equally similar possible worlds, one in which they are both French, and another
in which they are both Italian. Accordingly, on Lewis’s semantics, both (3) and (4) come out false,
because there are two equally similar worlds in which Verdi and Bizet are compatriots and in one it is
true that they are Italian (not French), in the other that they are French (not Italian). Interestingly, (5)
is true in Lewis’s semantics when understood as saying A (C∨¬C), and false when understood as
taking the form of the Conditional Excluded Middle principle, i. e. (A  C) ∨ (A  ¬C). Hence,
 does not validate (CEM).
In Chapter 2, our goal is not to solve the problem of how one can plausibly specify a similarity or-
der between possible worlds. Thinking one could offer a unique solution that works for all judgments
of similarity seems to be either overconfident or even presumptuous. Instead, we aim to propose a
method of how a rational agent should learn conditional information. We exploit the possible-worlds
framework as established by Kripke and Stalnaker to model examples of learning conditional informa-
tion. In particular, possible worlds will be used as Stalnakerian means to model an agent’s epistemic
state. The conditional information to be learned will be encoded by a certain meaning of Stalnaker
conditionals. Thereby, our learning method is based on the meaning of Stalnaker conditionals and
thus seems to run into the problem of how to specify the similarity order between possible worlds.
Fortunately, there is a decisive difference between the meaning of a (conditional) proposition and
the learning of this meaning: while the explicit meaning presupposes an antecedently fixed similarity
order, the learning of a (conditional) proposition may specify or adjust the similarity order. To be
clear, the explicit evaluation of a Stalnaker conditional’s meaning requires an agent to have an already
fixed (at least partially) similarity order; otherwise the agent does not know to which most similar
antecedent world she is supposed to move in order to check whether there the consequent is true. In
contrast, the learning of a Stalnaker conditional’s meaning provides the agent with information of how
to specify or adjust the similarity order; the agent learns that the most similar antecedent world is a
consequent world.12 Hence, to learn a Stalnaker conditional is, in part, to obtain some information
11Stalnaker (1981) acknowledges indeterminacy as an immanent element of natural language and captures it by adopting
Fraassen’s (1966) super-evaluations.
12Note that, with respect to learning, the difference between Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s semantics is not very big. Whether
you learn that in all most similar worlds, or the most similar world, the consequent is true makes no big difference. If you
learn conditional (3), you come to know that both Bizet and Verdi are Italian in the/all the most similar world(s), where they
are compatriots. Only if you learn the negation of a conditional, that is a conditional of the form ¬(A > C), the semantics
result in different propositions to be learned. In brief, Stalnaker’s semantics gives you, by (CEM), the proposition expressed
by A > ¬C. Lewis’s semantic is more problematic with respect to learning. ¬(A  C) is non-vacuously true at a world
w iff for any (A ∧ C)-world there is at least one (A ∧ ¬C)-world that is equally similar to w. By learning ¬(A  C) you
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about a similarity order. The obtained information can then be used to specify (or adjust) the as of
yet un- or under-specified (or even differently specified) similarity order. In this way, we turn the
disadvantage of how to specify a ‘correct’ similarity order in the advantage that a similarity order can
be made explicit within the learning process.
The difference between the meaning and the learning of a conditional within a possible-worlds
framework has been widely overlooked so far. Douven (2012, pp. 8-9) observed that nobody em-
ployed a possible-worlds semantics to model the learning of conditionals. Rather broadly Bayesian
approaches would be promising candidates. The idea in these approaches is that learning the unnested
conditional “If A, then C” implies that an agent’s credence function is constrained by the conditional
probability P(C | A), often with the further constraint that P(C | A) ≈ 1. In light of Lewis’s (1976)
results, both the disinterest in a possible-worlds framework to model the learning of conditional in-
formation and the proclivity for Bayesian approaches seems to be somewhat odd. After all, Lewis
has shown that there is an updating method, called ‘imaging’, according to which the probability of a
Stalnaker conditional corresponds to the probability of its consequent upon updating on its antecedent.
Moreover, Lewis has shown that, in general, the conditional probability P(C | A) is not equal to the
probability of the Stalnaker conditional P(A > C). Hence, if the Stalnaker conditional is a good ap-
proximation of the conditional information we learn, we should employ Lewis’s imaging rather than
Bayesian conditionalization, at least when learning conditional information.
According to our learning method, imaging on a certain proposition expressed by the Stalnaker
conditional A > C is tantamount to learning conditional information. Imaging has the advantage over
conditionalization that it can handle arbitrary compositions of propositions, for example any nested
conditionals. Imaging can be used to transfer the probability mass of each possible world to its most
similar possible world that satisfies A > C, even if P(A) = 0. In order to capture the learning of
uncertain conditional information, such as P(A > C) = k for k ∈ [0, 1], we will generalize Lewis’s
imaging to what we call Jeffrey imaging. Equipped with this generalisation, our method generates
the correct predictions for all of Douven’s (2012) benchmark examples and Van Fraassen’s (1981)
Judy Benjamin Problem. Both are unresolved challenges for broadly speaking Bayesian accounts like
Woodward’s (2005) and Hartmann and Rad’s (2017).
Moving back to Stalnaker’s (and Lewis’s) semantics, there is another problem: any two propo-
sitions A,C that are true in the actual world make a true conditional A > C (and A  C). This is
because the most similar possible world that satisfies the antecedent is here the actual world itself.
Hence, Stalnaker’s (and Lewis’s) logic for conditionals validates the following principle:
A ∧C ` A > C (1.1)
This means, for example, that if you believe ‘Lund is a town in Sweden’ and ‘Munich is a town
in Germany’, then you should also accept ‘If Lund is a town in Sweden, then Munich is a town
in Germany’ (and also the converse conditional). This conditional seems to be odd, because the
consequent seems to be independent of the antecedent. To assume the antecedent seems to have no
bearing whatsoever on the acceptance of the consequent. However, Stalnaker (1968, p. 101) has a
rationale why we should accept these odd conditionals:
if you already believe the consequent (and if you also believe it to be causally independent
of the antecedent), then it will remain a part of your stock of beliefs when you add the
antecedent, since the rational man does not change his beliefs without reason.
obtain only the information that the set of equally most similar A-worlds are not all C-worlds. This is not much to learn.
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Here, the change of belief and the plausible acceptance of a conditional come apart. While it is
reasonable to retain the belief in the consequent when you add the belief in the antecedent, it seems to
be no sufficient ground to accept the conditional. Intuitively, some relation of relevance between the
antecedent and the consequent seems to be necessary to plausibly accept a conditional.
The same problem haunts Gärdenfors’s (1988) Ramsey Test defined within his theory of belief
revision. On p. 147, he paraphrases Ramsey’s test maybe more accurately than Stalnaker, but on pain
of brevity:
In order to find out whether a conditional sentence is acceptable in a given state of belief,
one first adds the antecedent of the conditional hypothetically to the given stock of be-
liefs. Second, if the antecedent together with the formerly accepted sentences leads to a
contradiction, then one makes some adjustments, which are as small as possible without
modifying the hypothetical belief in the antecedent, such that consistency is maintained.
Finally, one considers whether or not the consequent of the conditional is then accepted
in this adjusted state of belief.
Gärdenfors’s variant says: accept the conditional “if A then C” in an epistemic state just in case the
minimal change of this state necessary to accept A also requires one to accept C. The changes, which
are ‘as small as possible’, correspond to Stalnaker’s moving to the ‘most similar’ possible world.13
More forcefully than Stalnaker, Gärdenfors insists that conditionals are accepted or rejected only
relative to an agent’s epistemic state.
Now, Gärdenfors’s Ramsey Test also validates a version of the principle (1.1). Suppose an agent
already believes A and C. Then the minimal change to accept A corresponds to no change of the
agent’s epistemic state. But then the agent still believes C. Hence, the agent is committed to accept
‘if A then C’.
In Chapter 3, we tackle the problem that extant formalisations of Ramsey’s test lack a relation of
relevance that is sufficient for the plausible acceptance of conditionals. Inspired by Rott (1986), we
search for plausible ways to invalidate the principle (1.1) within AGM style belief revision theory.
When we use Hansson’s (1999) belief bases, we find the following strengthening of the Ramsey Test
that invalidates the ‘and-to-if’ principle (1.1). In brief, accept a conditional A  C just in case,
after suspending judgment on A and C, you can infer C by assuming A. The strengthening consists
thus in prefixing the ordinary Ramsey Test by a suspension of judgment. To put it in a Stalnakerian
paraphrase:
First, suspend judgment on the antecedent A and the consequent C. Second, add A hypo-
thetically to your stock of beliefs. Finally, test whether you can infer C.
This strengthened Ramsey Test captures a wide range of asymmetric relevance relations in the follow-
ing sense: to assume the antecedent in the context of a certain kind of belief base allows the agent to
infer the consequent, but not vice versa. We will illustrate the asymmetry of our strengthened Ramsey
Test conditional by a generalised tower-shadow example. Famously, a shadow is cast because of the
tower, together with the sun, whereas the tower is intuitively not there because of the shadow and the
sun. The asymmetry and inferential structure of our strengthened Ramsey Test conditional make it
apt to analyse the conjunction ‘because’ of natural language which is involved in such tower-shadow
explanations.
13Like Stalnaker, Gärdenfors (1988) develops a Ramsey Test semantics for conditionals. After formalizing the Ramsey
Test within his belief revision theory, he goes on to show that his semantics is sound and complete with respect to Lewis’s
axiom system VC for his semantics of counterfactuals. Hence, the semantics of Gärdenfors and Lewis agree, at least on
their common domain.
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Let us relate Stalnaker’s conditional back to Ramsey’s variable hypotheticals. Stalnaker’s seman-
tics for conditionals can be regarded as contributing to the understanding between Ramsey’s variable
hypotheticals and subjunctives. Variable hypotheticals support subjunctives because the former entail
the latter. A variable hypothetical such as ‘All men are mortal’ does – understood as a Stalnaker con-
ditional – not just state that every actual man is mortal, but also that if something were a man, it would
be mortal. Hence, ‘if this stone were a man, it would be mortal’ can be regarded as an instantiation of
the variable hypothetical ‘All men are mortal’.
Ramsey (1929/1990) claims that variable hypotheticals and counterfactuals have no truth value. To
bolster his claim, he provides the following example. Suppose humans always assumed, for no reason
of course, that strawberries would give them stomach ache and thus never ate them. They all accept
the variable hypothetical “if I eat strawberries I shall have a stomach ache”. As a consequence of the
variable hypothetical, they endorse the counterfactual ‘if I were to eat strawberries, I would come to
have a stomach ache’ (and, by the way, also the corresponding indicative conditional). But is it not a
fact that ‘if I were to eat strawberries, I would not come to have a stomach ache’? Ramsey says no.
This ‘fact’ be just a consequence of our commonly shared variable hypothetical ‘if I eat strawberries
I will not have a stomach ache’. In contrast, the conjunction that ‘I have eaten strawberries and had
no pain’ be a fact. In Ramsey’s words (ibid., p. 253):
What is a fact is that I have eaten them and not had a pain. If we regarded the unfulfilled
conditional as a fact we should have to suppose that any such statement as ‘If he had
shuffled the cards, he would have dealt himself the ace’ has a clear sense true or false,
which is absurd. We only regard it as sense if it, or its contradictory, can be deduced from
our system. Otherwise we say ‘You can’t say what would have happened’, which sounds
like a confession of ignorance, and is so indeed, because it means we can’t foretell what
will happen in a similar case, but not because ‘what would have happened’ is a reality of
which we are ignorant.
Here, Ramsey says it is absurd that counterfactuals are true or false. Subjunctives are more about what
we can infer than about matters of fact. If we cannot infer the consequent, or its negation, from the
supposition of the antecedent, we lack some variable hypotheticals. Without them we cannot predict
what will happen in similar circumstances. The view that counterfactuals lack truth values stands in a
stark contrast with the view to which we turn next.
1.3 Lewis’s Counterfactual Analysis of Causation
Lewis (1986d) claims that counterfactuals do have truth values. He states on p. 22: “If some (A-and-
C)-world is closer to our world than any (A-and-C)-world, that’s what makes the counterfactual true
at our world.” What allows him to assign proper truth values to counterfactuals is his metaphysical
view on possible worlds. Unlike Stalnaker, who uses the concept of a possible world as an instrument
to model beliefs, Lewis holds that possible worlds exist; moreover, these worlds could be ordered by
similarity in a vague but well-understood way. Hence, it be a factual (although sometimes vague)
issue whether or not some (A∧C)-world is more similar to the actual world than any (A∧¬C)-world
is. To be clear, he does not understand possible worlds as something that does not exist but could
have. Instead, he thinks worlds are ways things could have been and these ways exist. And Lewis
(1973a, p. 85) is serious: “When I profess realism about possible worlds, I mean to be taken literally.”
So, what is a possible world when it is not a tool to model, for example, information states? For
Lewis (1986d, p. 1), the actual world is the concrete physical universe in space and time, in his quite
picturesque words:
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The world we live in is a very inclusive thing....There is nothing so far away from us as
not to be part of our world. Anything at any distance is to be included. Likewise the
world is inclusive in time. No long-gone ancient Romans, no long-gone pterodactyls, no
long-gone primordial clouds of plasma are too far in the past, nor are the dead dark stars
too far in the future, to be part of this same world....[N]othing is so alien in kind as not to
be part of our world, provided only that it does exist at some distance and direction from
here, or at some time before or after or simultaneous with now.
The actual world, so Lewis, provides us with the most vivid example of a possible world. Accordingly,
possible worlds are of the same kind than the actual world. In this line, Lewis (1973a, p. 85) writes
“[o]ur actual world is only one world among others. We call it alone actual not because it differs in
kind from all the rest but because it is the world we inhabit”. The difference between the actual and
the possible worlds be only that the actual world happens to be our world. What makes our world
actual is thus merely the contingency that we happen to live in this one.
Lewis (1986a) dubs his ontological view about the actual world ‘Humean supervenience’: there
is nothing to our world except the spatio-temporal distribution of local natural properties. On p. ix, he
notes:
Humean supervenience is named in honor of the greater denier of necessary connections.
It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular
fact, just one little thing and then another. (But it is no part of the thesis that these local
matters are mental.)
Lewis has found a way to reconcile the doctrine of Humean supervenience with modalities such as
counterfactuals. The solution is, roughly speaking, that possible worlds exist, but no part of one world
is a part of another. In any case, Lewis established an interpretation of Hume according to which you
can have it both: (i) only spatio-temporal entities exist in our world, and (ii) causal relations can be
understood as inter-world, or equivalently modal, relations that have a truth value.
The sentence after the ‘other words’ in Hume’s definition of causation reads like an analysis of
causation in terms of counterfactuals. Lewis takes up this idea to analyse causation between events,
i. e. natural properties of regions of space-time.14 Relying on his semantics for counterfactual condi-
tionals, Lewis (1973c) defines actual causation in terms of causal dependence. Let C and E be distinct
events.15 E causally depends on C iff whether or not E occurs counterfactually depends on whether or
not C occurs.16 Causal dependence is thus satisfied just in case two counterfactuals are true: C  E
and ¬C  ¬E. We say that E counterfactually depends on C iff the counterfactual C  E is true.
If C and E are actual events, that is they occur in the actual world, the first counterfactual is true, as
we already observed. Hence, if C and E occur, E causally depends on C iff ¬C  ¬E. In this sense,
Lewis (1973c, p. 557) writes:
We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the difference it makes
must be a difference from what would have happened without it. Had it been absent, [...]
its effects would have been absent as well.
14See Lewis (1986c) for a detailed description of what his events are.
15The restriction to distinct events was first pointed out by Kim (1973). If A and B are not wholly distinct events, A’s
happening is caused by any essential part of A, let us say B. This seems to be rather a relation of constitution or supervenience
than causation.
16Strictly speaking, C and E are propositions that express events. However, we can pair each event to the proposition E
that is satisfied at exactly those worlds where the event occurs. The set of E-worlds is thus the proposition that this event
occurs. Hence, we may use events and propositions interchangeably if we assume that there are no necessary connections
between distinct events.
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Lewis takes causation to be the transitive closure of causal dependence. Let 〈C, B, ...,D, E〉 be a finite
sequence of actual events. If B causally depends on C, ..., and E causally depends on D, we call
〈C, B, ...,D, E〉 a causal chain. Lewis’s definition of actual causation reads thus: C is a cause of E just
in case there is a causal chain from C to E. Given the distinct events C and E are both actual, it is
thus sufficient for C being a cause of E that ¬E counterfactually depends on ¬C. If E,D, and C are
actual events, and ¬E counterfactually depends on ¬D and ¬D counterfactually depends on ¬C, then
C is a cause of E. However, it is here still possible that ¬E does not counterfactually depend on ¬C.
Hence, counterfactual dependence is not necessary for causation. The reason is that counterfactual
dependence is not transitive, as we shall see shortly. Consequently, causation is a wider notion than
counterfactual dependence.
One important amendment of Lewis’s (1973c) analysis of causation is the exclusion of what he
calls ‘backtracking’ counterfactuals. For exemplification, assume that C is the only cause of both E
and F. Hence, we may infer that there is a counterfactual dependence between E and F: if E had not
occurred, then it would have to have been the case that C did not occur; but in this case, F would not
have occurred. This counterfactual tracks the unique cause C from one of the effects. Lewis excludes
such backtracking counterfactuals allowing only for non-backtracking counterfactuals to be used in
the assessment of causal dependence. In fact, Lewis (1973c, p. 566) stipulates that non-backtracking
counterfactuals “typically keep fixed the past up until the time at which the counterfactual antecedent
is supposed to obtain”. The reason be that this constitutes the “least over-all departure from actuality”
(ibid.). Consider the following scenario of early preemption:
Example 1. Early Preemption
Suppose two snipers conspire to assassinate a dictator. Sniper A and sniper B both take aim as the
dictator appears. A pulls her trigger and fires a shot which hits and kills the dictator. When B sees A
pulling the trigger, B desists to do so. However, had A not pulled the trigger, B would have shot and
killed the dictator.
Here, A’s taking aim (and also A’s pulling the trigger) is an actual cause of the dictator’s death,
while B’s taking aim is a preempted, merely potential cause. Lewis’s analysis of causation captures
the difference of the preempting actual cause to the preempted potential cause. The reason is that there
is a causal chain running from A’s taking aim to the dictator’s death, whereas there is no such chain
for B. There exists an intermediary event occurring between A’s taking aim and the dictator’s death,
let us say the bullet fired by A speeding through the air. Now, the speeding bullet causally depends on
A’s taking aim and pulling the trigger, and the dictator’s death on the speeding bullet. By the time the
bullet is speeding through the air B has already refrained from firing. Hence, the dictator would not
have died if it were not for A’s bullet speeding towards her. Since we have a causal chain, we have
causation. However, there is no such intermediary event to be found between B’s taking aim and the
dictator’s death. Consequently, B’s taking aim is no actual cause of the dictator’s death.
Furthermore, this early preemption scenario illustrates that causal dependence is not transitive.
Although the speeding bullet causally depends on A’s taking aim and pulling the trigger, and the
dictator’s death on the speeding bullet, the dictator’s death does not causally depend on A’s taking aim
and pulling the trigger.
Lewis (1986b) distinguishes cases of early and late preemption. In early preemption cases the
process from the preempted potential cause (B’s taking aim) is cut off before the process from the pre-
empting cause (A’s taking aim) has gone to completion (dictator’s death). In cases of late preemption,
however, the process from the preempted cause is cut off only after the process from the preempting
cause has brought about the effect. Consider the following example of late preemption:
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Example 2. Late Preemption
Suppose two snipers conspire to assassinate a dictator. Sniper A and sniper B both take aim as the
dictator appears. At the same time, both A and B pull their triggers and fire each a shot. A’s shot hits
the dictator just a moment before B’s would have. The dictator falls down, B’s bullet flies through the
air where the dictator was standing, and the dictator dies. Each shot alone would have been sufficient
for the dictator’s death.
Lewis’s analysis cannot capture that A’s actions are the actual cause of the dictator’s death. There
is no causal dependence between A’s actions and the death. If A had not shot, the dictator would
have died nevertheless due to B’s shot. Furthermore, there is no chain of stepwise causal dependences
running from cause to effect, because there is no intermediate event to be found that links A’s shot
and the death into a chain of causal dependences. In other words, the death of the dictator does not
causally depend on A’s bullet being in mid-trajectory, since the dictator would still have died due to
B’s bullet being in mid-trajectory.
Consider a slight modification of Example 2:
Example 3. Overdetermination
Suppose two snipers conspire to assassinate a dictator. Sniper A and sniper B both take aim as the
dictator appears. At the same time, both A and B pull their triggers and fire each a shot. The two shots
hit the dictator simultaneously and the dictator dies. Each shot alone would have been sufficient for
the dictator’s death.
Here, the actions of both A and B should count as actual causes of the dictator’s death. However,
Lewis’s analysis says that none of these actions count. If A had not shot, for example, the dictator
would still have died, because of B’s shot. The strategy to look for intermediary events does not work
here. Let us consider, for example, B’s bullet speeding through the air. In contrast to the case of early
preemption, if B’s bullet were not speeding through the air, A’s bullet would still speed through the
air and kill the dictator. Hence, B’s actions are no cause of the dictator’s death. Due to the symmetry
of the scenario, the same applies to A’s actions. The cases of late preemption and overdetermination
cannot be handled by the analysis of Lewis (1973c).
In light of recalcitrant examples, in particular late preemption, Lewis changed his analysis of cau-
sation twice over. Lewis (1986b) refines his notion of causation by the concept of ‘quasi-dependence’
to solve late preemption scenarios. Dissatisfied with the quasi-dependence causation, Lewis (2000)
defines causation as causal influence. We are not so much concerned with the details of the new ac-
counts of causation. Instead we want to point to a rather general problem of counterfactual accounts
of causation: it seems as if they can either solve cases of late preemption or of double prevention, but
not both.
Lewis (2000) presents one argument against his earlier solution to late preemption in Lewis
(1986b). The problem is that Lewis’s (1986b) refined analysis makes causation intrinsic to the pair C
and E, but some cases, especially cases of double prevention, show that causation is extrinsic. Briefly
explained, double prevention occurs when an event C prevents something that would have prevented
E from happening. Intuitively, some of the double prevention cases are cases of causation. But that C
causes E does not depend on the intrinsic natures of C and E. Rather, it depends on there being some
threat to E, a threat that C prevents, and the existence of threats is typically extrinsic to events, or so
the argument goes.
Hall (2004) provides an example of double prevention, which intuitively does not count as a case
of causation. A person is hiking on a mountain trail, when a boulder high above is dislodged and
rolls down the mountain slope toward the hiker. The hiker sees the boulder coming and ducks at
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the appropriate time. The rolling boulder causes the walker to duck and this, in turn, enables him
to continue the hike. This is a case of double prevention: the duck prevents the collision between
hiker and boulder which, had it occurred, would have prevented the hiker’s continuation. However,
the rolling boulder is the sort of thing that would prevent the walker’s continuation and so it seems
counterintuitive to say that it causes the continuation of the hike. Hence, this example challenges the
transitivity of causation.
Recall that Lewis’s counterfactual analysis relies on the transitivity of causation to handle cases of
early preemption. This commitment to transitivity is costly when facing cases of double prevention.
Lewis (1973c), the origin of most contemporary counterfactual accounts of causation, and his succes-
sor theories cannot concede the persuasive counterexamples to transitivity without succumbing to the
difficulties posed by early and, of course, late preemption.17
In Chapter 4, we devise an analysis of causation in terms of our strengthened Ramsey Test con-
ditional. Instead of a counterfactual assumption, we suspend judgment on the cause and the effect.
Thereby, the problem of overdetermination does not arise in the first place, which is a crucial ad-
vantage over counterfactual analyses. Moreover, early and late preemption turn out to be the same
problem. These advantages give us sufficient space to add an extra condition to capture switches and
double prevention without suffering any drawbacks on the other problems. Finally, we will tackle
the problem of spurious causation to provide a properly reductive analysis of causation. A cause is
spurious, for instance, if there is a common cause of two effects having no other causes and there
is a non-zero temporal distance between the two. Hence, there is the danger to mistakenly classify
the effect that occurs before the other as the genuine cause of the latter. After all, the earlier effect
temporally precedes the latter effect and both occur in constant conjunction (because both occur just
in case their common cause occurs). Furthermore, if the earlier effect had not occurred, the later never
had existed. In our analysis, the problem of spurious causation boils down to have the ‘correct’ gen-
eralisations that let us infer the effects from the genuine causes, but not from spurious causes. Hence,
we complete our analysis by a best system account of generalisations. We present the idea behind a
best system account of lawful generalisations in the next section.
More recently, Halpern and Pearl (2005) provide a powerful but non-reductive definition of cau-
sation in the tradition of Lewis (1973c). Their account of causation can be regarded to be inspired by
an observation of Lewis (1986b, p. 2006):
Hold fixed the laws but change the surroundings, in any of many ways, and we would
have the dependence that my original analysis requires for causation.
Halpern and Pearl (2005) implement the idea to ‘change the surroundings, in almost any of many
ways’ in their definition of actual causation. Thereby, they change Lewis’s counterfactual dependence
to counterfactual dependence under certain contingencies. At the same time, the ‘laws’, or so-called
‘structural equations’, remain invariant. However, since these structural equations are supposed to
represent causal relations, Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) account of causation is not fully reductive:
some information about causal relations is antecedently encoded in the structural equations. Although
they solve a great number of problematic cases, both Halpern and Pearl (2005) and Halpern (2015)
still struggle with a satisfactory solution to the set of problems containing overdetermination cases,
also called ‘disjunctive’ scenarios, and ‘conjunctive’ scenarios, where two events are necessary for an
effect to occur.
In Chapter 5, we translate our analysis of actual causation developed in Chapter 4 into Halpern
and Pearl’s (2005) framework of causal models. We show that our Ramsey-Test analysis defined
17For an insightful discussion of this trade-off problem, see Hitchcock (2001).
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on causal models deals satisfactorily with both overdetermination and conjunctive scenarios. By
the asymmetry of the structural equations and employing Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition of
intervention, our analysis will be simplified considerably. In fact, we will only need two conditions to
capture overdetermination, conjunctive scenarios, and preemption.
Following Lewis (1986b) and Lewis (1986c), Halpern and Pearl (2005) do not allow disjunctions
of events to be candidates for actual causes. The reason for this exclusion, so Halpern and Pearl (2005,
p. 853), be that if a disjunction is a cause at least one of its disjuncts must be a cause – we just do not
know which one. Hence, “there be no truly disjunctive causes once all the relevant facts are known.”
(ibid.) This is in line with the metaphysical verdict of Lewis (1986b, p. 212), who does not know “how
a genuine event could be the disjunction of two events both of which actually occur.” Sartorio (2006)
has shed doubt on this implication of Lewis’s metaphysics. She argues for the existence of disjunc-
tive causes by presenting a particular switching scenario. In the light of Sartorio’s Switch, we think
Lewis’s metaphysical reasons to exclude disjunctive causes might have been somewhat premature.
In Chapter 6, we aim to refine Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition of actual causation such that
it allows for disjunctive causes of the type found in Sartorio’s switch. In order to treat such disjunctive
causes within Halpern and Pearl’s framework of causal models, we first extend their causal model
semantics by disjunctive antecedents. Based on the extension, we will show that our refined Halpern-
Pearl definition aligns with Sartorio’s (2006) observation: a disjunctive cause does not imply that one
of its disjuncts must also be a cause.
1.4 Regularity Analysis of Causation
Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of actual causation can be contrasted with regularity analyses. As we
have already seen, Hume (1748) and Ramsey (1929/1990) attempt to provide an analysis of causation
in terms of regularities. In general, a typical sketch of a regularity theory goes like this: C is a cause
of E just in case C belongs to a minimal set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for E, given the
lawful regularities.
If the regularities can be expressed by generalisations, we can state the common ground of most
regularity analyses: a cause is any member of any minimal set of actual conditions that entail, in the
presence of certain generalisations, the occurrence of the effect. In greater detail:
Definition 1. Common Ground Regularity Analysis
Let C and E be distinct events, L a non-empty set of generalisations, and F a set of occurring events
(or true facts).18 C is a cause of E relative to F and L iff
(i) C and E occur,
(ii) L ∧ F |= C → E,
(iii) L ∧ F 6|= E, and
(iv) F 6|= C → E.
To sum up, C is a cause of E iff (i+ii) C and E occur, and L and F jointly imply the material
implication C → E, but (iii+iv) L and F jointly do not imply E, and F alone does not imply C → E.
There are three important considerations here. First, as already mentioned, a genuine actual cause
18Of course, C, E,L, and F are propositions or sets of propositions that represent or express events (or facts) and regu-
larities.
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C is, in the presence of the occurring facts and the generalisations, sufficient for the occurrence of
the effect E. Second, a genuine actual cause C is also necessary for the occurrence of E: without
C the generalisations and facts do not allow to infer E. Thirdly, the generalisations are necessary
for C being a sufficient condition and thus a cause for E. Note that the Common Ground Regularity
Analysis requires a weak condition of difference-making: without C and/or the set of generalisations
L the effect cannot be derived.
Suppose C is a cause of E in virtue of L and F according to the Common Ground Regularity
Analysis. Lewis (1973c, p. 565) shows that under additional assumptions C is then also a cause of E
according to his counterfactual analysis. The additional assumptions are L∧F |= ¬C → ¬E and that
L and F are counterfactually independent of C and ¬C. The argument goes roughly as follows: L and
F together with ¬C do not imply E (as we know by (ii) and (iii) that they do imply E only with C).
Under the stronger assumption that they do imply ¬E, we obtain thatL∧F |= (C → E)∧ (¬C → ¬E)
and F 6|= (C → E) ∧ (¬C → ¬E). Let us add the final assumption that L and F are counterfactually
independent of C and ¬C, that is C  L ∧ F and ¬C  L ∧ F . From this follows that E
causally depends on C, and thus C is a cause of E according to Lewis’s analysis. In fact, all of Lewis’s
analyses imply that C is a cause of E if both occur, and the counterfactual ¬C  ¬E is true (relative
to a similarity order between possible worlds). If you replace the ‘if’ in the preceding sentence by
an ‘iff’, you obtain what has been dubbed the ‘simple counterfactual analysis of causation’, which
is often taken as sufficient but not necessary for causation. In any case, it serves well as a proxy for
causal relations.
Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of causation can be regarded as an attempt to overcome several
shortcomings of typical regularity analyses of causation. Kyburg (1965), for example, points out that a
condition that is invariably followed by some outcome may nonetheless be irrelevant to that outcome.
Salt that has been hexed by a sorcerer invariably dissolves when placed in water, but hexing does not
cause the salt to dissolve. Hexing does not make a difference for dissolution. Lewis’s analysis, in
contrast, gets this right. If the Salt had not been hexed, it would have dissolved anyways. Hence, the
hexing is not a cause of the dissolving in water. Counterfactual accounts seem to obtain better results
concerning the relevance of the cause on its effect.
Another problem of regularity analyses relates to the asymmetry of causation: if C causes E, then
E will not also cause C. While C might belong to a minimal set of sufficient conditions for E when C
is a genuine cause of E, this might also be true when C is an effect of E – an effect which could not
have occurred, given the laws and the actual circumstances, except by being caused by E. Or it might
be true when C and E are joint effects of a common deterministic cause. Or when C is a preempted
potential cause of E – something that did not cause E, but would have done so if the actual cause had
been absent. Regularity analyses have troubles to break the symmetry of events occurring in ‘constant
conjunction’. As a consequence, they cannot properly discern causes from their effects (or capture the
asymmetry of causation) without further ado.
As we have already observed, the joint effects of a common cause may be used to illustrate the
problem of spurious regularities. Here is such an example due to Jeffrey (1969), where a cause is
regularly followed by two effects. Suppose that whenever the barometric pressure in a certain region
drops below a certain level, two things happen. First, the height of the column of mercury in a
particular barometer drops below a certain level. Shortly afterwards, a storm occurs. Then, it may
well also be the case that whenever the column of mercury drops, there will be a storm. If so, a simple
regularity theory would seem to rule that the drop of the mercury column causes the storm. In fact,
however, the regularity relating these two events is spurious.
In light of the difficulties regularity analyses of causation face, Lewis (1973c, p. 557) writes:
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It remains to be seen whether any regularity analysis can succeed in distinguishing
genuine causes from effects, epiphenomena [or joint effects], and preempted potential
causes–and whether it can succeed without falling victim to worse problems, without pil-
ing on the epicycles, and without departing from the fundamental idea that causation is
instantiation of regularities. I have no proof that regularity analyses are beyond repair,
nor any space to review the repairs that have been tried. Suffice it to say that the prospects
look dark. I think it is time to give up and try something else.
We throw our hat into the ring by proposing a more specific regularity analysis. A first step to improve
upon simple regularity analyses may be found in the idea of a best system analysis of regularities. The
idea can be traced back at least to Ramsey (1928/1978) and Ramsey (1929/1990, p. 242): “causal
laws” are “consequences of those propositions which we should take as axioms if we knew everything
and organized it as simply as possible in a deductive system.” There is a trade-off between strength
and simplicity of a deductive system, as Lewis (1994, p. 231-2) observed:
Take all deductive systems whose theorems are true. Some are simpler, better system-
atized than others. Some are stronger, more informative, than others. These virtues
compete: an uninformative system can be very simple, an unsystematized compendium
of miscellaneous information can be very informative. The best system is the one that
strikes as good a balance as truth will allow between simplicity and strength. [...] A
regularity is a law iff it is a theorem of the best system.
From this a best system account of natural laws almost falls in place. A “contingent generalization is
a law of nature”, so Lewis (1973a, p. 73), “if and only if it appears as a theorem (or axiom) in each of
the deductive systems that achieves a best combination of simplicity and strength.” In Chapter 4, we
supplement our analysis of causation by a best system account of generalisations.
Our novel analysis of causation can be regarded as a regularity analysis.19 We define actual
causation in terms of our strengthened Ramsey Test conditional . The analysis can be stated in a
simplified way as follows.
Definition 2. Strengthened Ramsey Test Analysis Simplified
Let C and E denote distinct events.20 C is an actual cause of E relative to an agent’s epistemic state S
iff
(1) C and E are believed to obtain,
(2) C  E is believed relative to S , and
(3) ¬C  E is not believed relative to S .
The epistemic state S represents the believed facts and generalisations (or laws). C  E is be-
lieved relative to S iff suspending judgment on the disjunction C ∨ E and, subsequently, assuming C
lets the agent infer E. Let − denote an operator on the epistemic state S that removes beliefs. Further-
more, let Cn and ` denote the consequence operator and relation of propositional logic, respectively.
Then, C  E is believed relative to S iff Cn(S ) − (C ∨ E),C ` E.21 Since S is closed under logical
19This being said, we think the best label for our analysis is an inferential analysis of causation based on generalisations.
20Again, C and E are propositions that represent or express events (or facts).
21Here is another simplification at work for expository reasons. Later, we enhance the epistemic state S with a priority
ordering between beliefs.
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consequence, subtracting the beliefs requires the agent also to suspend judgment on beliefs that, to-
gether with the believed facts and generalisations of S , entail C ∨E.22 Let us call Cn(S )− (C ∨E) the
agent’s agnostic epistemic state and abbreviate it by S ′. The agnostic epistemic state S ′ represents the
believed facts and generalisations after suspending judgment on the candidate cause and effect.
On the surface, our analysis resembles Lewis’s (1973c) analysis of causation in terms of a certain
kind of conditional. However, unlike Lewis’s but like regularity analyses, the major work is done
by generalisations, not by a similarity order between possible worlds (which is, as we have already
seen tricky in many ways.) Rather, we rely on the basic inferential idea of regularity analyses: the
generalisations, background conditions, and the cause entail the effect. The big conceptual difference
to regularity analyses is our suspension of judgment. In Chapter 3, we define the suspension of
judgment such that, by design, none of C,¬C, E,¬E is believed in the agnostic state S ′ = Cn(S ) −
(C ∨ E).
Let us clear up why our analysis of causation is closely related to regularity analyses. Consider
condition (2) of our analysis: C  E is believed relative to S iff Cn(S ) − (C ∨ E),C ` E. The right-
hand side is, by the deduction theorem of propositional logic, equivalent to Cn(S )− (C∨E) ` C → E.
Compare the latter expression to condition (ii) of the Common Ground Regularity Analysis. The
agnostic epistemic state S ′ (representing believed facts and generalisations) plays the same role as
L ∧ F . Together with the respective first conditions of actuality, i. e. (i) and (1), both analyses say
that an actual cause is sufficient for its effect. According to our analysis, an actual cause is, relative
to your beliefs after suspension (represented by S ′), sufficient to infer the effect. Furthermore, the
agnostic epistemic state is designed such that the agent cannot infer the effect, that is Cn(S ) − (C ∨
E) 0 E. Hence, the actual cause is also, relative to S ′, necessary to infer the effect. This is a more
specific implementation of condition (iii) in the Common Ground Regularity Analysis. Finally, the
generalisations in the agnostic epistemic state S ′ are also necessary to infer the effect: without the
generalisations LS ′ believed in S ′, the agent cannot infer the effect E from the cause C (except when
E follows logically from C). In symbols, (Cn(S ) − (C ∨ E)) \ LS ′ 0 C → E. An agent needs
at least some generalisations that figure as ‘inference tickets’ to derive E from C. This is a more
specific implementation of condition (iv) in the Common Ground Regularity Analysis. Notice that
our conditions (1) and (2) can be seen as a specification of conditions (i)-(iv).
Consider condition (3) of our analysis: ¬C  E is not believed relative to S iff Cn(S )− (C ∨ E) 0
¬C → E.23 The condition requires that the putative effect cannot be inferred from the absence of the
presumed cause, once the agent has suspended judgment. Condition (3) thus parallels a condition the
Common Ground Regularity Analysis gets for free, that is L ∧ F 2 ¬C → E (follows from (ii) and
(iii)).
The difference-making of condition (3) (and its sibling of the Common Ground Regularity Anal-
ysis) is weaker than counterfactual dependence. If C is an actual cause of E according to our analysis,
then C makes a difference as regards E in the following sense: C lets us infer E, while ¬C does not. It
is not required, as counterfactual dependence has it, that if ¬C were the case, ¬E would be the case.
It seems to be a conceptual truism about actual causation that not both an event C and its absence ¬C
are actual causes of E.24
We should note that our analysis of causation is epistemic. The ontic commitment in events (or
facts) and regularities is replaced by beliefs in these events (or facts) and generalisations. To use
22In Chapter 3, we will argue for the further condition that certain generalisations are not subject to the suspension of
judgment.
23In Chapter 3, we will see why the agent suspends judgment on C ∨ E rather than ¬C ∨ E. In brief, the reason is that
she suspends judgment on the literals she actually believes.
24See Sartorio (2005) for a defence of this weak condition of difference-making.
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the Kantian metaphor, causality is projected onto the world by an epistemic subject. In the spirit
of a regularity analysis, Kant (1781/87, p. A193/B238) maintains, that an effect follows its cause in
accordance with a particular empirical law. Kant agrees with ‘our’ Hume that neither the relation
of cause and effect nor the idea of necessary connection is given by our sensory perceptions only;
both claim, however, that relation and connection are contributions, at least partly, of our mind.25 We
locate ourselves thus in the tradition of (a certain interpretation of) Hume, Kant, Ramsey (1929/1990),
Gärdenfors (1988, Ch. 9), and, more recently, for instance, Spohn (2006). Gärdenfors (1988, p. 194),
for example, confesses:
For me, causality is primarily a cognitive concept. My position is Kantian to the extent
that I believe it is a category mistake to try to give a ‘realistic’ or ‘objective’ interpretation
of causality, where the causal relation holds among the real events, independently of
minds having beliefs about the events. Thus, I interpret causal claims only in relation to
a given state of belief.
An epistemic as opposed to realistic interpretation of causal relations strikes many philosophers as ut-
terly implausible. However, we think that an analysis should be evaluated with respect to its achieve-
ments. As we will see in Chapter 4, our analysis of causation overcomes the problems of relevance
and asymmetry, of joint effects, overdetermination, and conjunctive scenarios, as well as (early and
late) preemption, switches, and double prevention. Moreover, we aim to solve the problem of spurious
‘regularities’ by supplementing our analysis by a best system account of generalisations.
Let us compare briefly and superficially our analysis of causation to one of the most advanced
analyses of causation in the counterfactual tradition. Halpern and Pearl (2005) and Halpern (2015)
define actual causation relative to a causal model, or equivalently to a model of structural equations.
Hence, what counts as an actual causal relation depends on how the scenario under consideration
is modelled. Similar to our agent-relativity, if you change the model you might get different causal
relations.
The causal relata in Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) and Halpern’s (2015) accounts of actual causation
are value assignments to (random) variables. Let C and E be such value assignments. Very roughly,
their accounts say that C is an actual cause of E (relative to a causal model) iff C is necessary for
E when keeping fixed certain other variables. In other words, E would not be the case if it were not
for C (under certain contingencies). Which variables can be held fixed? The idea is that any set of
variables can be kept fixed so long as holding fixed the other variables at the values they actually take
does not make E false.
Our analysis of causation says, roughly, that C is an actual cause of E (relative to an agent) iff C is
sufficient to infer E after suspending judgment on C and E. The suspension of judgment is tantamount
to taking away the beliefs in C and E. In contrast to Halpern and Pearl’s accounts, our analysis tells
you which beliefs must be kept fixed, viz. the beliefs that do not let you infer C or E. You cannot
just intervene on almost any set of variables to test for causal relations. Moreover, while their account
allows the variables to be held fixed to take on non-actual (of counterfactual) values, our analysis does
not. The beliefs remaining after the suspension of judgment are actual beliefs.
In sum, we put forth an epistemic analysis of causation in terms of a strengthened Ramsey Test
conditional. The conditional, in turn, depends on generalisations that may be read as regularities. We
amend our analysis by a weak condition of difference-making: if the actual cause were believed not
to be the case, you could not infer the effect. Unlike Lewis (1973c), Halpern and Pearl (2005), and
Halpern (2015), we do not rely on the stronger condition of difference-making, that is, if the cause
had not been, the effect never had existed.
25For details, see Kant (1781/87, pp. A91-2/B123-4) and Kant (1783, §§ 27-30).
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1.5 Preview
We have collected a number of problems which we aim to resolve in the following chapters. Here is
a brief preview.
In Chapter 2, we ask Douven et al.’s question “How do we learn conditional information?” We
propose, roughly, that we learn conditional information by updating on Stalnaker conditionals. When
you update on a Stalnaker conditional A > C, you basically learn that the most similar world, in
which A is true, is a world that satisfies C. The disadvantage of possible-worlds semantics relying
on a similarity order is that it is far from clear how to specify this order explicitly. Regarding the
learning of conditional information, however, this ‘disadvantage’ turns into the advantage that we can
learn, at least in part, how to specify the similarity order between possible worlds upon receiving the
conditional information.
As Lewis (1976) has shown, the updating method he names ‘imaging’ corresponds to the Stalnaker
conditional: the probability value of a Stalnaker conditional is the probability value of its consequent
upon imaging on its antecedent. According to our method, we learn a piece of conditional informa-
tion by imaging on a certain proposition expressed by a Stalnaker conditional. We generalise Lewis’s
imaging to Jeffrey imaging in order to account also for the learning of uncertain conditional informa-
tion. Thereby, we enter the arena dominated by Bayesian approaches. Unlike these approaches, our
method based on Jeffrey imaging correctly predicts the rational learning outcomes in all of Douven’s
(2012) benchmark examples and Van Fraassen’s (1981) Judy Benjamin Problem.
We go on to adapt the method of learning uncertain conditional information to a method of learn-
ing uncertain causal information. We do so by applying Lewis’s (1973c) notion of causal dependence
to Stalnaker’s semantics. This move will allow us to implement Douven’s (2012) abductive concep-
tion with respect to the learning of conditionals: when learning a conditional, the explanatory power
of the antecedent with respect to the consequent determines the resulting probability of the antecedent.
The combination of the methods provides a unified framework within which we can distinguish be-
tween the learning of conditional, causal, and conjunctive information. (We sketch in Section 2.4 how
our method could also cover the learning of subjunctive conditionals.)
In Chapter 3, we transition from the learning of conditional information to the semantics of con-
ditionals. We aim to overcome the problem that extant Ramsey Test semantics do not account for a
proper relation of relevance between the antecedent and consequent, although such a conditional con-
nection seems to be necessary to plausibly accept a conditional. We establish a relation of relevance
by strengthening Ramsey’s test. The strengthening is inspired by both Ramsey’s (1929/1990) original
remarks on conditionals and Rott’s (1986) strengthened Ramsey Test. Within the framework of belief
bases, our strengthened Ramsey Test will prove to be asymmetric for a wide range of cases. That is,
in many cases, the agent can infer the consequent from the antecedent but not the antecedent from
the consequent. After illustrating the asymmetry of our strengthened Ramsey Test conditional by a
generalised tower-shadow example, we use the conditional to provide an analysis of ‘because’ as it
figures in explanations.
In Chapter 4, we aim to analyse actual causation in terms of our strengthened Ramsey Test, where
the strengthened conditional is conceived of as expressing a relation of production. The idea is that
the strengthened Ramsey Test allows us to verify or falsify that an event actually brings about another
event. Our concept of causation as production is reductive and solves the problems posed by cases
of overdetermination, preemption, switches, and double prevention. Moreover, we aim to solve the
problem of spurious causation by a best system account of generalisations.
In Chapter 5, we translate the analysis of actual causation provided in the previous chapter into the
framework of causal models due to Halpern and Pearl (2005). Although the translation simplifies our
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analysis considerably, we lose its reductiveness. A comparison of our analysis to Halpern and Pearl’s
(2005) and Halpern’s (2015) definition of actual cause reveals that they (but not we) still struggle with
any set of problems including both overdetermination and conjunctive scenarios.
In Chapter 6, we refine Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition of actual cause such that disjunc-
tions are admissible candidates for actual causes. This endeavour is motivated by Sartorio’s (2006)
argument for the existence of disjunctive causes. She puts forth a switching scenario that suggests,
against Lewis (1986b) and Halpern and Pearl (2005), the following observation: a disjunctive cause
does not imply that one of its disjuncts must also be a cause.
In Chapter 7, we leave the analyses of causation behind and turn to a rather epistemological ques-
tion in the philosophy of cognitive neuroscience. We aim to determine reasonable requirements for
cognitive neuroscientists to speak of causation as regards the mind-brain interaction. More specifi-
cally, we aim to make the characteristics of causation, as assumed in cognitive neuroscience, explicit.
Subsequently, we impose these ‘demands of causality’ upon the account of interventionism put forth
by Woodward (2005) and Woodward (2015). Within the resulting framework, we investigate to what
extent we are justified to derive causal relations between mental properties and properties of the brain,
depending on which scientific methods are used in the neuroscientific studies.
Chapter 2
Learning Conditional Information by
Jeffrey Imaging
In this chapter, we propose a method of learning conditional information. In a nutshell, an agent learns
conditional information by Jeffrey imaging on the minimally informative proposition expressed by a
Stalnaker conditional. We show that the predictions of the proposed method align with the intuitions
in Douven’s (2012) benchmark examples. Jeffrey imaging on Stalnaker conditionals can also capture
the learning of uncertain conditional information, which we illustrate by generating predictions for
the Judy Benjamin Problem.
Subsequently, we adapt the method of learning uncertain conditional information to a method
of learning uncertain causal information. The idea behind the adaptation parallels Lewis’s (1973c)
analysis of causal dependence. The combination of the methods provides a unified account of learning
conditional and causal information that manages to clearly distinguish between conditional, causal,
and conjunctive information. The ensuing account shows that the learning of uncertain conditional
and/or causal information may be modelled by Jeffrey imaging on Stalnaker conditionals.
Sources. This chapter builds on Günther (2018) and Günther (2017a). Substantial content of the
first paper is reprinted by permission from Springer Nature: Springer Netherlands, Journal of Philo-
sophical Logic, Learning Conditional Information by Jeffrey Imaging on Stalnaker Conditionals,
Günther, M., License Number 4324300410472 (2017), advance online publication, 15 November
2017 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-017-9452-z, J Philos Logic). Substantial content from the sec-
ond paper is reprinted by permission from Organon F: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy
of Sciences, Learning Conditional and Causal Information by Jeffrey Imaging on Stalnaker Condi-
tionals, Günther, M. (2017).
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2.1 Introduction
“How do we learn conditional information?” Douven et al. present this question for consideration in
a series of papers.1 Douven (2012) contains a survey of the available accounts that model the learning
of conditional information. The survey comes to the conclusion that a general account of probabilistic
belief updating by learning (uncertain) conditional information is still to be formulated. Douven and
Pfeifer (2014) analyses the state of the art even more pessimistically by writing that “no one seems to
have an idea of what an even moderately general rule of updating on conditionals might look like”,
even if we restrict the scope of the account to indicative conditionals.2
Douven (2012) dismisses the Stalnaker conditional as a means to model the learning of conditional
information. He argues for the dismissal by pointing out that the Stalnaker conditional “makes no
predictions at all about any of our examples”.3 Douven provides three possible worlds models for his
point. Each model consists of four worlds such that all logical possibilities of two binary variables
are covered. He observes that imaging on “If α, then γ” interpreted as a Stalnaker conditional has
different effects: in model I the probability of the antecedent α, i. e. P(α) decreases, in model II
P(α) remains unchanged, and in model III P(α) increases. According to Douven this flexibility of the
class of possible worlds models is a problem rather than an advantage, since there were no rationality
constraints to rule out certain models as rational representations of a belief state.
Pace Douven, we show that his dismissal of the Stalnaker conditional is unjustified by proposing
an updating method based on the Stalnaker semantics and inspired by Lewis’s imaging method. The
core idea of the proposed method is that an agent learns conditional information by Jeffrey imaging on
the minimally informative meaning of the corresponding Stalnaker conditional. The method succeeds
in modeling the three examples Douven takes as benchmark for an account of learning conditional
information. In addition, Jeffrey imaging, our generalisation of Lewis’s imaging method, accounts
for the learning of uncertain conditional information, as we will illustrate by applying our learning
method to Van Fraassen’s (1981) Judy Benjamin Problem.
In Section 2.2, we propose our probabilistic method of learning indicative conditional information.
First, we introduce the concepts of a Stalnaker conditional, Lewis’s imaging, and our generalisation
thereof. Based on these concepts, we supplement the properties of a Stalnaker model’s similarity order
by the minimally informative interpretation of a Stalnaker conditional and a default assumption. We
justify both by the rationale that belief changes should be as conservative as possible. We show that
the supplemented Stalnaker models provide sufficient constraints to model the learning of indicative
conditional information by applying the learning method to Douven’s examples as well as the Judy
Benjamin Problem. Thereby we recover possible worlds approaches from Douven’s dismissal.
2.2 A Probabilistic Method of Learning Indicative Conditional Infor-
mation
The proposed learning method may be summarised as follows. (i) We model an agent’s belief state
as a Stalnaker model. (ii) The agent learns conditional information by (ii).(a) interpreting the re-
ceived conditional information as a Stalnaker conditional, (ii).(b) constraining the similarity order
by the meaning of the Stalnaker conditional in a minimally informative way and in presence of the
1See Douven and Dietz (2011), Douven and Romeijn (2011), Douven (2012), Douven and Pfeifer (2014, especially
Section 6).
2Douven and Pfeifer (2014, p. 213).
3Douven (2012, p. 247).
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default assumption, and (ii).(c) updating her degrees of belief by Jeffrey imaging on this Stalnaker
conditional (together with further contextual information, if available). (iii) We check whether or not
the result of (Jeffrey) imaging complies with the correct intuitions associated with the scenario under
consideration.
In Section 2.2.1, we introduce the meaning of a Stalnaker conditional. In Section 2.2.2, we present
Lewis’s updating method called ‘imaging’, which relates the probability of a Stalnaker conditional
and the probability of the consequent after imaging on the antecedent. In Section 2.2.3, we generalise
Lewis’s imaging in order to model cases of learning uncertain conditional information. In Section
2.2.4, we describe our method of learning conditional information in more detail, before we apply the
method, in Section 2.2.6, to Douven’s examples and the Judy Benjamin Problem. In Section 2.2.5,
we provide a rationale for the minimally informative interpretation of Stalnaker conditionals and the
default assumption for learning conditional information.
2.2.1 The Stalnaker Conditional
The idea behind a Stalnaker conditional may be expressed as follows: a Stalnaker conditional α > γ
is true at a world w iff γ is true in the most similar possible world w′ to w, in which α is true.4 The
evaluation of a Stalnaker conditional requires a model of possible worlds. A model of possible worlds,
in turn, requires the specification of a logical language.
Definition 3. Full Conditional Language
Let Prop be the set of atomic propositions. Then L be a set of formulas such that
(i) for each p1, p2, ... ∈ Prop, pi ∈ L,
(ii) if α, γ ∈ L, then ¬α ∈ L and α ∧ γ ∈ L,
(iii) if α, γ ∈ L, then α > γ ∈ L,
(iv) and no other expressions are in L.
We say that L is the full conditional language.
The full conditional language L contains any type of Boolean combination of conditionals, e.g.
(α > γ) ∧ β ∈ L, and arbitrary nestings of conditionals, e.g. α > (γ ∧ (β > δ)).
Let w denote a Boolean assignment, or equivalently a possible world. We denote the set of Boolean
assignments, or equivalently the set of possible worlds, that satisfy a formula α by [α]. We thus
identify the set [α] with the proposition expressed by α. In symbols, [α] = {w ∈ W | w(α) = 1}.
Definition 4. Stalnaker Model
We say thatMS t = 〈W,R,≤,V〉 is a Stalnaker model iff
(i) W is a non-empty set of possible worlds,
(ii) R : W ×W is a binary accessability relation over worlds such that:
(a) for all w ∈ W: wRw. (Reflexivity)
4Cf. Stalnaker (1975). Note that Stalnaker’s theory of conditionals aims to account for both indicative and counterfactual
conditionals. Besides some cursory remarks in Section 2.4, we set the complicated issue of this distinction aside in this
chapter. However, we want to emphasise that Douven’s examples and the Judy Benjamin Problem only involve indicative
conditionals.
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(iii) ≤ assigns each w ∈ W a total order ≤w such that:
(a) for all w,w′,w′′ ∈ W: if w′ ≤w w′′ and wRw′′, then wRw′.
(b) for all w,w′ ∈ W: w′ ≤w w, only if w′ = w. (Unique Center Assumption)
(c) for all w,w′,w′′ ∈ W: w′ ≤w w′′ or w′′ ≤w w′. (Connectivity)
(d) for all w,w′ ∈ W: if wRw′ for some w′ ∈ [α] ⊆ W, then there is a w′′ ∈ [α] such that
w′′ <w w′′′ for all w′′′ ∈ [α].5 We say that w′′ is the unique α-world minimal under ≤w.
In symbols, w′′ = min≤w[α]. (Stalnaker’s Uniqueness Assumption)
(iv) V is an evaluation function of the full conditional language L iff
(a) ∀p ∈ Prop,∀w ∈ W : V(p,w) = 1 iff w(p) = 1 iff w  p,
(b) and ∀α, γ and ∀w ∈ W:
i. w  ¬α iff w 2 α
ii. w  α ∧ γ iff w  α and w  γ
iii. w  α > γ iff min≤w[α]  γ if there is a min≤w[α].
We comment on two aspects of Definition 4. (I) We presented an equivalent variant to Stalnaker’s
original models that emphasizes the similarity order ≤ between possible worlds, instead of a world
selection function.6 We interpret the world w′ = min≤w[α] as the most similar α-world from w. (II)
The accessability relation R is connective due to (iii).(a), (iii).(c), and (iii).(d) of Definition 4.
Now, we can state more precisely the meaning of a Stalnaker conditional. “If α, then γ” denotes
according to Stalnaker’s proposal the set of worlds (or equivalently the proposition) containing each
world whose most similar α-world is a world that satisfies γ. In symbols, [α > γ] = {w | w  α > γ} =
{w | min≤w[α] = ∅ or min≤w[α]  γ}.
Finally, note that any Stalnaker model validates the principle called ‘Conditional Excluded Mid-
dle’ according to which (α > γ)∨ (α > ¬γ). The reason is that, for any w ∈ W, the single most similar
α-world min≤w[α] is either a γ-world, or else a ¬γ-world. This principle will come in handy when
modeling the learning of conditional information with uncertainty. In Section 2.2.6, we will apply
our method to the learning of uncertain conditional information. First, however, we introduce Lewis’s
imaging method and our generalisation thereof.
2.2.2 Lewis’s Imaging
Lewis (1976) developed a probabilistic updating method called ‘imaging’. In order to present this
updating method, we introduce a notational shortcut: for each world w and each (possible) antecedens
α, wα = min≤w[α] be the most similar world of w such that wα(α) = 1. Invoking the shortcut, we can
then specify the truth conditions for Stalnaker’s conditional operator > as follows.
w(α > γ) = wα(γ), if α is possible.7 (2.1)
Definition 5. Probability Space over Possible Worlds
We call 〈W, ℘(W), P〉 a probability space over a finite set of possible worlds W iff
(i) ℘(W) is the set of all subsets of W,
5Here as elsewhere in the paper, the strict relation w′ <w w′′ is defined as w′ ≤w w′′ and w′′ 6≤w w′.
6For Stalnaker’s presentation of his semantics see Stalnaker and Thomason (1970).
7We assume here that there are only finitely many worlds. Note also that if α is possible, then there exists some wα.
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(ii) and P : ℘(W) 7→ [0, 1] is a probability measure, i.e.
(a) P(W) = 1, P(∅) = 0,
(b) and for all X,Y ⊆ W such that X ∩ Y = ∅, P(X ∪ Y) = P(X) + P(Y).
As before, we conceive of the elements of ℘(W) as propositions. We define, for each α,
P(α) = P([α]). We see that W corresponds to an arbitrary tautology denoted by > and ∅ to an ar-
bitrary contradiction denoted by ⊥. Definition 5 allows us to understand a probability measure P
as a probability distribution over worlds such that each w is assigned a probability P(w) > 0, and∑
w P(w) = 1. We may determine the probability of a formula α by summing up the probabilities of
the worlds at which the formula is true.8
P(α) =
∑
w
P(w) · w(α) (2.2)
Now, we are in a position to define Lewis’s updating method of imaging.
Definition 6. Imaging (Lewis (1976, p. 310))
For each probability function P, and each possible formula α, there is a probability function Pα such
that, for each world w’, we have:
Pα(w′) =
∑
w
P(w) ·
{
1 if wα = w′
0 otherwise
}
(2.3)
We say that we obtain Pα by imaging P on α, and call Pα the image of P on α.
Intuitively, imaging transfers the probability of each world w to the most similar α-world wα.
Importantly, the probabilities are transfered, but in total no probability mass is additionally produced
and no probability mass is lost. In formal terms, we have always
∑
w′ Pα(w′) = 1. Any α-world w′
keeps at least its original probability mass (since then wα = w′), and is possibly transfered additional
probability shares of ¬α-worlds w iff min≤w[α] = w′. In other words, each α-world w′ receives as its
updated probability mass its previous probability mass plus the previous probability shares that were
assigned to ¬α-worlds w such that min≤w[α] = w′. In this way, the method of imaging distributes the
whole probability onto the α-worlds such that Pα(α) =
∑
w(α)=1 P(w(α)) = 1, and each share remains
‘as close as possible’ at the world at which it has previously been located. For an illustration see
Figure 2.1.
8We assume here that each world is distinguishable from any other world, i. e. for two arbitrary worlds, there is always a
formula in L such that the formula is true in one of the worlds, but false in the other. In other words, we consider no copies
of worlds.
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Figure 2.1: A set of possible worlds. The blue area represents the proposition or set of worlds [α] =
{w3,w4,w6,w8}. The teal arrows represent the transfer of probability shares from the respective [¬α]-
worlds to their most similar [α]-world. Similarity is graphically represented by topological distance
between the worlds such that w3, for instance, is the most similar or ‘closest’ [α]-world to w2.
Lewis proved the following theorem, which will be useful to model the respective examples.
Theorem 1. (Lewis (1976, p. 311))
The probability of a Stalnaker conditional equals the probability of the consequent after imaging on
the antecedent, i. e. P(α > γ) = Pα(γ), if α is possible.
Proof. Suppose we obtain Pα by imaging P on α. Consider some formula γ ∈ L.
Pα(γ) =
∑
wα
P(wα) · wα(γ), (2.2) applied on Pα
=
∑
wα
∑
w
P(w) ·
{
1 if wα = w
0 otherwise
} · wα(γ), Definition 6
=
∑
w
P(w) ·
∑
wα
{
1 if wα = w
0 otherwise
}
· wα(γ)
 , Algebra
=
∑
w
P(w) · wα(γ), Simplification of the inner sum
=
∑
w
P(w) · w(α > γ), (2.1)
= P(α > γ), (2.2)

Note that α in Theorem 1 may itself be of conditional form β > δ for any β, δ ∈ L.
2.2.3 Jeffrey Imaging
For the case of learning uncertain conditional information, i. e. P(α > γ) = k for k ∈ [0, 1] but unequal
to 0 or 1, we need to generalise Lewis’s imaging method of Definition 6. In analogy to Jeffrey
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conditionalisation, we call the generalised method ‘Jeffrey’ imaging.9 Jeffrey imaging is based on
Lewis’s imaging and the fact that in a Stalnaker model the principle of Conditional Excluded Middle
prescribes that ¬(α > γ) ≡ α > ¬γ. We know, for all w ∈ W, presupposed α > γ is possible, both
(I) that
∑
w Pα>γ(w) sums up to 1 and (II) that
∑
w Pα>¬γ(w) sums up to 1. The idea is that if we form
a weighted sum over the terms of (I) and (II) with some parameter k ∈ [0, 1], then we obtain again a
sum of terms Pα>γk (w) such that
∑
w P
α>γ
k (w) = 1. Note, however, that we present the more general
case Pαk (w) in the definition below.
Definition 7. Jeffrey Imaging
For each probability function P, each possible formula α ∈ L (possibly of conditional form β > δ),
and some parameter k ∈ [0, 1], there is a probability function Pαk such that, for each world w’ and the
two similarity orderings centred on wα and w¬α, we have:
Pαk (w
′) =
∑
w
(
P(w) ·
{
k if wα = w′
0 otherwise
}
+ P(w) ·
{
(1 − k) if w¬α = w′
0 otherwise
})
(2.4)
We say that we obtain Pαk by Jeffrey imaging P on α ∈ L, and call Pαk the Jeffrey image of P on α.
Note that in the case where k = 1, Jeffrey imaging reduces to Lewis’s imaging.
Theorem 2. Properties of Jeffrey Imaging
(i)
∑
w′ Pαk (w
′) = 1
(ii) Pαk (α) = k
(iii) Pαk (¬α) = (1 − k)
(iv) Pαk (γ) = k · P(α > γ)
Proof. (i)
∑
w′
Pαk (w
′) =
∑
w′
∑
w
(
P(w) ·
{
k if wα = w′
0 otherwise
}
+
P(w) ·
{
(1 − k) if w¬α = w′
0 otherwise
} )
Algebra
=
∑
w′
(
k ·
∑
w
P(w) ·
{
1 if wα = w′
0 otherwise
}
+
(k − 1) ·
∑
w
P(w) ·
{
1 if w¬α = w′
0 otherwise
} )
by Def. 6,
∑
w′
∑
w
P(w) = 1
= k + (k − 1) = 1 for all k ∈ [0, 1]
(2.5)
9Cf. Jeffrey (1965). In personal communication, Benjamin Eva and Stephan Hartmann mentioned that the idea behind
Jeffrey imaging is already used in artificial intelligence research to model the retrieval of information. Sebastiani (1998,
p. 3) mentions the name ‘Jeffrey imaging’ without writing down a corresponding formula. Crestani (1998, p. 262) says that
Sebastiani (1998) suggested “a new variant of standard imaging called retrieval by Jeffrey’s logical imaging”. However, the
formalisation of Jeffrey’s idea on p. 263 differs from mine in at least two respects. (i) An additional truth evaluation function
occurs in the formalisation for determining whether a formula (i. e. ‘query’) is true at a world (i. e. ‘term’). (ii) Instead of a
parameter k locally gouverning the probability kinematics of each possible world, Crestani simply uses a global constraint
on the posterior probability distribution.
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(ii)
Pαk (α) =
∑
wα
Pαk (wα) · wα(α) Definition 7
=
∑
wα
(∑
w
P(w) ·
{
k if wα = wα
0 otherwise
}
+
∑
w
P(w) ·
{
(1 − k) if w¬α = wα
0 otherwise
} )
· wα(α) Second term cancels out
=
∑
w
P(w)
∑
wα
·
{
k if wα = wα
0 otherwise
}
· wα(α) Algebra
= k ·
∑
w
P(w) · wα(α) Algebra and (2.2)
= k · Pα(α) = k · P(α > α) = k
(2.6)
(iii) Obvious.
(iv) Replace in (ii) the ‘consequent’ α by γ.

We see that in total the revision method of Jeffrey imaging does neither produce additional proba-
bility shares, nor destroy any probability shares. In contrast to Lewis’s imaging, Jeffrey imaging does
not distribute the whole probabilistic mass onto the α-worlds, but only a part thereof that is deter-
mined by the parameter k. In particular, as compared to Lewis’s imaging, Jeffrey imaging may be
understood as implementing a more moderate or balanced movement of probabilistic mass between
α- and ¬α-worlds. For an illustration see Figure 2.2.
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
w6
w7
w8
w9
[α]
Pw1
Pw2
Pw5
Pw7
Pw9
Pw6
Pw8
Pw4
Pw1
Pw2
Pw5
Pw7
Pw9
Pw4
Pw3
Pw6
Pw8
Pw = k · Pw + (1 − k) · Pw
Figure 2.2: An illustration of the probability kinematics of Jeffrey imaging. The Jeffrey image Pαk
is characterised by a ‘k-inertia’ of the probabilistic mass from the respective α-worlds, and a ‘(1 −
k)-inertia’ of the probabilistic mass from the respective ¬α-worlds. Each teal arrow represents the
transfer of the probability share k · P(w) to the closest α-world from w. Each violet arrow represents
the transfer of the probability share (1 − k) · P(w) to the closest ¬α-world from w.
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It is easy to show that Pαk is a probability function. In a possible worlds framework, such a proof
basically amounts to showing that the probability shares of all the worlds sum up to 1 after Jeffrey
imaging. Therefore, property (i) of Theorem 2 provides minimal justification for applying Jeffrey
imaging to probabilistic belief updating.
2.2.4 A Simple Method of Learning Conditional Information
We outline now a method of learning conditional information in three main steps.
(i) We model an agent’s belief state as a Stalnaker modelMS t = 〈W,R,≤,V〉 such that all and only
those logical possibilities are represented as single worlds, which are relevant to the scenario
under consideration. For instance, if only a single conditional “If α, then γ” is relevant and
nothing else, then W contains exactly four elements as depicted in Figure 2.3.10
(ii) An agent learns conditional information “If α, then γ” iff (a) the agent interprets the received
conditional information as a Stalnaker conditional α > γ, (b) changes the similarity order ≤ by
the meaning of α > γ in a minimally informative way and respecting the default assumption,
and (c) updates her degrees of belief by Jeffrey imaging on the minimally informative meaning
of α > γ.
(iii) Finally, we check whether or not the result of Jeffrey imaging obtained in step (ii).(c) corre-
sponds to the intuition associated with the respective example.
Step (ii) constitutes the core of the learning method and requires further clarification.
(a) In the agent’s belief state, i. e. a Stalnaker model, the received information is interpreted. In the
case of conditional information, the received information is interpreted as Stalnaker conditional.
Hence, if the agent receives the information “If α, then γ”, she interprets the information as
meaning that the most similar α-world (from the respective actual world) is a world that satisfies
γ (presupposed α is possible). Technically, the interpretation (i. e. the meaning) of α > γ
relative to the Stalnaker model MS t is the proposition [α > γ] = {w ∈ W | min≤w[α] ∈ [γ]},
where w is the respective actual world.
(b) The similarity order(s) is/are changed upon receiving conditional information. The proposition
{w ∈ W | min≤w[α] ∈ [γ]} depends on the similarity order ≤. The learning method prescribes
that ≤ is specified, or adjusted, such that from each world the most similar α-world is a γ-
world whenever possible. In other words, the method demands a maximally conservative, or
equivalently minimally informative, interpretation of the received information. This amounts to
specifying or adjusting the orders ≤w such that as many worlds as possible satisfy the received
information. On the one hand, we can describe this interpretation as maximally conservative
in the sense that no worlds are gratuitously excluded. On the other hand, we may think of
possible worlds as information states. Then the exclusion of possible worlds corresponds to a
gain of information. If an agent interprets the received information in a maximally conservative
way, then as few as possible worlds or information states are excluded. In this sense, her gain
of information is minimal. We will also use the abbreviation [α > γ]min for the minimally
informative proposition expressed by α > γ.
10In other words, we consider “small” possible worlds models and do not allow for copies of worlds, i. e. worlds that
satisfy the same formulas.
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The learning method prescribes that the agent changes her similarity order respecting a default
assumption. This default assumption states that the most similar α > γ-world from any ex-
cluded α > ¬γ-world is a α ∧ γ-world, if there is more than one candidate. Formally, this
constraint expresses that min≤w(α>¬γ)=1[α > γ]  α∧γ, if min≤w(α>¬γ)=1[α > γ] is underdetermined.
(min≤w(α>¬γ)=1[α > γ] denotes the respectively most similar α > γ-world from any world w such
that w(α > ¬γ) = 1 given the minimally informative similarity order ≤.) Notice the interplay
between the two constraints for the similarity order: the minimally informative interpretation of
the Stalnaker conditional minimises the number of worlds which might have several candidates
for the most similar α > γ-world and, based on this interpretation, the default assumption de-
termines the most similar [α > γ]-world for each world having more than one candidate world
(at least in absence of further information).
(c) Jeffrey imaging is applied on the minimally informative meaning of the Stalnaker conditional
α > γ. The application of Jeffrey imaging determines a probability distribution after learning
the (uncertain) conditional information.
We note that the proposed learning method has the following properties resembling modus ponens
and modus tollens. If the agent already knows [α] (or [¬γ] resp.), learning the minimally informative
proposition [α > γ] implies that the agent also knows [γ] (or [¬α] resp.).
2.2.5 A Rationale for the Minimally Informative Interpretation and the Default As-
sumption
We aim to justify the minimally informative interpretation of conditional information and the default
assumption by the following rationale: an agent should change her belief state as conservatively as
possible when learning a proposition. We say that a belief change is as conservative as possible,
or equivalently maximally conservative, iff the change is not stronger than necessary to believe the
received information.11
We argue first that the rationale of maximally conservative belief change warrants the minimally
informative interpretation of the received conditional information. The learning of an indicative con-
ditional is constraint by its meaning. By Stalnaker’s semantics, an indicative conditional α > γ means
that γ is the case on the supposition of α. Hence, upon learning the indicative conditional (and hav-
ing or receiving no more information), the agent does not necessarily learn whether or not α is the
case, and a fortiori whether or not γ is the case. However, the agent learns at least that the con-
junction α ∧ ¬γ is not possible. Correspondingly, the minimally informative meaning of [α > γ],
or equivalently [α > γ]min = [(α ∧ γ) ∨ (¬α ∧ γ) ∨ (¬α ∧ ¬γ)], is exhausted by all those possible
worlds that verify the material implication.12 Consequently, [¬α] ⊂ [α > γ]min and [γ] ⊂ [α > γ]min,
which means that the minimally informative proposition [α > γ] is less informative than [¬α] and
[γ], respectively. When learning [α > γ]min and having or receiving no more information, an agent
learns only that the α ∧ ¬γ-world is excluded, whereas the learning remains silent on the status of
the ¬α-worlds. Learning only [α > γ]min thus qualifies as a maximally conservative belief change:
the agent believes the conditional information [α > γ] without believing any of the more informative
propositions [α], [¬α], [γ] and/or [¬γ].
11For proposals and justifications of a similar rationale, see Gärdenfors (1988) and Van Benthem and Smets (2015). For
a critical and elucidating discussion of the principle of minimal or conservative belief change, see Rott (2000).
12Here the question may arise why we do not simply learn conditional information by Jeffrey imaging on the material
implication. A short answer will be provided in Section 2.3.
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w1 w2
w3 w4
α
¬α
γ ¬γ
Figure 2.3: A four-worlds Stalnaker model for a case, in which the only received and relevant in-
formation is “If α, then γ”. The reflexive arrows illustrate that each world w is the most similar to
itself under the respective similarity order ≤w. The blue arrows illustrate the change of the similarity
order such that the received and interpreted information [α > γ] is minimally informative. Here, the
minimally informative meaning of α > γ is [α > γ] = {w ∈ W | w  α > γ} = {w1,w3,w4}. Note that
according to (iii).(b) and (iii).(d) of Definition 4 world w2 is its own most similar α-world, but does
not satisfy γ, i. e. min≤w2 [α] 2 γ and thus min≤w2 [α > γ] , w2. Relying on the default assumption
of step (ii).(b), min≤w2 [α > γ] = w(α ∧ γ) = w1. In words, the method prescribes that w1 is the most
similar α > γ-world to w2, which is excluded under the minimally informative meaning of α > γ.
This illustrates that the minimally informative meaning [α > γ] implies that ¬γ is excluded under the
supposition of α. Hence, imaging on the minimally informative meaning of α > γ ‘probabilistically
excludes’ w2 and the probability share of w2 will be fully transferred to w1.
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There comes a problem of underdetermination when learning the minimally informative propo-
sition [α > γ]. In general, the most similar α > γ-world from any excluded ¬(α > γ)-world is
underdetermined, and thus it is not determined whereto the probability shares of the excluded worlds
are transferred. In the Stalnaker model depicted in Figure 2.3, for instance, there are three candidate
worlds for the most similar α > γ-world from the excluded w2. We resort to the default assumption
(introduced in Section 2.2.4) to solve the problem of underdetermination.
The default assumption states that the most similar α > γ-world from any excluded α > ¬γ-world
is a α∧γ-world, if there is more than one candidate. Observe that all worlds included in the minimally
informative proposition [α > γ] are themselves, respectively, their unique most similar [α > γ]-
world due to the reflexivity of the acquired similarity order. In this way the minimally informative
interpretation minimises the number of excluded worlds, for which the default assumption may be
needed to overcome the problem of underdetermination. In case only α and γ are relevant and all
an agent learns is [α > γ]min, the default assumption simply states that the α ∧ γ-world is the most
similar world to the excluded α ∧ ¬γ-world. If the agent obtains additional information over and
above [α > γ]min, the default assumption leads to different outcomes – depending on which additional
information is learned. The outcome’s non-rigidity or variability with respect to different contextual
information is illustrated by the Ski Trip Example and Driving Test Example studied in Section 2.2.6.
There is a link between the default assumption and the probability distribution after learning: in
the case where the only received and relevant information is [α > γ]min, the default assumption is
satisfied iff the probability of the antecedent remains unchanged. Assume the default assumption is
in place and an agent does not come to believe a more informative proposition than [α > γ]min. Then
our learning method prescribes that the probability share of the α ∧ ¬γ-world is transferred to the
α ∧ γ-world. Hence, Pα>γ(α) = P(α). For the converse, assume Pα>γ(α) = P(α) and that all an agent
learns is [α > γ]min. The only transferred probability share is again P(α ∧ ¬γ). Suppose for reductio
that P(α ∧ ¬γ) is transferred to some ¬α-world. Since P(α ∧ ¬γ) > 0, Pα>γ(¬α) would be greater
than P(¬α). By the probability calculus, it would follow that Pα>γ(α) < P(α), which contradicts the
assumption. Hence, P(α ∧ ¬γ) is transferred to the α ∧ γ-world, and thus the default assumption is
satisfied.
We argue now that the default assumption is warranted by the rationale of maximally conservative
belief change. A consequence of this rationale is that there should be no belief change without any
reason. (If there were such a belief change, the change would be stronger than necessary, and thus
violating the rationale.) Upon learning the indicative conditional “If α, then γ”, there seems to be no
reason to change the probability of the antecedent, at least in the absence of additional information.13
As we have seen in the previous paragraph, if the agent does not possess or receive additional infor-
mation, the default assumption ensures that the probability of the antecedent remains unchanged when
learning “If α, then γ” interpreted as [α > γ]min. In the absence of further information, the default
assumption thus implements a demand of maximal conservativeness, viz. that the probability of the
antecedent should remain unchanged.
Let us consider cases where further contextual information is given. Here, the default assumption
does not necessarily ensure that the probability of the antecedent remains unchanged. If the contextual
information is sufficient to uniquely determine the respective most similar world, we do not need
to rely on the default assumption. We will see below that additional (contextual) information may
sometimes fully determine the epistemic states under consideration such that we are not in need of
the default assumption. If we need to rely on the default assumption, in contrast, we should judge
13Notice that the assumption of no additional information literally excludes that there is an epistemic reason, i. e. some
belief apart from [α > γ]min, to change the probability of the antecedent.
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the assumption by its predictions for specific scenarios. Unfortunately, there is a myriad of possible
scenarios that differ in their contextual information. However, we may refer again to the case studies in
Section 2.2.6, in which our learning method generates the intuitively correct results. Hence, the default
assumption seems to be justified in absence and presence of further information, at least prima facie.
This being said, we encourage the search for counterexamples to our learning method, especially
counterexamples involving contextual information.
In line with our learning method, Douven and Romeijn (2011) suggest that the probability of the
antecedent does not change upon learning an indicative conditional, at least in the absence of further
relevant information.14 They write:
We are inclined to think that Adams conditioning, or, equivalently, Jeffrey conditioning
with the explicit constraint of keeping the antecedent’s probability fixed in the update [...]
covers most of the cases of learning a conditional. (p. 654)
Since Adams conditioning always keeps the probability of the antecedent fixed, it is no general
method for learning conditional information, as sometimes this probability should change. It “may
entirely fall upon us”, so Douven and Romeijn (2011, p. 660), “to decide, on the basis of contextual
information, whether or not [Adams conditioning] applies to the learning of a given conditional”; and
further “deciding when Adams conditioning applies, may be an art, or a skill, rather than a matter of
calculation or derivation from more fundamental epistemic principles.”
In contrast to Douven and Romeijn (2011), our learning method proposes a principled way how
learning conditional information should affect the probability of the antecedent. As a consequence of
the minimally informative interpretation and the default assumption, learning indicative conditional
information does not alter the probability of the antecedent in the absence of further information.
If, in addition, contextual information is learned, the default that the probability of the antecedent
remains unchanged may be violated. Given the respective contextual information, our learning method
automatically calculates a possibly changed probability for the antecedent. No skilful decision about
which method should be applied is required.
2.2.6 Douven’s Examples and the Judy Benjamin Problem
We apply now our method of learning conditional information to Douven’s examples and the Judy
Benjamin Problem.
A Possible Worlds Model for the Sundowners Example
Example 4. The Sundowners Example (Douven and Romeijn (2011, pp. 645–646))
Sarah and her sister Marian have arranged to go for sundowners at the Westcliff hotel tomorrow. Sarah
feels there is some chance that it will rain, but thinks they can always enjoy the view from inside. To
make sure, Marian consults the staff at the Westcliff hotel and finds out that in the event of rain, the
inside area will be occupied by a wedding party. So she tells Sarah:
If it rains tomorrow, we cannot have sundowners at the Westcliff. (2.7)
Upon learning this conditional, Sarah sets her probability for sundowners and rain to 0, but she does
not adapt her probability for rain.
14Douven (2012) argues more precisely that the probability of the antecedent should only change if the antecedent is
explanatorily relevant for the consequent. It is noteworthy that if the probability of the antecedent should intuitively change
in one of Douven’s examples, the explanatory relations always involve beliefs in additional propositions (apart from the
conditional) given by the example’s context description.
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Figure 2.4: A Stalnaker model for Sarah’s belief state in the Sundowners Example.
We model Sarah’s belief state as the Stalnaker modelMS t = 〈W,R,≤,V〉 depicted in Figure 2.4.
W contains four elements covering the possible events of R,¬R, S ,¬S , where R stands for “it rains
tomorrow” and S for “Sarah and Marian can have sundowners at the Westcliff tomorrow”.
Sarah interprets the conditional uttered by her sister Marian as saying that the most similar R-world
from the respective ‘actual’ world is a world that satisfies ¬S . Note the symmetry to the scheme
depicted in Figure 2.3. Critics may find reasons why the default assumption in (ii).(b) of Section
2.2.4 is unjustified, and thus that we encounter here the problem of underdetermination. However,
as Douven himself points out, the intuition in the Sundowners Example derives from the verdict that
whether or not it rains may affect whether or not they have sundowners, but not the other way around:
having sundowners simply has no effect whatsoever on whether or not it rains.15 Hence, the change
of belief between R and ¬R is more far fetched than between S and ¬S . In other words, the worlds
along the horizontal axis are more similar than the worlds along the vertical axis. Consequently,
min≤w1 [R > ¬S ] = w2.
Imaging on the minimally informative proposition [R > ¬S ] = {w2,w3,w4} results in
PR>¬S (w′) =
∑
w P(w) ·
{
1 if wR>¬S = w′
0 otherwise
}
:
PR>¬S (w1) = 0 PR>¬S (w2) = P(w1) + P(w2)
PR>¬S (w3) = P(w3) PR>¬S (w4) = P(w4)
(2.8)
We see immediately that both intuitions associated with the Sundowners Example are satisfied,
viz. PR>¬S (R) = P(R) = P(w1) + P(w2) and PR>¬S (R ∧ S ) = PR>¬S (w1) = 0. We conclude that our
method yields the intuitively correct results.
15Cf. Douven (2012, p. 8).
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Although justified by Douven’s remarks, the Sundowners Example demands to invoke the default
assumption in order to avoid the problem of underdetermination. We will see in the following ex-
amples that more contextual information, in particular additional factual information, may render the
default assumption superfluous.16
A Possible Worlds Model for the Ski Trip Example
Example 5. The Ski Trip Example (Douven and Dietz (2011, p. 33))
Harry sees his friend Sue buying a skiing outfit. This surprises him a bit, because he did not know of
any plans of hers to go on a skiing trip. He knows that she recently had an important exam and thinks
it unlikely that she passed. Then he meets Tom, his best friend and also a friend of Sue’s, who is just
on his way to Sue to hear whether she passed the exam, and who tells him:
If Sue passed the exam, her father will take her on a skiing vacation. (2.9)
Recalling his earlier observation, Harry now comes to find it more likely that Sue passed the exam.
We model Harry’s belief state as the Stalnaker modelMS t = 〈W,R,≤,V〉 depicted in Figure 2.5.
W contains eight elements covering the possible events of E,¬E, S ,¬S , B,¬B, where E stands for
“Sue passed the exam”, S for “Sue’s father takes her on a skiing vacation”, and B for “Sue buys a
skiing outfit”.
Harry interprets the conditional uttered by his friend Tom as saying that the most similar E-world
from the actual world is a world that satisfies S . Crucially, Harry observed Sue buying a skiing outfit,
and thus has the factual information that B.
In total, Harry learns the minimally informative proposition [(E > S )∧B] = {w ∈ W | min≤w[E] ∈
[S ] ∧ B} = {w1,w3,w4}. Moreover, the default assumption states that w1(E ∧ S ∧ B) = 1 is the most
similar world to all worlds not included in the minimally informative proposition [(E > S ) ∧ B] (see
the caption of Figure 2.5).
Imaging on the minimally informative proposition [(E > S ) ∧ B] = {w1,w3,w4} results in
P(E>S )∧B(w′) = P∗(w′) =
∑
w P(w) ·
{
1 if w(E>S )∧B = w′
0 otherwise
}
:
P∗(w1) = P(w1) + P(w2) + P(w5) + P(w6) + P(w7) + P(w8) P∗(w2) = 0
P∗(w3) = P(w3) P∗(w4) = P(w4)
P∗(w5) = 0 P∗(w6) = 0
P∗(w7) = 0 P∗(w8) = 0
(2.10)
Our method yields again the correct result regarding the intuition associated with the Ski Trip
Example: P∗(E) ≥ P(E), since P∗(E) = P∗(w1) and P(E) = P(w1) + P(w2) + P(w5) + P(w6), and
P∗(E) > P(E) if P(w7) + P(w8) > 0.
The just presented model of the Ski Trip Example is surprisingly simple. Critics may say it is too
simple: your model should not omit the relation between B and S . Indeed, the first two sentences of
the Ski Trip Example suggest that there is some relation between Sue’s buying a skiing outfit and her
going on a skiing trip (or vacation). Intuitively, (a) going on a skiing trip is a good explanation for
buying a skiing outfit (S > B), and (b) buying a skiing outfit is a good predictor of going on a skiing
16Note that the Sundowners Example seems to be somewhat artificial. It seems plausible that upon hearing her sister’s
conditional, Sarah would promptly ask “why?” in order to obtain some more contextual information, before setting her
probability for sundowners and rain to 0. After all, she “thinks that they can always enjoy the view from inside”.
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(E ∧ ¬S ∧ B)
w3
(¬E ∧ S ∧ B)
w4
(¬E ∧ ¬S ∧ B)
w5
(E ∧ S ∧ ¬B)
w6
(E ∧ ¬S ∧ ¬B)
w7
(¬E ∧ S ∧ ¬B)
w8
(¬E ∧ ¬S ∧ ¬B)
Figure 2.5: An eight-worlds Stalnaker model for Harry’s belief state in the Ski Trip Example. The blue
arrows illustrate the change of the similarity order such that the received and interpreted information
[(E > S ) ∧ B)] is minimally informative. By the default assumption, w1(E ∧ S ∧ B) = 1 is the most
similar world from any ¬((E > S ) ∧ B)-world in case of underdetermination. Note that receiving
the factual information that B excludes all the worlds on the back of the cube. We see that receiving
factual information is very informative, as compared to obtaining conditional information.
2.2 A Probabilistic Method of Learning Indicative Conditional Information 39
trip (B > S ). Correspondingly, the critics may say that Harry rather learns [(E > S )∧ (S > B)∧ B] or
[(E > S ) ∧ (B > S ) ∧ B].
We will show now that our learning method’s result for the Ski Trip Example is robust with respect
to (a) and (b), i. e. it is compatible with assuming that Harry assumes, knows, or learns (a) or (b) in
addition to [(E > S ) ∧ B]. (Keep in mind, however, that we have no need to explicitly assume or
model any relation between B and S in order to obtain the intuitively correct result.)
Let’s assume Harry knows (a) S > B. In total, he comes to know the minimally informative
proposition [(E > S )∧ (S > B)∧B] = {w ∈ W | min≤w[E] ∈ [S ]∧min≤w[S ] ∈ [B]∧B} = {w1,w3,w4}.
Since the minimally informative proposition [(E > S ) ∧ (S > B) ∧ B] is identical to the minimally
informative proposition [(E > S ) ∧ B], our method yields the same result. Hartmann and Rad (2017)
make and need an assumption similar to (a). “From the story it is clear”, they write, that it “is more
likely that Sue buys a new ski outfit if her father invites her for a ski trip than if he does not” (p. 11).
They represent the relation between B and S as a directed arrow from S to B in a Bayesian network
claiming this would “properly represent the causal relation between these variables” (ibid.).
In contrast to the ‘causal relation’ between the variables, Harry could engage in the predictive
inference from Sue buying a skiing outfit to raising the likelihood that she will go on a skiing trip.
So, let’s assume Harry thinks (b) B > S . In total, he comes to know the minimally informative
proposition [(E > S ) ∧ (B > S ) ∧ B] = {w1,w3}. Since the minimally informative proposition
[(E > S )∧(B > S )∧B] is a subset of the minimally informative proposition [(E > S )∧B], our method
yields an even stronger result: if B is a predictor of S and B is believed, then it is (possibly) even more
likely that Sue passed the exam (E). We obtain P(E>S )∧(B>S )∧B(E) ≥ P(E>S )∧B(E) ≥ P(E). (Notice
that our method is also apt to handle cases when Harry assumes, knows, or learns the conditionals (a)
or (b) to a certain degree, as we will illustrate in the discussion of the Judy Benjamin Problem.)
Of course, Harry could also be equipped with some other contextual knowledge. Douven (2012,
p. 11) himself, for example, provides an alternative picture:
Sue’s having passed the exam would, if true, explain why she bought the skiing outfit;
that makes her having passed the exam more credible.
Here, Douven seems to propose that Harry has a relation between B and E in mind, viz. E > B (given
he knows already E > S and B). On this picture, Harry learns in total the minimally informative
proposition [(E > S ) ∧ (E > B) ∧ B] = {w1,w3,w4}. We see that if S and B are related in the sense
that they are both a ‘consequent’ of E, our method yields again the correct result.
We take this as further evidence that our method’s result for the Ski Trip Example is largely
independent of and compatible with additional plausible assumptions between its variables. If the
respective additional assumptions correspond to different (admissible) interpretations, the robustness
of the result could explain why it is intuitively so clear that Harry should believe it more likely that
Sue passed the exam.17 In any case, our learning method needs fewer assumptions than the other
accounts to obtain the desired result for the Ski Trip Example. At the same time, the result still stands
if we adopt the additional assumptions on which Douven (2012) as well as Hartmann and Rad (2017)
rely.
A Possible Worlds Model for the Driving Test Example
Example 6. The Driving Test Example (Douven (2012, p. 3))
Betty knows that Kevin, the son of her neighbors, was to take his driving test yesterday. She has no
17In Section 2.8, we generalise the proposed method to the learning of causal information, which allows us to define an
inference to the best explanation scheme, as Douven envisioned for the Ski Trip Example.
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idea whether or not Kevin is a good driver; she deems it about as likely as not that Kevin passed the
test. Betty notices that her neighbors have started to spade their garden. Then her mother, who is
friends with Kevin’s parents, calls her and tells her the following:
If Kevin passed the driving test, his parents will throw a garden party. (2.11)
Betty figures that, given the spading that has just begun, it is doubtful (even if not wholly excluded)
that a party can be held in the garden of Kevin’s parents in the near future. As a result, Betty lowers
her degree of belief for Kevin’s having passed the driving test.
We model Betty’s belief state as the Stalnaker modelMS t = 〈W,R,≤,V〉 depicted in Figure 2.6.
W contains eight elements covering the possible events of D,¬D,G,¬G, S ,¬S , where D stands for
“Kevin passed the driving test”, G for “Kevin’s parents will throw a garden party”, and S for “Kevin’s
parents have started to spade their garden”.
Betty interprets the conditional uttered by her mother as saying that the most similar D-world from
the actual world is a world that satisfies G. Furthermore, Betty infers from her contextual knowledge
that if Kevin’s parents are spading their garden, then they will not throw a garden party, in symbols
S > ¬G. Therefore, Betty also obtains the information that the most similar S -world from the actual
world is a world that satisfies ¬G. Finally, Betty knows that Kevin’s parents have started to spade
their garden, and thus has the factual information that S .
In total, Betty learns the minimally informative proposition [(D > G)∧ (S > ¬G)∧S ] = {w ∈ W |
min≤w[D] ∈ [G] ∧ min≤w[S ] ∈ [¬G] ∧ S } = {w4}. The obtained information, although interpreted in a
minimally informative way, is sufficient to identify the actual world. Therefore, the Stalnaker model
provides us with a unique most similar world (to any other world) under the changed similarity order
(see the caption of Figure 2.6).
Intuitively, Betty learns that she is in a S -world, since she factually obtains the information that
S . Hence, the conditional S > ¬G implies that ¬G is true in the actual world. By the conditional
D > G, we know that G is satisfied in the most similar D-world from the actual world. Since ¬G is
true in the actual world, we know that the actual world is not a D-world. But then the actual world is
a ¬D-world. For, if the actual world w were a D-world, w would satisfy G. To summarise, the actual
world satisfies ¬D,¬G, and, obviously, S .
Imaging on the minimally informative proposition [(D > G) ∧ (S > ¬G) ∧ S ] = {w4} results in
P(D>G)∧(S>¬G)∧S (w′) = P∗(w′) =
∑
w P(w) ·
{
1 if w(D>G)∧(S>¬G)∧S = w′
0 otherwise
}
:
P∗(w1) = 0 P∗(w2) = 0
P∗(w3) = 0 P∗(w4) = 1
P∗(w5) = 0 P∗(w6) = 0
P∗(w7) = 0 P∗(w8) = 0
(2.12)
Our method yields again the correct result regarding the intuition associated with the Driving Test
Example: P∗(D) < P(D), since P∗(D) = 0 and P(D) = P(w1) + P(w2) + P(w5) + P(w6) > 0. The
following Judy Benjamin Problem will show that if Betty thinks that the conditional D > G or S > ¬G
(or both) is/are uncertain, then the probability shares for some other worlds will not reduce to zero.
This fact fits nicely with the Driving Test Examples’s remark that “given the spading that has just
begun, it is doubtful [or uncertain] (even if not wholly excluded) that a party can be held in the garden
of Kevin’s parents”. We will treat the learning of uncertain conditional information in the next section.
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Figure 2.6: An eight-worlds Stalnaker model for Betty’s belief state in the Driving Test Example.
There is only a single world that satisfies the ‘minimally informative’ proposition [(D > G) ∧ (S >
¬G) ∧ S ]. For, [(D > G) ∧ (S > ¬G)] = {w ∈ W | min≤w[D] ∈ [G] ∧ min≤w[S ] ∈ [¬G]} =
{w4,w5,w7,w8}. Of those worlds only w4 is in the S -plane of the cube and thus the actual world.
42 2. Learning Conditional Information by Jeffrey Imaging
A Possible Worlds Model for the Judy Benjamin Problem
We apply now our method of learning conditional information to a case, in which the received con-
ditional information is uncertain. We show thereby that the method may be generalised to cases in
which the learned conditional information is uncertain, provided we use Jeffrey imaging. Follow-
ing the presentation in Hartmann and Rad (2017), we consider Bas Van Fraassen’s Judy Benjamin
Problem.18
Example 7. The Judy Benjamin Problem (Hartmann and Rad (2017, p. 7))
A soldier, Judy Benjamin, is dropped with her platoon in a territory that is divided in two halves,
Red territory and Blue territory, respectively, with each territory in turn being divided in equal parts,
Second Company area and Headquarters Company area, thus forming four quadrants of roughly equal
size. Because the platoon was dropped more or less at the center of the whole territory, Judy Benjamin
deems it equally likely that they are in one quadrant as that they are in any of the others. They then
receive the following radio message:
I can’t be sure where you are. If you are in Red Territory,
then the odds are 3 : 1 that you are in Second Company area.
(2.13)
After this, the radio contact breaks down. Supposing that Judy accepts this message, how should she
adjust her degrees of belief?
Douven claims that the probability of R should, intuitively, remain unchanged after learning the
uncertain conditional information. Furthermore, the probability distribution after hearing the radio
message, i. e. P∗, should take the following values:
P∗(R ∧ S ) = 3
8
P∗(R ∧ ¬S ) = 1
8
P∗(¬R ∧ S ) = 1
4
P∗(¬R ∧ ¬S ) = 1
4
(2.14)
We model Judy Benjamin’s belief state as the Stalnaker model MS t = 〈W,R,≤,≤′,V〉 depicted
in Figure 2.7. W contains four elements covering the possible events of R,¬R, S ,¬S , where R stands
for “Judy Benjamin’s platoon is in Red territory”, and S for “Judy Benjamin’s platoon is in Second
Company area”. The story prescribes that the probability distribution before learning the uncertain
information is given by:
P(R ∧ S ) = P(R ∧ ¬S ) = P(¬R ∧ S ) = P(¬R ∧ ¬S ) = 1
4
(2.15)
In the previous examples, our agents learned a Stalnaker conditional α > γ with certainty. Ac-
cording to Theorem 1, this amounts to the constraint that P(α > γ) = Pα(γ) = 1 (provided α
is not a contradiction). Given this constraint and since Pα is a probability distribution, we have
Pα(¬γ) = 1 − Pα(γ) = 0. This means that we were able to probabilistically exclude any ¬γ-world
under the supposition of α.
Now, our agent Judy Benjamin learns a Stalnaker conditional with uncertainty. According to
Theorem 1, this amounts in this case to the constraint that P(R > S ) = PR(S ) = 34 . By the law of total
probability, we obtain P(R > ¬S ) = PR(¬S ) = 14 . In contrast to learning conditional information with
certainty, we cannot subtract the whole probabilistic mass from the ¬S -worlds under the supposition
18Cf. Van Fraassen (1981, pp. 376–379) and Van Fraassen et al. (1986).
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Figure 2.7: A Stalnaker model for Private Benjamin’s belief state in the Judy Benjamin Problem.
The blue arrows illustrate the specification of a similarity order ≤′ such that the received information
[R > S ] is minimally informative. Note that each world having a blue arrow satisfies R > S . The red
arrows illustrate the specification of another similarity order ≤,≤′ such that the received information
[R > ¬S ] is minimally informative. Each world having a red arrow satisfies R > ¬S . In sum, the
similarity orders are specified such that one makes [R > S ] a minimally informative proposition and
the other makes [R > ¬S ] a minimally informative proposition. By the default assumption, we obtain
min≤w(R>¬S )=1[R > S ] = w1 and min≤′w(R>S )=1[R > ¬S ] = w2. Note that under ≤, worlds w3 and w4 satisfy
R > S , under ≤′ they satisfy R > ¬S . The teal arrows represent the transfer of k · P(w), while the
violet arrows represent the transfer of 1− k ·P(w). The application of Jeffrey imaging on [R > S ] with
k = 34 leads to the following probability distribution: P
R>S
3
4
(w3) = 34 ·P(w3)+ 14 ·P(w3) and PR>S3
4
(w4) =
3
4 · P(w4) + 14 · P(w4), whereas PR>S3
4
(w1) = 34 · P(w1) + 34 · P(w2) and PR>S3
4
(w2) = 14 · P(w1) + 14 · P(w2).
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of R. However, Judy Benjamin is informed from an external source about the proportion to which she
should gradually ‘exclude’ or downweigh the probability share of ¬(S > R)-worlds. Equivalently, we
may say that the most similar S > R-world (from any ¬(S > R)-world) obtains a gradual upweight of
probability such that it receives 34 of the probability shares of the ¬(R > S )-worlds; in turn, however,
this ¬(S > R)-world then receives a probability share from its most similar R > S -world weighed by
1
4 . Note that in Stalnaker models ¬(S > R) ≡ S > ¬R given a similarity order (and provided S is
possible). Judy Bejamin’s learning process may thus be modeled by considering the degree of belief
in two Stalnaker conditionals that are, under a single similarity order, by the principle of Conditional
Excluded Middle, mutually exclusive.
We apply now Jeffrey imaging to the Judy Benjamin Problem, where a source external to Judy
provides her with the information that k = 34 .
PR>S3
4
(w′) =
∑
w
(P(w) ·
{
k if wR>S = w′
0 otherwise
}
+ P(w) ·
{
(1 − k) if wR>¬S = w′
0 otherwise
}
) (2.16)
Given the probability distribution before the learning process in Equation (2.15), Judy obtains the
following probability distribution after being informed that P(R > S ) = 34 :
PR>S3
4
(w1) = PR>S3
4
(R ∧ S ) = 3
8
PR>S3
4
(w2) = PR>S3
4
(R ∧ ¬S ) = 1
8
PR>S3
4
(w3) = PR>S3
4
(¬R ∧ S ) = 1
4
PR>S3
4
(w4) = PR>S3
4
(¬R ∧ ¬S ) = 1
4
(2.17)
Our learning method using Jeffrey imaging matches the intuitions Douven claims to be correct for
the Judy Benjamin Problem. Note, in particular, that PR>S3
4
(R) = P(R) = 12 .
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2.3 Taking Stock
Let us take stock. We have seen that Douven’s dismissal of the Stalnaker conditional as a tool to model
the learning of conditionals is unjustified. Rather, the learning may be modelled by Jeffrey imaging
on the meaning of Stalnaker conditionals under the following two conditions: (i) the similarity order
of the Stalnaker model is changed in a way such that the meaning of the conditional is minimally
informative, and (ii) the default assumption is in place. The proposed learning method leads to the
intuitively correct results in Douven’s examples and complies with Douven’s intuition for the Judy
Benjamin Problem.
The minimally informative meaning of a Stalnaker conditional corresponds to the meaning of the
material implication. So why – for the sake of simplicity – do we not propose a method of learning
conditional information by Jeffrey imaging on the material implication? There are two reasons. First,
the application of Jeffrey imaging is defined with respect to similarity orders independent of using
the material implication or the Stalnaker conditional. An equivalent of the default assumption for the
material implication would require (an equivalent to) a similarity order as well. Hence, the proposal
to Jeffrey image on the material implication is prima facie not more simple than our proposal.
Second, it is far from clear how to formulate Jeffrey imaging and the default assumption for the
material implication with respect to uncertainty, contextual information and nested conditionals, as we
did for the Stalnaker conditional. The material implication and the minimally informative interpreted
19Appendix A contains a possible worlds model of Douven and Romeijn’s (2011) Jeweller Example. There, we show
that our method also applies to examples where uncertain factual information is learned.
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Stalnaker conditional come apart when negated. Whereas the negation of the material implication
carries the strong information [α ∧ ¬γ], the negation of the minimally informative proposition ex-
pressed by a Stalnaker conditional, i. e. [¬(α > γ)]min, is again a minimally informative proposition,
viz. [α > ¬γ]min = [¬α ∨ ¬γ]. As should be clear by now, this difference is crucial for the learning
of uncertain conditional information by Jeffrey imaging and shows that the Stalnaker conditional is
better suited than the material implication.
Even if we try to repair the material implication account by simply stipulating that ¬(α → γ)
means α → ¬γ (which it doesn’t!), we run into further problems when considering nested con-
ditionals. Our learning method validates the import-export principle for right-nested condition-
als, i. e. [α > (β > γ)]min = [(α ∧ β) > γ]min, and minimally informative interpreted right-
nested Stalnaker conditionals correspond to their material counterparts given their usual meaning,
i. e. [α > (β > γ)]min = [α → (β → γ)]. However, for left-nested conditionals, we obtain
[(α → β) → γ] ⊂ [(α > β) > γ]min ⊂ [(α ∧ β) > γ)]min, a divergence between the material im-
plication and the Stalnaker conditional that is not easily overcome.
As we have just defended against the material implication, the proposed learning method is based
on Stalnaker’s semantics for conditionals. Crucially for our learning method, this semantics validates
the principle of Conditional Excluded Middle as opposed to, for example, Lewis’s (1973a) semantics
for counterfactuals.20 We are not claiming that Stalnaker’s semantics are the correct semantics for
conditionals (if there is any). Rather the employed semantics seem to be a good approximation. How-
ever, we are committed to the following conditional claim: if Stalnaker’s semantics for conditionals
are considered to be correct, or at least rational (for many cases), then the proposed learning method
should be considered correct, or at least rational (for those cases). Next, we touch upon the question
whether Stalnaker’s semantics apply to subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals, and thus whether
our learning method is applicable to subjunctives and counterfactuals.
2.4 Subjunctive Conditional Information
So far, we have applied our method of learning conditional information only to examples involving
indicative conditionals. Can our method of learning conditional information also be applied to the
learning of subjunctive conditionals? On the face of it, there seems to be no particular problem. From
the subjunctive conditional “If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, someone else would have” you learn
according to our method that the most similar world in which Oswald did not kill Kennedy, is a world
in which someone else did. However, as we have discussed in the Introduction, the subjunctive condi-
tional differs from its corresponding indicative conditional “If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, someone
else did” in meaning. Hence, our learning method should be able to learn different propositions de-
pending on the mood of a conditional.
We have already discussed the Oswald-Kennedy example in the Introduction (Chapter 1). In light
of the Kennedy-Oswald pair of conditionals, we need to explain how the information to be learned
differs depending on the subjunctive and indicative mood. As our method relies on the Stalnaker
conditional, we need to say how the most similar antecedent world differs when changing the mood
of a conditional. The rough idea to evaluate a Stalnaker conditional is to move to the possible world
in which the antecedent obtains and is as much like the actual world as possible both with regard to
particular facts about the past as well as generalisations about what might follow from what. In the
20See Stalnaker (1981) for a defense of the principle of Conditional Excluded Middle based on superevaluations and
cognitive habits.
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Introduction, we promised to sketch an amendment of Stalnaker’s semantics that allows for the most
similar antecedent world to differ depending on the mood of the conditional. Here it comes.
To evaluate a conditional we move to possibly different most similar worlds. In the case of in-
dicative conditionals, the world we move to is just the most similar antecedent world to the actual
world. In the case of subjunctive conditionals, the world we move to is the most similar antecedent
world to the actual world as it has been immediately before the point of time to which the antecedent
refers. The idea is borrowed from Lewis (1973c, p. 566) who claims that “counterfactuals typically
keep fixed the past up until the time at which the counterfactual antecedent is supposed to obtain.”
Hence, when you move to a most similar antecedent world in the subjunctive case, you are not re-
stricted by the facts of the actual world in-between the reference time of the antecedent and the now.
A full account of antecedent reference will not be given here.21 However, we would like to answer
two obvious challenges.
First, consider one of Ramsey’s ‘universal’ variable hypotheticals: “If you ever took arsenic, you
would come to be poisoned.” Here it seems that the antecedent’s time reference may be represented
by a variable bound by a universal quantifier on the whole conditional. Given any (also future) time t,
if you were to take arsenic, you would be poisoned after t. Hence, to evaluate a variable hypothetical
we are free to move to any most similar antecedent world at any time t. In particular, we may just
move to the most similar antecedent world here and now: “If you take arsenic, you will be poisoned.”
Second, relatedly, there are antecedents that seemingly do not refer to any time. Take, for example,
Lewis’s humorous conditional “If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over.” Interestingly, if
kangaroos have no tails, they topple over as well. For timeless antecedents, the most similar antecedent
world for indicatives and subjunctives seems to coincide. This fits nicely to Lewis’s remark that
subjunctives about the future seem equivalent to their corresponding indicatives. “If she were to
eat the cake in 10 minutes from now, she would come to have a stomach ache” indeed seems to be
equivalent to “If she eats the cake in 10 minutes from now, she will have a stomach ache.”
As is widely acknowledged, let us suppose that our beliefs about the future are based inductively
on our beliefs of the past. Then, if the antecedent world refers to the present or future, we are at
present unable to distinguish the antecedent world most similar to the actual world from the most
similar world in 10 minutes. The antecedent world we judge most similar now, or before any time in
the future, is just the very antecedent world we judge most similar up to the present.
Metaphorically speaking, indicative conditionals stick closer to the actual world than subjunctive
conditionals because indicatives involve no time travel in thoughts. The most similar antecedent world
of an indicative can be no further from the actual world than the corresponding subjunctive (at least,
as we always tacitly assumed, that time is more fundamental than anything else, including causation.)
Except in cases where they coincide, indicative antecedent worlds are more similar to and thus more
constrained by the (facts of the) actual world (as it is now). This explains our observation in the
Introduction that the evaluation of subjunctives is somewhat more independent from the actual here
and now than the evaluation of indicatives.
Let us revisit the Oswald-Kennedy example. Both conditionals are composed out of the following
atoms:
O: Oswald killed Kennedy.
S: Someone else killed Kennedy.
21Bennett (1974) and Davis (1979) work out full accounts of antecedent reference, and so does Khoo (2017) more
recently.
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Let us use > for conditionals in the indicative mood, and t> for conditionals in the subjunctive mood.
The subscript t reminds us that the evaluation of a subjunctive conditional requires us to move to the
antecedent world that is most similar to the actual world as it has been immediately before the point of
time to which the antecedent refers. Let s(A) denote the most similar A-world to the actual world, and
st(A) the most similar A-world to the actual world immediately before the time at which (the event or
fact described by) A occurs.
As in the Introduction, let us assume that we believe to be true that Oswald actually killed
Kennedy. Whether or not there was a conspiracy to assassinate Kennedy, we believe ¬O > S to
be true. Even if Oswald acted alone in killing Kennedy, ¬O > S is believed to be true in s(¬O)
because we believe that Kennedy has been assassinated in s(¬O). The fact that Kennedy has been
assassinated in the actual world makes s(¬O) more similar to it than a world in which Kennedy has
not been assassinated. The crux is that this fact is not part of the actual world restricted in time up to
immediately before Oswald assassinated Kennedy. If we judge which world is more similar to the the
actual world as it has been before Oswald assassinated Kennedy at time t, then the fact that Kennedy
has been killed at time t plays obviously no role. Consequently, this fact is not available to single out
st(¬O).
According to our proposed amendment to Stalnaker’s semantics, st(¬O) is the world in which
Oswald did not kill Kennedy and is otherwise most similar to the actual world as it has been immedi-
ately before the point of time at which Oswald killed Kennedy. Now, if Oswald acted alone in killing
Kennedy, we believe ¬Ot>S to be false; if there was a conspiracy to assassinate Kennedy, we believe
¬Ot>S likely to be true. In both cases, we do not consider whether or not Kennedy actually has been
assassinated. The amendment explains this: as we move to immediately before the time referred to in
the antecedent, we do not know whether or not Kennedy has been assassinated. Hence, we are free to
believe either way, probably guided by our context knowledge and system of variable hypotheticals.
Let us indicate how our method would apply to the learning of subjunctive conditionals. Assume
our agent to be modelled is firmly convinced that Oswald killed Kennedy, that is O. Furthermore, it
seems to her that Oswald having killed Kennedy implies that no one else did. From this follows the
material implication O → ¬S . Hence, the possibility O ∧ S is already excluded.22 Finally, let us
assume that she does not believe in a conspiracy theory according to which many powerful people
planned to kill Kennedy. In fact, she beliefs the anti-conspiracy hypothesis “If Oswald had not killed
Kennedy, no one would have”. To her, this is a counterfactual because she already believes O. We
may define the counterfactual (relative to our agent) ¬O¬t >¬S by O ∧ (¬Ot>¬S ).23 If she now learns
¬Ot>S (from another person) and accepts it, she learns about a conspiracy theory and accepts it. In
reality, of course, the more likely outcome of this situation is a Ramsey Test disagreement, at least if
the other person believes the same factual information O ∧ ¬S .
Learning (and accepting) ¬Ot>S is tantamount to learn (and accept) that the possibility ¬O ∧ ¬S
is excluded. By the default assumption, the most similar possible world from the excluded ¬O ∧ ¬S -
world is the world st(¬O) that satisfies S . If there is still some small probabilities associated to the
¬O-worlds, they are transferred to this ¬O ∧ S -world. If ¬O is already probabilistically excluded,
because the agent firmly believes O in the sense that P(O) = 1, no probabilities are transferred.
However, note that the agent still learns from ¬O¬t >S that ¬S is not the case under the supposition
of ¬O.24 We conjecture that our method should, in principle, be applicable to model the learning of
22It seems intuitively safe to say that a person cannot be killed by two different assassins. But then, there are cases of
overdetermination. Let us just assume that the agent we model does not consider cases of overdetermination, like the one
where two assassins shoot at exactly the same time.
23In general, we may define a counterfactual A¬t >C by ¬A ∧ (At>C).
24Here, one might think about an amendment to our amendment. We might add probabilities to our learning method that
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subjunctive and counterfactual information. However, the respective model will be more complicated
than the corresponding indicative model, because time-indexed duplicate worlds need to be included.
If our conjecture is correct, our amended learning method is even more general than before, in so far
it would also capture the learning of subjunctively conditional information.
We turn now to the learning of (uncertain) causal information by adapting the proposed method.
The adaptation is inspired by Lewis’s (1973c) notion of causal dependence which we apply to Stal-
naker conditionals. This move will allow us to formally implement Douven’s (2012) idea of how the
degree of belief in the antecedent should change as a result of its explanatory status when learning a
conditional. The combination of the methods provides a unified framework that manages to clearly
discern between the more informative causal and merely conditional interpretation of a conditional.
2.5 Learning Causal Information
In the previous sections, we proposed and tested a method of learning conditional information. We
have shown that the predictions of the proposed method align with the intuitions in Douven’s (2012)
benchmark examples and that it can generate predictions for the Judy Benjamin Problem. Now, we
adapt the method of learning conditional information to a method of learning causal information. The
adapted method allows us to conceive causally of the information conveyed by the conditionals uttered
in Douven’s examples and the Judy Benjamin Problem. The combination of the proposed learning
method and its adaptation amounts to a unified framework for the learning of (uncertain) conditional
and causal information.
It may come as a surprise that we propose an account of learning that involves (Jeffrey) imag-
ing. After all, the standard view on learning that α is Bayesian conditionalization on α, while David
Lewis’s imaging on α is widely conceived of as modeling the supposition of α. But learning a con-
ditional may – according to the suppositional view on conditionals – be interpreted as learning what
is true under a supposition (about which we may be uncertain). In particular, learning the conditional
“If α, then γ” is thus equivalent to learning the conditional information that γ is the case under the
supposition that α is the case.
Douven aims to provide an account of learning conditional information that is an empirically
adequate account of human reasoning. Douven and Verbrugge (2010) submitted the thesis whether
the acceptability of an indicative conditional ‘goes by’ the conditional probability of its consequent
given the antecedent to empirical testing, and claim that the experiments speak against the thesis.25
Their results indicate that conditional probabilities do not correspond to probabilities of conditionals.
This was proven by Lewis (1976) when conditionals are to be understood as Stalnaker conditionals.
These formal and empirical results obviously provide a severe challenge for Bayesian analyses of
learning conditionals, where conditional probabilities usually take center stage.
Moreover, Zhao et al. (2012) obtained empirical results that indicate a fundamental difference be-
tween supposing and learning. In particular, supposing a conditional’s antecedent α seems to have less
impact on the credibility of the consequent γ than learning that α is true. We will provide a framework
that allows us both, to distinguish between the learning of ‘factual’ and conditional information and
to generate empirically testable predictions.
are not actual, or equivalently counterfactual, in the actual world, but that have been actual immediately before the belief as
regards the antecedent was settled. See, for instance, Edgington (2008), Leitgeb (2012a,b), and Hájek (2014) for accounts
of such counterfactual probabilities.
25The ‘goes by’ is Lewis formulation that may be found in Lewis (1976, p. 297).
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In Section 2.6, we introduce Douven’s desideratum for accounts of learning (uncertain) condi-
tional information. His own proposal is based on the explanatory status of the antecedent. In Section
2.7, we sketch his argumentation against the method of imaging on the Stalnaker conditional as an
account of learning conditional information. The reason for Douven’s dismissal of the method is that
the rationality constraints of Stalnaker models are not sufficient to single out a model, which may
count as a representation of a belief state.
In Section 2.8, we adapt the method of learning conditional information to a method of learning
causal information. The adaptation is inspired by Lewis’s notion of causal dependence and replaces
the pragmatic assumption by the assumption that the antecedent makes a difference. In Section 2.9,
we apply our adapted method of learning causal information to Douven’s examples and the Judy Ben-
jamin Problem. In Section 2.10, we formally implement Douven’s idea concerning the explanatory
status of the antecedent within our framework.
2.6 Douven’s Account of Learning Conditional Information via the Ex-
planatory Status of the Antecedent
Douven (2015) propounds a broadly Bayesian model of learning conditional information. As the stan-
dard Bayesian view of learning, Douven’s account assumes that learning the unnested indicative con-
ditional “If α, then γ” implies that the posterior degree of belief for γ given α is set to approximately
1, i. e. P∗(γ | α) ≈ 1. In contrast to standard Bayesian epistemology, explanatory considerations play
a major role in his model of updating on conditionals.
Douven proposes a desideratum for any account of learning conditional information, viz. a crite-
rion that determines whether an agent raises, lowers, or leaves unchanged her degree of belief P(α)
for the antecedent upon learning a conditional. He even writes that we “should be [...] dissatisfied
with an account of updating on conditionals that failed to explain [...] basic and compelling intuitions
about such updating, such as, in our examples”.26 Douven’s methodology consists in searching for
an updating model that accounts for our intuitions with respect to three examples, the Sundowners
Example, the Ski Trip Example and the Driving Test Example. The three examples represent the
classes of scenarios, in which P(α) should intuitively remain unchanged, be increased and decreased,
respectively. He dismisses any method of learning conditional information that cannot account for all
of the three examples. He emphasises that no single account of learning uncertain conditional and/or
causal information is capable of solving all of his examples. Taking the examples as benchmark, he
also dismisses the Stalnaker conditional as a tool to model the learning of conditional information.
We have already shown that he errs on both: our account of learning conditional information succeeds
in modelling all of his benchmark examples and is based on the Stalnaker conditional.
The core hypothesis of Douven’s account is that the change in explanatory quality or ‘explana-
tory status’ of the antecedent α during learning the information results in a change of the degree of
belief for α. If the explanatory status of α goes up, that is α explains γ well, then the degree of be-
lief after learning the conditional increases, i. e. P∗(α) > P(α); if the explanatory status of α goes
down, P∗(α) < P(α); if the explanatory status remains the same, a variant of Jeffrey conditioning is
applied that has the property that P∗(α) = P(α). Following Bradley (2005), Douven calls this Jeffrey
conditioning over a restricted partition ‘Adams conditioning on P∗(γ | α) ≈ 1’.27
26Douven (2012, p. 3).
27The partition is restricted according to the odds for the consequent of the learned conditional. For details, see Bradley
(2005, pp. 351–52), and Douven and Romeijn (2011, pp. 650–53).
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Douven and Romeijn proposed a solution to the Judy Benjamin Problem. The problem indicates
that the revision method that minimises the Kullback-Leibler divergence leads to counterintuitive
results for learning uncertain conditional information. Their solution uses the variant of Jeffrey con-
ditioning mentioned above. However, their proposed method fails to account for examples where
the probability of the antecedent is supposed to change, since it has the invariance property that
P∗(α) = P(α), for all α, and thus disqualifies as a general account of learning conditional infor-
mation.28
2.7 Douven’s Dismissal of the Stalnaker Conditional
Douven claims that Stalnaker conditionals are not suited to model the learning of conditional informa-
tion. He argues for this claim by pointing out that a learning method based on the Stalnaker conditional
“makes no predictions at all about any of our examples”.29 The cited reason is that we would not be
able to exclude certain Stalnaker models as rational representation of a belief state.
Recall from 2.2 that Douven provides three possible worlds models for his point. Each model
consists of four worlds such that all logical possibilities of two binary variables are covered. He
observes that imaging on “If α, then β” interpreted as a Stalnaker conditional has different effects: in
model I the probability of the antecedent α, i. e. P(α) decreases, in model II P(α) remains unchanged,
and in model III P(α) increases. According to Douven this flexibility of the class of possible worlds
models is a problem rather than an advantage, since there would be no rationality constraints to rule
out certain models as rational representations of a belief state.
Consider a scenario of the class, where the antecedent remains unchanged (e.g. the Sundowners
Example). The problem is, so Douven, that there are no criteria to exclude models I and III as rational
representations of a belief state, in which P(α) should not change. In Douven’s words:
In fact, to the best of my knowledge, nothing said by Stalnaker (or Lewis, or anyone else
working on possible worlds semantics) implies that, supposing imaging is the update rule
to go with Stalnaker’s account, models I and III [...] could not represent the belief state of
a rational person; [...] In short, interpreting “If A, B” as the Stalnaker conditional and up-
dating on it [...] by means of imaging offers no guarantee that our intuitions are respected
about what should happen – or rather not happen – after the update [...]. Naturally, it
cannot be excluded that some of these models – and perhaps indeed all on which [...] [the
degree of belief in the antecedent] changes as an effect of learning [the conditional] – are
to be ruled out on the basis of rationality constraints that I am presently overlooking, per-
haps ones still to be uncovered, or at least still to be related to possible worlds semantics
as a tool for modelling epistemic states. It is left as a challenge to those attracted to the
view considered here to point out such additional constraints.30
In the previous sections, we met the challenge Douven mentions in the quote. We discovered two
constraints that singled out Stalnaker models that plausibly represent the belief states in Douven’s
benchmark examples. Imposing the two additional constraints amounts to interpreting the meaning of
a Stalnaker conditional in a minimally informative way and supplementing the analysis by a default
assumption. However, our account is somewhat incomplete because it cannot model explanatory or
causal information conveyed by a conditional.
28Cf. Douven and Romeijn (2011, pp. 648–655), Douven (2012, pp. 9–11).
29Douven (2012, p. 7).
30Douven (2012, pp. 8-9).
2.8 An Adaptation of the Method to the Learning of Causal Information 51
2.8 An Adaptation of the Method to the Learning of Causal Informa-
tion
In Section 2.6, we have seen that Douven invokes explanatory considerations in order to model the
learning of conditional information. His account presupposes an explanatory reading of the learned
conditional information, which may be of the form ‘If α, then γ’. While we are skeptical about
the presupposition that any conditional can or should be read as (a part of) an explanation or causal
dependence, we admit that conditionals often figure in explanations. Hence, the proposed method
of learning conditional information should be able to account for the learning of causal information
conveyed by conditionals; otherwise, the proposed method suffers a major drawback.
In this section, we sketch how the proposed method may be adapted to a method of learning
causal information. The adaptation is inspired by Lewis’s analysis of causal dependence in terms of
counterfactuals. Douven claims that, in any account of explanation that relies on a Stalnaker model,
‘to explain’ means to ‘provide causal information’, where ‘causal’ refers to a Lewis style analysis.31
We write α ⇒ γ for the causal reading of “If α, then γ”. According to Lewis’s idea of causal
dependence, α ⇒ γ is satisfied iff α > γ and ¬α > ¬γ. We may apply the proposed method of
learning conditional information by taking the minimally informative meaning of α⇒ γ into account
(instead of the one of α > γ), if we substitute the default assumption. We call the adaptation the
‘method of learning causal information’.
The substitution of the default assumption to what we call ‘causal difference assumption’ runs as
follows. Assume we have no further contextual knowledge. Then, the most similar α ⇒ γ-world
from any excluded α ⇒ ¬γ-world is a (α ∧ γ)-world, if the excluded α ⇒ ¬γ-world satisfies α.
Furthermore, the most similar α⇒ γ-world from any excluded α⇒ ¬γ-world is a (¬α ∧ ¬γ)-world,
if the excluded α⇒ ¬γ-world satisfies ¬α. In symbols,
min≤wα⇒¬γ[α⇒ γ] =
{
wα∧γ if wα⇒¬γ(α) = 1
w¬α∧¬γ if wα⇒¬γ(α) = 0
}
(2.18)
The causal difference assumption is justified, if we understand causal dependence as difference
making à la Lewis.32 The antecedent α makes the difference as to whether γ or ¬γ. Hence, α ⇒ γ
means that worlds in which α obtains are worlds in which γ obtains, and accordingly that worlds in
which ¬α obtains are worlds in which ¬γ obtains. It is built in the analysis of causal dependence, so
to speak, that the difference making factors (α and ¬α) are more dissimilar than the ensuing effects.
Note that causal dependence is more informative than conditional dependence. For, the minimally
informative meaning of [α ⇒ γ] is in the absence of further information always a strict subset of
the minimally informative meaning of [α > γ]. The reason is that causal dependence, by definition,
conveys in addition to the indicative conditional information also the information [¬α > ¬γ]. In
brief, if an agent learns α ⇒ γ, our adapted method prescribes that the α ∧ ¬γ-worlds transfer their
31Cf. Douven (2012, pp. 8-9, especially footnote 7), Lewis (1973c). Furthermore, Douven claims that Lewis’s and
Stalnaker’s semantics for conditionals are “exactly the same” (Douven (2012, p. 8, lines 8–11)). However, there is a
difference between the Stalnaker and Lewis semantics. In a Stalnaker model, there is always a single most similar world
(or no world) to the actual world, whereas Lewis’s semantics allows for a set of worlds (or no world) whose elements are
equally similar to the actual world. A consequence of the difference is that Lewis’s ‘official’ semantics for conditionals,
i. e. the system VC, does not validate the principle of Conditional Excluded Middle, whereas Stalnaker’s logic C2 for
conditionals does. In Lewis’s nomenclature, system C2 is labelled by VCS. (Cf. Lewis (1973b), Lewis (1973a), and, for
details, Unterhuber (2013, especially Chapter 3.2 and Chapters 3.3.3 and 3.3.4)) The non-identity of Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s
semantics implies that our method of learning causal information is not equivalent to Lewis’s notion of causal dependence.
While the method relies on Lewis’s idea, we stick to Stalnaker’s semantics in this paper.
32Cf. Lewis (1973c).
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probability shares to the most similar α ∧ γ-world, and the ¬α ∧ γ-worlds transfer their probability
shares to the most similar ¬α ∧ ¬γ-world. In other words, if the antecedent α is a difference maker,
then the probability mass of those worlds w that do not satisfy α ⇒ γ is shifted to the most similar
α⇒ γ-world w′ that agrees with the Boolean evaluation for α, i. e. w(α) = w′(α).
2.9 Douven’s Examples and the Judy Benjamin Problem as Causal Sce-
narios
We apply now our adapted method of learning causal information to Douven’s examples and the Judy
Benjamin Problem.
Recall Example 4, the Sundowners Example, from Section 2.2.6. We model Sarah’s belief state
as the Stalnaker model depicted in Figure 2.8. W contains four elements covering the possible events
of R,¬R, S ,¬S , where R stands for “it rains tomorrow” and S for “Sarah and Marian can have sun-
downers at the Westcliff tomorrow”.
Let us assume that Sarah interprets the conditional uttered by her sister Marian as conveying the
causal information R⇒ ¬S . As Douven himself points out, the intuition in the Sundowners Example
derives from the verdict that whether or not it rains makes the difference as to whether or not they
have sundowners, but not the other way around: having sundowners simply has no effect whatsoever
on whether or not it rains.33 Hence, the change of belief between R and ¬R is more far fetched than
between S and ¬S . In other words, the worlds along the horizontal axis are more similar than the
worlds along the vertical axis. Since R⇒ ¬S ≡ (R > ¬S )∧ (¬R > S ), R⇒ ¬S expresses both that S
is excluded under the supposition of R and ¬S is excluded under the supposition of ¬R. By the causal
difference assumption, we obtain min≤w1 [R > ¬S ] = w2 and min≤w4 [¬R > S ] = w3. Lewis’s imaging
method results in a shift of probability shares along the horizontal axis of Figure 2.8.
Imaging on the minimally informative proposition [R⇒ ¬S ] = {w2,w3} results in
PR⇒¬S (w′) =
∑
w P(w) ·
{
1 if wR⇒¬S = w′
0 otherwise
}
:
PR⇒¬S (w1) = 0 PR⇒¬S (w2) = P(w1) + P(w2)
PR⇒¬S (w3) = P(w3) + P(w4) PR⇒¬S (w4) = 0
(2.19)
We see immediately that both intuitions associated with the Sundowners Example are satisfied,
viz. PR⇒¬S (R) = P(R) = P(w1) + P(w2) and PR⇒¬S (R ∧ S ) = P(w1) = 0. We conclude that the
method of learning causal information yields the intuitively correct results. Our account, thus, allows
to conceive of the conditional learned in the Sundowners Example as conveying causal information.
Recall Example 5, the Ski Trip Example, from Section 2.2.6. We model Harry’s belief state as
the Stalnaker model depicted in Figure 2.9. W contains eight elements covering the possible events
of E,¬E, S ,¬S , B,¬B, where E stands for “Sue passed the exam”, S for “Sue’s father takes her on a
skiing vacation”, and B for “Sue buys a skiing outfit”.
We assume that Harry interprets the conditional uttered by his friend Tom as conveying the causal
information E ⇒ S . Furthermore, The Ski Trip Example assumes that Harry is equipped with the
following contextual knowledge: Sue buying a skiing outfit may causally depend on the invitation of
Sue’s father to a skiing vacation, in symbols S ⇒ B. Finally, Harry observed Sue buying a skiing
outfit, and thus has the factual information that B.
33Cf. Douven (2012, p. 8).
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w1 w2
w3 w4
Pw1
Pw4
R
¬R
S ¬S
Figure 2.8: A Stalnaker model for Sarah’s belief state in the Sundowners Example. The blue arrows
illustrate the change of the similarity order such that the received information, causally understood
as R ⇒ ¬S , is minimally informative. Here, the minimally informative meaning of R ⇒ ¬S is
[R⇒ ¬S ] = [R > ¬S ] ∩ [¬R > S ] = {w2,w3}.
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w1
(E ∧ S ∧ B)
w2
(E ∧ ¬S ∧ B)
w3
(¬E ∧ S ∧ B)
w4
(¬E ∧ ¬S ∧ B)
w5
(E ∧ S ∧ ¬B)
w6
(E ∧ ¬S ∧ ¬B)
w7
(¬E ∧ S ∧ ¬B)
w8
(¬E ∧ ¬S ∧ ¬B)
Pw2
Pw3
Pw4
Pw5
Pw6
Pw7
Pw8
Figure 2.9: An eight-worlds Stalnaker model for Harry’s belief state in the Ski Trip Example. Harry
learns the minimally informative proposition [(E ⇒ S ) ∧ (S ⇒ B)] = {w ∈ W | (minw≤[E] ∈
[S ]) ∧ (minw≤[¬E] ∈ [¬S ]) ∧ (minw≤[S ] ∈ [B]) ∧ (minw≤[¬S ] ∈ [¬B])} = {w1,w8}. Since Harry also
obtains the factual information B, we can also exclude the ¬B-world w8.
In total, Harry learns the minimally informative proposition [(E ⇒ S ) ∧ (S ⇒ B) ∧ B] = {w1}.
Since w1 is the only world that is not probabilistically excluded, we do not need to appeal to the causal
difference assumption in this example.
Imaging on the minimally informative proposition [(E ⇒ S )∧ (S ⇒ B)∧ B] = {w1} results in the
following probability distribution, where we do not display the vanishing probabilities:
P(E⇒S )∧(S⇒B)∧B(w′) = P∗(w′) =
∑
w P(w) ·
{
1 if w(E⇒S )∧(S⇒B)∧B = w′
0 otherwise
}
:
P∗(w1) = 1 (2.20)
The result meets the intuition associated with the Ski Trip Example: P∗(E) > P(E), since P∗(E) =
P∗(w1) and P(E) = P(w1) + P(w2) + P(w5) + P(w6). Later on, we will see that the probabilities of the
worlds w2,w3,w4 would not have vanished entirely, if either E ⇒ S or S ⇒ B (or both) had conveyed
only uncertain information.
In Section 2.2.6, when we interpreted the uttered conditional as merely conveying conditional
information, we needed to rely on the default assumption to model the Ski Trip Example. If we appeal
to the causal interpretation in the Ski Trip Example, we need neither the default assumption nor the
causal difference assumption any more. Again, our framework allows to conceive of the conditional
learned in the Ski Trip Example as conveying causal information.
Recall Example 6, the Driving Test Example, from Section 2.2.6. We model Betty’s belief state as
the Stalnaker model depicted in Figure 2.10. W contains eight elements covering the possible events
of D,¬D,G,¬G, S ,¬S , where D stands for “Kevin passed the driving test”, G for “Kevin’s parents
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w1
(D ∧G ∧ S )
w2
(D ∧ ¬G ∧ S )
w3
(¬D ∧G ∧ S )
w4
(¬D ∧ ¬G ∧ S )
w5
(D ∧G ∧ ¬S )
w6
(D ∧ ¬G ∧ ¬S )
w7
(¬D ∧G ∧ ¬S )
w8
(¬D ∧ ¬G ∧ ¬S )Pw2
Pw3
Pw4
Pw5
Pw6
Pw7
Pw8
Figure 2.10: An eight-worlds Stalnaker model for Betty’s belief state in the Driving Test Example.
will throw a garden party”, and S for “Kevin’s parents have started to spade their garden”.
Assume Betty interprets the conditional uttered by her mother as the causal information D ⇒ G.
Furthermore, Betty infers from her contextual knowledge that because Kevin’s parents are spading
their garden, they will not throw a garden party, in symbols S ⇒ ¬G. Finally, Betty knows that
Kevin’s parents have started to spade their garden, and thus has the factual information that S .
In total, Betty learns the minimally informative proposition [(D ⇒ G) ∧ (S ⇒ ¬G) ∧ S ] = {w4}.
In Figure 2.10, we see that the Driving Test Example is structurally similar to the Ski Trip Example.
Imaging on the minimally informative proposition [(D ⇒ G) ∧ (S ⇒ ¬G) ∧ S ] = {w4} results in
the following probability distribution, where we do not display the vanishing probabilities:
P(D⇒G)∧(S⇒¬G)∧S (w′) = P∗(w′) =
∑
w P(w) ·
{
1 if w(D⇒G)∧(S⇒¬G)∧S = w′
0 otherwise
}
:
P∗(w4) = 1 (2.21)
Our method yields again the correct result regarding the intuition associated with the Driving Test
Example: P∗(D) < P(D), since P∗(D) = 0 and P(D) = P(w1)+ P(w2)+ P(w5)+ P(w6) > 0. Again, our
framework allows to conceive of the conditional learned in the Driving Test Example as conveying
causal information.
The following Judy Benjamin Problem will illustrate that if Betty thinks that the conditionals
D⇒ G or S ⇒ ¬G (or both) convey uncertain information, then the probability shares for some other
worlds will not reduce to zero. This fact fits nicely with the Driving Test Examples’s remark that
“given the spading that has just begun, it is doubtful [or uncertain] (even if not wholly excluded) that
a party can be held in the garden of Kevin’s parents”. We exemplify the application of our method to
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the learning of uncertain causal information now.
Recall Example 7, the Judy Benjamin Problem, from Section 2.2.6. We apply now our method
of learning causal information to this case, in which the received information is uncertain. We show
thereby that the method may be generalised to cases in which the learned information is uncertain,
provided we use Jeffrey imaging.
We model Judy Benjamin’s belief state as the Stalnaker model depicted in Figure 2.11. W contains
four elements covering the possible events of R,¬R, S ,¬S , where R stands for “Judy Benjamin’s
platoon is in Red territory”, and S for “Judy Benjamin’s platoon is in Second Company area”. The
story prescribes that the probability distribution before learning the uncertain information is given by:
P(R ∧ S ) = P(R ∧ ¬S ) = P(¬R ∧ S ) = P(¬R ∧ ¬S ) = 1
4
(2.22)
In the previous examples, our agents implicitly learned Stalnaker conditionals of the form α > γ
with certainty. According to Theorem 1, this amounts to the constraint that P(α > γ) = Pα(γ) = 1
(provided α is not a contradiction). Given this constraint and since Pα is a probability distribution,
we have Pα(¬γ) = 1 − Pα(γ) = 0. This means that we were able to probabilistically exclude any
¬γ-world under the supposition of α.
Now, our agent Judy Benjamin learns uncertain causal information, i. e. she implicitly learns
Stalnaker conditionals with uncertainty. According to Theorem 1 and since R ⇒ S is equivalent to
(R > S )∧(¬R > ¬S ), this amounts in the Judy Benjamin Problem to the constraint that P(R⇒ S ) = 34 .
By our method, we obtain P(R ⇒ ¬S ) = 14 . In contrast to learning causal information with certainty,
we cannot subtract the whole probabilistic mass from the ¬S -worlds under the supposition of R, and
accordingly from the S -worlds under the supposition of ¬R. However, Judy Benjamin is informed
from an external source about the proportion to which she should gradually ‘exclude’ or downweigh
the probability share of R ⇒ ¬S -worlds. Equivalently, we may say that the most similar R ⇒ S -
world (from any R ⇒ ¬S )-world) obtains a gradual upweight of probability such that it receives 34
of the probability shares of the R ⇒ ¬S -worlds; in turn, however, this R ⇒ ¬S -world then receives
a probability share from the R ⇒ S -world weighed by 14 . Note that in Stalnaker models R ⇒ ¬S is
equivalent to (R > ¬S ) ∧ (¬R > S ).
We apply now Jeffrey imaging to the Judy Benjamin Problem, where a source external to Judy
provides her with the information that k = 34 .
PR⇒Sk (w
′) =
∑
w
(
P(w) ·
{
k if wR⇒S = w′
0 otherwise
}
+ P(w) ·
{
(1 − k) if wR⇒¬S = w′
0 otherwise
})
(2.23)
Given the probability distribution before the learning process in Equation (2.22), Judy obtains the
following probability distribution after being informed that P(R⇒ S ) = 34 :
PR⇒S3
4
(w1) = PR⇒S3
4
(R ∧ S ) = 3
8
PR⇒S3
4
(w2) = PR⇒S3
4
(R ∧ ¬S ) = 1
8
PR⇒S3
4
(w3) = PR⇒S3
4
(¬R ∧ S ) = 1
8
PR⇒S3
4
(w4) = PR⇒S3
4
(¬R ∧ ¬S ) = 3
8
(2.24)
The probability distribution of (2.24) does not conform to Douven’s intuitively correct distribution
of (2.14), while the desideratum PR>S3
4
(R) = P(R) = 12 is met. Note that the learning of causal
information results in PR⇒S3
4
(¬R ∧ ¬S ) = 38 , which may be plausible for cases of causal dependence.
However, we do not think that the conditional of the Judy Benjamin Problem is meant to express a
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w1 w2
w3 w4
R
¬R
S ¬S
Figure 2.11: A Stalnaker model for Private Benjamin’s belief state in the Judy Benjamin Problem. The
blue arrows illustrate the specification of a similarity order ≤′ such that the received information [R⇒
S ] is minimally informative. Note that each world having two outgoing blue arrows (one for R > S and
one for ¬R > ¬S ) satisfies R ⇒ S . The red arrows illustrate the specification of another similarity
order ≤,≤′ such that the received information [R ⇒ ¬S ] is minimally informative. Each world
having two outgoing red arrows (one for R > ¬S and one for ¬R > S ) satisfies R ⇒ ¬S ). In sum,
the similarity orders are specified such that one makes [R ⇒ S ] = {w1,w4} a minimally informative
proposition and the other makes the complement proposition [R ⇒ ¬S ] = {w2,w3} a minimally
informative proposition. By the causal difference assumption, we obtain min≤′w2 [R ⇒ S ] = w1 and
min≤′w3 [R ⇒ S ] = w4. Furthermore, we obtain min≤w1 [R ⇒ ¬S ] = w2 and min≤w4 [R ⇒ ¬S ] = w3.
The teal arrows represent the transfer of k · P(w), while the violet arrows represent the transfer of
1−k·P(w). The application of Jeffrey imaging on [R⇒ S ] with k = 34 leads to the following calculation
for the probability distribution: PR⇒S3
4
(w1) = 34 ·P(w1)+ 34 ·P(w2), and PR⇒S3
4
(w2) = 14 ·P(w1)+ 14 ·P(w2),
and PR⇒S3
4
(w3) = 14 · P(w3) + 14 · P(w4), and PR⇒S3
4
(w4) = 34 · P(w3) + 34 · P(w4).
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causal dependence relation. In Section 2.2.6, we treated the received uncertain conditional as merely
carrying uncertain conditional information. Applying the method of learning uncertain conditional
information allowed us to offer a solution to the Judy Benjamin Problem that agrees with Douven’s
desired distribution of (2.14).
The Judy Benjamin Problem illustrates quite vividly the main difference between learning con-
ditional and causal information. A merely conditional understanding of the conditional in the Judy
Benjamin Problem does not affect the (row of) ¬α-worlds, whereas the difference-making or causal
dependence interpretation of the conditional affects the (row of) ¬α-worlds.
2.10 Stalnaker Inferences to the Explanatory Status of the Antecedent
The method of learning causal information provides a formally precise implementation for when and
how Douven’s explanatory status of the antecedent should change. Recall his idea from Section 2.6
that the explanatory power of the antecedent with respect to the consequent determines the probability
of the antecedent after learning the conditional. The idea is related to abduction, nowadays more
commonly referred to as ‘inference to the best explanation’, or at least to a good explanation. The
schema of such an inference runs as follows: α explains γ (well), and γ obtains. Therefore, α is true,
or at least more likely.
We may interpret a Stalnaker agent’s learning of α ⇒ γ as inference to a good explanation.
Suppose an agent believes the fact γ and receives the information α ⇒ γ. Then the agent infers that
α explains γ (well).34 For, α ⇒ γ implies that ¬γ would be the case, if α were not the case. But γ is
the case and thus indicates that α is the case as well. The Ski Trip Example is an instance of this type
of reasoning. Harry learns E ⇒ S , S ⇒ B and the fact B. He infers by our method of learning causal
information that S explains B and, in turn, that E explains S . Consequently, P(E⇒S )∧(S⇒B)∧B(E) ≥
P(E). In general, P(α⇒γ)∧γk (α) ≥ P(α), if k > 12 . In such a case, we call α the antecedent in a
‘Stalnaker inference to a good explanatory status of the antecedent’, or simply the antecedent in a
‘Stalnaker inference to a good explanans’.
In the Driving Test Example, Kevin’s passing the driving test (D) is at odds with the parent’s
spading their garden (S ). D does not explain S (well). There is rather a tension between the occurrence
of D and S . We can again formally implement the reasoning. Suppose S and S ⇒ ¬G, where G stands
for “Kevin’s parents will throw a garden party”. Betty receives the information that D ⇒ G. S and
S ⇒ ¬G implies that G is not the case. By D ⇒ G, we may therefrom infer that D is not the case
either. For, if D were the case, G would be the case. Consequently, P(D⇒G)∧(S⇒¬G)∧S (D) ≤ P(D).
In general, P(α⇒γ)∧¬γk (α) ≤ P(α), if k > 12 . In such a case, we call α the antecedent in a ‘Stalnaker
inference to a bad explanans’. Notice that our framework allows for a probabilification of the Stalnaker
inferences, if uncertain causal information is learned.
2.11 Conclusion
We have seen that Douven’s dismissal of the Stalnaker conditional as a tool to model the learning
of conditional and causal information is unjustified. Rather, this type of learning may be modeled by
Jeffrey imaging on the meaning of Stalnaker conditionals under the following condition: the similarity
order of the Stalnaker model is changed in a way such that the meaning of the conditional is minimally
34We may also say that α is a ground for γ that makes the difference as to whether or not γ obtains.
2.11 Conclusion 59
informative. Both methods of learning information align with the intuititively correct results in Dou-
ven’s benchmark examples. However, Douven’s intuitions about the Judy Benjamin Problem are only
met, if we understand the conditional Judy receives as conveying merely conditional information.
We have shown that the method of learning (uncertain) conditional information may be adpated to
a learning method of (uncertain) causal information. The adaptation is based on the Stalnaker condi-
tional, for which Lewis’s idea of causal dependence is implemented. The two methods come with two
different assumptions, viz. the default assumption and the causal difference assumption, respectively.
The combination of the two methods provides a unified framework that manages to clearly discern
between a merely conditional and a causal reading of the conditional “If α, then γ”. Hence, the gen-
eral method cannot be attacked for not being applicable to conditionals that (are supposed to) express
causal dependences. In detail, if no further contextual information is available, conjunctive informa-
tion is strictly more informative than causal information, which is in turn strictly more informative
than conditional information. For, the minimally informative conjunctive, causal and conditional
propositions stand in the following strict subset relation: [α ∧ γ] ⊂ [α⇒ γ] ⊂ [α > γ].
The causal dependence reading can be used to formalise Douven’s explanatory status of the an-
tecedent. We thereby convey the explanatory status a precise formal meaning that may be used to
operationalize Douven’s idea that explanatory considerations play a core role in learning conditionals.
Furthermore, the results suggest that we should distinguish between a merely conditional or supposi-
tional interpretation and a causal dependence interpretation of a conditional. A supposition should not
affect those cases, in which the antecedent is not satisfied, whereas a difference-making conditional
should. Based on this distinction, we hope that the proposed framework can help psychologists of
reasoning to provide an empirically adequate account of actual reasoning behaviour with respect to
the learning of conditional and causal information.
The advantages of our unified framework of learning uncertain information, as compared to al-
ternative accounts, will be assessed elsewhere. We plan to compare our account in detail to Dou-
ven’s account of learning conditional information and Bayesian accounts of learning conditionals. In
particular, we will show that the Bayesian account of Hartmann and Rad (2017) – that minimizes
the Kullback-Leibler divergence on a fixed Bayesian network – has severe problems to capture the
merely conditional interpretation of conditionals. As a consequence the Judy Benjamin Problem re-
mains troublesome for their account.
Chapter 3
On the Ramsey Test Analysis of ‘Because’
In the previous chapter, we were concerned with the learning of conditional and causal information.
We proposed a method of learning conditional and causal information based on Stalnaker’s (1968)
semantics of conditionals. Now, we move on to the natural language semantics of conditionals and
because. The assertion of a conditional ‘if α, then γ’ commonly implies that the antecedent α is
in some way relevant for the consequent γ. The semantics of variably strict conditionals by Lewis
(1973a) and Stalnaker (1968) spells out the relation of relevance between antecedent and consequent
via a similarity order between possible worlds.1 However, this semantics fails to account for the
relevance between antecedent and consequent, at least in the indicative case. That is, if α and γ are
true in the actual world, then the conditional α > γ is true in that world, independently of whether
there is any connection between α and γ. For example, ‘If Munich is a town in Germany, then Lund
is a town in Sweden’ is true, provided that Munich is a town in Germany and Lund a town in Sweden.
This seems to be an absurd consequence.
The Ramsey Test approach to conditionals by Gärdenfors (1978) and Gärdenfors (1988) faces an
analogous problem: if α and γ are believed to be true, then α > γ must be accepted in that approach.
Hence, the formal semantics of conditionals by Stalnaker (1968), Lewis (1973a), Gärdenfors (1978),
and Gärdenfors (1988) fail to distinguish between trivially true and non-trivially true indicative con-
ditionals. This problem has been addressed by Rott (1986) in terms of a strengthened Ramsey Test.
In this chapter, we refine Rott’s variant of a strengthened Ramsey Test and the corresponding analysis
of because sentences. Given that because is used to express explanatory relations, we show that our
final analysis captures the presumed asymmetry between explanans and explanandum much better
than Rott’s original analysis.
Sources. This chapter builds on joint work with Holger Andreas. Substantial content of Andreas
and Günther (2018) is reprinted by permission from Springer Nature: Springer Netherlands, Erken-
ntnis, On the Ramsey Test Analysis of ‘Because’, Holger, A. and Günther, M., License Number
4364830123295 (2018), advance online publication, 7 June 2018 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-
018-0006-8, Erkenn).
1Grove (1988) has shown that Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s possible worlds semantics can equivalently be spelled out in
systems of spheres of possible worlds.
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3.1 Introduction
We attempt to analyse the presumed relevance between a conditional’s antecedent and its consequent
by means of a strengthened Ramsey Test. More specifically, we suggest that a conditional be accepted
iff it passes the following test:
First, suspend judgement about the antecedent and the consequent. Second, add the an-
tecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of explicit beliefs. Finally, consider whether or
not the consequent is entailed by your explicit beliefs.
We believe that this variant of a strengthened Ramsey Test has interesting applications in different
areas of philosophical logic:
1. The analysis of indicative, subjunctive, and counterfactual conditionals in natural language.
2. The analysis of the conjunction ‘because’ in natural language.
3. The logical analysis of explanations.
4. The conditional analysis of causation.
The chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation are devoted to analyse causation in terms of our strength-
ened Ramsey Test. In this chapter, however, we focus on the semantic analysis of indicative con-
ditionals and the word ‘because’ in natural language. In passing, we shall also make references to
explanations, which seem to be related to an analysis of ‘because’ in natural language.
Let us briefly explain why the problem of relevance between antecedent and consequent is par-
ticularly pressing for an analysis of ‘because’. If a speaker asserts ‘γ because of α’, then he or she
already believes, or knows, that α and γ. Hence, the standard Ramsey Test conditional α > γ is far
too weak for a conditional analysis of ‘because’. For, this conditional does not require the antecedent
to be relevant for the consequent in case α and γ are believed to be true.
In addition to the relevance between explanans and explanandum, our analysis aims to account
for the presumed asymmetry of explanatory relations. As is widely agreed upon, the presence of a
tower may well explain the occurrence of a shadow, but not vice versa. That is, we endorse ‘there is a
shadow because of the tower’, but not ‘there is a tower because of the shadow’. The structure of this
simple example captures a large class of asymmetric explanatory relations. We take it as a starting
point to eventually work out a general account of scientific explanations.
The following analysis of ‘because’ will be shown to yield the intended results for the tower-
shadow scenario. Let designate our strengthened Ramsey Test conditional. That is, α  γ iff, after
suspending judgment about α and γ, an agent can infer γ from the supposition of α (in the context of
further beliefs in the background). The schema of our definition is then:
Because α, γ relative to K(S ) iff α  γ ∈ K(S ) and α, γ ∈ K(S )
where K(S ) designates the belief set of the epistemic state S . We represent epistemic states by belief
bases rather than belief sets. This proves crucial to account for the asymmetry between explanans and
explanandum.
The next step is to generalise the tower-shadow scenario. We shall specify the inferential rela-
tions on the basis of which our analysis verifies statements of the form ‘γ because of α’, provided the
underlying representation of epistemic states satisfies certain conventions. While this analysis cap-
tures the presumed asymmetry for the tower-shadow scenario as well as further classes of explanatory
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relations, there remain cases for which the analysis yields symmetric explanations. We therefore con-
clude with a proposal for a strictly asymmetric Ramsey Test conditional, which in turn yields a strictly
asymmetric analysis of ‘because’.
The present investigation is very much inspired by the work of Rott (1986) on strengthening the
Ramsey Test and his corresponding analysis of ‘because’. We will show, however, that Rott’s analysis
fails to account for the asymmetry of explanatory relations in the case of the tower-shadow scenario
and a related class of explanatory relations. This is why we propose an alternative strengthening of
the Ramsey Test.
Methodologically, we are working upward from the applications to the formal theory. This strat-
egy seems preferable, for example, when it comes to choosing between different variants of a strength-
ened Ramsey Test. Moreover, it is worth noting that we take certain intuitions about the propriety of
explanatory relations for granted, for instance, the intuition of asymmetry in the tower-shadow exam-
ple. Our analysis thus aims to capture this and related intuitions about the propriety of explanatory
directions.
3.2 Belief Revision Theory
3.2.1 Belief Revision: Basic Ideas
Belief revision theory provides us with a precise semantics of belief changes for the Ramsey Test. Let
us therefore very briefly review the basic ideas of this theory. Let K be a set of formulas that represent
the beliefs of an agent and α a formula that represents a single belief. In the AGM framework,
developed by Alchourrón et al. (1985)), one distinguishes three types of belief change of a belief set
K by a formula α:
1. Expansions K + α
2. Revisions K ∗ α
3. Contractions K − α.
An expansion of K by α consists in the addition of a new belief α to the belief set K. This operation is
not constrained by any considerations as to whether the new epistemic input α is consistent with the
set K of present beliefs. Hence, none of the present beliefs is retracted by an expansion.
A revision of K by α, by contrast, can be described as the consistent integration of a new epistemic
input α into a belief system K. If α is consistent with K, it holds that K + A = K ∗ α. If, however, α is
not consistent with K, some of the present beliefs are to be retracted in order to believe α.
A contraction of K by α, finally, consists in retracting a certain formula α from the presently
accepted system of beliefs. This operation will be used to define the suspension of judgement about α
in our strengthened version of the Ramsey Test.
Belief changes can be defined in various ways. In what follows, we explain two approaches to the
determination of belief revisions and contractions. First, entrenchment based revisions, which are part
of the classical AGM theory. Second, partial meet base revisions, which use the AGM framework but
have been developed at a later stage. Before we do so, we briefly introduce the AGM postulates for
belief revisions and contractions.2
2For an accessible exposition of the classical AGM theory, including a detailed discussion of the postulates, the reader
is referred to Gärdenfors (1988).
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3.2.2 AGM Postulates
AGM Belief Revision Theory aims to specify how a rational agent revises her belief state when ac-
commodating a new belief. In part, the theory was devised to capture the effect on a rational agent’s
belief state when she learns new evidence. However, according to Gärdenfors (1988, p. 48) a “revi-
sion may also be made when you, for the sake of the argument, hypothetically accept a proposition”,
for example in a Ramsey Test situation.
In AGM Belief Revision Theory, belief states are modeled as belief sets. The intended interpre-
tation of such a set is that it contains those and only those sentences that are accepted or believed to
be true by the corresponding agent. A belief set K is a consistent set of sentences that is closed under
logical consequence. Formally, let ` denote some logical consequence and Cn(X) the corresponding
set of logical consequences of a set X. Then, for any belief set K, we have K 0 ⊥ and K = Cn(K).
The consequence relation ` represents the logic underlying the respective belief revision theory. As
such ` governs the object language L of the theory.
We write ` α iff the formula α is valid. Let → denote material implication, ⊥ an arbitrary con-
tradiction, and > an arbitrary tautology. The consequence relation ` needs to satisfy certain minimal
conditions:
1. If α is a truth-functional tautology, then ` α.
2.
` α→ β ` α
` β (Modus Ponens)
3. ` is consistent, i. e. 0 ⊥.
Note that the logic governing L is underspecified. However, the logic requires to include at least
Boolean propositional logic as given by the minimal conditions. Furthermore, Cn(K) denotes the set
{α | K ` α for α ∈ L}. Therefore, the set of logically valid formulas Cn(>) = Cn(∅) is included in
every belief set, and the set of contradictory formulas Cn(⊥) = K⊥ = L is the unique largest belief
set. We follow Gärdenfors in calling the set of all formulas K⊥ the absurd belief set.
Here are the definitions of expansion, contraction, and revision as given by the basic AGM postu-
lates.
Definition 8. Expansion
We say that K + α be the expansion of K by α, and is given by K + α = Cn(K ∪ {α}). An expansion
of K by α satisfies
1. K ⊆ K + α
2. α ∈ K + α.
Definition 9. Contraction
We say that K − α be a contraction of K with respect to α only if
(K−1) K − α is a belief set.
(K−2) If ` α↔ β then K − α = K − β.
(K−3) K − α ⊆ K.
(K−4) If 0 α then α < K − α.
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(K−5) If α ∈ K then K = (K − α) + α.
(K−6) If α < K then K − α = K.
(K−5) is called the recovery postulate. Later, we will see that it is problematic when we want to
model an asymmetric because.
Definition 10. Revision
We say that K ∗ α be a revision of K with respect to α only if
(K∗1) K ∗ α is a belief set.
(K∗2) If ` α↔ β then K ∗ α = K ∗ β.
(K∗3) If 0 ¬α then K ∗ α , K⊥.
(K∗4) α ∈ K ∗ α.
(K∗5) If ¬α < K then K ∗ α = K + α.
K−6 is an implementation of Gärdenfors’s ‘criterion of informational economy’ which demands
for contractions that as few beliefs as possible be removed from K. This means that the operation − of
belief contraction is in some sense supposed to be a minimal change of K. On logical grounds alone
the minimality requirement is underdetermined, i. e. there are several minimal ways to determine
which beliefs are to be kept and which are to be given up. The operation ∗ of belief revision has
the same problem of underdetermination. For Gärdenfors has proven that (K−1)–(K−6) plus the Levi
identity is equivalent to (K∗1)–(K∗5) plus the Harper identity.3 Hence, it is now sensible why we
used the indefinite article in the first lines of the definitions, since there is no unique K − α or K ∗ α
singled out by (K−1)− (K−6) or (K∗1)− (K∗5), respectively. Gärdenfors tries to solve this problem of
underdetermination by invoking a relation of epistemic entrenchment.
3.2.3 Entrenchment Based Revisions
If we revise a belief set K by a new belief α that is not consistent with K, some beliefs of K need to
be retracted so as to consistently integrate α into the belief system. In other words, we need to retract
¬α first in order to be able to accept α. This idea has been expressed by the Levi identity:
K ∗ α = (K − ¬α) + α. (Levi identity)
The challenge arising here is to find a sensible way of retracting ¬α from K. From a logical point of
view, there is no unique solution to this problem, set aside trivial belief revision problems. For, there
are several subsets K′ of K such that ¬α < K′. How shall we choose among those subsets?
Belief revision theory tells us that an operation of contraction (as well as that of a revision) should
be guided by two principles. First, the ‘criterion of informational economy’ or conservativity princi-
ple: when forced to change our beliefs, we should retain as many as possible of the present beliefs.
Second, certain beliefs are more firmly established than others. When revising our beliefs, we should
maintain the former and be prepared to give up the latter, at least if this is logically possible. The two
principles have been been formalised by the theory of entrenchment based revisions.
3See Gärdenfors (1988, Appendix A, p. 211 ff.). The Harper identity states that K − α = K ∩ K ∗ ¬α. We will not use it
in this chapter.
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Let us begin with the formal characterisation of the epistemic entrenchment relation. α ≤ β means
that α is at most as entrenched as β. The following postulates formally characterise this relation
(Gärdenfors, 1988, pp. 89–91):
If α ≤ β and β ≤ χ, then α ≤ χ (EE1)
If α ` β, then α ≤ β (EE2)
α ≤ α ∧ β or β ≤ α ∧ β (EE3)
When K , K⊥, α < K iff α ≤ β for all β ∈ K (EE4)
If β ≤ α for all β ∈ L, then α ∈ Cn(∅). (EE5)
where L is the set of all formulas of the formal language used to analyse belief changes, and K⊥ the
absurd belief set containing all elements of L.
Epistemic entrenchment orderings and contractions are interdefinable by (G-) which has been
introduced by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988). In what follows, we shall use only the direction from
epistemic entrenchment orderings to contractions:
β ∈ K − α iff β ∈ K
and either α < (α ∨ β) or α ∈ Cn(∅). (G-)
So, a belief β of K will remain in the belief set after a contraction with α iff either α is strictly less
epistemically entrenched than α ∨ β or α is a logical truth. As one would expect, the strict and
equivalence relations of epistemic entrenchment are defined as α < β iff α ≤ β but not β ≤ α, and
α ∼ β iff α ≤ β and β ≤ α. Once contractions are defined, revisions can be determined using the Levi
identity.
The classical AGM theory assumes that belief sets are logically closed. That is, K = Cn(K),
where Cn is a consequence operation that satisfies certain standard properties, such as monotonicity,
compactness, and the deduction theorem (Hansson, 1999, Ch. 1+). In this chapter, we assume Cn to
be given by classical logic. Henceforth, Cn is always used to designate the consequence operation of
classical propositional logic.
3.2.4 Belief Bases
The study of belief bases and revisions thereof is intended to achieve a more realistic representation
of epistemic states and their dynamics. It can be seen as a cognitively more adequate refinement of
classical belief revision theory, which only investigates changes of logically closed belief sets. Why
are belief sets felt to be a deficient representation of epistemic states from a cognitive point of view?
The problem is that even for languages of propositional logic, any belief set is infinite. This contrasts
with the finiteness of human minds and computers. As human minds have only a finite capacity to
memorise sentences that are accepted, so have computers only a finite storage.4
Unlike belief sets, belief bases are allowed to be finite and are usually assumed to be so. The idea
is to have a set H of explicit beliefs that represents all further implicit beliefs in the sense that the
latter beliefs are consequences of H. In formal terms:
K(H) = In f (H).
4The study of belief base changes has been originated by Sven Ove Hansson. Much of what we are going to say about
such revisions draws on his Textbook of Belief Dynamics (Hansson, 1999).
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K contains all beliefs of the agent with a belief base H, i. e. the explicit beliefs and those beliefs
that the agent is committed to accept because they are inferable from the explicit beliefs. In f is
an inferential closure operation. We assume that this operation is given by classical logic. Thus,
K(H) = Cn(H).
3.2.5 Partial Meet Base Revision
A contraction of a belief base H by α can be defined using the notion of a remainder set H⊥ α :
Definition 11. H⊥α (Hansson (1999, p. 12))
Let H be a set of formulas and α a formula. H′ ∈ H⊥α iff
1. H′ ⊆ H
2. α < Cn(H′)
3. there is no H′′ such that H′ ⊂ H′′ ⊆ H and α < Cn(H′′).
A simple means to define the contraction of H by α is to take the intersection of the members of
the remainder set H⊥α:
H − α =
⋂
H⊥ α. (FMBC)
This way of defining a contraction is also referred to as full meet base contraction.
We can refine this way of determining contractions by invoking the idea of an epistemic ordering
among the members of H − α. Suppose ≤ is a binary transitive relation. A ≤ A′ means that A′ is
epistemically not inferior to A. To put it more simply, A ≤ A′ means that A′ is epistemically at least
as good as A. Using such an epistemic ordering, we can define a selection function for the remainder
set as follows:
σ(H⊥α) = {H′ ∈ H⊥α | H′′≤ H′ for all H′′ ∈ H⊥α}. (Def σ)
Then, we take the selected members of the remainder set to define the contraction of H by α:
H − α =
⋂
σ(H⊥α). (PMBC)
It remains to explain the expansion of a belief base H by α, which is straightforward:
H + α = H ∪ {α}. (H + α)
Now we are in a position to put everything together, thus defining partial meet base revisions:
H ∗ α =
⋂
σ(H⊥¬α) + α. (PMBR)
3.2.6 Prioritised Belief Bases
While the idea of an epistemic ordering of beliefs is quite plausible, it is far from clear how to order the
subsets of a set of beliefs. This does not matter for studying the formal properties of belief changes,
but it does so for studying concrete examples. Hence, we finally show how an epistemic ordering
among the members of a belief base can be translated into an ordering among the subsets of such a
base.
Drawing on the work by Brewka (1991), we assume the epistemic ordering among the items of H
to be a strict weak ordering. Such an ordering can be represented by a sequence of subsets of H:
H = 〈H1, . . . ,Hn〉.
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where H1, . . . ,Hn is a partition of H. H is called a prioritised belief base. H1, . . . ,Hn are sets of
formulas that represent explicit beliefs, and the indices represent an epistemic ranking of the beliefs.
H1 is the set of the most firmly established beliefs, the beliefs in H2 have secondary priority, etc.
This prioritisation of beliefs can be used to define an epistemic ordering among the subsets of H:5
Definition 12. H′′ ≤ H′
Let H be a set of formulas, and H′′ and H′ be subsets of H. H′′ ≤ H′ iff there is no i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) such
that
1. H′ ∩ Hi ⊂ H′′ ∩ Hi
2. for all j < i ( j ≥ 1),H′′ ∩ H j = H′ ∩ H j.
In the following investigation, we assume that our belief base has exactly two levels of epistemic
priority: the upper level, containing the generalisations, and the lower level, which contains our beliefs
about atomic facts. These levels of epistemic priority affect the determination of belief changes: when
we retract a belief α, we retract first beliefs about atomic facts before we retract generalisations.
If necessary, we also retract generalisations, but only if the retraction of α cannot be achieved by
retractions of beliefs about atomic facts. For the considerations to follow, it may be helpful to have a
graphical representation of such a prioritised belief base in mind:
G
L
G stands for the set of generalisations, while L contains the beliefs about the atomic facts. L is a
set of literals. A literal is an atomic formula or its negation.
If we need to distinguish between strict and ceteris paribus laws, we can do so by distinguishing
between two corresponding levels of generalisations. Strict laws have priority over ceteris paribus
laws. The notion of a generalisation subsumes strict and non-strict laws.
The present convention about generalisations and literals allow us to define the revision of epis-
temic states (in addition to the revision of belief sets of epistemic states). That is,
(H, <) ∗ α
has a well defined meaning insofar as Definition 12, (Def σ), and (PMBR) together define the revised
belief base H′, while the revised epistemic ordering <′ is determined by the simple convention that
generalisations have priority over literals. So there is an epistemic state (H′, <′) such that (H′, <′) =
(H, <) ∗ α. Iterated belief base revisions are thus well understood.
Such are the basic ideas and definitions about belief changes that will be used in the present
analysis of ‘because’. We study the properties of belief set revisions using an epistemic entrenchment
ordering of beliefs. Belief base revisions are studied in terms of partial meet base revisions with an
underlying selection function that is defined by a prioritised belief base.
Why do we not study belief set revisions in terms of partial meet belief set revisions? The simple
reason for this choice is that the idea of an epistemic entrenchment ordering is easier applicable than
the idea of an epistemic ordering of subsets of a logically closed (and so infinite) belief set. Despite
the differences between partial meet belief set revisions and entrechment based belief set revisions, it
has been shown that any entrenchment based belief set revision can be represented by a partial meet
belief set revision, and vice versa (Gärdenfors, 1988, Ch. 4). Hence, results about the former can be
translated into results about the latter.
5This definition is inspired by Brewka (1991), but the resulting belief revision operation is not equivalent with the one
defined there.
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3.2.7 Why Belief Bases?
In the final analysis of ‘because’, we shall use belief base revisions rather than belief set revisions.
For, the combination of belief bases with our novel variant of a strengthened Ramsey Test allows us
to capture the asymmetry of explanatory relation for a large class of scenarios, including the famous
tower-shadow scenario. Belief set revisions of the classical AGM theory, by contrast, turn out not to
be suited for this purpose (cf. sections 3.5 and 3.6).
Admittedly, belief base revision theory is less well established than belief set revision theory. This
is surprising in light of distinctive merits of belief bases if compared with belief sets. First, there
is the above indicated finite-memory argument in favour of belief bases. A belief set is an infinite
entity and so cannot be fully comprehended by a human mind, at least on a literal understanding of
comprehension. Likewise, a computer cannot store a belief set for obvious reasons.
Second, relatedly, while the study of formal properties is not much impeded by the infinite
character of belief sets, the study of concrete examples certainly is. Note that even the notation
K = Cn(α, β, γ) is misleading if K is supposed to be a belief set. For, it suggests that the belief set
K is generated by the belief base {α, β, γ}. This is misleading because belief set revisions differ from
belief base generated revisions as regards their formal properties (cf. Hansson (1999, Ch. 4)). More-
over, it is quite a bit more work to completely specify the epistemic priority ordering for a belief set
than it is for a belief base. As a consequence of this, iterated belief changes are easier to define and
to describe using belief bases (cf. Section 3.2.6). It is therefore not surprising that, in the belief set
revision literature, examples of concrete belief changes are hardly formalised. It is next to impossible
to find a fully formalised application of belief set revision theory, even to toy examples. Using belief
bases, by contrast, makes applying belief revision theory to particular examples much easier.
In sum, belief bases are cognitively more plausible and much easier to use when it comes to for-
malising belief systems that concern specific examples. However, there is also an influential objection
to belief bases. This objection appeals to the principle of the irrelevance of syntax (Dalal, 1988),
which is sometimes violated in the belief base approach. Contrary to this principle, Brewka (1991)
has pointed out that choosing the formulation {p ∧ q} over {p, q} may well be intended to make a
difference. This choice is justified, for example, if p and q are only to be given up together.
We are not convinced that the principle of the irrelevance of syntax is justified from a cognitive
perspective. Contrary to this principle, one can point out that the study of belief bases carries on what
Van Benthem (2008) has termed the cognitive turn in philosophical logic, i. e. the development of
logical systems that aim to represent and to theoretically explain human reasoning. For the above
indicated reasons, a finitely bounded human mind has no alternative to working with belief bases.
Note, finally, that there is a very simple way to respect the principle of the irrelevance of syntax
within the belief base approach. It suffices to require that the members of a belief base conform to
a specific logical form. For example, we can require to represent generalisations by disjunctions of
literals, while beliefs about atomic facts be represented by literals. The latter requirement has already
been made explicit.
3.3 The Ramsey Test
3.3.1 The Ramsey Test by Ramsey
Ramsey (1950, footnote 1) proposes the following evaluation procedure for conditionals that is known
as the Ramsey Test (RT):
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If two people are arguing ‘If p will q?’ and are both in doubt as to p, they are adding
p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q; so that
in a sense ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, q’ are contradictories. [...] If either party believes not p
for certain, the question ceases to mean anything to him except as a question about what
follows from certain laws or hypotheses.
The RT is an epistemic evaluation recipe for conditionals in the sense that the evaluation depends
on the beliefs of the agent(s) involved in the hypothetical discussion. This evaluation recipe for an
epistemic agent has been pointedly expressed by Stalnaker (1968, p. 102):
First, add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs; second, make whatever
adjustments are required to maintain consistency (without modifying the hypothetical
belief in the antecedent); finally, consider whether or not the consequent is then true.
3.3.2 The Ramsey Tests by Gärdenfors and Levi
The AGM theory allows Gärdenfors (1988, Ch. 7) to concisely formalise the epistemic recipe of the
Ramsey Test:
α > γ ∈ K iff γ ∈ K ∗ α. (RTG)
Thus, a conditional α > γ is accepted in K iff γ is believed in the course of revising K by α.
Writing K ∗ α and speaking of belief set revisions is misleading insofar as this suggests that it
is the belief set itself that is revised. This is not quite correct because there is no sensible way of
uniquely determining the revision of a belief set by a new epistemic input. It is rather the belief
set of a particular epistemic state that is revised, according to the AGM theory. As indicated in
the previous section, epistemic states can be represented in various ways. Syntactic representation
schemes commonly have the form of a pair (A, <), where A is a set of formulas and < an epistemic
ordering among formulas or sets of formulas. A is logically closed for belief set revision schemes,
while it does not have to be so for belief base revision schemes. Most possible world approaches to
belief revision work with epistemic states of the form (W, <), where W is a set of possible worlds and
< a plausibility ordering among these worlds (cf. (Grove, 1988)).
It is thus more appropriate to write K(S )∗α or K(A, <)∗α and to speak of the revision of the belief
set of an epistemic state. In this notation, S stands for an epistemic state. As regards the Ramsey Test,
it seems consequently more appropriate to write:
α > γ ∈ K>(S )iff γ ∈ K(S ) ∗ α. (RTL)
K(S ) stands for the beliefs in non-modal propositions, i. e. beliefs that can be expressed by formulas of
classical logic without any conditional or modal operator. K>, by contrast, stands for the conditionals
accepted, or believed, by the agent on the basis of the Ramsey Test.
In spirit, the distinction between K(S ) and K>(S ) goes back to Levi (1988). It was also Levi (1988)
who emphasised another distinction, viz. between believing and merely accepting conditionals, in
light of a famous triviality theorem proved by Gärdenfors (1986). If we merely accept conditionals
without viewing them as truth-apt, we avoid the fatal consequences of the triviality theorem for the
Ramsey Test.6
6The triviality theorem continues to provoke lively research in belief revision theory (see, e.g., Rott (2011); Leitgeb
(2010); Bradley (2007)).
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We shall discuss triviality briefly in Section 3.6.4. There, it will be shown that an important
premise of the proof by Gärdenfors (1986) is violated for our variant of a strengthened Ramsey Test.
This allows us to remain neutral as to whether conditionals are properly believed or merely accepted.
As (RTL) gives us a clearer instruction of how to carry out a particular Ramsey Test, we prefer (RTL)
over (RTG) as formulation of the Ramsey Test. A similar strategy has been recommended by Hansson
(1992) who shows that triviality can be avoided by taking belief bases to represent the epistemic
states underlying the Ramsey Test. Following Hansson (1992), we favour (RTL) without making a
commitment as regards the belief-acceptance distinction for conditionals.
3.3.3 Absurdity: Relevance Issues of the Ramsey Test
(RTG) leads to the absurdity that any two accepted formulas α, β bear a conditional relation between
each other, as has been shown by Rott (1986). Suppose α, β ∈ K. By the AGM belief revision
postulates, we know that, if α ∈ K, then K ∗ α = K. Therefore, β ∈ K ∗ α. We conclude by (RTG) that
α > β ∈ K. Hence,
If α, β ∈ K, then α > β ∈ K. (Absurdity)
(Absurdity) expresses that a (RTG) agent accepts a conditional connection between any two formulas
she accepts. If, for example, ‘Munich is a town in Germany’ and ‘Lund is a town in Sweden’ is
accepted by an agent, then (RTG) prescribes that ‘If Munich is a town in Germany, then Lund is a
town in Sweden’ should also be accepted.
The just observed problem carries over to a Ramsey Test analysis of ‘because’ as proposed by
Ramsey (1950, p. 156, our emphasis) himself; there he relates conditional sentences ‘If α, then γ’ and
sentences ‘Because α, γ’ by stating:
because is merely a variant on if, when [the antecedent] p is known to be true.
It is a consequence of this view that, if α ∈ K, then ‘if’ and ‘because’ coincide. Thus, given
Ramsey’s view, (RTG) prescribes that our agent accepts the sentences ‘Because Munich is a town in
Germany, Lund is a town in Sweden’, and the converse ‘Because Lund is a town in Sweden, Munich
is a town in Germany’. In more general terms, (Absurdity) entails that a (RTG) agent accepts any
because sentence composed of any two accepted formulas, once Ramsey’s analysis of ‘because’ is
adopted. This is in any case not less troubling than the (Absurdity) of the merely conditional reading.
Moreover, the absurdity violates the asymmetry of one usage of because in natural language, viz. the
one according to which the acceptance of ‘because α, β’ precludes the acceptance of ‘because β, α’,
at least for some α, β. We might, for instance, accept that we sometimes get injured because we often
play football, but then we would not accept that we often play football because we get sometimes
injured.7
In sum, (RTG) fails to capture the semantics of indicative conditionals. This failure leads to
verifying absurd explanatory relations if we accept Ramsey’s analysis of ‘because’ in terms of the
Ramsey Test. The underlying problem is that the conditional connective > does not express a proper
relation of relevance between the antecedent and the consequent. Rott (1986) proposes to invalidate
(Absurdity) by modifying (RTG) such that the mere acceptance of α, γ does not result in the acceptance
of ‘If α, γ’, as we shall see in the next section.
7Although the latter because sentence seems totally fine in a context, in which the agent performs a so-called inference
to the best explanation: repeatedly playing football may be the best explanation for occasional injuries. This reasoning
towards (as opposed to from) the putative explanatory ‘causes’ seems to justify the usage of ‘because’ in the other direction.
So peculiar as natural language is, we do not want to ban this usage of ‘because’ from natural language. For now, we just
want to focus on the one usage showing the asymmetry without being entirely sure that this usage is strictly asymmetric.
For example, ‘because p and q are true, p ∧ q is true’ does not seem to preclude ‘because p ∧ q is true, p and q are true’.
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3.4 Rott’s Ramsey Test Analysis of ‘Because’
Rott (1986) embeds a parallel analysis of ‘if’ and ‘because’ in a systematic theory of universal con-
ditionals. Universal conditionals, Rott claims, are not instantiated in natural language. However, he
proposes a semantics of the natural language conjunctions ‘if’, ‘if ... might’, ‘because’, ‘though’
and ‘even if’ by specifying constraints on the acceptance of ‘antecedents’ and ‘consequents’ of the
respective universal conditionals.8
Rott aims to analyse the type of ‘because’ that points to a reason or an explanation. The basic idea
of Rott’s analysis is that ‘Because α, γ’ be synonymous to ‘α is a reason or an explanation for γ’. In
an explanatory sentence, for example, ‘because’ may be seen as a connective that relates explanans
and explanandum. As such a pointer ‘because α, γ’ expresses a relation of positive relevance between
(explanans) α and (explanandum) γ. However, we have seen in the last section that (RTG) does not
capture a proper conditional connection of (positive) relevance between antecedent and consequent.
Rott’s analysis of ‘because’ is driven by considerations of how to establish a relation of positive
relevance, and this means for a start to find ways to invalidate (Absurdity). One such way consists
in (i) the modification of (RTG) to his Strong Ramsey Test; another way in (ii) the contraction of the
belief set by the consequent, before the set is revised by the respective antecedent. The implementation
of (i) and (ii) in Rott’s analysis gives rise to the scheme of universal pro-conditionals. This scheme
allows him to derive a semantics of the indicative and subjunctive ifs and of a certain ‘because’ of
natural language.9
3.4.1 The Strong Ramsey Test and the Contraction of the Belief Set by the Consequent
In Section 3.3.3, we have seen that (RTG) together with Ramsey’s analysis of ‘because’ fails since
this analysis validates (Absurdity). This failure requires a modification of (RTG) that invalidates
(Absurdity). Rott’s idea is to strengthen (RTG), which results in his ‘Strong Ramsey Test’:
α≫ γ ∈ K iff γ ∈ K ∗ α and γ < K ∗ ¬α. (SRTR)
We obtain in the situation where a (SRTR) agent already accepts α, γ:
If α, γ ∈ K, then [α≫ γ ∈ K iff γ < K ∗ ¬α]. (1)
Implication (1) shows how (SRTR) invalidates the (Absurdity) that the mere acceptance of α and γ is
sufficient for the acceptance of ‘Because α, γ’. The reason is that the second conjunct of the right-
hand-side of (SRTR) still needs to be satisfied. This modification makes (SRTR) “more adequate for
natural language conditionals than” Gärdenfors’s Ramsey Test, so Rott argues, since “it explicitly
requires the antecedent to be positively relevant for the consequent” (Rott, 1986, p. 352).10
The situation represented by implication (1) requires the (SRTR) agent to perform a contrary-to-
fact supposition. The counterfactual supposition of ¬α needs to retract the accepted γ from the belief
8‘Antecedent’ is here a generalisation of the antecedent of a conditional sentence. It stands for ‘subordinate clause’
of the respective sentence. This mirrors Rott’s view that all of the mentioned conjunctions are derived from a framework
of universal conditionals. In detail, the indicative and subjunctive ifs and ‘because’ fall into the category of universal
pro-conditionals, ‘though’ into the category of universal contra-conditionals, and ‘even if’ into the category of universal
un-conditionals. See Rott (1986, pp. 355-363).
9Considerations of how to systematically categorise conditionals result in the schemes of universal contra- and un-
conditionals as well.
10This idea has recently been exploited in an analysis of evidential support by Chandler (2013).
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set. In this sense the contrary-to-fact supposition ‘makes a difference’ as to whether γ is accepted.11
An alternative method to invalidate (Absurdity) consists in the contraction of the belief set by the
consequent before (RTG) is applied.
α > γ ∈ K iff γ ∈ (K − γ) ∗ α. (RT−G)
In the situation where a (RT−G) agent already accepts α, γ, the consequent γ may not be in the belief
set K after a contraction by γ and a subsequent revision by α, i. e. γ < (K − γ) ∗ α. The consequent
γ is only accepted if it is a consequence of the contracted belief set (K − γ) revised by the antecedent
α. We may say that (the belief expressed by) α is an inferential epistemic reason for γ such that the
supposition of α epistemically brings about the acceptance of γ.
3.4.2 Universal Pro-Conditionals and ‘Because’
If we amend the (SRTR) and its dual by (RT−G), we obtain the scheme of universal pro-conditionals
that is according to Rott (1986, p. 355) “perfect for the analysis of what you can call a ‘conditional
connection’”. We write⇒ for the universal pro-conditional. The scheme is then given by
α⇒ γ ∈ K iff [α≫ γ ∈ (K − γ)] or [¬α≫ ¬γ ∈ (K − γ)]
iff [γ ∈ (K − γ) ∗ α and γ < (K − γ) ∗ ¬α]
or [¬γ < (K − γ) ∗ α and ¬γ ∈ (K − γ) ∗ ¬α].
(UPC)
(UPC) says that there is a conditional connection (of positive relevance) between antecedent α and
consequent γ iff (i) α lets us infer γ in the context of K − γ, and the supposition of ¬α makes a
difference as to whether γ is accepted, or (ii) ¬α lets us infer ¬γ in the context of K − γ, and the
supposition of α makes a difference as to whether ¬γ is accepted.
Rott derives the natural language ifs and ‘because’ from the scheme (UPC) by specifying ac-
ceptance constraints on antecedent and consequent of the respective connective. For universal pro-
conditionals the acceptance constraint is that the acceptance status of the antecedent and the conse-
quent is the same. In accordance with Ramsey’s view, ‘because α, γ’ is only accepted if the antecedent
α is accepted. Let a⇒ be the connective of Rott’s ‘because’, where the superscript a indicates that
the antecedent is accepted. Then Rott’s analysis of the natural language ‘because’ is given by
α a⇒ γ ∈ K iff α⇒ γ ∈ K and α, γ ∈ K
iff γ ∈ (K − γ) ∗ α or ¬γ ∈ (K − γ) ∗ ¬α
and α, γ ∈ K.
(BecauseR)
(BecauseR) can be derived from (UPC) using a proposition in Rott (1986, p. 350):
Proposition 1. If γ ∈ K ∗ α and γ ∈ K ∗ ¬α then γ ∈ K.
Proposition 2. Let K be a non-absurd belief set and γ a non-tautology. Then (UPC) and α, γ ∈ K
implies (BecauseR).
Proposition 2 and all subsequent propositions are proven in Appendix B.
11(SRTR) structurally resembles Lewis (1973c)’s notion of causal dependence in terms of counterfactual conditionals.
Using⇒ for causal dependence, we can transcribe Lewis’s idea into the notation of belief revision: α⇒ γ ∈ K iff γ ∈ K ∗α
and ¬γ ∈ K∗¬α. Note that Lewis’s causal dependence requires a stronger version of difference making than (SRTR), viz. the
adoption of ¬γ in K ∗ ¬α in contrast to the mere retraction of γ. Moreover, Lewis might say that ‘γ because α’ means γ is
causally dependent on α, when α and γ are (believed to be) true. Given Lewis (1973a)’s semantics for counterfactuals, we
obtain the following implication paralleling (1): If α, γ ∈ K, then [α⇒ γ ∈ K iff ¬γ ∈ K ∗ ¬α].
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3.5 Symmetry Problems of Rott’s ‘Because’
3.5.1 A General Symmetry Problem
We can show now that (BecauseR) is symmetric for a large class of potentially explanatory relations.
For this to be achieved, we distinguish between trivial and non-trivial implications in K. As the mem-
bers of K are non-modal propositional formulas, laws and generalisations are to be represented by
material implications. However, not all implications in a belief set K represent instances of generali-
sations. As is well known, if ¬α ∈ K, then, for any γ, α→ γ ∈ K. Likewise, if γ ∈ K, then, for any α,
α→ γ ∈ K. How can we distinguish, then, between trivial implications and non-trivial implications in
K, on the understanding that only the latter represent instances of genuine generalisations? Arguably,
a material implication is non-trivial in a belief set K iff it ‘survives’ a contraction by the negation of
the antecedent and a contraction by the consequent:
Definition 13. Non-trivial implication in K
K contains an implication α→ γ non-trivially iff
1. α→ γ ∈ K, and
2. α→ γ ∈ K − ¬α, and
3. α→ γ ∈ K − γ.
Now, if non-trivial implications represent instances of generalisations, it is reasonable to assume
that non-trivial implications are more entrenched than literals and conjunctions of literals.12 For, this
assumption guarantees that generalisations are available for counterfactual considerations. To see this
consider the following: suppose ¬α, α→ γ ∈ K, where α→ γ is a non-trivial implication, such as ‘if
it snows on the street, the street gets white’. Further, suppose that ¬α < α → γ, where α < β means
that β is strictly more entrenched than α. By (G-) and the entrenchment postulate (EE2), it holds then
that α → γ ∈ K − ¬α. By the Levi identity, this implies that γ ∈ K ∗ α, as it should be. The street
would get white if it were to snow on the street.
If, by contrast, α → γ ≤ ¬α, we would have (i) ¬α ∨ γ ≤ ¬α. By (EE2), however, we know
that (ii) ¬α ≤ ¬α ∨ γ. Using ` (α → γ) ↔ (¬α ∨ γ), we can infer from (i), (ii), and (G-) that
α → γ < K − ¬α. Hence, our generalisation represented by α → γ would not be available for
counterfactual considerations on the hypothetical assumption of α. We could not infer that the street
would get white if it were to snow on the street. It goes without saying that this result is highly
counterintuitive.
We must wonder, finally, whether or not a non-trivial implication α → γ can be retracted in the
course of a revision by a proposition β that is neither related to the antecedent α nor to the consequent
γ. Such a retraction does not seem reasonable at all, even though there may be an entrenchment
ordering that requires it. For example, we should not retract ‘if it snows on the street, the street gets
white’ if we get to know that Munich is a town in Germany, Anna goes to the party, etc. The case study
in sections 3.5.2 and 3.6.3 will further support the claim that implications representing generalisations
must be more entrenched than literals and conjunctions of literals.
Hence, it is reasonable to make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Let α → γ be a non-trivial implication in K. Let δ, β be literals or conjunctions
of literals. <K denotes the entrenchment ordering associated with the beliefs of K and <K−δ the
entrenchment ordering of the beliefs of K − δ. Then, β <K α→ γ and β <K−δ α→ γ.
12See Hansson (1999, p. 96) for a brief justification of why law-like statements should – in most cases – be epistemically
more entrenched than factual statements.
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The second conjunct of this assumption says that the implication α→ γ remains more entrenched
than literals and conjunctions thereof, after a contraction of K by a literal or a conjunction of literals.
We can show that a⇒ is symmetric, if α→ γ is an accepted non-trivial implication.
Proposition 3. Let α and γ be literals or conjunctions of literals. Further, α, γ ∈ K. Suppose that
α → γ is a non-trivial implication in K and Assumption 1 holds for α → γ. Then α a⇒ γ ∈ K and
γ a⇒ α ∈ K.
Proposition 3 says that, under Assumption 1, if α → γ is a non-trivial implication in K, then a⇒
is symmetric since both α a⇒ γ ∈ K and γ a⇒ α ∈ K. In particular, we have the following problem
for Rott’s a⇒ : if γ → α is a non-trivial implication in K, then α a⇒ γ ∈ K. This means, for
instance, if an agent accepts the sensible generalisation ‘if there is lightning, then there is thunder’,
the agent is also committed to accept ‘because there is thunder, there is lightning’. Of course, from
an information-theoretic point of view, it is sensible to say that we believe there is lightning, because
we believe that there is thunder. However, we are interested in the asymmetric usage of ‘because’
that goes beyond a purely information-theoretic relation. To be more precise, we aim to define an
epistemic relation of bringing about according to which we accept, for instance, that lightning brings
about thunder, but we should not accept the converse.
3.5.2 Further Symmetry Problems
We have seen that the notion of because implemented in a⇒ is symmetric on some reasonable as-
sumptions. However, as we shall see shortly, the scope of Proposition 3 is limited. By means of a
simple example scenario, we lift the limitation by showing that a⇒ does not capture intuitively asym-
metric relations of relevance. The scenario illustrates the symmetry of a⇒ over and above Proposition
3. It may be understood as revealing further symmetry problems for (BecauseR) by characterising an-
other class of problematic applications. The characterisation of a class means here that once the reader
understands the underlying structure of the example scenario, she may easily come up with her own
examples of the problematic class.
Suppose there is a tower (t), the sun is shining (s), so that the sun casts a shadow (sh).13 (t, s,
and sh are propositional constants to be used for the below formalisation of the example.) Intuitively,
the presence of the tower and the sunlight explain that there is a shadow, but not vice versa, i.e. there
being a shadow does not explain that there is a tower. After all, there might be, for instance, another
opaque object exposed to sunlight. However, it seems that the following common-sense generalisation
is entailed by our background knowledge:
t ∧ s→ sh. (2)
We assume in our scenario that (2) is epistemically more entrenched in the agent’s background knowl-
edge than the facts t, s, and sh. Let us assume, moreover, that K = Cn({t, s, sh, t ∧ s → sh}). Note
that (2) plays the role of a non-trivial implication that remains more entrenched than any literals or
conjunctions of literals after the contraction of the epistemic state by some literals or conjunctions
thereof. Assumption 1 is thereby satisfied, and thus (2) constitutes a special case of Proposition 3 ac-
cording to which a non-trivial implication may be of the form α1∧α2∧ ...∧αn → γ for a finite n ∈ N,
13The example is similar to the famous tower-shadow scenario, for which there is wide agreement that the height of the
tower together with the altitude of the sun explain the length of the shadow, but not vice versa. However, see Van Fraassen
(1980b, pp. 132-34) for an interesting challenge of this agreement involving the notion of relevance. Note that we simplified
the original tower-shadow scenario such that a wider class of examples succumbs to the asymmetry problem of Rott’s
(BecauseR).
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where the αi are literals. If such a non-trivial implication with a conjunction of antecedent conditions
is accepted, we obtain α1∧α2∧ ...∧αn a⇒ γ as well as γ a⇒ α1∧α2∧ ...∧αn. In particular, suppose
the non-trivial implication (2) with n = 2. Then a (BecauseR) agent is committed to both the plausible
direction that ‘There is a shadow, because there is a tower and the sun is shining’ and the less plausible
direction that ‘There is a tower and the sun is shining, because there is a shadow’.
Following our cognitive habits, we do not list all of the antecedent conditions when using ‘be-
cause’, especially if there are many. Rather we only state the pertinent ones given a particular contex-
tual knowledge. If this is true, the scope of Proposition 3 is limited. For, this proposition does not tell
us whether α1 ∧α2 ∧ ...∧αn → γ being a non-trivial implication entails that α1 ∧α2 ∧ ...∧αn−k a⇒ γ
and γ a⇒ α1 ∧ α2 ∧ ... ∧ αn−l, where 1 ≤ k, l < n. In what follows we show that further symmetry
problems arise for non-trivial implications of the logical form α1 ∧ α2 → γ, and because sentences
of the form α1 a⇒ γ and γ a⇒ α1, where αi and γ are literals, respectively. We illustrate this further
class of symmetry problems by proving the following proposition about the tower-shadow scenario, in
which an antecedent condition of a generalisation remains implicit in the background knowledge, viz.
‘the sun is shining’. Thereby we show that a⇒ may express a symmetric relation even if Proposition
3 is not applicable.
Proposition 4. Assume a (BecauseR) agent accepts all facts and the generalisation of the tower-
shadow scenario, i. e. t, s, sh, t ∧ s → sh ∈ K, where the order of epistemic entrenchment is t, s, sh <
t ∧ s→ sh. Then, t a⇒ sh ∈ K if t ≤ sh and sh a⇒ t ∈ K if sh ≤ t.
The proposition shows that Rott’s analysis only verifies the desired direction ‘because of the tower
there is a shadow’, if ‘there is a tower’ is at most as entrenched as ‘there is a shadow’, and thus both
beliefs are given up when the belief set is contracted by ‘there is a shadow’. Moreover, a (BecauseR)
agent is committed to believe the undesired direction ‘because of the shadow there is a tower’, if ‘there
is a shadow’ is at most as entrenched as ‘there is a tower’. The question is, of course, why should
some of those atomic beliefs be more or less entrenched? It seems to be an ad hoc strategy to assume
the entrenchment ordering that verifies the intended results. Why should the belief that there is a tower
be strictly less entrenched than the belief that there is a shadow?
Even if we grant that t < sh in order to obtain the desired asymmetry, a change in the epistemic en-
trenchment ordering could change the set of accepted because statements. There is a general problem
surfacing here: a given epistemic entrenchment ordering alone cannot do both (i) represent firmness
of belief and, somewhat independently, (ii) encode explanatory relations of because sentences. In
other words, either an ordering of epistemic entrenchment is used for the representation of epistemic
firmness, or it is used to obtain the desired asymmetry – but you do not get both from one ordering. To
be clear, it seems too much of a demand for one ordering of epistemic entrenchment that it can satisfy
the role of representing epistemic firmness and ensure the relatively stable asymmetry of because.
This trade-off between the representation of firmness and asymmetry seems to apply to any account
that directly and only relies on an ordering of epistemic entrenchment. It is by no means obvious
that there should not be a certain independence between the firmness of belief and the acceptance of
explanatory because statements.
Our analysis, in contrast, has no such sensitivity to the firmness of particular beliefs. The firmness
of particular beliefs can change without changing the direction of accepted because sentences, at least
when the relevant generalisations are in place. Of course, our analysis hinges on the assumption
which generalisations the agent accepts. But the generalisations also allow us to vary the firmness of
particular beliefs, while preserving the asymmetry of because.
The underlying structure of the tower-shadow scenario illustrates the tendency of (BecauseR) to
express a symmetric relation. In addition to the symmetry shown by Proposition 3, the scenario
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illustrates why a⇒ is prone to symmetry problems, even if certain antecedent conditions are not
explicitly stated. The tower-shadow scenario thus lets us recognize symmetry problems for (BecauseR)
even beyond the assumptions of Proposition 3.
Rott seems to be aware of the symmetry problems. He writes in Rott (1986, p. 347):
[If] someone insists that because is positively about an asymmetric causal relation in the
world, I have to confess that I cannot give a satisfactory interpretation of this ‘causal’
because. I shall concentrate on the ‘informative’ because specifying just reasons. Yet I
conjecture that this ‘informative’ because is the more common and the more general one,
and that the ‘causal’ because can eventually be characterised as a special case by a few
non-epistemic conditions.
The quote is interesting in at least three respects. (i) Rott distinguishes between several interpretations
of the word ‘because’ that correspond to different usages of the word. He calls the usage that points
to reasons ‘informative’, and the usage that expresses an ‘asymmetric causal relation’ ‘causal’. (ii)
Rott assumes that a concept of causation needs to satisfy ‘a few non-epistemic conditions’. Hence, he
writes that a causal relation be ‘in the world’, although he outlines a purely epistemic account. (iii)
Rott conjectures that the ontological ‘causal’ usage is derivative as a special case from the epistemic
‘informative’ usage.
We agree that the word ‘because’, like many natural language connectives, has several interpre-
tations, and thus is used in a variety of ways. As for the non-epistemic conditions that a concept of
causation may have to satisfy, the requirement that a cause precedes its effect seems still promising.
As is well known, this requirement is central to both Hume’s and Ramsey’s account of causation.14
Moreover, the requirement of temporal precedence has been adopted by Spohn (2006) in his ranking-
theoretic elaboration of the basic Humean idea about causation. We shall not further pursue this line
here, but confine ourselves to finding an epistemic interpretation of ‘because’ that is asymmetric. We
leave it open, however, whether or not this interpretation deserves to be called ‘causal’. In doing so,
we bracket the topic of causation for now and return to it in the next chapters.
Recall from Section 3.4 Rott’s basic idea that the ‘informative’ usage of ‘because’ expresses a
reason or an explanation. But then Rott’s analysis runs into the following difficulty: (BecauseR) fails
to capture the asymmetry associated with some explanations, as we have seen in the tower-shadow
scenario. In other words, if an explanation should intuitively be asymmetric, then (BecauseR) is too
permissive as it allows for intuitively incorrect converse explanations. We consider this difficulty to
call for a complementation of Rott’s merely ‘informative’ because with an epistemically asymmetric
because.
3.5.3 Using Belief Bases
So far the symmetry of Rott’s ‘because’ has been characterised within the original AGM belief revi-
sion theory, assuming validity of all AGM postulates as established in Gärdenfors (1988, Ch. 3). This
accords with the framework assumed in Rott’s analysis. Now we switch from the original AGM the-
ory, which employs belief sets, to belief revision using belief bases (as outlined in sections 3.2.6-3.2.4)
and Levi’s formulation of the Ramsey Test.
14“A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the
mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.” (Hume (1739/1978,
p. 170)) One might wonder whether the temporal order of cause and effect is a properly non-epistemic condition in the
context of Hume’s work, but this is a question that need not concern us here. See also Ramsey (1929/1990).
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As regards revisions and contractions, belief bases behave somewhat differently if compared to
belief sets.15 Notably, recovery (K−5), which is needed in the proof of Proposition 4, is not valid
for belief base revisions.16 Thus the question arises: could we resolve the symmetry problems of
(BecauseR) by resorting to belief base revisions instead of belief set revisions? The answer to this
question is no – as the below proposition shows.
Proposition 5. Assume a (BecauseR) agent accepts all the formulas in K(H, <) = K(S ) for H =
{t, s, sh, t ∧ s → sh}, where the order of epistemic priority is t ∼ s ∼ sh < t ∧ s → sh. Then t a⇒
sh < K>(S ) and sh a⇒ t ∈ K>(S ).
As compared to Proposition 4, Proposition 5 makes things even worse for Rott’s analysis of be-
cause. Using belief bases, (BecauseR) does not verify the desired direction ‘because of the tower there
is a shadow’. Moreover, a (BecauseR) agent is still committed to believe the undesired direction ‘be-
cause of the shadow there is a tower’. This shows that it is by no means a trivial task to find a Ramsey
Test operator capturing the asymmetry of the tower-shadow example, even if we employ belief bases.
In sum, switching from belief sets to belief bases does not resolve the problem that Rott’s analysis
of ‘because’ verifies the undesired direction that there is a tower because of the shadow. In the next
section, we propose an alternative strengthening of (RTG) that avoids this troublesome result and fares
better in capturing asymmetric relations of relevance.
3.6 Our Ramsey Test Analysis of ‘Because’
3.6.1 Further Strengthening the Ramsey Test Semantics
Ramsey (1950, p. 247) expresses his idea about the semantics of conditionals as follows:
In general we can say [...] that ‘If φ then ψ’ means that ψ is inferable from φ, that is, of
course, from φ together with certain facts and laws not stated but in some way indicated
by the context.
In Ramsey’s approach to conditionals, so-called ‘variable hypotheticals’ guide an agent’s infer-
ences. More specifically, a set of these law-like variable hypotheticals, together with a set of factual
beliefs, including the antecedent φ, let the agent infer the consequent ψ. The inferability from law-
like generalisations and facts is thus tantamount to the acceptability of conditionals, as has also been
pointed out in Levi’s (2007) interpretation of Ramsey’s approach. Ramsey’s test question is whether
the consequent can be inferred from generalisations judged to be reliable and some facts that specify
the boundary conditions or contextual knowledge so that the generalisations are applicable. A con-
ditional ‘If φ then ψ’ is thus acceptable just in case the consequent is inferable from the antecedent,
the atomic facts judged to be true, and the judged to be reliable generalisations. Notice that Ramsey’s
idea requires the retention of reliable generalisations. Otherwise, the conditional cannot be inferred.
This is very much in line with the discussion of non-trivial implications of Section 3.5.1.
Inspired by Ramsey, our test question is: after the suspension of judgment on everything that
entails antecedent and/or consequent, is an agent disposed to infer the consequent from the antecedent
and the remaining background beliefs including the generalisations? This basic idea of our semantics
may be expressed by the following evaluation recipe:
15See Hansson (1999) for a very comprehensive study of belief base revisions and contractions, including a detailed
comparison to belief set revisions and contractions.
16Hansson (1999, Ch. 2) discusses the recovery postulate in detail. In Van Benthem and Smets (2015, p. 302) recovery is
justifiedly called “the most conroversial” AGM postulate.
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First, suspend judgement about the antecedent and the consequent. Second, add the an-
tecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of explicit beliefs. Finally, consider whether or
not the consequent is entailed by your explicit beliefs.
Our basic idea is thus split into two steps. The first step consists in an ‘agnostic move’, i. e.
our agent suspends acceptance and/or rejection of antecedent α and consequent γ with respect to her
epistemic state.17 The second step then consists in supposing or hypothesising the antecedent α, and
checking whether the consequent γ is thereby inferred.
In order to render our idea precise, we introduce a belief function that helps us formally implement
the agnostic move.
Definition 14. Belief Function
Let ⊥ be some arbitrary classical contradiction, and φ a formula.
B(φ) =

φ if φ ∈ K
¬φ if ¬φ ∈ K
⊥ otherwise.
Now, we are in a position to present the core of our strengthened Ramsey Test semantics. Let
be the conditional connective of the Strengthened Ramsey Test. Then our evaluation recipe can be
formally expressed as follows:
α  γ ∈ K> iff α > γ ∈ K> − (B(α) ∨ B(γ)) iff γ ∈ K − (B(α) ∨ B(γ)) ∗ α. (S RTP)
The evaluation of α  γ consists of two steps. (i) The agnostic move is implemented by a contraction
of the belief set K by B(α) ∨ B(γ). The result is a new belief set K′ such that ¬α, α,¬γ, γ < K′ is
guaranteed. Moreover, K′ does neither contain B(α) ∨ B(γ) nor ¬B(α) ∨ ¬B(γ). The contraction by
B(α) ∨ B(γ) amounts to the agent’s operation of suspending acceptance and/or rejection with respect
to α and γ. We call the result of this contraction the agnostic belief set K′. (ii) α  γ ∈ K> iff
α > γ ∈ K′> iff γ ∈ K′ ∗ α. The second step requires for α  γ to be accepted that (RTL) is satisfied
for α > γ with respect to the agnostic belief set K′ of step (i).
We noted that ¬α < K − B(α) ∨ B(γ). By the Levi identity, we obtain:
γ ∈ K − (B(α) ∨ B(γ)) ∗ α iff γ ∈ K − (B(α) ∨ B(γ)) + α. (3)
Moreover, we have:
γ ∈ K − (B(α) ∨ B(γ)) + α iff K − (B(α) ∨ B(γ)), α ` γ (4)
where ` is the provability relation of classical logic. We arrive thus at an alternative formulation of
(S RTP):
α  γ ∈ K> iff K − (B(α) ∨ B(γ)), α ` γ. (5)
This formulation emphasises the inferential character of our strengthened Ramsey Test: α  γ
means that γ is inferable from α together with the beliefs in K − (B(α) ∨ B(γ)).
17The first step is reminiscent of the Pyrrhonian epoché by Edmund Husserl (1913, §§31-33). This phenomenological
epoché denotes the method of suspending or bracketing (German: Einklammerung) the acceptance status of one’s beliefs
about the world. We apply the Pyrrhonian idea with a – by far – smaller scope: we demand an agent to suspend her respective
belief status of the particular antecedent and consequent under consideration. We call the bracketing or suspension of
antecedent and consequent ‘agnostic move’ and credit Pyrrho by labelling our Strengthened Ramsey Test (SRTP).
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Interestingly, (S RTP) validates (Absurdity) if we employ belief sets. Suppose α, γ ∈ K. Applying
step (i) yields α, γ < K′. However, by the recovery postulate, (α ∨ γ) → γ ∈ K′ and thus, by closure,
α→ γ ∈ K′. Hence, γ ∈ K − (α ∨ γ) ∗ α.
In contrast, (S RTP) invalidates (Absurdity) if we employ belief bases. For, then, recovery is not
satisfied any more. Let S = (H, <) be an epistemic state. Then, it is an open question whether or not
γ ∈ K(S ′) ∗ α, and thus whether or not α  γ ∈ K>(S ).
Using belief bases provides Ramsey’s semantics of conditionals a transparent meaning: α  γ
means that γ is inferrable from α together with the ‘facts and laws not stated’ in the conditional, but ex-
plicitly stored in the agnostic epistemic state S ′. In other words, our agent will accept α  γ ∈ K>(S )
only if she is disposed to (classically) infer γ from α together with the literals and generalisations
stored in the agnostic epistemic state S ′.
According to Ramsey’s quote in Section 3.3.1 ‘two people’ can disagree when arguing ‘If p, will
q?’, even if both believe ¬p for certain. Our (S RTP) clarifies the sense in which p  q ∈ K(S ) and
p  ¬q ∈ K(S ) are contradictories: the ‘laws or hypotheses’ of S must be different. It could be that
two agents accept the same facts while they accept different generalisations. Hence, they would not
have a dispute about facts but about how to revise the beliefs. If for ‘either party’ ¬p ∈ K(S ), then
K(S ′) ∗ p entails either q or ¬q or none of q,¬q. A consistent epistemic agent cannot accept both
p  q and p  ¬q. Based on different sets of generalisations, however, two agents may well have
different inferential dispositions. This is Ramsey’s wisdom wherefore he speaks about ‘two people’.
Let us compare Rott’s (SRTR) and (BecauseR) with our (S RTP). Our semantics is closer to
Gärdenfors’s (RTG) than Rott’s is. The only difference, apart from using the formulation (RTL), to
(RTG) consists in bracketing the epistemic status of antecedent and consequent. After this suspension
of judgement, (RTG) is applied in the standard way. The bracketing of the epistemic status in the
agnostic epistemic state may be seen as a further strengthening of (RT−G) in the sense that not only the
consequent is contracted from the belief set, but also the antecedent. Almost ironically, we solve prob-
lems of excessive symmetry by a ‘more’ symmetric contraction as compared to (RT−G). The additional
epistemic suspension of the antecedent is the reason in virtue of which our semantics does not require
a contrary-to-fact-supposition, but nevertheless expresses a relation of positive relevance. In contrast,
(BecauseR) requires a counterfactual supposition in view of cases in which the antecedent α remains
in K −γ. For, then K −γ = (K −γ) ∗α, and so γ < (K −γ) ∗α. Without a contrary-to-fact-supposition,
our semantics does not rely on a notion that structurally resembles a counterfactual notion of causal
dependence.
3.6.2 Another Analysis of ‘Because’
By Ramsey’s view on the relation between ‘if’ and ‘because’ and Rott’s constraint on universal pro-
conditionals, we can read our (S RTP) ‘if’ as ‘because’ in the case when α, γ ∈ K. Thus, we obtain the
following analysis:
α P⇒ γ ∈ K> iff α  γ ∈ K> and α, γ ∈ K. (BecauseP)
To avoid well-known paradoxes involving tautologies, we may furthermore require that the conse-
quent of an explanatory relation is contingent. That is, we may require that γ < Cn(∅). But we shall
not further explore paradoxes with logical truths surrounding conditionals and explanatory relations
as this is a different topic.
Arguably, the semantics of (BecauseP) is simpler than that of (BecauseR) insofar as it does not
rest on counterfactual suppositions. In comparison to (RT−G), our semantics puts more emphasis on
the inference relation between antecedent (plus context knowledge) and consequent by bracketing the
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epistemic status of the antecedent and the consequent – which is in the spirit of Ramsey’s ideas about
conditionals. Moreover, our semantics solves the class of symmetry problems associated with the
tower-shadow scenario of Section 3.5.2, as we shall see in the next section.
3.6.3 Symmetry Problems Resolved
We reconsider now the tower-shadow scenario with respect to our analysis of ‘because’. In the original
AGM framework, we will see that our analysis does not provide the desired asymmetry, because of
the recovery postulate governing the belief set. If we use belief bases, however, we can show (1) that
our semantics for ‘because’ validates the intuitively correct (explanatory) because statement, and (2)
that our semantics invalidates the intuitively incorrect, converse because statement.
Proposition 6. Assume a (BecauseP) agent accepts all facts and the single, more entrenched gen-
eralisation of the tower-shadow scenario, i. e. t, s, sh, t ∧ s → sh ∈ K. Then t P⇒ sh ∈ K> and
sh P⇒ t ∈ K>.
The proposition shows that (BecauseP) validates (with respect to K) that ‘because there is a tower,
there is a shadow’, as desired. However, in the original AGM framework, our semantics validates
(with respect to K) also the undesired direction ‘because there is a shadow, there is a tower’.
Let us move on to belief bases. The following proposition shows the asymmetry we were looking
for.
Proposition 7. Assume a (BecauseP) agent accepts all the formulas in K(H, <) = K(S ) for H =
{t, s, sh, t ∧ s → sh}, where the agent may assume whatever epistemic ordering <. Then t P⇒ sh ∈
K>(S ), but sh P⇒ t < K>(S ).
The proposition shows that (BecauseP) validates (with respect to K(S )) that ‘because there is a
tower, there is a shadow’, as desired. Using belief bases, our semantics invalidates (with respect to
K(S )) the undesired direction ‘because there is a shadow, there is a tower’. Note that this result holds
independently of any assumptions about the epistemic ordering among the members of the belief base
H.
The result is reasonable since a shadow may be cast by various things. It does not have to be a
tower. To this claim, one may object that the shadow cast by this tower has a particular shape that is
normally only produced by the very tower. This objection presupposes that an agent can uniquely infer
the antecedent from the consequent. But there are frequently occurring examples where the agent is
not able to do this. Here is such an example: person A sees person B taking poisonous arsenic, which
leads to the death of B. Once A has suspended judgement about B’s poisoning himself and his death,
the assumption of B’s taking arsenic lets A infer B’s death, but the assumption of B’s death does not
allow A to infer B’s intake of arsenic.
We note that the generalisation t ∧ s→ sh figures as ‘directed inference ticket’ when using belief
bases in virtue of the absence of recovery. In general, it is easy to show that an implication α → γ
is ‘non-trivially’ in a belief base H iff α  γ ∈ K>(H, <), where α, γ are literals or conjunctions
thereof. In contrast to a⇒ , the ‘non-triviality’ of an implication α → γ ∈ H is not sufficient for the
acceptance of γ  α ∈ K>(H, <).
In the original AGM framework, (BecauseP) succumbs to the same class of symmetry problems
as Rott’s analysis. In contrast to (BecauseR), however, our semantics provides the desired asymmetry,
but only if we use belief bases. We conclude that, using belief bases, our strengthened Ramsey Test
semantics solves the class of symmetry problems characterised by the tower-shadow scenario. The
idea behind (BecauseP) is thus able to capture these asymmetric relations of relevance.
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It is worth noting, finally, that the asymmetry of ‘because’ may also be captured by (BecauseP)
together with a belief set revision scheme that does not validate the recovery postulate. Severe with-
drawals by Rott and Pagnucco (1999) and the related scheme of mild contractions by Levi (2004)
seem to be the most obvious choices for such a scheme. These findings may cast doubt on the validity
of the recovery postulate from a different angle.18
3.6.4 Note on Non-triviality
A note on triviality is in order here. As is well known, Gärdenfors (1986, 1988, Ch. 7) has shown that
his version of the Ramsey Test implies, in the context of the full set of AGM postulates, that there
are only trivial belief revision systems. (The precise meaning of triviality need not concern us here.)
Therefrom, he concluded that either the Ramsey Test or a rationality postulate called preservation
if ¬α < K and β ∈ K, then β ∈ K ∗ α (K∗P)
has to be given up (where βmay well be a conditional). Does our strengthened Ramsey Test fall prey to
the triviality theorem? It does not. For here is a counterexample to (K∗P). Suppose K = Cn(q→ ¬r).
Hence, q  ¬r ∈ K>. Now, let us revise K (consistently) with q → r such that (i) ¬q < ¬q ∨ r for
the beliefs of K′ = K ∗ (q → r) = Cn({q → r, q → ¬r}). Using (G−), we can infer from (i) that
(q → r) ∈ K′ − (¬q ∨ >), where > stands for a tautology. Hence, (q → ¬r) < K′ − (¬q ∨ >). By
the definition of , this implies that q  ¬r < K′>. Hence, (K∗P) is violated. (For belief bases, an
analogous result can easily be obtained with the same formulas.) Our semantics of  is therefore
non-trivial in the sense that a crucial premise of Gärdenfors’ triviality theorem is violated.
Gärdenfors’s triviality result forces us to chose between preservation (for conditionals) and the
Ramsey Test. Our semantics for  does not validate preservation in the first place. Hence, we can
side with the Ramsey Test without falling prey to the triviality result.
3.6.5 Note on Package Contraction
We have expressed the suspension of judgement about the antecedent α and the consequent γ using
a contraction by the disjunction α ∨ γ. We should acknowledge, however, that the suspension of
judgement can also be expressed by an operation called package contraction. This operation contracts
a belief set K by another belief set A. Such contractions can be determined using ideas about partial
meet revision, which are based on the notion of a package remainder:
Definition 15. K⊥A (Fuhrmann and Hansson (1994, Sect. 8))
Let K and A be two sets of formulas. B ` A means that B entails at least one member of A. K′ ∈ K⊥ A
iff
1. K′ ⊆ K
2. K′ 0 A
3. there is no K′′ such that K′ ⊂ K′′ ⊆ K and K′′ ` A.
A selection function for K⊥A can then be invoked, as explained in Section 3.2.5. (The notion of a
selection function applies to remainder sets of belief sets and belief bases.)
18For the usual criticisms of this postulate, see, for instance, Hansson (1991) and Makinson (1987).
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Why did we not chose package contractions to define the suspension of judgement about the
antecedent and the consequent? This question is easy to answer if we work with belief bases and
adopt the conventions of Section 3.2.6 as well as Definition 12, (Def σ), and (PMBC) for belief base
contractions. Let us assume these definitions (i. e. Definition (12), (Def σ) and (PMBC)) also for
belief base package contractions. On these conditions, it is easy to show that (H, <) − α ∨ γ = (H, <
) − {α, γ}. So it does not make a difference which operation is used. For simplicity, we chose the
contraction by α ∨ γ as opposed to the package contraction by {α, γ}.
If we do not work with belief bases or deviate from the conventions in Section 3.2.6, using a pack-
age contraction by {α, γ} rather than a contraction by α ∨ γ may well have unintended consequences.
Suppose the strengthened Ramsey Test conditional p is defined using a package contraction. Fur-
ther, assume α, γ ∈ K(S ) and α→ γ has high epistemic priority, and is epistemically superior to both
α and γ. (Epistemic priority may be spelled out in terms of an ordering among the members of a belief
base, an entrenchment ordering, or an ordering of subsets of K that defines a selection function σ.)
Then, it is reasonable to expect that α p γ. For, there is an inferential connection between α and γ
that is based on a generalisation with high epistemic priority. Now, suppose that α∨γ has even higher
epistemic priority than α → γ. Suppose, for contradiction, α p γ. By the deduction theorem, this
implies that (i) α→ γ ∈ K(S ′), where S ′ = S − {α, γ}. Because of the high priority of α ∨ γ, we have
α ∨ γ ∈ K(S ′) and so (ii) ¬α → γ ∈ K(S ′). Since K(S ′) is closed under classical logic, (i) and (ii)
imply that γ ∈ K(S ′). This, however, contradicts S ′ = S − {α, γ}. Hence, α p γ < K>(S ).
The underlying problem is that, if α ∨ γ has epistemic priority over α → γ (while we do believe
α → γ quite firmly), the package contraction by {α, γ} forces us to give up α → γ. We avoid this
problem if we define the suspension of judgement via a contraction by α ∨ γ.
3.6.6 Note on the Logic of the Strenghtened Ramsey Test Conditional
Unfortunately, working out the logical theory of our strengthened Ramsey Test Conditional  is
a comprehensive enterprise, in particular if we consider belief bases part of its semantics. On the
surface, it seems that  behaves similar to the conditional operators due to Stalnaker (1968), Lewis
(1973a) and Gärdenfors (1988), or the systems of non-monotonic reasoning à la Kraus et al. (1990).
However, this appearance is misleading. The logical theory of is quite different from the conditional
logics of the mentioned operators. One of the reasons is that does not validate a rule called RCM by
Chellas (1980), which corresponds to the rule Right Weakening (RW) in the context of non-monotonic
reasoning systems. These rules are needed in many proofs of the standard properties of conditional
logics, even very weak ones.
Here are the rules, where→ stands for the material implication and > for a conditional operator:
RW :
` α→ β γ > α
γ > β
(6)
RCM :
` α→ β
(γ > α)→ (γ > β) (7)
Here is a counterexample to RW for: Suppose H = {p, q, r, q∧ r → p}, where p, q, r, < q∧ r →
p. Let S = (H, <).
(i) S − (p ∨ q) = S ′ = {r, q ∧ r → p}. Therefore, S ′ ∗ q ` p, and so q  p ∈ K>(S ).
(ii) S − (p ∨ q ∨ r) = S ′ = {q ∧ r → p}. Therefore, S ′ ∗ q 0 p ∨ r as K(S ′) = Cn({q, q ∧ r → p}).
Consequently, q  (p ∨ r) < K>(S ).
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(i) and (ii) show that the following instance of RW or RCM is not valid:
RW :
` p→ p ∨ r q  p ∈ K>(S )
q  (p ∨ r) ∈ K>(S ) (8)
RCM :
` p→ p ∨ r
(q  p ∈ K>(S ))→ (q  (p ∨ r) ∈ K>(S )) (9)
We see that the logical weakening of the consequent of  is not valid. This property might be
interesting in the context of relevance logics. For now, let us resume the main thread of the chapter.
3.7 Generalising the Tower-Shadow Scenario
3.7.1 Conjunctive and Disjunctive Scenarios
We have spent quite a bit of time investigating the explanatory directions of the famous tower-shadow
asymmetry. It proved anything but trivial to capture these directions in a Ramsey Test framework. Our
solution to this problem is of course intended to work not only for a single example, but for a wider
class of explanatory relations. Let us therefore specify further classes of explanatory relations that are
well captured by (BecauseP).
Suppose our prioritised belief base consists of two levels: an upper level G of generalisations and
a lower level L of literals, as explained in Section 3.2.6. Further, let us distinguish between different
types of generalisation:
α1 ∧ . . . ∧ αn → γ (C)
α1 ∨ . . . ∨ αn → γ (D)
where α1, . . . , αn are literals. We say that a generalisation of type (C) represents a conjunctive explana-
tory scenario, whereas a generalisation of type (D) represents a disjunctive explanatory scenario.19 It
seems as if these generalisations give rise to corresponding explanatory relations, in the sense of the
present Ramsey Test analysis of ‘because’. Suppose δ is a generalisation of type (C). Then, ‘γ be-
cause of αi’ is verified by an epistemic state (H, <) if (i) δ ∈ G, and α1, . . . , αn ∈ L. Suppose δ is a
generalisation of type (D). Then, ‘γ because of αi’ is verified by (H, <) if (i) δ ∈ G, and αi ∈ L. Recall
that H = G ∪ L.
These explanatory relations do in fact hold for a large class of conjunctive and disjunctive explana-
tory scenarios, but there are exceptions. Suppose a lit match that is dropped and lightning individually
suffice to bring about a forest fire, on condition that oxygen is present. Further, assume that both a lit
match has actually been dropped and lightning has actually occurred. So, there is a forest fire. Intu-
itively, we would endorse ‘there is a forest fire because of lightning’ and ‘there is a forest fire because
of the lit match’. The example can be formalised by the following prioritised belief base:
m ∧ o→ f , l ∧ o→ f
m, l, o, f
where the propositional constants have the following natural language interpretations. m: a lit
match has been dropped in the forest. l: there is lightning with electrical discharges to the ground of
the forest. f : there is a forest fire. o: oxygen is present.
19The distinction between conjunctive and disjunctive explanatory scenarios is taken from an analogous distinction in the
literature on actual causation (cf. Halpern and Pearl (2005, Sec. 3)). Disjunctive scenarios amount to cases of overdetermi-
nation if more than one of the antecedent conditions is satisfied.
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Let us test for l  f . (H, <)−(l∨ f ) = ({m∧o→ f , l∧o→ f }, <′). Hence, f < (K(H, <)−(l∨ f ))+l.
Therefore, l  f < K>(H, <). So our Ramsey Test analysis of ‘because’does not verify ‘there is a
forest fire because of lightning’, which is counterintuitive.
The present example is a variant of a scenario of overdetermining causes in the literature on actual
causation (Halpern and Pearl, 2005, Sec. 3). So we can describe this example as one of overdeter-
mining causal explanations. It is easy to see that the problem in question arises not just because of
the overdetermination structure but because of the combination of this structure with a background
condition that is needed for the two explanations of the forest fire. We try to solve this problem by
drawing on ideas about causal graphs, as introduced in the literature on actual causation (cf. Halpern
and Pearl (2005)).
Let us view the members of a belief base H with two levels G and L in terms of an undirected
graph in the following way. The propositional constants of the literals in L are represented by nodes,
while any two nodes whose propositional constants occur together in some generalisation in G are
connected by an edge. We can derive the literal γ from the literal α, using certain generalisations in
G, only if these literals are connected by a path. Let us call such a path explanatory iff there is a
derivation of γ from α that uses generalisations of G and, possibly, also literals of L. In the case of
a scenario of overdetermination, we have two different explanatory paths with two different literals α
and α′. Arguably, for α to explain γ, it suffices if there is a subgraph that contains one explanatory
path from α to γ. This view is analogous to the widely shared intuition that overdetermining causes
are proper causes.
Drawing on this picture of explanatory paths, we can account for overdetermining explanations
by weakening our strengthened Ramsey Test:
α s γ ∈ K>(H, <) iff there are (H′, <′) and L−∈H s.t.
(H′, <′) = (H, <) −
∨
L−, α  γ ∈ K>(H′, <′), and
L− is a possibly empty set of literals.
(S RTP′)
∨
A designates an arbitrary disjunction of the members of the set A of formulas. This translates
directly to our analysis of ‘because’:
Because α, γ (relative to K(H, <)) iff
α, γ ∈ K(H, <) and α s γ ∈ K>(H, <).
(BecauseP′)
The motivation for this refinement may be summarised as follows: to capture explanatory relations
in terms of inferential connections between literals, it is sometimes necessary to ignore explanatory
paths that are parallel to the one under consideration. Fortunately, there is no need to specify the
meaning of ‘sometimes’ in this justification. In the literature on actual causation it is a common
strategy to identify active causal paths in terms of a subset of the nodes of a given causal graph
(Hitchcock, 2007; Halpern and Pearl, 2005). The index ‘s’ in s stands for ‘subset’, thus indicating
that a subset of H suffices as background theory for α to be inferentially relevant for γ.
This refined analysis of ‘because’ solves our problem. For this to be seen, observe that (H, <)
contracted by
∨{m} yields (H′, <′) =
l ∧ o→ f , m ∧ o→ f
l, o, f
and l  f ∈ K>(H′, <′). In the next section, we shall see that (BecauseP′) works for any combi-
nation of conjunctive and disjunctive scenarios. That is, we can combine generalisations of type (C)
and (D), in an arbitrary way, to form explanatory paths.
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3.7.2 Inferential Ramsey Test Explanations
Our Ramsey Test analysis of ‘because’, combined with belief bases, qualifies as an inferential ap-
proach to explanation. For, it is essential to this analysis that the explanandum can be inferred from
the explanans, in the context of certain generalisations and possibly further background conditions.
In this section, we shall specify which explanatory inferential relations are captured by our analysis,
given the members of the belief base satisfy the conventions of Section 3.2.6. Thereby, we charac-
terise a large class of explanatory relations for which our analysis of ‘because’ works correctly and
completely.
We confine ourselves to explanatory relations between presumed facts that are expressed by liter-
als. An inferential explanation of this type may be characterised as follows:
Definition 16. Inferential explanation of γ by α
We say that α inferentially explains γ – in the eyes of an agent a – iff there are G and L such that
1. G is a set of generalisations
2. L is a set of literals
3. α and γ are literals and believed to be true by a
4. all members of G ∪ L are believed to be true by a
5. G ∪ L, α ` γ
6. G ∪ L 0 γ.
Figuratively speaking, we can say that α explains γ iff there is an inferential path from α to γ such
that α is an essential premise of this path, and all premises are believed to be true. Our analysis of
‘because’ by (BecauseP′) captures precisely this inferential understanding of an explanation:
Proposition 8. Let α and γ be literals. Epistemic states are represented by prioritised belief bases
with two levels: an upper level G of generalisations and a lower level L of literals, as explained in
Section 3.2.6. A (BecauseP′) agent accepts ‘γ because of α’ with respect to (H, <) iff α inferentially
explains γ – in the sense of Definition 16 – in the eyes of the agent accepting all members of H.
One must wonder, however, whether (BecauseP′) is strictly asymmetric in the sense that ‘γ because
of α’ implies that ‘α because of γ’ does not hold. This is not so. Symmetric explanations can be
constructed if we have G ∪ L, α ` γ and G ∪ L, γ ` α.
Should we therefore further strengthen our semantics so as to yield a strictly asymmetric condi-
tional? Is our common sense and scientific notion of ‘because’ asymmetric in the sense that ‘γ because
of α’ always precludes ‘α because of γ’? While it is difficult to provide a clear-cut example of a prop-
erly symmetric explanation, we hesitate to answer this question in the affirmative. We could enforce
strict asymmetry, of course, by simply defining α a γ iff α s γ and γ 4s α. This would rule out
a number of further cases, such as inferential relations that are based on definitions or mathematical
laws.
The question of whether explanatory relations are strictly asymmetric is strongly related to re-
search in philosophy of science on explanation and causation. It is an open question whether or not
any explanation must be causal, as suggested by Woodward (2003). If so, then there is good rea-
son to suppose that explanatory relations must be asymmetric, given that causation is an asymmetric
relation. Our analysis of ‘because’ thus becomes intertwined with an analysis of causation. Future
research must show how our strengthened Ramsey Test semantics can be exploited for a fully fledged
account of scientific explanation.
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3.8 Conclusion
We strengthened Gärdenfors’s Ramsey Test semantics for conditionals in a way which is well-
motivated by Ramsey’s original remarks. Like Rott’s Strong Ramsey Test, but unlike Gärdenfors
Ramsey Test semantics, our semantics avoids the absurdity that any two accepted formulas constitute
an accepted because sentence. However, Rott’s analysis of ‘because’ is susceptible to symmetry prob-
lems, as was shown by Proposition 3 and the tower-shadow scenario. Using belief bases, we could
show that our strengthened Ramsey Test semantics captures the asymmetry of the tower-shadow sce-
nario in an intuitively correct manner: the presence of the tower explains the presence of the shadow,
but not vice versa.
We moved on to generalising the tower-shadow scenario by characterising the beliefs on the basis
of which ‘γ because of α’ is verified by an epistemic state, according to our analysis. This generali-
sation reveals that our analysis of ‘because’ is not strictly asymmetric. At least for causal explanatory
relations in scientific language, a strictly asymmetric analysis of ‘because’ seems to be called for. We
envision to achieve such an analysis by an epistemic analysis of causation that is likewise based on
the present variant of a strengthened Ramsey Test. The idea is that we can use this epistemic analysis
of causation to identify actual causes and distinguish them from their effects. If we succeed, we can
test whether ‘because α, γ’ expresses a causal relation. We turn to this epistemic analysis of actual
causation in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
Causation in Terms of Production
In this chapter, we aim to analyse actual causation in terms of production. The latter concept is made
precise by the strengthened Ramsey Test semantics of conditionals that we developed in the previous
chapter. In brief, we recall that our strengthened Ramsey Test conditional A  C is satisfied just
in case C is believed in the course of assuming A, after judgement has been suspended about A and
C. The idea is that this test allows us to (epistemically) verify or falsify that an event brings about
another event. We will see that complementing the concept of production by a weak condition of
difference-making gives rise to a full-blown analysis of causation.
Inspired by Hall (2004) and Hall (2007), we regard production rather than counterfactual depen-
dence as the more central notion of causation. As we just mentioned, we aim to analyse the concept
of production by a strengthened Ramsey Test conditional. Based on the Ramsey Test conditional, we
define a concept of causation that is reductive and solves the problems of overdetermination, preemp-
tion, and double prevention. Moreover, we aim to solve the problem of spurious causation by a best
system account of generalisations.
Sources. This chapter builds on joint work with Holger Andreas. Substantial content of Andreas
and Günther (2019) is reprinted by permission from Springer Nature: Springer Netherlands, Philo-
sophical Studies, Causation in Terms of Production, Holger, A. and Günther, M., License Number
4553020860480 (2019), advance online publication, 19 March 2019 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-
019-01275-3, Philos Stud).
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4.1 Introduction
We aim to propose an analysis of causation that builds upon a strengthened Ramsey Test semantics of
conditionals. The evaluation recipe for such conditionals can be expressed as follows:
First, suspend judgement about the antecedent and the consequent. Second, add the an-
tecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of explicit beliefs. Finally, consider whether or
not the consequent is entailed by your explicit beliefs.
In brief, A  C iff, after suspending judgement about A and C, C is believed in the course of assuming
A. We suggest that such a test allows us to (epistemically) verify or falsify that an event brings about a
certain other event, and thus qualifies as a candidate cause of the latter event. Hence, as a preliminary
starting point, we define:
C is a cause of E iff C and E occur, and C  E. (Def C)
The logical foundations of the belief changes that define the conditional are explicated using AGM-
style belief revision theory, as founded by Alchourrón et al. (1985) and fleshed out by Gärdenfors
(1988).
We aim to set forth the first analysis of causation in terms of production that is formally as rig-
orous as the counterfactual accounts of causation by Lewis (1973c) and Halpern and Pearl (2005).
As pointed out by Paul and Hall (2013), these counterfactual accounts face persistent problems, es-
pecially the combination of overdetermination, preemption, and double prevention. For our analysis
the problem of overdetermination does not even arise. Early and late preemption turn out to be the
same problem, which is solved by imposing constraints on the inferential relations underlying the
conditional. Halpern and Pearl (2005) solve the problems of overdetermination and preemption in
a formally rigorous way as well, but at the price of rather complex set-theoretic constructions that are
difficult to supplement with an intuitive motivation. We do not discuss causal models in this chapter.
In the next chapter, however, we will translate the present analysis into the framework of causal mod-
els, and then compare it to the definition of actual cause due to Halpern and Pearl (2005) and Halpern
(2015).
The plan of this chapter is straightforward: we work upward from belief changes via the strength-
ened Ramsey Test to an analysis of causation. In Section 4.2, we explain the basic ideas of AGM-style
belief revision theory and the Ramsey Test, then moving on to our strengthened Ramsey Test condi-
tional. On the basis of the conditional, Section 4.3 develops an epistemic approach to causation.
In a stepwise fashion, we deal with the problems of joint effects, overdetermination and conjunctive
scenarios, early and late preemption, switches and double prevention. Section 4.4 aims to answer the
challenge of spurious causation by amending our analysis with a best systems account of generalisa-
tions. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Belief Changes and the Ramsey Test
4.2.1 Belief Changes: Basic Ideas
AGM-style belief revision theory provides a precise semantics of belief changes for the Ramsey Test.
Let us therefore make ourselves familiar with the basic ideas of belief revision. Suppose K is a set of
formulas that represent the beliefs of an agent, while A is a formula that represents a single belief. In
the AGM framework, one distinguishes three types of belief change of a belief set K by a formula A:
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1. Expansions K + A
2. Revisions K ∗ A
3. Contractions K ÷ A.
An expansion of K by A consists in the addition of a new belief A to the belief set K. This operation
is not constrained by any considerations as to whether the new epistemic input A is consistent with
the set K of present beliefs. Hence, none of the present beliefs is retracted by an expansion. K + A
designates the expanded belief set.
A revision of K by A, by contrast, can be described as the consistent integration of a new epistemic
input A into a belief system K. If A is consistent with K, it holds that K + A = K ∗ A, i. e. the revision
by A is equivalent to the expansion by A. If, however, A is not consistent with K, some of the present
beliefs are to be retracted, as a consequence of adopting the new epistemic input. K ∗A designates the
revised system of beliefs.
A contraction of K by A, finally, consists in retracting a certain formula A from the presently
accepted system of beliefs. This operation will be used to define the suspension of judgement about A
in our strengthened version of the Ramsey Test. K ÷ A designates the belief set after the retraction of
A.
In some contexts, it is helpful to distinguish between the belief system K and the epistemic state
S that underlies it. Henceforth, we shall make this distinction, and write K(S ) for the belief system K
of the epistemic state S .
Belief changes can be defined in various ways. A large number of different belief revision schemes
have been developed in the spirit of the original AGM theory. We shall assume that epistemic states
are represented by belief bases. In symbols, S = H. A belief base H is a set of formulas that represent
the explicit beliefs of an agent. Belief base revision schemes are guided by the idea that the inferential
closure of a belief base H gives us the belief set K of H:
K(H) =d f In f (H).
K contains all beliefs of the epistemic state H, i. e. the explicit beliefs and those beliefs that the agent
is committed to accept because they are inferable from the explicit beliefs. In f is an inferential closure
operation that may or may not be given by the consequence operation of classical logic.1
The definition of an expansion is straightforward for belief bases:
K(H) + A =d f K(H + A)
where H + A stands for adding the new epistemic input to the belief base H.
Note that we can define revisions in terms of contractions and expansions:
K(S ) ∗ A = (K(S ) ÷ ¬A) + A. (Levi identity)
Once we have retracted ¬A, we obtain a belief set K(S ′) that is consistent with A. Hence, we have
K(S ′) ∗ A = K(S ′) + A.
In the following analysis of causation, we assume that our belief base has exactly two levels of
epistemic priority: the upper level, containing the generalisations, and the lower level, which contains
our beliefs about atomic facts. These levels of epistemic priority affect the determination of belief
changes: when we retract a belief A, we first retract atomic beliefs that imply A (in the context of the
1Nonmonotonic and paraconsistent inference operations have proved useful as well, for example Brewka (1991).
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generalisations). If necessary, we also retract generalisations, but only if the retraction of A cannot be
achieved by retractions of beliefs with lower epistemic priority. For the considerations to follow, it
may be helpful to have a graphical representation of such a prioritised belief base in mind:
G
F
G stands for the set of generalisations, while F contains the beliefs about the atomic facts. For
some causal scenarios, it is necessary to distinguish between strict and ceteris paribus generalisations.
Then, we need to have at least two levels of epistemic priority for the generalisations. The canonical
scenarios of preemption, overdetermination, and double prevention can be represented using just one
level of generalisations. We shall use boldfaced symbols, such as H and H′, to refer to prioritised
belief bases.
Such are the basic ideas about belief changes that will be used in the present analysis of causation.
In the Appendix, we expound precise definitions of belief changes for prioritised belief bases. These
definitions will enable the reader to formally verify, or to falsify, certain claims to be made about
applications of our analysis to causal scenarios. For an intuitive understanding of what follows, the
Appendix is not needed.
4.2.2 The Ramsey Test
Ramsey (1929/1990) devised an epistemic evaluation recipe for conditionals that is nowadays known
as the Ramsey Test. Its core idea has been pointedly expressed by Stalnaker (1968, p. 102):
First, add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs; second, make whatever
adjustments are required to maintain consistency (without modifying the hypothetical
belief in the antecedent), finally, consider whether or not the consequent is then true.
It was then Gärdenfors (1978) who translated this test into the language of belief changes and who in-
sisted more forcefully than Stalnaker on an epistemic understanding of conditionals. Using the AGM
framework, he was able to define a semantics of conditionals explicitly in terms of belief changes:
A > C ∈ K(S ) iff C ∈ K(S ) ∗ A (RT)
where > designates the conditional connective. Recall that K(S ) ∗ A designates the revision of the
beliefs of an epistemic state S with the formula A. So the Ramsey Test defines that a conditional
A > C is to be accepted in a belief system K(S ) iff the consequent C is in K(S ) when revised by the
antecedent A. Unlike Gärdenfors (1978), we require that A and C be non-conditional formulas.2
4.2.3 Strengthening the Ramsey Test
As we have seen in the previous chapter, in order to analyse the logic of ‘because’, Rott (1986)
introduces a strengthened version of the Ramsey Test:
A≫ C iff C ∈ K(S ) ∗ A and C < K(S ) ∗ ¬A.
2Gärdenfors (1986) has proven a triviality theorem concerning the Ramsey Test, after a conditional logic was developed
on the basis of this test in Gärdenfors (1978). Recently, however, there have been various, apparently successful attempts at
defending the Ramsey Test in light of this result (see, e.g., Bradley (2007)). We have shown that our strengthened Ramsey
Test does not imply triviality in Chapter 3, Section 3.6.4, and Andreas and Günther (2018).
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In the wake of this work, we define a conditional with the following intuitive meaning: A  C iff,
after suspending any beliefs in K(S ) as to whether A and C are true or false, it holds that C ∈ K(S )∗A.
The evaluation of A  C, thus, consists of two steps: (i) contracting K(S ) in such a manner that we
become agnostic about A and C; (ii) testing whether or not C is in K(S ) ∗ A. In more formal terms:
Definition 17. Belief function B(A)
Let T be some arbitrary classical tautology and A a formula.
B(A) =

A if A ∈ K(S )
¬A if ¬A ∈ K(S )
¬T otherwise.
A  C ∈ K(S ) iff C ∈ (K(S ) ÷ B(A) ∨ B(C)) ∗ A. (SRT)
Contracting K(S ) by B(A) ∨ B(C), where A and C are contingent, results in a belief system K(S ′)
that contains none of A, ¬A, C, ¬C. Moreover, K(S ′) does neither contain B(A) ∨ B(C) nor ¬B(A) ∨
¬B(C). Subsequently, the ordinary Ramsey Test is carried out on the belief set K(S ′). That is, A 
C ∈ K(S ) iff C ∈ K(S ′) ∗ A.
In other words, the first step of (SRTSE) consists in an agnostic move that lets us suspend judge-
ment about the antecedent and the consequent. Then, we check whether or not we can infer the
consequent C from the antecedent A, in the context of the remaining beliefs of the epistemic state. If
so, A  C ∈ K(S ). Otherwise, A  C < K(S ).
Note that ¬A < K(S ) ÷ B(A) ∨ B(C). By the Levi identity, this implies that
C ∈ (K(S ) ÷ B(A) ∨ B(C)) ∗ A iff C ∈ (K(S ) ÷ B(A) ∨ B(C)) + A.
Moreover, we have:
C ∈ (K(S ) ÷ B(A) ∨ B(C)) + A iff (K(S ) ÷ B(A) ∨ B(C)), A ` C
where ` designates the relation of provability in classical logic. Hence,
A  C ∈ K(S ) iff (K(S ) ÷ B(A) ∨ B(C)), A ` C.
This is another formulation of (SRTSE). A  C therefore means that the consequent C is inferable
from the antecedent A, together with certain beliefs in K(S ), after judgement has been suspended
about A and C. The above definition of is defined for epistemic states S in general, which may be
represented in various ways. For the analysis to follow, however, we assume that epistemic states are
represented by prioritised belief bases. In symbols, we assume that there is a prioritised belief base H
such that S = H.
4.3 Causation
4.3.1 Actual Causation
We are aiming at an analysis of actual causation between events. Actual causation concerns the
question of whether or not a particular occurrent event causes another occurrent event. It is related
to, but different from causation at the type-level, which concerns causal relations between repeatable
events. Unless otherwise stated, upper case Latin letters stand for propositions saying that a certain
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event occurs. By abuse of notation, we shall also speak of the event C, and thereby refer to the event
whose occurrence is claimed by the proposition C.
We express the requirement that the causal relata be occurring events as follows:
C, E ∈ K(S ). (C1)
K(S ) designates the belief set of the epistemic state S . Our analysis is thus relative to an epistemic
state, in a similar way as the analysis of Spohn (2006) and Ramsey (1929/1990) is, and perhaps the
one of Hume (1739/1978).3
4.3.2 Production
Recall that our analysis of causation is driven by the idea that a cause brings about, or produces, its
effect. Consequently, we advance the strengthened Ramsey Test as an inferential means to verify or
falsify that a certain event brings about a certain other event. Hence, for C to be a cause of E it must
hold that
C  E ∈ K(S ).
This condition allows us to capture a large range of causal relations. It is somewhat too liberal,
however. Sometimes, we are not only able to infer the effect from the cause, but also the other way
around. For example, thunder caused by lightning seems to be unique in the sense that it is different
from thunder caused by blasts or supersonic aircraft. (If it is not, then the better for our analysis.)
Hence, lightning strongly conditionally implies – in the sense of (SRTSE) – thunder. But it seems
counterintuitive and wrong to view thunder as a cause of lightning. For thunder does not produce
lightning.
The idea of production seems to imply a temporal asymmetry between the producing event and
the effect: the cause must precede its effect. Hence,
t(C) < t(E) (C2)
where t(C) is a function that yields the time at which the event C occurs. (C2) expresses an old
Humean dictum on causation, which is also central to Spohn’s ranking-theoretic analysis of causation.
We thus take the temporal order of events as not relying on causal relations. Once (C2) is in place,
our analysis rules out that the thunder is a cause of the lightning, as intended. If A, B, or A and B are
temporally extended events, we take t(A) < t(B) to mean that A comes into being before B, while A
and B may well overlap.
4.3.3 Joint Effects
Joint effects of a common cause can pose a problem for an inferential approach to causation. Take the
following neuron diagram from Paul and Hall (2013, p. 71):
3In the Treatise, Hume defines: “A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the
idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea
of the other.” (Hume (1739/1978, p. 170), our emphasis). Hume can be read to slightly favour this essentially epistemic
account of causation over a non-epistemic variant.
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C D
B
E
Figure 4.1: A neuron diagram for joint effects of a common cause.
C fires and, thereby, sends signals to D and B so that D and B are excited. E is excited in the
course of receiving a signal from D. Intuitively, the excitation of B is not a cause of the excitation of
E. However, the excitation of B strongly conditionally implies – in the sense of (SRT) – the excitation
of E. For, once we have suspended judgement about the excitation of both B and E, the excitation of
B lets us infer the excitation of C because there is no other way to excite B. Therefrom, we can infer
that D fires, which in turn implies the excitation of E.
As observed by Paul and Hall (2013, 71-72), most counterfactual approaches solve the problem by
excluding backtracking counterfactuals. We can adopt a similar strategy. The counterintuitive result
about joint effects is avoided if all inferences that lead from the presumed cause C to the putative
effect E are non-backtracking. We can make this idea precise in proof-theoretic terms. Recall that any
inferential step in a natural deduction proof consists of a set P of premises and a conclusion C, where P
may contain subproofs as premises. With this in mind, we can define the notion of a forward-directed
proof. Such a proof conforms to the temporal order of events in the following sense:
Definition 18. H `F C
Let H be a set of formulas and C be a formula. Only literals and conjunctions of literals are taken
to assert the occurrence of an event. We say there is a forward-directed natural deduction proof of C
from H – in symbols H `F C – iff there is a natural deduction proof of C from H such that (i) for all
inferential steps P/I (of the main proof and any subproof), if I asserts the occurrence of an event, then
this event does not precede any event that is asserted by a premise in P or by a premise in a subproof
that is a member of P, and (ii) the assumption of any subproof is consistent with H.
The notion of an event is understood, in this definition, in the broad sense that includes negative
events. A negative event is simply the failure of a corresponding positive event to occur. If A, B, or
A and B are temporally extended events, we say that B does not precede A iff B does not come into
being before A.
Why do we require that the assumption of any subproof is consistent with H? In our inferential
approach to causation, subproofs are intended to represent possible ways how an event may bring
about another event. Any assumption made in a subproof must therefore be consistent with H, the
beliefs that form our premises. This condition will be relevant for the resolution of late preemption in
Section 4.3.6.
Using this notion of a forward-directed proof, we can impose a temporal constraint on our Ramsey
Test:
A F C ∈ K(S ) iff (K(S ) ÷ B(A) ∨ B(C)), A `F C. (S RTF)
That is, C is a forward-directed strong conditional implication of A iff there is a forward-directed
proof of C from A and the explicit beliefs of the epistemic state H, after suspending judgement on the
antecedent A and the consequent C. Recall that the epistemic state S is represented by a prioritised
belief base H.
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Now, we require there to be a forward-directed proof of the putative effect from the presumed
cause:
C F E ∈ K(S ). (C3)
This condition solves the problem of joint effects. For, the inference from the firing of B to the firing
of C is backward-directed. Hence, there is no forward-directed proof of E from A.
The requirement of using only forward-directed inferences is well motivated by our intuitions
about causation: a cause must bring about, or produce, its effect. The inferential test of this production
must be forward-directed in a manner that represents the temporal order of actual productive processes
in the real world.
Note that a proof is forward directed iff it is not backward directed, i. e. does not involve in-
ferences to the occurrence of an event that precedes any event asserted in the premises. Hence, a
forward-directed proof may still involve inferences where the events asserted in the premises and the
conclusion are simultaneous. The exclusion of backward-directed inferences will also prove crucial
to solving the problem of preemption in sections 4.3.5 and 4.3.6.
4.3.4 Overdetermination and Conjunctive Scenarios
The problem of overdetermination is severe for a counterfactual approach to causation in the tradition
of Lewis (1973c). This approach is centred on the idea of counterfactual dependence between cause
and effect: if the cause had not occurred, the effect would not have occurred either – according to the
simple counterfactual analysis. As is well known, this approach fails in cases described as overdeter-
mination. Suppose a prisoner is shot by two soldiers at the same time, and each of the bullets is fatal
without any temporal precedence. Then, intuitively, both shots would qualify as causes of the death
of the prisoner. However, if one of the soldiers had not shot at the prisoner, the prisoner would still
have died. The death of the prisoner does therefore not counterfactually depend on the shooting by a
single soldier. Hence, on the counterfactual approach, neither of the soldiers is causally responsible
for the death of the prisoner.
Or, consider the following neuron diagram:
C
A
E
Figure 4.2: A neuron diagram for overdetermination and conjunctive scenarios.
Neurons C and A fire so that neuron E is excited. The firing of each of C and A suffices to excite
E. Hence, if C had not fired, E would still have been excited. This implies that, on the counterfactual
approach, neither C nor A causes E to be excited. Such results are counterintuitive and not acceptable.
Our condition that C F E allows us to recognise relations of actual causation even in cases of
overdetermination. It is easy to verify that the firing of C strongly conditionally implies the firing of
E, in a forward directed manner. In formal notation, C F E, where C and E, respectively, stand for
the firing of the neurons C and E. To verify C F E, we need to suspend judgement about the firing
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of the neurons C and E. Suspending judgement about E forces us also to suspend judgement about A
because our beliefs are inferentially closed. More precisely, if we were to retain the belief that A fires,
we would also have to retain the belief that neuron E is excited because we believe that the firing of
A triggers the firing of E. The latter belief has priority over beliefs about atomic events because it is
intended to represent law-like connections between types of events. In sum, since A implies E and
since we must retract our belief in E, we must also retract the belief in A.
In this way the suspension of judgement about C and E leads to an epistemic state in which we
continue to believe the relations of firing between the neurons, but have no beliefs as regards the firing
of C, A, and E. If we then assume that C is firing, we can infer that E is excited, in a forward-directed
manner. Hence, C F E. Thereby, we have epistemically verified that the firing of C produces the
firing of E. These inferential considerations can easily be generalised so as to capture other examples,
including those with fatal bullets.
We can therefore conclude that – thanks to (SRTSE) – the problem of overdetermination does not
arise in the first place for our analysis of causation. This is an important advantage over counterfactual
approaches to causation. As we do not have to introduce further conditions to take overdeterministic
causation into account, our analysis remains relatively simple and less likely to fall prey to further
counterexamples that resemble scenarios of overdetermination. In particular, we have more leeway to
deal with overdetermination’s close relatives known as preemption, switches, and double prevention.
Halpern and Pearl (2005) call the above neuron diagram a conjunctive scenario if the firing of
both C and A is necessary to excite E. To give an example, it seems plausible that lightning together
with a preceding drought is an – if not ‘the’ – actual cause of a forest fire. Indeed, it is again easy to
verify that the firing of C strongly conditionally implies the firing of E, in a forward directed manner.
This time the suspension of judgement regarding C and E does not force us to suspend judgement
on A. The reason is that the firing of A alone is not sufficient to excite E. Hence, the suspension of
judgement on C and E results in an epistemic state in which we continue to believe that A is firing. If
we then assume that C is firing, we can infer that E is excited, in a forward directed manner. The same
reasoning applies to the verification of A F E due to the symmetry of the conjunctive scenario.
Unlike the account of Halpern and Pearl (2005), our analysis also verifies C∧A F E. As proven
by Eiter and Lukasiewicz (2002), Halpern and Pearl’s definition of actual causation precludes any
conjunction of two (or more) events to be an actual cause (at least when the causal model contains
only finitely many variables). In a conjunctive scenario, where two events are necessary for an effect
to occur, the conjunction of both events is thus never an actual cause, while both events individually
are recognised as actual causes. It seems surprising – to say the least – that the conjunction of two
actual causes is not also an actual cause. They are forced to say that the lightning and the preceding
drought together are no actual cause of the forest fire, while the lightning and the preceding drought
individually are. Our analysis escapes such artefacts that stem from Halpern and Pearl’s formal appa-
ratus.
4.3.5 Early Preemption
Preemption is about backup processes: there is an event C that, intuitively, causes E. But even if C
had not occurred, there is a backup event A that would have brought about E. Paul and Hall (2013,
p. 75) take the following neuron diagram as canonical example of early preemption:
96 4. Causation in Terms of Production
C
A
D
B
E
Figure 4.3: Paul and Hall’s (2013) canonical neuron diagram for early preemption.
C’s firing excites neuron D, which in turn leads to an excitation of neuron E. At the same time,
C’s firing inhibits the excitation of B. Had C not fired, however, A would have excited B, which in
turn would have led to an excitation of E. Such scenarios are described as early preemption because
the backup process does not get started in the first place, or is cut off prior to the occurrence of the
effect.
How does our approach fare with respect to such scenarios? The good news is that we can easily,
and without further modification, verify that C brings about E. That is, C F E, where C and E,
respectively, stand for the excitation of the neurons C and E. Once we have suspended judgement
about C and E, the assumption C lets us infer, in the context of our background theory, that D and
E. These inferences are forward directed. The simple counterfactual approach, by contrast, fails here
because it does not hold that the putative effect does not occur if the presumed cause is absent. In fact,
E fires, even if C does not, due to the firing of A. This problem forced counterfactual approaches to
be refined in various ways, see for example Lewis (1986a), and Halpern and Pearl (2005).
A  E holds as well, but the inferential path from A to E is not strictly forward directed. Hence,
A F E does not hold, which is more good news. To see this, let us suspend judgement as regards
A and E. Clearly, the retraction of E requires the retraction of D and C. Otherwise, we could infer
E using our beliefs about the relations of firing. These beliefs have priority over our beliefs about
the firing of a neuron insofar as the relations of firing represent law-like connections between events.
Trivially, retraction of A requires us to retract A. Notably, however, we do not retract ¬B (the belief
that B is not firing), as a consequence of retracting A ∨ E. For, ¬B neither implies A nor C, nor E. B
may not fire because A does not fire or because C does fire, or both. After the agnostic move, we no
longer know the reason why B does not fire. ¬B merely implies ¬A ∨ C, which does not suffice to
establish C inferentially, as we shall see more clearly below.
So suspension of judgement results in an epistemic state in which we continue to believe ¬B,
but have no beliefs about A, C, D, and E. If we now assume A, we can infer E, but only via the
inferential path that goes through C and D. We cannot infer E in a forward-directed manner because
we believe that B does not fire, and so we believe that B cannot excite E. The inferential path via C
is backward directed because it involves an inference from ¬B, A, and (A ∧ ¬C) ↔ B to C. Clearly,
this inference violates the condition of forward directedness as explained in Definition 21. For, from
A firing and B not firing at a certain time tB we can infer that C is firing at a certain time tC , with the
constraint that tC < tB. Hence, there is no forward-directed proof that would allow us to derive C from
{¬B, A, (A∧¬C)↔ B}. For simplicity, we leave the temporal order implicit, but it is obvious from the
neuron diagram that a full explication of the temporal order would enable us formally to verify that
the inference from A to E is not forward directed.
It is worth formalising the example. This is the epistemic state H that represents the scenario:
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C ↔ D, D→ E, (A ∧ ¬C)↔ B, B→ E
A, ¬B, C, E, D
Note that we do not only believe that C → D but also D → C because – in the confines of our
causal scenario – D can only be excited by C. E, by contrast, can be excited by two different neurons.
Hence, we do not believe that E → D. Suspension of judgement as regards A and E results in an
epistemic state H′:
C ↔ D, D→ E, (A ∧ ¬C)↔ B, B→ E
¬B
As explained above, it is obvious that we have to retract A,C, E, and D, as a consequence of
retracting A ∨ E. Why can we retain ¬B? Here is the diagram of a model that verifies all members of⋃
H′ but fails to verify A ∨ E:4
{¬A,¬B,¬C,¬D,¬E}. (1)
Hence, (i) A∨ E is not a logical consequence of ⋃ H′. Note furthermore that (ii) a contraction cannot
produce new beliefs. Because of (i) and (ii), we can retain ¬B without having any belief as to whether
A or E. Retaining ¬B is even mandatory by the principle of conservativity, which is central to AGM-
style belief revision theory (see Gärdenfors (1988) and Hansson (1999)).
To carry out (SRTSE), let us expand K(H′) by A. Using (A ∧ ¬C) ↔ B and ¬B, we can infer C
from A, but not in a forward directed manner, for the above explained reasons. In brief, C starts to
fire before B is actually inhibited; the inhibition of B by C is not immediate. Hence, A 4F E, and so
Condition (C3) is violated.
Note, finally, that we can generalise the argument that shows us why we retain certain beliefs
about an intermediate event between the preempted cause A and the effect E, after the agnostic move
as regards A and E has been carried out. Retaining such beliefs is feasible and mandatory on the
following grounds: (i) The intermediate event in question does not occur because the causal process
from A to E is cut off by the genuine cause C. (ii) Suspension of judgement concerning A and E
requires us to suspend judgement about A, C, D and E, where D is an intermediate event between the
genuine cause and the effect. (iii) The failure of the intermediate event B to occur may be due to A’s
failure to occur, the occurrence of C, or both. (iv) ¬B does not allow us to infer the effect E via the
preempted pathway. (ii) and (iii) imply that (v) we can neither infer C (which would imply D and E)
nor ¬A from ¬B. (v) and (iv) imply that there is no way to infer E from ¬B, once A, C, D, and E
have been retracted. Hence, ¬B is consistent with being agnostic about A and E. Since belief changes
are to be as conservative as possible, it is mandatory to retain ¬B. (For further details, please consult
Appendix C.)
Most decisive and by no means trivial in this line of reasoning is (iii): the failure of the intermedi-
ate event to occur may be due to the non-occurrence of the preempted cause or the occurrence of the
genuine cause, or both. As we are agnostic as to whether any of these causes occurs, we cannot infer
from the non-occurrence of the intermediate event any claim as regards the occurrence of the genuine
and the preempted cause. (If, by contrast, we were to believe that the preempted cause is present,
we could infer the presence of the genuine cause from the non-occurrence of the intermediate event.)
Hence, we can remain agnostic as regards the presence of the preempted and the genuine cause, while
believing that the intermediate event does not occur. We shall explain why it is intuitive to require that
the effect be inferable from the cause in a forward directed manner in the next section.
4A diagram of a model A is the set of all closed literals (in a given language) that are true in A. The notion of a first
order diagram has a clear analogue for propositional languages. In the case of propositional logic, a diagram contains for
any propositional constant A, either A or ¬A. Such a diagram represents a valuation of a language of propositional logic.
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4.3.6 Late Preemption
The canonical example of late preemption is presumably the most frequently cited causal scenario in
the recent literature on actual causation. Suppose Billy and Suzy are throwing rocks at a bottle. Suzy’s
rock hits the bottle first, and thus is the genuine cause of the bottle’s shattering. Billy, however, is also
very skilful at throwing rocks. If Suzy had not thrown her rock, Billy’s rock would have hit the bottle,
and thus the bottle would have shattered a little bit later. Billy’s throw is a preempted cause of the
shattering of the bottle. Paul and Hall (2013, p. 99) describe this causal scenario as late preemption.
In such a scenario, there is a backup process present that fails to go to completion merely because
another process is effective prior to the backup one.
As is easy to verify, Suzy’s throw strongly conditionally implies – in the sense of (SRTSE) –
that the bottle shatters. Likewise for Billy’s throw. But only the first conditional implication can be
established by a forward-directed proof. Hence, Billy’s throw does not qualify as a genuine cause of
the shattering of the bottle, as it should be.
Why is there no forward-directed proof of the shattering of the bottle from the assumption that
Billy throws a rock at the bottle, once judgement has been suspended as regards the occurrence of these
two events? The reasons for this are perfectly analogous to the reasons why there is no such proof in
the case of early preempted causes. After judgement has been suspended, we continue to believe that
Billy’s rock did not hit the bottle. Therefore, there is no forward-directed inferential path from the
assumption that Billy throws his rock to the shattering of the bottle. We can infer from Billy’s throw
and his rock not hitting the bottle that Suzy’s rock has hit the bottle first. This inference, however, is
not forward-directed because, by assumption, Suzy’s rock arrives at the bottle before Billy’s rock had
a chance to hit.
Again, it is helpful to have a formal representation of the example:
ST: Suzy throws a rock at the bottle.
BT: Billy’s throws a rock at the bottle.
SH: Suzy’s rock hits the bottle.
BH: Billy’s rock hits the bottle.
BS: The bottle shatters.
We have adopted the symbols from Halpern and Pearl (2005), with the qualification that they stand
for sentences instead of variables in a causal model. Here is the epistemic state H that represents the
causal scenario:
S T ↔ S H, S H → BS , (BT ∧ ¬S H)↔ BH, BH → BS
S T, BT, S H, ¬BH, BS
After the agnostic move as regards BT and BS , we have the epistemic state H′:
S T ↔ S H, S H → BS , (BT ∧ ¬S H)↔ BH, BH → BS
¬BH
Why do we continue to believe ¬BH after judgement has been suspended as regards BT and
BS ? In other words, why is BT ∨ BS not a logical implication of ⋃ H′? Here is the diagram of a
countermodel to this inference:
{¬S T,¬BT,¬S H,¬BH,¬BS }.
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It is easy to show that the model of this diagram verifies all members of
⋃
H′, while it does not verify
BT ∨ BS . Hence BT ∨ BS is not a logical implication of ⋃ H′.
Using BT ∧ ¬S H ↔ BH, we can infer from BT and ¬BH that S H. This inference however is
not forward-directed because the event asserted by S H precedes, at least slightly, the event asserted
by ¬BH. (Recall that our notion of a forward-directed inference applies also to premises that assert
the occurrence of a negative event, understood as the absence of a certain positive event.) Hence,
BT 4F BS . Billy’s throw of the rock, though perfectly accurate, does therefore not qualify as the
genuine cause of the shattering of the bottle. As is obvious, our solution exploits the consideration of
intermediate events in similar ways as the solution by Halpern and Pearl (2005) does in the framework
of structural equations.
Note once more that our insistence on forward-directed inferences is well motivated: we want to
analyse causation as production by an epistemic verification that the presumed cause brings about the
putative effect. Consequently, this epistemic verification must proceed by forward directed inferences.
Otherwise, our inference would not model, or reconstruct, a process of production.
We should finally discuss a potential objection to the present solution to the problem of preemp-
tion. Suppose, we were to adopt the following implication laws in our belief base, in addition to those
already specified:
BT → (BH ∨ S H)
(BH ∨ S H)→ BS .
Then, there would be a forward-directed proof from BT to BS , in the context of the remaining beliefs,
after judgement has been suspended as regards BT and BS . Both implication laws hold true of the
causal scenario under consideration. Hence, BT F BS , after all.
There are two ways to answer this objection. First, arguably, these laws are derived and do there-
fore not count as explicit beliefs. Hence, they should not be members of the belief base. Second, we
can prevent the adoption of the above implication laws by the following requirement: any consequent
of any implication law of H asserts the occurrence of n (n ≥ 1) distinct, non-disjunctive events. (In
the case of a biimplication, we have two consequents.) This is a reasonable requirement because it
forces our inferences to reconstruct the precise way in which the presumed cause has brought about
the effect. In deterministic scenarios, the condition is easy to meet. Hence, we shall adopt it.
4.3.7 Switches
Switching scenarios are problematic for counterfactual accounts of causation. Lewis (1973c), for
example, defines actual causation as the transitive closure of causal dependence. If the distinct events
C and E occur, then E causally depends on C just in case if C had not occurred, E would not have
occurred. As a consequence, counterfactual dependence of ¬E on ¬C is sufficient for actual causation
of the occurring event E by the occurring event C. This sufficiency for causation is widely shared
among the counterfactual accounts in the tradition of Lewis, e.g. by Hitchcock (2001), Woodward
(2003), Hall (2004), Hall (2007), and Halpern and Pearl (2005).
The following neuron diagram represents a simplified version of a switching scenario:
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F
R
L
A
Figure 4.4: A neuron diagram for a switching scenario.
Neuron L is special: it is excited unless inhibited. The firing of neuron F excites R’s firing, which
in turn excites neuron A. At the same time, F’s firing inhibits the excitation of L, which would have
been excited in case F had not fired. In brief, F determines which one of L and R is firing, and thus
acts like a switch. Speaking of events, F,R and A occur, and both ¬R counterfactually depends on
¬F, and ¬A counterfactually depends on ¬R. By the transitive closure imposed on the one-step causal
dependences, Lewis (1973c) is forced to say that F is a cause of A.
The counterfactual accounts based on structural equations due to Hitchcock (2001) and Halpern
and Pearl (2005) reject the transitivity of causation. Still, Hitchcock (2001) counts F to be a cause
of A. The reason is that there is an active path from F over R to A and keeping the off-path variable
L fixed at its actual value induces a counterfactual dependence of ¬A on ¬F. Similarly, Halpern and
Pearl (2005) count F to be a cause of A, since A counterfactually depends on F under the contingency
that ¬L.
Hall (2007, p. 28) puts forth a switching scenario in which F should intuitively not count as a
cause of A: Flipper is standing by a switch in the railroad tracks. A train approaches in the distance.
She flips the switch (F), so that the train travels down the right-hand track (R), instead of the left (L).
Since the tracks reconverge up ahead, the train arrives at its destination all the same (A).
Flipping the switch does not seem to be a cause of the train’s arrival. After all, there is no net
effect. By assumption, ‘the train arrives at its destination all the same’ independent of the flipping.
In other words, flipping the switch makes no difference to the train’s arrival. However, the above
mentioned accounts, including the ones based on structural equations, say that F is a cause of A.
Furthermore, the flipping of the switch is a cause of the train traveling on the right-hand track, which
in turn causes the arrival of the train. Hence, switching scenarios pose indeed a severe challenge for
the transitivity of causation.
Our analysis verifies that F brings about A. Once we have suspended judgement on F and A, the
assumption of F lets us infer – in a forward-directed manner – that R and thus A. Here, we see that
production is necessary but not sufficient for causation. Although F is a producer of A, F is not a
cause of A. Our diagnosis of the problem is: while it is possible that F brings about A and the absence
of F also brings about A, in the sense of (S RTF), it sounds paradoxical to say that F causes A and
the absence of F causes A as well. The concept of causation seems to preclude that both the presence
and absence of an event can genuinely cause the same effect. In the same vein, Sartorio (2005, p. 90)
states “if causes are difference-makers, it is in virtue of the fact that events and their absences would
not have caused the same effects.”
Therefore, we complement our analysis by a weak condition of difference-making. For C to be a
cause of E, the absence of C does not strongly conditionally imply E, in a forward-directed manner:
¬C F E < K(S ). (C4)
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Condition (C4) says that an event is only an actual cause if its absence does not also bring about the
effect. Importantly, this condition is weaker than the difference-making in counterfactual approaches
as it does not require the putative effect to be absent if the presumed cause fails to occur. The condition
merely demands that the putative effect cannot be inferred from the absence of the presumed cause,
once the agnostic move has been made.5
Let us now return to the switching scenario. We know already that F brings about A. That is,
F F A ∈ K(S ). However, the absence of F also brings about A, in a forward directed manner.
Hence, ¬F F A ∈ K(S ). Flipping the switch and not flipping the switch individually bring about the
arrival of the train. Once Condition (C4) is in place, flipping the switch is no cause of the train’s arrival.
However, our analysis verifies that F causes R and R causes A. Here, the transitivity of causation fails
because we can infer ‘too much’: the effect A will trivially obtain independent of whether or not F
occurs.
To ease the verification of the details, we explicate the epistemic state H that represents the causal
scenario:
F ↔ R, ¬F ↔ L, R→ A L→ A
F, R, A
After the agnostic move as regards F and A, we have the epistemic state H′:
F ↔ R, ¬F ↔ L, R→ A L→ A
If we now assume F, we obtain R and thus A, both in a forward-directed manner. The assumption
of ¬F results in L and thus A, again both inferences are forward-directed.
Unlike the standard counterfactual condition of difference-making, (C4) does not imply counter-
intuitive results about overdetermination. Let C be a putative cause of an effect E in a scenario of
overdetermination. If we test ¬C F E < K(S ), the agnostic move forces us to suspend judgment
about the occurrence of all overdetermining causes. The reason is that any overdetermining cause
would imply the occurrence of the effect, which would violate the suspension of judgement as regards
cause and effect. Hence, if we assume – after the agnostic move – that one of the overdetermining
causes is absent, we are unable to infer the effect. ¬C F E < K(S ) is therefore satisfied for causal
relations in scenarios of overdetermination.
Similar considerations apply to conjunctive scenarios and cases of preemption. In conjunctive
scenarios, where two (or more) events are necessary for an effect to occur, the agnostic move forces
us to suspend judgement only on the presumed cause C and the effect E. The reason is that the set of
other events alone is by assumption not sufficient to bring about the effect E. In cases of preemption,
observe that to test ¬C F E < K(S ) results in the same belief set K(S ÷ B(C) ∨ B(E)) than the test
of C F E ∈ K(S ), given that C, E ∈ K(S ). (Of course, if the latter condition is not satisfied, C
is no candidate for being a cause of E.) Hence, the suspension of judgement required by Condition
(C4) leads to an epistemic state in which the absence of C does not strongly conditionally imply, in
a forward-directed manner, that E. In Figure 4.3, for example, the belief that ¬B is retained after
the agnostic move, and thus the absence of C does not bring about E. Hence, ¬C F E < K(S ) is
satisfied for cases of preemption.
To sum up, our forward-directed conditional F verifies some cases where the antecedent does
not cause the consequent in any reasonable sense. Hence, we have complemented Condition (C3) by
the weak difference-making Condition (C4) to yield a more appropriate account of causation in terms
of production. As an upshot, our analysis of causation combines a notion of production and a weak
5Condition (C4) is inspired by Rott (1986).
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notion of counterfactual dependence. Here our analysis stands in stark contrast to the postulate of
Hall (2004) that there be two stand-alone concepts of causation. We rather agree with Hall (2007)
that production and weak counterfactual dependence are metaphysically entangled in one concept of
causation.
4.3.8 Double Prevention
Problems concerning double prevention have been observed at a time later than those of preemption.
Suppose a boulder is dislodged and, hence, is rolling toward a hiker. The hiker sees the boulder coming
and ducks so that he does not get hurt. If the hiker had not ducked, the boulder would have hurt him,
in which case the hiker would not have continued the hike. Since, however, he was clever enough to
duck, the hiker continues the hike. This scenario due to Hitchcock (2001, p. 276) is described as a
case of double prevention: the boulder threatens to prevent the continuation of the hike, but provokes
an action that prevents this prevention from being effective. Double prevention is thus about threat
canceling.
Paul and Hall (2013, p. 216) take the following neuron diagram to represent cases of double pre-
vention similar to Hitchcock’s boulder example:
E
FB
DC
Figure 4.5: A neuron diagram for one type of double prevention.
In Figure 4.5, an event C starts a process via B that threatens to prevent E, but at the same time
C initiates another process via D that prevents the threat. In particular, the firing of neuron D inhibits
F’s firing, which would have inhibited E’s firing.
For clarity, it is helpful to have an explicit correspondence between the neuron diagram and the
boulder example:
C: A boulder is dislodged.
B: The boulder rolls toward the hiker.
D: The hiker sees the boulder and ducks.
F: The hiker gets hit by the boulder.
E: The hiker continues the hike.
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Like switching scenarios, the scenario seems to show that there are cases where the transitivity
of causal relations is violated: the dislodged boulder C causes the ducking of the hiker D, which in
turn enables the hiker to continue the hike E. But it is counterintuitive to say that the dislodging of
the boulder C causes the continuation of the hike E. After all, the boulder has no net effect on the
continuation of the hike.
Now, the dislodged boulder strongly conditionally implies – in the sense of (S RTF) – that the
hiker continues the hike. Once we have suspended judgement about the events C and E, we can infer
from the boulder that the hiker ducks, which in turn lets us infer that the hiker continues the hike. All
inferences are forward-directed. Hence, we have C F E ∈ K(S ). Conditions (C1) and (C2) are
satisfied as well. However, if the boulder had not been dislodged, the hiker would have continued the
hike all the same. That is, we can infer, in a forward-directed manner, E from ¬C, once the agnostic
move has been carried out. But this means that ¬C F E ∈ K(S ) – in violation of Condition (C4).
Therefore, our analysis does not accept the dislodged boulder as a cause of the continuation of the
hike.
Again, it is worthwhile formalising the example considered. The following epistemic state repre-
sents our beliefs about the causal scenario:
C ↔ B, C ↔ D, B ∧ ¬D↔ F, F ↔ ¬E
C, B, D, ¬F, E
With respect to this epistemic state, we have C F E ∈ K(S ), but also ¬C F E ∈ K(S ). After
the agnostic move, the implications are still in place, whereas all the literals are given up. Hence, the
assumption of C or ¬C, respectively, lets us infer E, in a forward-directed manner. Due to Condition
(C4) the dislodged boulder is no cause of the continuation of the hike.6
The structural equation accounts of Hitchcock (2001) and Halpern and Pearl (2005) classify C
as a cause of E. Even worse, Hall (2007, p. 36) shows that they count C a cause of E “for exactly
the same reason” they count, in Figure 4.3, C a cause of E, or Suzy’s throw a cause of the bottle
shattering. Hence, our analysis has a major advantage over these accounts by being able to capture
both, scenarios of preemption and double prevention.
4.4 Spurious Causation
So far, we have relied on intuitions which generalisations should be believed or accepted in the differ-
ent scenarios. For an epistemological account of causal reasoning, this relativity to what an epistemic
agent judges plausible seems warranted. However, if we are interested in analysing a notion of causa-
tion, we need to take care that we can deal with the problem of spurious causation. In our framework,
a spurious cause occurs if there is a common cause of at least two effects and a non-zero temporal
distance between the occurrences of the two effects. This problem is nicely illustrated by the neuron
diagram of Figure 4.1 in Section 4.3.3 that represents joint effects of a common cause. As there is a
stable conjunction between the firing of B and E, it seems on first sight reasonable to have the impli-
cation B→ E as a generalisation in the belief base. (In Section 4.3.3, by contrast, it was assumed that
B→ E is not a member of the belief base.) Hence, B  E ∈ K(S ). If the firing of B precedes that of
E, the inference is forward directed, and so B F E ∈ K(S ) holds as well. The other conditions of
6Halpern and Pearl (2005), Halpern (2015), Halpern and Hitchcock (2015), and Spohn (2006) do not address this par-
ticular scenario of double prevention. Other scenarios of double prevention that Halpern and Pearl (2005) take into account
are captured by the present analysis as well. See Example 4.4 in Halpern and Pearl (2005). Moreover, our account gives the
solutions, widely acknowledged to be correct, to the so-called ‘Bunzel diagrams’ in Lewis (1986a, pp. 208-9).
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our analysis are satisfied in an obvious way. So we would have to consider the firing of B as a cause of
the firing of E. The problem is now that, by assumption, B is no actual cause of E, but only a spurious
cause. (The arrows in a neuron diagram represent the genuine causal relations. In Figure 4.1, there
is no arrow from B to E.) Notice that the problem of spurious causation reduces in our framework
to having the ‘correct’ generalisations (in form of material implications) in the respective belief base.
Here, ‘correct’ means something like ‘corresponding to the arrows’. So, how do we figure out which
generalisations should be in the belief base?
Inspired by Ramsey (1928/1978) and Lewis (1973a), we answer with a mild best systems account
of generalisations: we should believe the generalisations which we would take as axioms when or-
ganising all of our beliefs as simply as possible in a deductive system. The idea is roughly that, once
organised in a ‘most simple’ system, certain generalisations become redundant in the sense that the
agent can still infer what she could infer before, but now without these generalisations. Hence, the
redundant generalisations are not needed any more and can be forgotten for the sake of simplicity,
whereas the non-redundant generalisations remain in the belief base to retain inferential power.
We exemplify our idea by elaborating the lightning example from Section 4.3.3.7 A causal anal-
ysis of a thunderstorm should distinguish at least three events: (i) the electrical discharge between a
cloud and the ground, (ii) the flash of the lightning, and (iii) the thunder. Arguably, the modern the-
ory of physics contains non-redundant generalisations in the sense of a best system, namely laws of
nature. Physics tells us that the electrical discharge between a cloud and the ground is – via the rapid
production of heat within the region of the air where electricity is conducted – the common cause of
the flash and the thunder. Physics would deny that the flash is a genuine cause of the thunder. So
we have to conclude that the flash is a mere spurious cause of the thunder. But the event of the flash
satisfies conditions (C1) – (C4) with respect to the thunder. So we must further refine our analysis.
Why is the electrical discharge rather than the flash a genuine cause of the thunder that temporally
follows? Let us take a closer look at the various inferential paths in this causal scenario. The flash
and the electrical discharge of the lightning are alike in that we can infer from their occurrence the
occurrence of the thunder. The inferential paths, however, differ from one another. We can infer the
thunder from the electrical discharge, in a forward-directed manner, using only generalisations that
are laws of nature. In essence, it is the the laws of electrodynamics, atomic theory, and acoustics
that are used in this path. By contrast, there is no forward-directed inferential path from the flash
to the thunder such that all generalisations thereof are laws of nature. The inference from the flash
of the lightning to the thunder is either not strictly forward-directed (when it goes via the electrical
discharge) or not based on laws of nature (when the thunder is directly inferred from the flash, without
going through the common cause of the flash and the thunder).
Why is the generalisation ‘if there is a flash at the sky, then there will be a thunder a few seconds
later’ not a law of nature? What are laws of nature? We do not attempt to answer the latter question,
but observe that the generalisation in question is not a non-redundant generalisation or law of nature
in the sense of a best system account. In fact, a very weak understanding of what a best system is
suffices to make the crucial distinction.
Explanation 1. Law of Nature
A generalisation is a law of nature iff it is a member of a deductive system that does a good job at
balancing strength and simplicity and that is not clearly inferior to an alternative system.
This formulation is intentionally sloppy and thus acknowledges that the optimisation of strength
7One paradigm of a spurious cause is the drop of the barometer which does not count as a genuine cause of any storm.
Since, however, the correlation between the drop of the barometer and the storm is commonly considered to be probabilistic,
this example is not well suited for the present analysis of deterministic causation.
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and simplicity cannot be accomplished in a straightforward manner.8 We deem the criticism, thor-
oughly worked out in Van Fraassen (1989, pp. 40-64), correct that the laws of best systems are mind-
dependent in virtue of the appeal to simplicity, strength, and their best balance. For obvious reasons,
this criticism does not affect our account: the laws are always relative to an epistemic state. Neverthe-
less, Explanation 1 is still sufficient to rule out that the generalisation asserting a regular connection
between a flash at the sky and a thunder is a law of nature. For, (i) it seems plausible that the laws
of electrodynamics, atomic theory, acoustics, etc. (i. e. the laws that are used in the inferential path
from the flash to the thunder via the electrical discharge) are members of any deductive system that
does a good job at maximising strength and simplicity, and that is not clearly inferior to an alternative
system. Further, (ii) our generalisation concerning flash and thunder can be derived from the laws
described in (i). More precisely, it can be derived that the generalisation holds universally for a sys-
tem that contains clouds above the ground and an atmosphere of a specific composition.9 Otherwise,
there would not be an inferential path from the flash to the thunder via the electrical discharge. (i) and
(ii) imply that our generalisation concerning flash and thunder is not a law of nature in the sense of
Explanation 1. For this to be seen more clearly, suppose we have a deductive system that contains (a)
the laws of electrodynamics, atomic theory, etc. (i. e. the laws that are used in the inferential path from
the flash to the thunder via the electrical discharge), (b) a general description of the type of system in
which the generalisation about flash and thunder is supposed to hold, and (c) the generalisation about
flash and thunder for systems described in (b). If we drop from this system component (c), we obtain
a deductive system that is simpler, while being equally strong. The system with components (a), (b),
and (c) is therefore clearly inferior to an alternative system.
In sum, the generalisation about flash and thunder is redundant in all systems that contain those
generalisations that are indispensable for achieving a powerful deductive systematisation of certain
optical, electrical, acoustic, and meteorological phenomena. In a similar vein, it can be shown that
the generalisation about the drop of the barometer and the storm is redundant in the best deductive
systems of the corresponding domain. Finally, the assertion of a regular connection between the firing
of B and E (in the above neuron diagram) is redundant in the just explained sense. Readers whose
intuitions about laws of nature diverge from best system accounts may well replace ‘law of nature’ by
‘non-redundant generalisation’ in what follows. So we can leave it open what laws of nature actually
are.10
In light of the different types of inferential path in a scenario of spurious causation, an inferential
account of spurious causation almost falls into place:
Definition 19. Spurious Cause
C is a spurious cause of E iff C satisfies conditions (C1) – (C4) with respect to E, and
1. there is an inferential path from C to E such that all generalisations thereof are laws of nature,
but this inferential path is not forward directed, and
2. there is no forward-directed inferential path from C to E such that all generalisations thereof
are laws of nature.
8For an accessible summary, sympathetic reconsideration, and refinement of the best system account, the reader is
referred to Cohen and Callender (2009). Notably, their account is prepared to face a variety of best systems, as Explanation
1 is. It is worth noting, moreover, that Cohen and Callender (2009) are concerned with deductive systematisations of our
knowledge of whatever domains.
9The description of this type of system is part of the description of a flash at the sky and the thunder. The existential
statement that there are such systems may or may not be part of a best system.
10Strictly speaking, Explanation 1 is an account of what we judge to be a law of nature and so should explicitly be
relativized to our beliefs about a certain domain. For simplicity, we continue to speak of laws of nature and leave the
relativisation implicit.
106 4. Causation in Terms of Production
Let us now cast this inferential account of spurious causation into our framework of strengthened
Ramsey Test conditionals. For this to be done, a few more concepts need to be introduced:
Definition 20. H `L C
H `L C iff there is a natural deduction proof of C from H such that all generalisations of this proof
are laws of nature.
Definition 21. H `F−L C
H `F−L C iff there is a forward-directed natural deduction proof of C from H such that all generalisa-
tions of this proof are laws of nature.
Now we can move on to defining the two conditionals needed in the account of spurious causation:
A L C ∈ K(S ) iff (K(S ) ÷ B(A) ∨ B(C)), A `L C (S RTL)
A F−L C ∈ K(S ) iff (K(S ) ÷ B(A) ∨ B(C)), A `F−L C. (S RTF−L)
These two conditionals give us the formal means to exclude spurious causation:
If C L E ∈ K(S ), then C F−L E ∈ K(S ). (C5)
This condition says that, if there is an inferential path from C to E such that all generalisations thereof
are laws of nature, then there must be a forward-directed inferential path with this property. Otherwise,
it is not a genuine cause. Note that we do not require that quotidian causal claims be based on laws
of nature or non-redundant generalisations, and thus free of spurious causal judgements. Without a
modern theory of physics, for example, a flash might well be categorised as the cause of a thunder.
If we want to restrict ourselves to a scientific notion of causation, we can ban spurious causes by
dropping (C5) and modifying (C3) and (C4) to:
(C3∗) C F−L E ∈ K(S ), and
(C4∗) ¬C F−L E < K(S ).
4.5 Conclusion
It is time for a concluding summary of our analysis. We represent causal scenarios by epistemic
states, which in turn are given by prioritised belief bases. Such a base H has two levels: an upper level
of generalisations and a lower level of beliefs about atomic facts. On grounds explained in Section
4.3.6, any consequent of any generalisation in
⋃
H asserts the occurrence of n (n ≥ 1) distinct, non-
disjunctive events. This in mind, we define:
Definition 22. C is a cause of E
The event (asserted by) C is a cause of the event (asserted by) E – relative to an epistemic state S – iff
(C1) C, E ∈ K(S ),
(C2) t(C) < t(E),
(C3) C F E ∈ K(S ),
(C4) ¬C F E < K(S ), and
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(C5) if C L E ∈ K(S ), then C F−L E ∈ K(S ).
Definition 22 puts forth an analysis of causation in terms of a strengthened Ramsey Test condi-
tional, which is meant to express a relation of production. By condition (C3), production is necessary
but not sufficient for actual causation. Similarly, (C4) amounts to a weak condition of difference-
making that is necessary but not sufficient for actual causation. Causes are difference-makers in the
weak sense that events and their absences do not bring about the same effects. From this follows
the principle of difference making convincingly argued for by Sartorio (2005): if C is a cause of E,
¬C is not a cause of E. The reason is that C is a cause of E requires both C F E ∈ K(S ) and
¬C F E < K(S ), while ¬C is a cause of E requires ¬C F E ∈ K(S ) and C F E < K(S ). But
this is impossible. Hence, our analysis satisfies Sartorio’s constraint which she imposes on any theory
of causation as a condition “that the true analysis of causation (if there is such a thing) would have to
meet” (ibid., p. 75).
In the Appendix D, we explain how counterfactual dependence and our analysis of causation
relate. There, we have shown that, within the original AGM belief revision theory, Lewis’s (1973c)
notion of counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation as understood by our analysis when
t(C) < t(E). Specifically, if C, E ∈ K for contingent propositions C, E, and counterfactual dependence
is transcribed into the AGM framework as ¬C > ¬E ∈ K, it follows that C is a cause of E according to
our analysis, where the epistemic state S is a classic belief set K, as opposed to a prioritised belief base
H. Back in our framework using prioritised belief bases, the two ‘counterfactual’ generalisations C →
E and ¬C → ¬E being in K(H) are sufficient for causation, at least when the temporal precedence
and forward-directedness is assumed.
We have achieved a formally elaborated solution to the problems of overdetermination, conjunc-
tive scenarios, (early and late) preemption, switches, and double prevention. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no other formally well-defined account in the literature that solves the whole set of these
problems. Finally, we have shown how to tackle the problem of spurious causation by a best system
account of generalisations. Our analysis is based only on (non-redundant) generalisations and knowl-
edge about temporal relations among events. At no point, causal relations are taken as primitive or
antecedently known. In this sense, our analysis qualifies as reductive. Arguably, this reductive prop-
erty is an important advantage over accounts based on causal models, such as those put forward by
Halpern and Pearl (2005) and Woodward (2003). In the next chapter, we develop the idea behind the
present analysis of causation within the framework of causal models. We will see that this framework
simplifies our analysis considerably at the cost of losing its reductiveness. Moreover, embedding our
analysis into causal models makes the comparison with Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) and Halpern’s
(2015) definition of actual cause easier.
Chapter 5
A Ramsey-Test Analysis of Causation for
Causal Models
In this chapter, we aim to provide a Ramsey-Test analysis of actual causation within the framework of
causal models. Methodically, we define the strengthened Ramsey Test, as developed in the chapters
3 and 4, for causal models. The result is a variant to the definitions of actual causation put forth by
Halpern and Pearl (2005) and Halpern (2015). On the way, we point out that the account of Halpern
and Pearl (2005) and Halpern’s modification thereof in Halpern (2015) both still struggle with the
issues of overdetermination and conjunctive scenarios. We show that our variant, in contrast, deals
satisfactorily with both overdetermination and conjunctive scenarios.
The goal of Halpern and Pearl (2005) is to provide a formal framework to answer the question:
given all the information about a scenario (considered relevant by a modeler), is/was event C the
actual cause of the event E? The answer, so Halpern and Pearl, depends on the causal model with
respect to which the question is asked. They aim thus to extract the relations of actual causation
(as we did in Chapter 4) from a given causal model (unlike our attempt in Chapter 4). A causal
model consists of, roughly speaking, a set of structural equations and a set of (random) variables. The
structural equations are supposed to represent primitive causal mechanisms or ‘law-like’ relationships
that support a counterfactual interpretation. A structural equation assigns a value x to a random
variable X. Halpern and Pearl take such an assignment to a (random) variable to represent an event.
Halpern and Pearl (2005) define actual causation with respect to a model of structural equations,
or equivalently a causal model. I want to stress that claims of causation are always relative to a
causal model. This means that each claim of causation is evaluated with respect to a particular causal
model. Their approach allows only to claim that the value assignment X = x (actually) causes the
other value assignment Y = y (in a particular context) in a particular model of structural equations.
As a consequence the modeler must decide which events are explicitly included in the model (i. e.
the endogenous variables) and which events to leave in the background (i. e. the exogenous vari-
ables). Subsequently, the modeler specifies the structural equations that model the causal influence of
exogenous and endogenous variables on other endogenous variables.
Causal models can be represented by causal networks. A causal network is a directed (acyclic)
graph, where the nodes correspond to the endogenous variables and there is a directed edge from a
node labeled X to one labeled Y iff Y’s structural equation depends on the value of the variable X.
Causal networks can thus be used to depict the (recursive) dependencies of the structural equations.
Notice the similarity of causal networks to Lewis’s (1973c) neuron diagrams. Neuron diagrams depict
the dependencies among a set of binary variables for one particular context. Causal networks lift the
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restriction to binary variables. While the edges in a neuron diagram represent only excitatory or
inhibitory functional relations, a causal network allows for arbitrary functional relations. Hence, the
class of functions represented by neuron diagrams is more limited than the class represented by causal
networks.
The basic idea behind Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition is to extend Lewis’s notion of causal
dependence to a notion of contingent dependence. To recall, Lewis (1973c, p. 563) defines causal
dependence between occurring events C, E in terms of counterfactual dependence: E causally depends
on C iff C and E happened, and if C had not happened, E would not have happened. Furthermore,
he identifies actual causation with the transitive closure of causal dependence. Hence, C is an actual
cause of E iff there is a chain of causal dependencies from C to E. Halpern and Pearl extend this
definition by (possibly non-actual) contingencies: C is an actual cause of E iff E causally depends
on C under certain contingencies. Roughly, contingent dependence says that even if E does not
counterfactually depend on C in the actual situation, E counterfactually depends on C under certain
contingencies.1
Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 843) give the following example to illustrate the notion of contingent
dependency.2
Example 8. Consider two fires advancing toward a house. Fire A burned the house before fire B.
Hence, we (and many juries nationwide) consider fire A ‘the actual cause’ for the damage, even
supposing that the house would definitely have been burned down by fire B, if it were not for A.
The event of the house burning down does not counterfactually depend on fire A. However, the
house’s burning down counterfactually depends on fire A under the contingency that, for example,
firefighters reach the house inbetween the actual arrival of fire A and (the then non-actual arrival of)
fire B. The house’s burning down also counterfactually depends on fire A under the contingency that
fire B was not started. Symmetrically, the house’s burning down also counterfactually depends on fire
B under the contingency that fire A was not started. In the definition of actual causation Halpern and
Pearl (2005, p. 844) offer, they aim to exclude the contingencies of the latter type that interfere with
actual causal processes.
All in all, Halpern and Pearl (2005) provide a powerful framework to model actual causation.
Their definition of actual cause in terms of contingent causal dependence copes well with many of the
benchmark examples in the literature. As we will see in Section 5.2, they established a language to ex-
press causal relations based on the asymmetry of structural equations and the notion of an intervention
(or, to be precise, a submodel).
Now, what are we up to? We will use the framework established by Halpern and Pearl (2005) to
define an alternative notion of actual causation. We borrow their models of structural equations on
which we define our strengthened Ramsey Test. The core idea transferred to the framework of causal
models can be paraphrased as follows: for two variables A,C endogenous to the causal model under
consideration, C = c agnostically depends on A = a if and only if, after suspending judgement on
C = c and A = a, C = c will be derived by the structural equations once we set A = a. If we write
A = a  C = c for C = c agnostically depends on A = a, our concept of causation can be roughly
given as follows: C = c is an actual cause of E = e iff
(i) C = c and E = e occur, and
(ii) C = c  E = e.
1Note that Halpern and Pearl do not take the chain of the causal dependencies for their definition of actual causation. In
contradiction to Lewis’s stipulation, they think (Halpern and Pearl, 2005, p. 844) that causation is not always transitive.
2We modified the example slightly.
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Remarkably, our analysis of actual causation boils down to only two conditions (due to the asymmetry
of the structural equations and the definition of an intervention).
Sources. This chapter builds on joint work with Holger Andreas. Substantial content of Andreas
and Günther (2018) is reprinted by permission from Oxford University Press, The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, A Ramsey Test Analysis of Causation for Causal Models, Andreas, H.
and Günther, M., License Number 4516510013975 (2018), advance online publication, 10 December
2018 (https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy074, BJPS).
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5.1 Introduction
We propose a Ramsey Test analysis of actual causation in the framework of causal models. The basic
idea is to define a Ramsey Test conditional for causal models. The evaluation recipe of this new
Ramsey Test conditional can be informally stated as follows:
First, suspend judgment about the antecedent and the consequent. Second, add the an-
tecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs. Finally, consider whether or not the
consequent is entailed by your beliefs.
In brief, the conditional A  C should be believed iff, after suspending judgment on A and C, C
is believed as a result of assuming A.3 The conditional  gives rise to a template for an analysis of
causation:
C is a cause of E iff C and E occur, and C  E.
In the chapters 3 and 4, we have shown that  can be explicated using AGM-style belief revision
theory, as founded by Alchourrón et al. (1985) and Gärdenfors (1988). Still using some concepts of
belief revision, however, we aim to define in this chapter the conditional  within the framework of
causal models. Thereby, the above template becomes a surprisingly powerful analysis of causation.
Why analyse causation by a Ramsey Test conditional in the framework of causal models? After
all, Halpern and Pearl (2005) already put forward a formally precise definition of actual causation
that captures a wide range of causal scenarios, including troublesome cases of preemption. However,
as they admit, their definition is “complicated” (ibid., p. 880). Moreover, even this highly elaborate
definition runs into a problem. As proven by Eiter and Lukasiewicz (2002), this definition precludes
any conjunction of two (or more) events to be an actual cause. In a conjunctive scenario, where two
events are necessary for an effect to occur, the conjunction of both events is thus no actual cause, while
both events individually are recognized as actual causes. It seems surprising – to say the least – that
the conjunction of two actual causes is not also an actual cause. If lightning and a preceding drought
are necessary factors for a forest fire to occur, the conjunction of these factors should qualify as an –
if not ‘the’ – actual cause.
Halpern’s (2015) modification of the Halpern and Pearl (2005) definition is more elegant and al-
lows – in principle – to count conjunctions as actual causes. Henceforth, we refer to the Halpern and
Pearl (2005) definition also as ‘HP definition’ and to Halpern’s (2015) modification as ‘modified HP
definition’. As we shall see later, the modified HP definition inherits the problem of the conjunctive
scenario. The modification comes with another cost. In scenarios of overdetermination, the modified
definition does not recognize the overdetermining causes as actual causes. (Surprisingly, the modified
HP definition classifies the conjunction of the overdetermining causes as an actual cause.) We observe
that no Halpern-Pearl definition satisfactorily solves both conjunctive scenarios and cases of overde-
termination. We show that this predicament can be remedied in the framework of causal models by
our Ramsey Test analysis of causation.
The plan of this chapter is straightforward: we work upward from causal models via the strength-
ened Ramsey Test to an analysis of causation. Section 5.2 extends Halpern and Pearl’s causal model
semantics by the notion of an agnostic model. Based on this extension, Section 5.3 presents our
strengthened Ramsey Test and our analysis of actual causation. Section 5.4 applies the analysis to
overdetermination, conjunctive scenarios, and preemption. Section 5.5 compares our Ramsey Test
variant to the Halpern-Pearl definitions of actual causation. Section 6.4 concludes the chapter.
3For a detailed presentation and embedding of our strengthened Ramsey Test into the literature, see Andreas and Günther
(2018) or Chapter 3.
112 5. A Ramsey-Test Analysis of Causation for Causal Models
5.2 An Extension of Causal Model Semantics
We extend Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) causal model semantics by the notion of an agnostic model.
This model represents the suspension of judgment in our strengthened Ramsey Test. We briefly intro-
duce causal models and the Arsonists Example, before we define the notion of an agnostic model and
its corresponding operator of suspension.
5.2.1 Halpern and Pearl’s Causal Model Semantics
The semantics of conditionals due to Halpern and Pearl (2005, pp. 851-852) is defined with respect to
a causal model over a signature.
Definition 23. Signature S
A signature S is a triple S = 〈U,V,R〉, where U is a finite set of exogenous variables, V is a finite
set of endogenous variables, and R maps any variable Y ∈ U ∪V to a non-empty (but finite) set R(Y)
of possible values for Y .
Definition 24. Causal Model M
A causal model over signature S is a tuple M = 〈S,F 〉, where F maps each endogenous variable
X ∈ V to a function FX : (×U∈UR(U)) × (×Y∈V\{X}R(Y)) 7→ R(X).
The mapping F defines a set of (modifiable) structural equations that model the causal influence
of exogenous and endogenous variables on other endogenous variables. The function FX determines
the value of X ∈ V given the values of all the other variables in U ∪ V. Note that F defines no
structural equation for any exogenous variable U ∈ U.
A structural equation such as x = FX(~u, y) says (in a context where the exogenous variables take
the values ~u), if Y were set to y (by means of an intervention), then X would take on the value x.
Notice the difference to a direct intervention on X: an intervention that assigns a value x′ , x to X
(by means external to the model) overrules the value x assigned by FX(~u, y). The difference points to
a ‘causal’ asymmetry. In any structural equation, the values of the variables on the right-hand side
jointly determine the value of the variable on the left-hand side; if, however, the value of the variable
on the left-hand side is changed by means of an external intervention, the values of the variables on
the right-hand side remain unaffected.
Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 849) confine themselves to models of recursive structural equations.4
In such models, the causal dependences among the variables in V can be represented by a directed
acyclic graph. Hence, there is a strict partial order such that, if X ≺ Y , then the value of X may affect
the value of Y , but the value of Y cannot have any effect on the value of X. A consequence of the
restriction to models M of recursive equations is that, given a context ~U = ~u, there is always a unique
solution to the equations in M; for we can always solve the equations in the order given by ≺.
In the spirit of Halpern and Hitchcock (2010, p. 397), we make two assumptions concerning the
variables of a causal model: (i) no value of a variable X logically implies a value of another variable
Y , and (ii) the different values of the same variable are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.
Given a signature S = 〈U,V,R〉, we say that a formula of the form X = x, where X ∈ U ∪ V
and x ∈ R(X), is a primitive value assignment. Halpern and Pearl (2005) and Halpern (2015) interpret
4However, Halpern and Pearl (2005, pp. 883-884) provide a definition of actual causation for non-recursive models in
their appendix.
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primitive value assignments as ‘primitive events’.5 We write ~X for a (finite) set {X1, .., Xn} of variables,
and ~x for a (finite) set {x1, .., xn} of values of the variables in ~X. We abbreviate the set of primitive
value assignments {X1 = x1, .., Xn = xn} by ~X = ~x.6
The values of the variables in M = 〈S,F 〉 are not determined. If the exogenous variables are
not set to a value, the structural equations in F are not triggered and thus no endogenous variable is
assigned a value. Only if we set all the exogenous variables U ∈ U to exactly one of their values,
the structural equations propagate the causal influence from parent to child variables such that each
endogenous variable V ∈ V is assigned exactly one value. In other words, if a context ~u = {u1, ..., un}
is set for all n variables Ui ∈ U, the structural equations recursively determine the value of each
endogenous variable. The result is that in a contextualized causal model 〈M, ~u〉 every variable in
U ∪V is assigned exactly one value.
In Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) semantics, a simple conditional [Y = y]X = x is satisfied in a
contextualized causal model 〈M, ~u〉 if the intervention setting the variable Y to the value y results in X
taking on the value x.7 Such an intervention is defined by the notion of a submodel MY=y of M.
Definition 25. Submodel M~X=~x
Let M = 〈S,F 〉 be a causal model, ~X a (possibly empty) set of variables in V and ~x, ~u sets of
values for the variables in ~X, ~U. We call the causal model M~X=~x = 〈S~X ,F
~X=~x〉 over signature S~X =
〈U,V \ ~X,R V\~X〉 a submodel of M. F
~X=~x maps each variable in V \ ~X to a function F ~X=~xY that
corresponds to FY for the variables inV \ ~X, and sets the variables in ~X to ~x.
Let us consider an example of a causal model due to Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 856):
Example 9. Arsonists Example
Suppose that two arsonists drop lit matches in different parts of a dry forest, and both cause trees
to start burning. Consider two scenarios. In the first, called the disjunctive scenario, either match
by itself suffices to burn down the whole forest. That is, even if only one match were lit, the forest
would burn down. In the second scenario, called the conjunctive scenario, both matches are necessary
to burn down the forest; if only one match were lit, the fire would die down before the forest was
consumed.
We can describe the essential structure of these two scenarios using a causal model with four
variables:
• an exogenous variable U that determines, among other things, the motivation and state of mind
of the arsonists. For simplicity, assume that R(U) = {u00, u10, u01, u11}; if U = ui j, then the first
arsonist intends to start a fire iff i = 1 and the second arsonist intends to start a fire iff j = 1. In
both scenarios U = u11;8
5Although we find the interpretation of primitive value assignments as primitive events remarkable, we will relegate the
discussion of this issue to another occasion, where we also discuss omissions. For some challenging observations on this
interpretation, see Hall (2007).
6We deviate from Halpern and Pearl’s presentation of causal models insofar as ~X denotes a set of variables and not a
vector of variables. However, Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 849, footnote 1) are “implicitly identifying the vector ~X with the
subset ofV consisting of the variables in ~X”. Halpern (2015, footnote 2) uses the vector notation, but sometimes views “~Z
as a set of variables.”
7We follow Fenton-Glynn (2017) in conveying “=” a double role: the sign figures as (i) identity and (ii) an assignment
operator such as Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) “←” or Pearl’s (2009) “do(·)”. Although this double role is mathematically
sloppy, it avoids an unnecessary multiplication of notation and is harmless as long as we keep in mind that [~Y = ~y]φ
expresses a conditional whose antecedent assigns the variables in ~Y the values ~y.
8We will normally leave the context ~u implicit in the following examples (as is common practice in causal modeling).
See, for example, Halpern and Pearl (2005) and Halpern and Hitchcock (2010).
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• endogenous variables ML1 and ML2, each either 0 or 1, where MLi = 0 if arsonist i does not
drop the lit match and MLi = 1 if he does, for i = 1, 2;
• an endogenous variable FB for forest burns down, with values 0 (it does not) and 1 (it does).
The two scenarios differ with respect to the structural equation for FB:
• Disjunctive scenario: FB = FFB(ML1,ML2) = max(ML1,ML2).
• Conjunctive scenario: FB = FFB(ML1,ML2) = min(ML1,ML2).
U
ML1 ML2
FB
Figure 5.1: Causal network for the Arsonists
Example. The arrows represent the depen-
dences among the variables as encoded by the
structural equations.
U
ML1 ML2
FB
Figure 5.2: The causal network of the sub-
model for setting ML1 = 0. The removal of
the arrow between U and ML1 represents that
FML1 does not any more depend on the value
of U.
Causal networks can be used to depict the recursive dependences of the structural equations, as in
figures 6.1 and 6.2. A causal network is a directed acyclic graph, where the nodes correspond to the
variables and there is an arrow from a node labeled X to one labeled Y iff X is a parent variable of
Y iff FY depends on the value of X iff X ≺ Y .9 Analogous to the asymmetry of structural equations,
causal networks have the property that variables only causally affect their descendants: if Y is not a
descendant of X, then a change in the value of X has no effect on the value of Y .
Let us now check whether or not the conditional [ML1 = 0]FB = 1 is true in the contextualized
causal model 〈M, u11〉 of the Arsonists Example. The intervention that sets ML1 = 0 induces a
submodel MML1=0 of M. If the solution to the structural equations of MML1=0 satisfies FB = 1, then
[ML1 = 0]FB = 1 is true in the contextualized causal model. If the conditional is indeed satisfied in
the contextualized causal model, we write 〈M, u11〉 |= [ML1 = 0]FB = 1.
In the disjunctive scenario, 〈M, u11〉 |= [ML1 = 0]FB = 1 iff 〈MML1=0, u11〉 |= FB = 1.10 The
structural equations for the submodel MML1=0 are:
• FML1=0ML1 = 0. Hence, ML1 = 0.
• FML1=0ML2 (u11) = 1. Hence, ML2 = 1.
9Note that the acyclicity follows from the assumption that the structural equations are recursive.
10Notice that the operator [ML1 = 0] relates 〈M, u11〉 and 〈MML1=0, u11〉. In general, [] can be seen as both an operator on
a (contextualized) causal model and as the antecedent of a conditional.
5.2 An Extension of Causal Model Semantics 115
• FML1=0FB (ML1,ML2) = max(ML1,ML2). Since ML2 = 1, FB = 1.
The solution of the structural equations of MML1=0 satisfies FB = 1, and thus 〈M, u11〉 |= [ML1 =
0]FB = 1. Notice the difference between the structural equation FML1(u11) = 1 and F
ML1=0
ML1
= 0:
the former depends on the value of U, whereas the latter does not. After the intervention that sets
ML1 = 0, the variable ML1 is treated as if it were an exogenous variable, viz. it is assigned a
value by its structural equation that does not depend on other variables. The structural equations for
the other variables, i. e. V \ {ML1}, remain unchanged: FML2(u11) = 1 = FML1=0ML2 (u11) = 1 and
FFB(ML1,ML2) = F
ML1=0
FB (ML1,ML2) = max(ML1,ML2).
The conjunctive scenario differs from the disjunctive scenario only in the structural equation for
FB: FML1=0FB (ML1,ML2) = min(ML1,ML2). Since ML1 = 0, FB = 0. Hence, 〈M, u11〉 6|= [ML1 =
0]FB = 1. We conclude that the conditional [ML1 = 0]FB = 1 is true in the disjunctive scenario and
not true in the conjunctive scenario.
Before turning to our extension, we observe a correspondence between an arbitrary set of primitive
value assignments ~X = ~x and the conjunction of all members of ~X = ~x, i. e.
∧ ~X = ~x. Given a
contextualized causal model 〈M, ~u〉, and an arbitrary Boolean combination of value assignments φ,
〈M, ~u〉 |= [~X = ~x]φ iff 〈M, ~u〉 |= [∧ ~X = ~x]φ, where ∧ ~X = ~x = (X1 = x1 ∧ ... ∧ Xi = xi). Based on
this correspondence, we will move back and forth between sets of primitive value assignments and
their big conjunctions – without further mentioning. Moreover, by convention we take 〈M, ~u〉 |= [~X =
~x, ~Y = ~y]φ to be synonymous with 〈M, ~u〉 |= [~X = ~x ∪ ~Y = ~y]φ.
5.2.2 Agnostic Models
Our Ramsey Test requires a suspension of judgment. In order to define the suspension of judgment,
we extend Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) causal model semantics by a new type of model, which we
call agnostic. Such an agnostic model is meant to represent the suspension of judgment. Intuitively,
the actual context is suspended in an agnostic model such that the value assignments are (partially)
indeterminate: the values of some variables are suspended, while the values of other variables are
unchanged. The idea behind such a (partially) agnostic value assignment is that some variables of a
causal model are assigned the set of all of their possible values. Formally, an agnostic value assign-
ment is a function A that assigns each variable Y of a subset of a causal model’s variables the set
R(Y) = {y1, ..., yn} of its mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive values. Notice that A assigns sets
of values to endogenous and possibly exogenous variables.
An agnostic value assignment contrasts with a context of a causal model. A context ~u uniquely
determines the value assignment ~u ∪ ~v of the variables U ∪ V with respect to 〈M, ~u〉. A partially
agnostic value assignmentA renders indeterminate the value assignment ~u∪~v of some of the variables
inU ∪V with respect to 〈M, ~u〉.
Similar to Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) [] operator based on the notion of a submodel, we now
define a new operator []s based on the notion of an agnostic model.
Definition 26. Agnostic Model 〈M~X=~x,A〉
Let 〈M, ~u〉 be a contextualized causal model and ~X = ~x a set of primitive value assignments for a
(possibly empty) subset of the variables in U ∪ V. We say that 〈M~X=~x,A〉 is the agnostic model of
〈M, ~u〉 with the core ~X = ~x iff
(1) M~X=~x is a submodel of M, and
(2) A(Yi) = R(Yi) for all Yi ∈ (U ∪V) \ ~X.
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An agnostic model 〈M~X=~x,A〉 with the core ~X = ~x is agnostic with respect to the variables in the
set ~Y = U∪V\ ~X. The variables in ~X are set to the values ~x independent of the context value(s) for ~U.
Intuitively, the core ~X = ~x contains the variable assignments that are protected from the suspension of
judgment. In other words, we are not agnostic about the variables in the core. Hence, the variables of
the causal model are partitioned into the variables ~Y , on which we suspend judgment, and the variables
~X, on which we do not suspend judgment.
We define satisfaction of a formula φ in an agnostic model as follows: 〈M~X=~x,A〉 |= φ iff
〈M~X=~x, ~u ∪ ~v〉 |= φ for any value assignment ~u ∪ ~v to the variables U ∪ V that respects the struc-
tural equations of M~X=~x.
11 Note that M~X=~x = M in the special case where ~X is the empty set. We
define the suspension operator []s as follows:
〈M, ~u〉[~X = ~x]s = 〈M~X=~x,A〉 (Def-[]s)
The suspension operator []s renders the values of the variables ~Y = U ∪V \ ~X indeterminate.
To summarize, the suspension of judgement on the variablesU ∪V \ ~X with respect to a contex-
tualized causal model 〈M, ~u〉 results in an agnostic model 〈M~X=~x,A〉. After this ‘agnostic move’, the
model 〈M~X=~x,A〉 satisfies φ iff any value assignment ~u ∪ ~v respecting the structural equations of the
submodel M~X=~x satisfies φ.
5.3 A Strengthened Ramsey Test for Causal Models
We briefly introduce the idea of the Ramsey Test and uncover its relation to Halpern and Pearl’s (2005)
causal model semantics. Subsequently, we define our strengthened Ramsey Test. By the template
presented in the Introduction, this test gives us an analysis of causation.
5.3.1 The Ramsey Test and Causal Models
Ramsey (1929/1990) proposed a test to evaluate conditionals. When an agent has no firm opinion on a
proposition A, she should believe a conditional ‘if A then B’ if she believes B as a result of adding A to
her stock of beliefs. Stalnaker (1968, p. 102) extended Ramsey’s test to cover the remaining epistemic
attitudes with respect to the antecedent:
First, add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs; second, make whatever
adjustments are required to maintain consistency (without modifying the hypothetical
belief in the antecedent); finally, consider whether or not the consequent is then true.
In brief, the recipe says that the conditional A > C should be believed just in case C is believed as a
result of assuming A.
Structurally, Stalnaker’s Ramsey Test resembles the evaluation of conditionals in Halpern and
Pearl’s causal model semantics. For this to be seen, recall that the conditional [Y = y]X = x is true,
if X takes on the value x as a result of setting Y on y. Of course, the conditional [Y = y]X = x is
only true or false with respect to a contextualized causal model – very much like the Ramsey Test is
relative to the beliefs of an epistemic state. The intervention in a causal model plays a role similar
to the assumption of the antecedent in the Ramsey Test. Likewise, the value of the variable X after
the intervention corresponds to the belief in the consequent after the Ramsey Test revision. In other
words, the consequent of the Ramsey Test is comparable to the solution for the variable X of the
11Henceforth, we simply write ~u ∪ ~v for a value assignmentU ∪V = ~u ∪ ~v.
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structural equations in the submodel MY=y. On top of this, the structural equations of the submodel
provide a precise meaning to the phrase ‘as a result of’. Hence, Halpern and Pearl’s causal model
semantics may be regarded as containing a fully worked out version of the Ramsey Test. In fact, they
flesh out the (hypothetical) assumption of the Ramsey Test as a (hypothetical) intervention. In the
next section, we devise a strengthened Ramsey Test for causal models.
5.3.2 A Strengthened Ramsey Test for Causal Models
Let us recall our exposition from the introduction of the strengthened Ramsey Test:
First, suspend judgment about the antecedent and the consequent. Second, add the an-
tecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs. Finally, consider whether or not the
consequent is entailed by your beliefs.
We translate now this test into the framework of causal models. Let Prim〈M, ~u〉 denote the set of
primitive value assignments that are satisfied in the contextualized causal model 〈M, ~u〉. In symbols,
Prim〈M, ~u〉 = {X = x | 〈M, ~u〉 |= X = x}.
Having this shorthand for the actual value assignments, how do we determine which beliefs or
judgments are to be suspended in our strengthened Ramsey Test? Inspired by AGM belief revision,
we define a contraction operator that turns a contextualized causal model into a partially agnostic
model such that φ is not believed (any more) in the latter. We define the contraction operator via a
remainder set of primitive value assignments:
Definition 27. Remainder Set 〈M, ~u〉⊥φ
Let 〈M, ~u〉 be a contextualized causal model. φ is a Boolean combination of value assignments. We
call 〈M, ~u〉⊥φ the remainder set of 〈M, ~u〉 with respect to φ:
P ∈ 〈M, ~u〉⊥φ iff
(1) P ⊆ Prim〈M, ~u〉, and
(2) 〈M, ~u〉[P]s 6|= φ, and
(3) there is no P′ such that P ⊂ P′ ⊆ Prim〈M, ~u〉 and 〈M, ~u〉[P′]s 6|= φ.
Condition (1) simply demands that the beliefs that need not be suspended are actual beliefs. In-
tuitively, Condition (2) demands that the contextualized causal model 〈M, ~u〉 does not satisfy φ after
suspending judgment on all the variables of M, except the variables in P. Condition (3) says that
each member P of the remainder set is maximal in the sense that adding an actual belief would revoke
the suspension of judgment with respect to φ. A remainder set 〈M, ~u〉⊥φ contains thus all maximal
subsets P of Prim〈M, ~u〉 that do not satisfy φ with respect to the respective agnostic models 〈MP,A〉.
Using the suspension operator and the definition of a remainder set, we define now the contraction
operator []−. The contraction of the contextualized causal model 〈M, ~u〉 by the Boolean combination
φ is given by:
〈M, ~u〉[φ]− = 〈M, ~u〉[⋂ 〈M, ~u〉⊥φ]s , (Def []−)
where
⋂〈M, ~u〉⊥φ designates the intersection of all the members of the remainder set 〈M, ~u〉⊥φ.⋂〈M, ~u〉⊥φ represents the primitive value assignments that survived the suspension. Henceforth, we
abbreviate
⋂〈M, ~u〉⊥φ by P−.
We are now in a position to define our strengthened Ramsey Test conditional . In brief, ~X =
~x  φ iff φ is entailed by the solution to the structural equations of the agnostic model 〈MP− ,A〉,
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once ~X is set to ~x, where P− =
⋂〈M, ~u〉⊥(~X = ~x ∨ φ). The evaluation of ~X = ~x  φ comprises two
steps: (i) contracting the set Prim〈M, ~u〉 of primitive value assignments such that we become agnostic
on whether or not (~X = ~x) ∨ φ. (ii) Checking whether or not φ is entailed by the structural equations
of the agnostic model 〈MP− ,A〉 after setting ~X to its original values ~x. We define the strengthened
Ramsey Test for the contextualized causal model 〈M, ~u〉 as follows:
〈M, ~u〉 |= ~X = ~x  φ iff 〈M, ~u〉[~X = ~x ∨ φ]− |= [~X = ~x]φ (SRTSE)
We explain SRTSE by the following proposition and corollary.
Proposition 9. Let 〈M, ~u〉 be a contextualized causal model, ~X = ~x a set of primitive value as-
signments and φ a Boolean combination of value assignments. Then 〈M, ~u〉 |= ~X = ~x  φ iff
〈MP−,~X=~x, ~u∪~v〉 |= φ for all value assignments ~u∪~v which respect the structural equations of MP−,~X=~x.
Proof. By SRTSE, 〈M, ~u〉 |= ~X = ~x  φ iff 〈M, ~u〉[~X = ~x ∨ φ]− |= [~X = ~x]φ. Abbreviating⋂〈M, ~u〉⊥(~X = ~x ∨ φ) by P−, the definition of []s gives us 〈MP− ,A〉 |= [~X = ~x]φ. By the defini-
tion of [], we obtain 〈MP−,~X=~x,A〉 |= φ. This means by the definition of satisfaction in an agnostic
model nothing but 〈MP−,~X=~x, ~u ∪ ~v〉 |= φ for all value assignments ~u ∪ ~v that respect the structural
equations of MP−,~X=~x. 
Corollary 1. Let 〈M, ~u〉 be a contextualized causal model, P− and ~X = ~x sets of primitive value
assignments and φ a Boolean combination of value assignments. Then 〈M, ~u〉[P−]s |= [~X = ~x]φ iff
〈M, ~u〉[P− ∪ ~X = ~x]s |= φ.
Proof. Both sides of the equivalence are equivalent to 〈MP−,~X=~x,A〉 |= φ. 
We should make our notational convention explicit that for any operator []∗ on causal models, we
have:
〈M, ~u〉[. . .]∗ |= φ iff 〈M, ~u〉 |= [. . .]∗φ.
In words, []∗ can be seen as both an operator on a contextualized causal model and as the an-
tecedent of a conditional. In particular, we can present the strengthened Ramsey Test as a nested
conditional
〈M, ~u〉 |= ~X = ~x  φ iff 〈M, ~u〉 |= [~X = ~x ∨ φ]−[~X = ~x]φ.
5.3.3 A Ramsey-Test Definition of Actual Causation
Based on the template of the introduction, we define actual causation with respect to a contextualized
causal model as follows:
Definition 28. ~X = ~x is an Actual Cause of φ with respect to 〈M, ~u〉
Let 〈M, ~u〉 be a causal model, ~X = ~x a set of primitive value assignments and φ a Boolean combination
of value assignments. ~X = ~x is an actual cause of φ with respect to 〈M, ~u〉 iff
C1 〈M, ~u〉 |= ~X = ~x ∧ φ, and
C2 〈M, ~u〉 |= ~X = ~x  φ.
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According to C1, for ~X = ~x to be an actual cause of φ, both ~X = ~x and φ must occur in the actual
context. Hence, the members of ~X = ~x are actual value assignments. C2 demands that the cause ~X = ~x
and the effect φ form the antecedent and the consequent of a Strengthened Ramsey Test conditional
that holds true in the respective causal model. That is, C2 demands that 〈M, ~u〉[~X = ~x∨φ]− |= [~X = ~x]φ.
The suspension of judgment on the actual belief ~X = ~x ∨ φ results in believing the actual primitive
value assignments of P− ⊂ Prim〈M, ~u〉. Observe that the suspension of judgment does not always
force us to give up all actual beliefs. For, the beliefs in P− are protected from the suspension of
judgment. This protection is implemented by setting the structural equations of the variables in P−
to their actual values, as expressed by MP− . In this way, actual beliefs surviving the suspension of
judgment may influence our judgments on relations of actual causation.
5.3.4 Minimality
As we shall see below, we do not need any minimality condition to treat the canonical examples of
overdetermination, preemption, and conjunctive scenarios. Such a minimality condition is here su-
perfluous due to the simplicity of the examples and standard translations into causal models. Notably,
causal models usually do not contain irrelevant variables. However, we can implement a minimality
condition by rephrasing C2 as follows:
C2’ 〈M, ~u〉 |= ~X′ = ~x′  φ for all ~X′ = ~x′ ⊆ ~X = ~x.
C2’ says that each subset of an actual cause needs to be an actual cause. If a subset ~X′ = ~x′ is irrelevant,
it follows that 〈M, ~u〉 6|= ~X′ = ~x′  φ. Hence, C2’ prevents that actual causes contain irrelevant
conjuncts. A more thorough motivation and presentation of C2’ will be given when requisite.
5.4 Applying the Definition of Actual Causation
We apply now our definition of actual causation to overdetermination, conjunctive scenarios, and
preemption.
5.4.1 Overdetermination and Conjunctive Scenarios
Recall the Arsonists Example from Section 5.2.1. The causal model comprises three endogenous
variables ML1,ML2, and FB, each taking either the value 0 or the value 1. In the actual context u11,
all three variables take the value 1. In the disjunctive scenario, each of ML1 and ML2 are individually
sufficient for FB = 1. The disjunctive scenario is thus a scenario of symmetric overdetermination.
The set of actual value assignments is Prim〈M, u11〉 = {ML1 = 1,ML2 = 1, FB = 1}.
By Definition 28, ML1 = 1 is an actual cause of FB = 1 with respect to the contextualized causal
model 〈M, u11〉 iff
C1 〈M, u11〉 |= ML1 = 1 ∧ FB = 1, and
C2 〈M, u11〉 |= ML1 = 1  FB = 1.
C1 is obviously satisified. We verify condition C2. By SRTSE,
〈M, u11〉 |= ML1 = 1  FB = 1 iff
〈M, u11〉[ML1 = 1 ∨ FB = 1]− |= [ML1 = 1]FB = 1.
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Abbreviating
⋂〈M, ~u〉⊥(ML1 = 1 ∨ FB = 1) by P−, the definition of []s gives us 〈MP− ,A〉 |=
[ML1 = 1]FB = 1. Notice that the agnostic set of value assignments is P− = ∅. In particular,
we need to suspend judgment on ML2. Otherwise, we could derive FB = 1 by the structural equation
FFB = max(ML1,ML2), which would violate the suspension of judgment on ML1 = 1 ∨ FB = 1.
Hence, in the agnostic model 〈MP− ,A〉 of 〈M, u11〉 no actual value assignment is retained.
To be more precise, suppose for reductio that P− = {ML2 = 1}. Then, by Definition 41 and
Def []−, ML2 = 1 ∈ P for all P in the set 〈M, u11〉⊥(ML1 = 1 ∨ FB = 1). But then 〈M, u11〉[P]s |=
ML1 = 1 ∨ FB = 1 – in violation of condition (2) of Definition 41. Therefore, we would, after the
suspension of judgment on ML1 = 1 ∨ FB = 1, obtain 〈MP− ,A〉 |= ML1 = 1 ∨ FB = 1. That is
〈MP− , ~u∪~v〉 |= ML1 = 1∨FB = 1 for all possible value assignments ~u∪~v which respect the structural
equations of MP− . Observe that, for each ~u ∪ ~v, setting ML2 to the value 1 results in FB = 1, as the
structural equation for FB remains ready to be triggered.
It remains to check whether or not 〈MP− ,A〉 |= [ML1 = 1]FB = 1. If we set ML1 back to
its original value 1, FB takes on the value 1 under each value assignment respecting the structural
equations of MP−,ML1=1. In symbols, 〈MP−,ML1=1,A〉 |= FB = 1. We conclude that ML1 is an actual
cause of FB = 1 in the disjunctive scenario.
Let us now move on to the conjunctive scenario of the Arsonist’s example. Here, both ML1 and
ML2 need to take the value 1 for FB taking on the value 1. Accordingly, the structural equation for
FB is FFB = min(ML1,ML2), while the scenario remains otherwise unchanged. Now, the suspension
of judgment on ML1 = 1∨FB = 1 does not require to retract the belief in ML2 since ML1 alone is not
sufficient to entail FB = 1 via the structural equations. Formally,
⋂〈M, ~u〉⊥(ML1 = 1 ∨ FB = 1) is
identical to P− = {ML2 = 1}. The reason is that there is a possible value assignment ~u ∪ ~v = {ML1 =
0,ML2 = 1, FB = 0} respecting the structural equations of MP− such that 〈MP− , ~u ∪ ~v〉 6|= FB = 1.
Hence, 〈M, ~u〉[P−]s 6|= FB = 1.
It remains to check whether or not 〈MP− ,A〉 |= [ML1 = 1]FB = 1. If we set ML1 back to 1 in
the agnostic model 〈MP− ,A〉, FB takes on the value 1 under each value assignment respecting the
structural equations of MP−,ML1=1. We conclude that ML1 = 1 is an actual cause of FB = 1 in the
conjunctive scenario.
By the same reasoning pattern, ML2 is an actual cause of FB = 1 in both the disjunctive and
conjunctive scenario due to the symmetry of the Arsonists Example. Moreover, we leave it to the
reader to verify that the conjunction ML1 = 1 ∧ ML2 = 1 is also an actual cause of FB = 1 in both
scenarios.
5.4.2 Preemption
Let us consider the following case of preemption analyzed by Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 861):
Example 10. Suzy & Billy Throw Rocks at a Bottle
Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks and throw them at a bottle. Suzy’s rock gets there first, shattering
the bottle. Since both throws are perfectly accurate, Billy’s would have shattered the bottle had it not
been preempted by Suzy’s throw.
In such scenarios the actual cause preempts a merely potential cause. Here Suzy’s throw is the
actual cause of the bottle’s shattering, which preempts Billy’s throw. The key characteristic in this
preemption case is: if Billy throws, the bottle will shatter – no matter what else is actually going on.
Even if we counterfactually assume that Suzy is not throwing her rock at the bottle, knowing that
Billy throws allows us still to infer that the bottle shatters. Nevertheless, Billy’s throw does intuitively
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not count as an actual cause of the bottle’s shattering (while Billy’s throw does count as a potential
cause). Other scenarios of preemption have a similar structure.
We formalize the example following Halpern and Pearl (2005, pp. 861-864). The example com-
prises five endogenous variables:
• S T for ‘Suzy throws’ with two values: 0 (Suzy does not throw), 1 (she does).
• BT for ‘Billy throws’ with two values: 0 (Billy does not throw), 1 (he does).
• S H for ‘Suzy’s rock hits the bottle’ with two values: 0 (it does not), 1 (it does).
• BH for ‘Billy’s rock hits the bottle’ with two values: 0 (it does not), 1 (it does).
• BS for ‘the bottle shatters’ with two values: 0 (it does not), 1 (it does).
S T S H
BT BH
BS
Figure 5.3: Causal network for the Suzy & Billy Throw Rocks at a Bottle Example.
We have the following structural equations:
• FS H = S T .
• FBH = min(BT,¬S H). Note in particular BH = 1 iff BT = 1 and S H = 0.
• FBS = max(S H, BH).
The actual context ~u determines that S T = BT = 1. The ensuing set of actual value assignments
is Prim〈M, ~u〉 = {S T = 1, S H = 1, BS = 1, BT = 1, BH = 0}.
We check first whether Suzy’s throw (S T = 1) is an actual cause of the bottle’s shattering (BS =
1). By Definition 28, S T = 1 is an actual cause of BS = 1 with respect to the contextualized causal
model 〈M, ~u〉 iff
C1 〈M, ~u〉 |= S T = 1 ∧ BS = 1, and
C2 〈M, ~u〉 |= S T = 1  BS = 1.
Condition C1 is obviously satisfied. We verify C2. By SRTSE,
〈M, ~u〉 |= S T = 1  BS = 1 iff
〈M, ~u〉[S T = 1 ∨ BS = 1]− |= [S T = 1]BS = 1.
Abbreviating
⋂〈M, ~u〉⊥(S T = 1 ∨ BS = 1) by P−, the definition of []s gives us 〈MP− ,A〉 |= [S T =
1]BS = 1. By Definition 41, P = {BT = 1, BH = 0} is the only member of the remainder set
〈M, ~u〉⊥(S T = 1 ∨ BS = 1), and so P = P−. It is instructive to take a closer look at why this is
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so. Clearly, P is a subset of Prim〈M, ~u〉. Furthermore, 〈M, ~u〉[P]s 6|= S T = 1 ∨ BS = 1. The reason
is that there is a possible value assignment ~u ∪ ~v = {S T = 0, S H = 0, BS = 0, BT = 1, BH = 0}
that respects the structural equations of MP such that, in this value assignment, S T = 1 ∨ BS = 1 is
false. (Respecting the structural equations means that the structural equations for BT and BH are set
to 1 and 0, respectively, and the other structural equations remain intact). Hence, 〈MP,A〉 6|= S T =
1 ∨ BS = 1. However, if an actual value assignment to one or more of the other variables would
remain in P, the agnostic model 〈MP,A〉 would satisfy S T = 1 ∨ BS = 1. Notice also that the set
{BH = 0} is a subset of {BT = 1, BH = 0}, and so it is excluded as a member of the remainder set
〈M, ~u〉⊥(S T = 1 ∨ BS = 1) by the maximality condition of Definition 41.
It remains to check whether or not 〈MP− ,A〉 |= [S T = 1]BS = 1, which is the case iff
〈MP−,S T=1, ~u ∪ ~v〉 |= BS = 1 for each possible value assignment ~u ∪ ~v respecting the structural equa-
tions of MP−,S T=1. The structural equations of MP−,S T=1 ensure that S T = 1 and so S H = 1, which in
turn leads to BS = 1. We obtain 〈MP−,S T=1,A〉 |= BS = 1. Therefore, Suzy’s throw is recognized as
an actual cause of the bottle’s shattering.
We demonstrate now that Billy’s throw (BT = 1) is not an actual cause of the bottle’s shattering
(BS = 1). The reasoning is analogous to the above case, where Suzy throws. By Definition 28,
BT = 1 is an actual cause of BS = 1 with respect to the contextualized causal model 〈M, ~u〉 iff
C1 〈M, ~u〉 |= BT = 1 ∧ BS = 1, and
C2 〈M, ~u〉 |= BT = 1  BS = 1.
Condition C1 is obviously satisfied. We falsify C2. By SRTSE,
〈M, ~u〉 |= BT = 1  BS = 1 iff
〈M, ~u〉[BT = 1 ∨ BS = 1]− |= [BT = 1]BS = 1.
Abbreviating
⋂〈M, ~u〉⊥(BT = 1 ∨ BS = 1) by P−, the definition of []s gives us 〈MP− ,A〉 |=
[BT = 1]BS = 1. This time P− = {BH = 0}. There is only one maximal P = {BH = 0} such
that 〈M, ~u〉[P]s 6|= BT = 1 ∨ BS = 1. The reason is that there is the possible value assignment
~u ∪ ~v = {S T = 0, BT = 0, S H = 0, BH = 0, BS = 0} which respects the structural equations of
MP. Hence, 〈M, ~u〉[P−]s 6|= BT = 1 ∨ BS = 1. Furthermore, P− is maximal because including any
other primitive value assignment (or assignments) of the set of actual assignments would result in an
agnostic model that satisfies BT = 1 ∨ BS = 1.
Let us now determine whether or not 〈MP− ,A〉 |= [BT = 1]BS = 1. If we set BT = 1 in
the agnostic model 〈MP− ,A〉, the model does not satisfy BS = 1. The reason is that the structural
equation for BH is set to its actual value 0, and so the influence of BT on BS is blocked by BH. In
other words, the intervention that sets BH on its actual value cancels BH’s dependence on BT (and
S H). Consequently, the value of BH cannot be determined by the value of BT (and/or S H).
More formally, 〈MP− ,A〉 |= [BT = 1]BS = 1 iff 〈MH−,BT=1, ~u ∪ ~v〉 |= BS = 1 for each possible
value assignment ~u ∪ ~v respecting the structural equations of MP−,BT=1. Since, however, ~u ∪ ~v =
{S T = 0, BT = 1, S H = 0, BH = 0, BS = 0} respects the structural equations of MP−,BT=1, we have
〈MP− ,A〉 6|= [BT = 1]BS = 1. Hence, Billy’s throw is not an actual cause of the bottle’s shattering.
On our account, actuality influences whether or not there is an actual causal relation. The actual
value assignment BH = 0 is exempt from the suspension of judgment, and thus remains in P−. In other
words, the ‘actuality’ BH = 0 survives the suspension of judgment by setting the structural equation
for BH to the value 0. Consequently, BH takes on its actual value in the agnostic model 〈MP− ,A〉
independent of the values for BT and S H. This is an example of how certain parts of actuality may
“intervene” to tell apart actual causes from merely potential causes.
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5.5 Comparison to the Halpern-Pearl Definitions
We now compare the Halpern-Pearl definitions of actual causation to our Ramsey Test variant. In the
introduction, we cited Eiter and Lukasiewicz’s (2002) proof: according to Halpern and Pearl’s (2005)
definition the conjunction of two or more events never qualifies as an actual cause (at least when the
causal model contains only finitely many variables). Recall the conjunctive scenario of the Arsonists
Example, where both arsonists need to drop lit matches for the forest to burn down. Given the actual
context, that is both arsonists intend to start a fire, each of them individually qualifies as an actual
cause according to both the Halpern-Pearl definitions and our Ramsey Test variant.12 However, both
Halpern-Pearl definitions do not admit the conjunction of both arsonists dropping lit matches as an
actual cause. But why should this conjunction not count as an actual cause of the forest’s burning
down? It seems that making an actual cause explicit in addition to another should not invalidate their
conjunction as actual cause. Merely bringing an event of the actual context from the background into
consideration should not invalidate a relation of actual causation, especially if this actually occurring
event is a necessary factor for the effect to occur.
The modified HP definition considerably simplifies the definition given in Halpern and Pearl
(2005). The modification licenses – in principle – conjunctive causes. To see why the conjunction of
the arsonists dropping their lit matches is not an actual cause, we present the modified HP definition
given in Halpern (2015):
Definition 29. ~X = ~x is an Actual Cause of φ with respect to 〈M, ~u〉
Let 〈M, ~u〉 be a causal model, ~X = ~x a set of primitive events and φ a Boolean combination of primitive
events. ~X = ~x is an actual cause of φ with respect to 〈M, ~u〉 iff
AC1 〈M, ~u〉 |= ~X = ~x ∧ φ, and
AC2 There is a set ~W of variables inV and a setting ~x′ of the variables in ~X such that:
if 〈M, ~u〉 |= ~W = ~w, then 〈M, ~u〉 |= [~X = ~x′, ~W = ~w]¬φ.
AC3 ~X is minimal; no subset of ~X satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2.13
According to this definition, ML1 = 1∧ML2 = 1 (or rather {ML1,ML2}) is not an actual cause of
FB = 1 with respect to the conjunctive scenario. The reason is AC3. There are subsets of {ML1,ML2},
e.g. {ML1}, that satisfy AC1 and AC2. For instance, let ~W = {ML2}. Consequently,
if 〈M, ~u〉 |= ML2 = 1, then 〈M, ~u〉 |= [ML1 = 0,ML2 = 1]FB = 0,
which is true because 〈MML1=0,ML2=1, ~u〉 |= FB = 0.
The modified definition, so reads Halpern’s (2015) abstract, “gives reasonable answers (that agree
with those of the [HP definition]) in the standard problematic examples”. As we have just seen, the
two definitions agree indeed in the conjunctive scenario. The conjunction of both primitive events,
that are necessary for the effect to occur and individually recognized as actual causes, does not form
an actual cause itself. We would not call this result ‘reasonable’. As pointed out in the Introduction,
12According to our definition, why is ML1 = 1 an actual cause of FB = 1 in the conjunctive scenario? Informally,
because the actual context has it that ML2 = 1 and the suspension of judgment does not require to give up this belief.
13The notation [~X = ~x]φ can be read as a non-backtracking counterfactual conditional X1 = x1 ∧ ... ∧ Xk = xk  φ. If
so inclined, the relation to Lewis’s (1973c) analysis of causation becomes evident: if ~X had not been ~x, φ would not have
occurred. AC2 adds to this clause ‘at least under certain contingencies’. The idea behind Definition 29 is thus roughly ‘φ
but for ~X = ~x under the actual contingencies ~W = ~w’.
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if lightning and a preceding drought are necessary factors for a forest fire to occur, the conjunction
of these factors should qualify as an – if not ‘the’ – actual cause. All of the considered cases, the
conjunctive scenario, the disjunctive scenario (or overdetermination), and preemption are ‘standard
problematic examples’. Interestingly, we will see below that the Halpern-Pearl definitions do not
agree on overdetermination.
Let us consider our example of preemption again. We will find that the modified definition and our
variant use a similar strategy, viz. an intervention of actuality. According to the modified definition,
Suzy’s throw (S T = 1) is an actual cause of the bottle’s shattering (BS = 1) with respect to 〈M, ~u〉.
AC1 and AC3 are obviously satisfied. As to AC2, let ~W = {BH}. Consequently,
if 〈M, ~u〉 |= BH = 0, then 〈M, ~u〉 |= [S T = 0, BH = 0]BS = 0
is satisfied, as 〈MS T=0,BH=0, ~u〉 |= BS = 0. Notice that choosing ~W to be {BH} is tantamount to keeping
BH fixed at its actual value 0. As the structural equation of BH is set to 0 in 〈MS T=0,BH=0, ~u〉, even if
Billy throws (BT = 1), the bottle does not shatter. In our variant, the actual value assignment BH = 0
survives the suspension of judgment, and thus the same intervention of actuality applies. However, in
contrast to the modified definition, we are not free to simply choose some actual value assignments.
The interventions of actuality, so to speak, are determined by the suspension of judgment.
The modified definition implies that Billy’s throw (BT = 1) is not an actual cause of the bottle’s
shattering (BS = 1) with respect to 〈M, ~u〉. The reason is that AC2 is violated: there are no variables
that can be kept fixed at their actual values such that setting BT to the value 0 results in BS taking
on the value 0. In the actual context ~u, Suzy throws, her rock hits, and so the bottle shatters whether
or not Billy throws. This explanation of why we do judge Suzy’s throw to be a cause of the bottle’s
shattering but not Billy’s derives from the same intuition as in our definition: it was her rock that
actually hit the bottle and not his. The difference is, again, that our variant gives us the pertinent piece
of actuality (BH = 0), whereas the modified HP definition requires to check what happens when all
subsets of variables are, respectively, kept at their actual values.
Let us turn our attention to the disjunctive scenario of the Arsonists Example, where each of the
arsonists alone is sufficient for the forest to burn down. We show that, according to the modified
definition, the conjunction ML1 ∧ ML2 = 1 qualifies as an actual cause of FB = 1. AC1 is satisfied,
as 〈M, ~u〉 |= ML1 = 1 ∧ ML2 = 1 ∧ FB = 1. As to AC2, let ~W = ∅. Consequently,
〈M, ~u〉 |= [ML1 = 0,ML2 = 0]FB = 0 iff 〈MML1=0,ML2=0, ~u〉 |= FB = 0.
This is satisfied, as FML1=0,ML2=0FB = max(ML1,ML2) = 0. Interestingly, {ML1,ML2} is minimal in
the sense of AC3, as the two subsets {ML1} and {ML2} do not satisfy AC2. (The empty set does not
even satisfy AC1.) We present the argument for {ML1}. Let ~W be the ∅ or {ML2}. According to AC2,
either
〈M, ~u〉 |= [ML1 = 0]FB = 0,
or
〈M, ~u〉 |= [ML1 = 0,ML2 = 1]FB = 0.
However, it is easy to see that neither 〈MML1=0, ~u〉 |= FB = 0 nor 〈MML1=0,ML2=1, ~u〉 |= FB = 0, as
FML1=0FB = F
ML1=0,ML2=1
FB = max(ML1,ML2) = 1. By the same reasoning pattern {ML2 = 1} does not
satisfy AC2 due to the symmetry of the Arsonists Example.
The following tables summarize the differences between the considered definitions with respect
to the Arsonists Example.
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Conjunctive Scenario
Actual Cause of FB = 1 HP Definition Modified HP Def. RT Variant
ML1 = 1 Yes Yes Yes
ML2 = 1 Yes Yes Yes
ML1 = 1 ∧ ML2 = 1 No No Yes
The table compares the HP definition, the modified HP definition, and our Ramsey Test variant (RT
variant) in the conjunctive scenario of the Arsonists Example. Remarkably, as shown above, Halpern’s
modification does not recognize the conjunction ML1 = 1 ∧ ML2 = 1 as an actual cause of FB = 1.
Disjunctive Scenario
Actual Cause of FB = 1 HP Definition Modified HP Def. RT Variant
ML1 = 1 Yes No Yes
ML2 = 1 Yes No Yes
ML1 = 1 ∧ ML2 = 1 No Yes Yes
The table compares the HP definition, the modified HP definition, and our Ramsey Test variant in
the disjunctive scenario of the Arsonists Example. Unlike Halpern’s (2015) statement, the modified
definition does not agree with Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition. This is troublesome because
overdetermination is clearly a ‘standard problematic example’. Furthermore, the modified definition
qualifies the conjunction ML1 = 1 ∧ ML2 = 1 to be an actual cause of FB = 1 in the disjunctive
scenario. Halpern’s (2015) attempt to explain this conundrum is barely convincing. He resorts to the
claim that if ~X = ~x is an actual cause of φ, then each “conjunct in ~X = ~x is called part of a cause of
φ” (his emphasis). In the disjunctive scenario, however, each of ML1 = 1 and ML2 = 1 individually
are intuitively judged to be actual causes of FB = 1, not merely part of one cause. This is why
overdetermination is considered a major problem for Lewis’s (1973c) original counterfactual account
of causation.
A more general note on causal models is in order. We adopted the framework of causal models
and so inherited their merits and drawbacks. The problems of spurious causation or joint effects will
not arise due to the recursivity of the structural equations. Moreover, the recursivity lifts the need to
obtain the directedness of causation, e.g. by assuming a temporal order.
On the other hand, models of structural equations suffer from a drawback: they encode some type-
level causal relations that need to be antecedently given. In other words, generic knowledge about
causal relations is presupposed, be it in form of sets of counterfactuals (e.g. Hitchcock (2001) and
Woodward (2003)), or primitive causal mechanisms construed as law-like relationships that support a
counterfactual interpretation (e.g. Pearl (2009) and Halpern and Pearl (2005)).14
Finally, our Ramsey Test analysis of actual causation is characterized by an epistemic interpreta-
tion of causal models. That is, we take the structural equations to express beliefs about elementary
causal dependences. While for Halpern and Hitchcock (2015, p. 384) the structural equations may be
seen as “describing objective features of the world”, they agree that “judgments of actual causation
are subjective”. Note, furthermore, that their ‘reasoning about causality’ is suspiciously close to our
‘judgments on causal relations’. “[U]ltimately”, so Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 878), “the choice of
model is a subjective one”. This is in line with the present Ramsey Test definition being relative
14This being said, the proponents of models of structural equations do not find the presupposition of type-level causal
relations all too problematic. For causal models do not directly represent relations of actual causation. Rather, they encode
generic knowledge about causal structures in terms of which actual causes can be identified, whereas the generic causal
relations are primitives that cannot be further analysed in terms of actual causation. For a more detailed justification, see
Halpern and Pearl (2005), Halpern and Hitchcock (2010), and Fenton-Glynn (2017).
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to an epistemic state. Hence, nothing seems to preclude an interpretation of the model-relativity as
agent-relativity.
5.6 Conclusion
We have proposed a Ramsey Test definition of actual causation in the framework of causal models.
For this definition cases of overdetermination, conjunctive scenarios, and preemption are no problem.
With respect to these standard examples, we have shown that the definition surpasses the Halpern-
Pearl definitions. Underlying this claim are criteria that Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 846) suggest for
evaluating approaches of actual causation:
The best ways to judge the adequacy of an approach are the intuitive appeal of the def-
initions and how well it deals with examples; we believe that this article shows that our
approach fares well on both counts.
We believe that the present article has shown that our variant to the Halpern-Pearl definitions fares
even better with respect to overdetermination and conjunctive scenarios.
Of course, we need to deal with the other problematic examples of the literature in order to prop-
erly compete with the Halpern-Pearl definitions. Fortunately, this research is already in progress,
including a treatment of double prevention, switches, and omissions. Moreover, we will provide a
more detailed comparison between the agnostic dependence used in our strengthened Ramsey Test
and the notion of counterfactual dependence.
In the next chapter, we stay with causal models à la Halpern and Pearl (2005). In the tradition
of Lewis (1986b), they exclude categorically that causes can be disjunctive events. More specifically,
disjunctive events are excluded from being causes by Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition: they
require each candidate cause to have the form of a conjunction of primitive events. Lewis (1986b,
p. 212) excludes disjunctive events from being candidates for actual causes simply because he does
not know “how a genuine event could be the disjunction of two events both of which actually occur.”
Following this metaphysical verdict, Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 853) state that the “only reasonable
definition of ‘A or B causes φ’ seems to be that ‘either A causes φ or B causes φ’. There are no
truly disjunctive causes once all the relevant facts are known.” Sartorio (2006) challenges the view
that ‘there exist no truly disjunctive causes when all the relevant facts are known’. She puts forth a
switching scenario, in which ‘the disjunction of two events both of which actually occur’ plausibly
seems to be an actual cause. We will work out how we can understand disjunctive causes in the sense
of Sartorio’s switch. Subsequently, we use this insight to extend Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition
of actual causation such that the definition covers this type of disjunctive causes.
Chapter 6
A Refined Halpern-Pearl Definition for
Sartorio’s Disjunctive Causes
In the previous chapter, we proposed an alternative to the Halpern-Pearl definitions of actual causation
(Halpern and Pearl (2005); Halpern (2015)). We think that our variant has the potential to become a
strong competitor to the Halpern-Pearl definitions when we refine it further. In general, however, it
seems that the definition provided by Halpern and Pearl (2005) is currently still the benchmark for
conditional analyses of causation in the tradition of Lewis (1973c). As is well known, Lewis (1986b,
p. 212) does “not know how a genuine event could be the disjunction of two events both of which
actually occur.” His reasons for this statement derive from his metaphysics. More recently, Sartorio
(2006) has shed doubt on this implication of Lewis’s metaphysics. She argues for the existence of
disjunctive causes by presenting an example of such. Now, for Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition,
disjunctions of primitive events are not even admissible candidates for actual causes. The reason for
this exclusion, so Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 853), be that if a disjunction is a cause at least one of
its disjuncts must be a cause – we just do not know which one. Hence, “there be no truly disjunctive
causes once all the relevant facts are known.” (ibid.)
In the light of Sartorio’s example of a disjunctive cause, we think Lewis’s metaphysical reasons
to exclude disjunctive causes might be somewhat premature. Hence, we aim in this chapter to refine
Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition of actual causation such that it allows for disjunctive causes
of the type found in Sartorio’s example. In order to treat such disjunctive causes within Halpern
and Pearl’s framework of causal models, we first extend their causal model semantics by disjunctive
antecedents. Based on the extension, we will show that our refined Halpern-Pearl definition aligns
with Sartorio’s (2006) observation: a disjunctive cause does not imply that one of its disjuncts must
also be a cause.
Sources. This chapter builds on Günther (2017b). Substantial content from this contribution to the
Proceedings of the 21st Amsterdam Colloquium is reprinted by permission from Alexandre Cremers,
Thom van Gessel, and Floris Roelofsen (editors): Institute of Logic, Language and Computation
(ILLC), University of Amsterdam (2017).
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6.1 Introduction
Halpern and Pearl (2005) define actual causation based on a causal model semantics of conditionals.
The semantics is restricted to antecedents that do not contain disjunctions. “We might consider gener-
alizing further to allow disjunctive causes”, so Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 853), but they discard the
idea, because there be “no truly disjunctive causes once all the relevant facts are known”.
Making no use of formal means such as causal models, Sartorio (2006) argues for the existence of
disjunctive causes. She does so by putting forward a switching scenario, in which all the relevant facts
are known. Sartorio’s Switch provides motivation for Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition of actual
causation to be applicable to causes that have a particular disjunctive form. Hence, we first need to
lift the restriction of causal models to non-disjunctive antecedents such that we can express arbitrary
Boolean combinations in a conditional’s antecedent.
In Section 6.2, we translate Sartorio’s Switch into a causal model. En passant we introduce
Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) causal model semantics and definition of actual causation. In Section
6.3, we extend their causal model semantics by antecedents having a disjunctive form. This allows us
to refine Halpern and Pearl’s definition of actual causation such that it captures disjunctive causes of
the type found in Sartorio’s Switch.
6.2 Sartorio’s Switch and Causal Models
Sartorio (2006) argues for the existence of disjunctive causes. She invokes roughly the following
scenario to back up her claim.
Example 11. Sartorio’s Switch (Sartorio (2006, p. 523–528))
Suppose a person is tied on a track and a train is running towards the person. Although the track
branches and there is a switch determining on which of two tracks the train continues, the tracks
reconverge before the place, where the person is captivated. Now, Sartorio adds details to this typical
switching scenario. A person, called Flipper, flips the switch such that the train continues on the left
track. Moreover, there is construction work carried out on the right track. Another person, called
Reconnecter, reconnects the right track before the train would have arrived in case Flipper hadn’t
flipped the switch. The train travels on the left track and kills the trapped person.
Sartorio proposes that the disjunction ‘Flipper flips the switch and/or Reconnecter reconnects’ is
the actual cause of the person’s death, while both individually ‘Flipper flips the switch’ and ‘Recon-
necter reconnects’ are not actual causes of the person’s death.1
In her judgment, she complies with the simple counterfactual analysis of actual causation: event
C is a cause of event E iff C and E occur, and E counterfactually depends on C, that is, if it were not
the case that C occurs, E would not have occurred. Thereby, she takes counterfactual dependence to
be a prima facie reason for and thus a proxy for causation.2 Accordingly, ‘Flipper flips the switch’
(and ‘Reconnecter reconnects’) is not an actual cause of the person’s death. For, if it were not the
1In this chapter, we are silent on the issue of whether or not actual causes are events or facts. We just assume that if there
are disjunctive causes, they are events and/or facts. However, see Lewis (1986b, pp. 241-69) for an argument challenging
the existence of disjunctive events, and thus disjunctive event causation.
2See Sartorio (2006, p. 529). Most recent counterfactual accounts of causation say that counterfactual dependence is
sufficient for causation, but not necessary. See, for instance, Hitchcock (2001), Woodward (2003), Hall (2004), Hall (2007),
Halpern and Pearl (2005), Halpern (2015). Hence, no counterfactual dependence between C and E seems to allow for
causation between C and E, whereas the presence of counterfactual dependence seems to be a very strong reason for the
presence of a causal relation.
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case that ‘Flipper flips the switch’ (or ‘Reconnecter reconnects’ respectively), the person would die
nevertheless. Additionally, the conjunction ‘Flipper flips the switch and Reconnecter reconnects’ is
no actual cause of the person’s death. For, if it were not the case, the person might die nevertheless,
viz. in case one of Flipper and Reconnecter does what they do. However, the disjunction ‘Flipper flips
the switch or Reconnecter reconnects’ is an actual cause of the person’s death. For, if it were not the
case, the person would not die. Sartorio (2006, p. 530) confirms that “the death happened because at
least one of them did what they did.”
Counterfactual accounts cash out the idea that a cause makes a difference.3 In her argumentation
for disjunctive causes, Sartorio endorses a principle of difference making for which she argued in
Sartorio (2005): if an event is a cause of an effect, then its absence would not have been a cause of the
same effect. Relying on this principle, she argues that Flipper’s redirection is not a cause given that
there was an alternative route that would have led to the same outcome (even though this route is not
actualized). There is no net difference between flipping and not flipping the switch with respect to the
person’s death. Hence, the flipping fails to make a difference in the sense of the principle: if we were
to count the flipping as a cause, we would have to count its absence as a cause too. Therefore, Sartorio
(2006, p. 532) thinks that “the mere fact that there was an alternative route is sufficient to rob the event
of the redirection of its causal powers.” Flipper’s redirection to the left track renders Reconnecters
reconnection of the right track causally inefficacious, and, conversely, the reconnection renders the
redirection causally inefficacious. The core of her reasoning goes as follows: “If either event had
happened without the other, then that event would have been causally efficacious [...]. But, when both
events happen, they deprive each other of causal efficacy.” (ibid., p. 531) However, so argues Sartorio,
the outcome must still depend on the existence of some viable causally efficacious path. Hence, the
disjunctive fact that at least one path was causally efficacious is the cause of the outcome.
We translate now Sartorio’s Switch into a causal model and check which formulas qualify as actual
causes according to Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition of actual causation.
6.2.1 Halpern and Pearl’s Causal Model Semantics
Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) causal model semantics of conditionals is defined with respect to a causal
model over a signature.
Definition 30. Signature
A signature S is a triple S = 〈U,V,R〉, where U is a finite set of exogenous variables, V is a finite
set of endogenous variables, and R maps any variable Y ∈ U∪V on a non-empty (but finite) set R(Y)
of possible values for Y .
Definition 31. Causal Model
A causal model over signature S is a tuple M = 〈S,F 〉, where F maps each endogenous variable
X ∈ V on a function FX : (×U∈UR(U)) × (×Y∈V\{X}R(Y)) 7→ R(X).
The mapping F defines a set of (modifiable) structural equations modeling the causal influence of
exogenous and endogenous variables on other endogenous variables. The function FX determines the
value of X ∈ V given the values of all the other variables inU∪V. Note that F defines no structural
equation for any exogenous variable U ∈ U. We write ~X for a (finite) vector of variables X1, .., Xn,
and ~x for a (finite) vector of values x1, .., xn of the variables. Hence, we abbreviate X1 = x1, .., Xn = xn
by ~X = ~x.
3Lewis (1973c, p. 557), for example, writes “We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the difference
it makes must be a difference from what would have happened without it.”.
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A structural equation such as x = FX(~u, y) says (in a context where the exogenous variables take
the values ~u), if Y were set to y (by means of an intervention), then X would take on the value x.
Notice the difference to a direct intervention on X: an intervention that assigns a value x′ , x to X
(by means external to the model) overrules the value x assigned by FX(~u, y). The difference points
to a ‘causal’ asymmetry. In structural equations, the values of the variables on the right-hand side
cannot be changed without changing the values of the variables on the left-hand side; but the values
of the variables on the left-hand side can be changed (by means of an external intervention) without
changing the values of the variables on the right-hand side.
Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 849) confine themselves to models of recursive structural equations.4
In such models, the causal dependences among the variables in V can be represented by a directed
acyclic graph. Hence, there is a strict partial order such that, if X ≺ Y , then the value of X may affect
the value of Y , but the value of Y cannot have any effect on the value of X. A consequence of the
restriction to models M of recursive equations is that, given a context ~U = ~u, there is always a unique
solution to the equations in M; for we can always solve the equations in the order given by ≺.
In the spirit of Halpern and Hitchcock (2010, p. 397), we make two assumptions concerning the
variables of a causal model: (i) no value of a variable X logically implies a value of another variable
Y , and (ii) the different values of the same variable are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.
Intuitively, a simple conditional [Y = y]X = x is true in a causal model M given context ~u =
u1, ..., un, if the intervention setting Y = y results in the solution X = x for the structural equations.5
Such an intervention is defined by the notion of a submodel MY=y of M.
Definition 32. Submodel
Let M = 〈S,F 〉 be a causal model, ~X a (possibly empty) vector of variables in V and ~x, ~u vectors
of values for the variables in ~X, ~U. We call the causal model M~X=~x = 〈S~X ,F
~X=~x〉 over signature
S~X = 〈U,V\ ~X,R
∣∣∣V\~X〉 a submodel of M. F ~X=~x maps each variable inV\ ~X on a function F ~X=~xY that
corresponds to FY for the variables inV \ ~X and sets the variables in ~X to ~x.
We can describe the structure of Sartorio’s Switch using a causal model including four binary
variables:
• an exogenous variable T , where T = 1 if the train arrives and T = 0 otherwise;
• an endogenous variable F, where F = 1 if Flipper flips the switch and F = 0 otherwise;
• an endogenous variable R, where R = 1 if Reconnecter reconnects and R = 0 otherwise;
• an endogenous variable D, where D = 1 if the person dies and D = 0 otherwise.
Leaving the functions FF , FR and FD implicit, the set of structural equations is given by:
• F = T
• R = T
4This being said, (Halpern and Pearl, 2005, pp. 883-884) provide a definition of actual causation for non-recursive
models in their appendix.
5We follow Fenton-Glynn (2017) in conveying “=” a double role: the sign figures as (i) identity and (ii) an assignment
operator such as Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) “←” or Pearl’s (2009) “do(·)”. Although this double role is mathematically
sloppy, it avoids an unnecessary multiplication of notation and is harmless as long as we keep in mind that [~Y = ~y]φ
expresses a conditional whose antecedent assigns the variables in ~Y the values ~y.
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• D = max(F,R)
In words, Flipper flips the switch (F = 1), if the train arrives (T = 1). Reconnecter reconnects
(R = 1), if the train arrives. The person dies (D = 1), if at least one of F = 1 and R = 1 is the case.
Causal networks can be used to depict the recursive dependences of the structural equations. A
causal network is a directed acyclic graph, where the nodes correspond to the variables and there is
an arrow from a node labeled X to one labeled Y iff X is a parent variable of Y iff FY depends on the
value of X iff X ≺ Y .6 Analogous to the asymmetry of structural equations, causal networks have the
property that variables only causally affect their descendants: if Y is not a descendant of X, then a
change in the value of X has no effect on the value of Y .
The recursive dependencies of the structural equations are depicted in Figure 6.1.
T
F R
D
Figure 6.1: The causal network for Sartorio’s Switch.
To illustrate the causal model semantics, let us check whether or not the conditional [F = 1]D = 1
is true in the causal model M of Sartorio’s Switch (given the context t = 1). Intuitively, the intervention
that sets F = 1 induces a submodel MF=1 of M. If the solution to the structural equations of MF=1
satisfies D = 1, then [F = 1]D = 1 is true in the causal model M under context T = t. In this case, we
write 〈M, t〉 |= [F = 1]D = 1.
In the scenario of Sartorio’s Switch, 〈M, t〉 |= [F = 1]D = 1 iff 〈MF=1, t〉 |= D = 1. The structural
equations for the submodel MF=1 are:
• F = 1
• R = T
• D = max(F,R)
We see that the solution to the structural equations of MF=1 satisfies D = 1, and thus M satisfies
the conditional [F = 1]D = 1 (given t). Notice the difference between the structural equation F = T
and F = 1: the former depends on T , whereas the latter does not. After the intervention that sets
F = 1, the variable F is treated similar to an exogenous variable, i. e. it is assigned a value by its
structural equation that does not depend on other (exogenous and/or endogenous parent) variables.7
The structural equations for the variables inV \ {F} remain unchanged.
6Note that the acyclicity follows from the assumption that the structural equations are recursive.
7Intuitively, we may think of a value assignment X = x in model M by an intervention as overruling the structural
equation in M.
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6.2.2 Halpern and Pearl’s Definition of Actual Causation
The basic idea behind Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition of actual causation is to extend Lewis’s
notion of causal dependence to a notion of contingent dependence. The simple counterfactual analysis
mentioned above is Lewis’s (1973c) definition of causal dependence: event E causally depends on
event C iff (i) C and E occur, and (ii) E counterfactually depends on C. Furthermore, he identifies
actual causation with the transitive closure of causal dependence. Hence, C is an actual cause of E
iff there is a chain of causal dependencies from C to E. Halpern and Pearl extend this definition by
(possibly non-actual) contingencies: C is an actual cause of E iff E causally depends on C under
certain contingencies. Roughly, contingent dependence makes it possible that even if E does not
counterfactually depend on C in the actual situation, E counterfactually depends on C under certain
contingencies.8
Based on their causal model semantics for conditionals, Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 853) propose
the following definition of actual causation.
Definition 33. Actual Causation
~X = ~x is an actual cause of φ in 〈M, ~u〉 iff the following three conditions hold:
AC1. 〈M, ~u〉 |= (~X = ~x) ∧ φ.
AC2. There exists a partition 〈~Z, ~W〉 ofV with ~X ⊆ ~Z and some setting 〈~x′, ~w′〉 of the variables in
〈~X, ~W〉 such that if 〈M, ~u〉 |= Z = z∗ for all Z ∈ ~Z, then both of the following conditions hold:
(a) 〈M, ~u〉 |= [~X = ~x′, ~W = ~w′]¬φ.
(b) 〈M, ~u〉 |= [~X = ~x, ~W′ = ~w′, ~Z′ = ~z∗]φ for all subsets ~W′ of ~W and all subsets ~Z′ of ~Z.
AC3. ~X is minimal; no subset of ~X satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2.
AC1 requires both that the actual cause ~X = ~x and its effect φ are true in the actual (contextualized)
model. AC3 ensures that only the conjuncts of ~X = ~x “essential” for changing φ in AC2(a) are part of
a cause, or as Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 853) say “inessential elements are pruned.” To understand
AC2, it is helpful to think of ~X = ~x as the minimal set of conjuncts that counts as a cause of the effect
φ, and to think of ~Z = ~z as the active causal path(s) from ~X to φ.
AC2(a) is reminiscent of Lewis’s (1973c) counterfactual dependence: φ would be false, if it were
not for ~X = ~x. The condition says that there is a setting ~X = ~x′ changing φ to ¬φ, if the variables not
on the active causal path(s) take on certain values, i. e. ~W = ~w′. The difference to the counterfactual
criterion is that φ’s dependence on ~X = ~x may be tested under certain contingencies ~W = ~w′, which
are non-actual for ~w′ , ~w. Note that those contingent ‘but-for-tests’ allow to identify more causal
relationships than the simple counterfactual criterion.
AC2(b) restricts the contingencies allowed to be considered. The idea is that any considered
contingency does not affect the active causal path(s) with respect to ~X = ~x and φ. In other words,
AC2(b) guarantees that ~X alone is sufficient to change φ to ¬φ. The setting of a contingency ~W = ~w′
only eliminates spurious side effects that may hide ~X′s effect. The idea behind AC2(b) is implemented
as follows: (i) setting a contingency ~W = ~w′ leaves the causal path(s) unaffected by the condition that
changing the values of any subset ~W′ of ~W from the actual values ~w to the contingent values ~w′ has
no effect on φ’s value. (ii) At the same time, changing the values of ~W′ may alter the values of the
variables in ~Z, but this alteration has no effect on φ’s value.
8Note that Halpern and Pearl do not take the transitive closure for their definition of actual causation. In contrast to
Lewis’s dictum, they think (Halpern and Pearl, 2005, p. 844) that causation is not always transitive.
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We apply now Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition of actual causation to the causal model of
Sartorio’s Switch. The result is that each of F = 1 and R = 1 is an actual cause of D = 1. However,
the conjunction F = 1 ∧ R = 1 and the disjunction F = 1 ∨ R = 1 do not qualify as actual causes of
D = 1.
We show that F = 1 is an actual cause of D = 1. (The argument for R = 1 is structurally the same
as the causal model of Sartorio’s Switch is symmetric with respect to F and R.) Let ~Z = {F,D}, and so
~W = {R}. The contingency R = 0 satisfies the two conditions of AC2: AC2(a) is satisfied, as setting
F = 0 results in D = 0; AC2(b) is satisfied, as setting F back to 1 results in D = 1. The counterfactual
contingency R = 0 is required to reveal the hidden dependence of D on F, or so argue Halpern and
Pearl.
The conjunction F = 1 ∧ R = 1 is no actual cause of D = 1 due to the minimality condition AC3.
Let ~Z = {F,R,D}, and so ~W = ∅. AC2(a) is satisfied, as setting F = 0 ∧ R = 0 results in D = 0.
AC2(b) is satisfied trivially. However, two subsets of ~X = {F,R} satisfy the two conditions of AC2 as
well, viz. ~X′ = {F} and ~X′′ = {R}. Therefore, ~X = {F,R} is not minimal and according to AC3 the
conjunction F = 1 ∧ R = 1 is thus no actual cause of D = 1. Minimality is meant, so Halpern and
Pearl (2005, p. 857), to strip “overspecific details from the cause.”
The disjunction F = 1 ∨ R = 1 does not count as actual cause of D = 1, simply because Halpern
and Pearl’s (2005) definition of actual causation does not admit causes in form of proper disjunctions,
i. e. disjunctions having more than one disjunct. They do not “have a strong intuition as to the best
way to deal with disjunction in the context of causality and believe that disallowing it is reasonably
consistent with intuitions.” (p. 858)
Sartorio (2006, p. 530) observes that “there is no general motivation for believing that, when
(if) a disjunctive fact is a cause, at least one of its disjuncts must also be a cause.” In other words,
it is possible that a disjunctive fact is a cause while its disjuncts are not. This observation stands
in sharp contrast to Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition of actual causation, according to which
both ‘disjuncts’ individually can qualify as actual causes, whereas the disjunction cannot. In the
next section, we first define disjunctive antecedents for Halpern and Pearl’s causal model semantics;
subsequently, we extend their definition of actual causation to cover disjunctive causes as found in
Sartorio’s Switch.
6.3 An Extension of Causal Model Semantics by Disjunctive An-
tecedents
Recall Sartorio’s Switch of Section 6.2. Sartorio argues that the person tied to the tracks dies because
at least one of Flipper and Reconnecter does what they do. Therefore, the disjunctive fact that at
least one track or path was causally efficacious is the cause of the outcome. Moreover, if only one of
Flipper’s and Reconnecter’s events would occur, their disjunction would be causally inefficacious, but
the single occuring event would be causally efficacious. We identify here two necessary conditions
under which there are disjunctive causes: (i) there are at least two actually occuring and potentially
efficacious events on different paths (“two tracks”), and (ii) there is an event that switches the paths
without making a net difference with respect to the outcome (“flipping the switch”).
Let us consider Sartorio’s Switch using the variables of our causal model. In her switching sce-
nario, Sartorio maintains that the disjunction F = 1∨R = 1 is an actual cause of D = 1. Recalling the
necessary conditions for disjunctive causes, Sartorio’s disjunctive conditional [F = 1 ∨ R = 1]D = 1
means:
• the actual case F = 1 and R = 1 results in D = 1, and
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• the counterfactual case F = 1 and R = 0 results in D = 1, and
• the counterfactual case F = 0 and R = 1 results in D = 1.
Disjunctive causation requires here that both of F = 1 and R = 1 are actual, and each of F = 1 and
R = 1 alone would be sufficient to result in D = 1. In such a case, if one or the other is sufficient for
the effect and both occur, then Sartorio judges the disjunction of both to be the cause. In this sense,
Sartorio understands the disjunctive antecedent F = 1∨ R = 1 as a summary of two actually occuring
events F = 1 and R = 1, whose actual co-occurrence robs them of their individual causal efficacy.
Moreover, in a context, in which only one of them is actual, this one individually would be an actual
cause.
Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) causal model semantics does not allow to evaluate the conditional
[F = 1 ∨ R = 1]D = 1. The reason is that the submodel MF=1∨R=1 is undefined, and thus they cannot
evaluate disjunctions in the antecedent. Moreover, the structural equation for D of Sartorio’s Switch
does apply to values of F and R, but it does not apply to a disjunction such as F = 1 ∨ R = 1. Hence,
the value for D is not determined by the disjunction. Next, we propose a conservative extension of
Halpern and Pearl’s causal model semantics that allows us to evaluate antecedents that are disjunctive
in Sartorio’s sense.
6.3.1 Evaluating Disjunctive Antecedents
As we have just observed, Sartorio’s disjunctive causes of the form A = a ∨ B = b require that the
Boolean conjunction A = a∧B = b actually obtains, and if one of A = a or B = b would obtain but not
the other, the effect would still follow. We implement now this logic governing Sartorio’s disjunctive
causes by extending Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) framework of causal models.
The idea behind evaluating a conditional with disjunctive antecedent is to check whether the con-
sequent is true in each disjunctive situation of the antecedent. A disjunction A = a ∨ B = b is true in
three possible situations:
(i) A = a ∧ B = b,
(ii) A = a ∧ B = ¬b, and
(iii) A = ¬a ∧ B = b.
We refer to (i)-(iii) as the disjunctive situations or possibilities of the formula A = a ∨ B = b. We
evaluate the antecedent [A = a ∨ B = b], for example, by carrying out three interventions rather
than one. Each of these interventions corresponds to a disjunctive situation. The result is exactly one
submodel per disjunctive situation.
In symbols, the idea behind evaluating a conditional with disjunctive antecedent can be expressed
as follows:
〈M, ~u〉 |= [A = a ∨ B = b]C iff
〈MA,B, ~u〉 |= C, and
〈MA,¬B, ~u〉 |= C, and
〈M¬A,B, ~u〉 |= C.
(1)
Given A = a ∨ B = b is an actual disjunctive cause of C, the intervention corresponding to
disjunctive situation (i) results in the submodel MA=a,B=b, in which A and B take the same values as in
the actual contextualized model 〈M, ~u〉.
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Our strategy to evaluate a conditional with disjunctive antecedent does not require to modify
Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) notion of a submodel. Rather, the evaluation requires to look at (possibly)
more than one submodel, namely at exactly one submodel for each disjunctive situation. In general,
we write φi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for the formula that expresses the i-th disjunctive situation of the formula
φ (that contains only finitely many primitive events).9
For clarity, we define an extended causal language.
Definition 34. Extended Causal Language L
The extended causal language L contains
• the two propositional constants > and ⊥,
• a finite number of random variables ~X = X1, ..., Xn associated with finite rangesR(X1), ...,R(Xn),
• the Boolean connectives ∧,∨,¬ and the operator [], and
• left and right parentheses.
A formula φ of L is well-formed iff φ has the form
• X = x for x ∈ R(X) (primitive event);
• if φ, ψ ∈ L, then ¬φ, φ ∧ ψ, φ ∨ ψ ∈ L (Boolean combinations of primitive events);
• if [] does not occur in φ, ψ ∈ L, then [φ]ψ ∈ L (conditionals).
For the extended causal language, we define a valuation function. Recall that 〈M, ~u〉 |= X = x is
shorthand for X = x is the solution to all of the structural equations in the recursive model M given
context ~u.
Definition 35. Valuation Function
A valuation function v〈M,~u〉 (abbreviated as v) is associated with any arbitrary model M and any arbi-
trary vector ~u. v〈M,~u〉 : L 7→ {1, 0} assigns either 1 or 0 to all formulas of the extended causal language
L:
(a) v(X = x) =
1, if 〈M, ~u〉 |= X = x0, otherwise
(b) v(¬φ) = 1 iff v(φ) = 0
(c) v(φ ∧ ψ) = 1 iff v(φ) = 1 and v(ψ) = 1
(d) v(φ ∨ ψ) = 1 iff v(φ) = 1 or v(ψ) = 1
(e) v([φ]ψ) =
1, if v(ψ) = 1 in each 〈Mφi , ~u〉0, otherwise
, where Mφi is a submodel of M such that 〈M, ~u〉 |= [φi]ψ, and φi is a non-disjunctive formula
expressing one disjunctive possibility of φ.
9Note that the number i of φi depends on the number d of disjunctions occurring in φ. In general, i ≤ 2d+1 − 1, i. e.
there are at most 2d+1 − 1 disjunctive situations of φ. When the disjuncts are mutually exclusive, there are less disjunctive
situations, because some are impossible. Take for example F = 1 ∨ F = 0 for the binary variable F. Here, there are only
two disjunctive situations, because F = 1 ∧ F = 0 is impossible. The reason is, for any Boolean valuation function v, if
v(F = 1) = 1 then v(F = 0) = 0 and if v(F = 0) = 1 then v(F = 1) = 0.
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Clause (c) of the valuation function entails that X1 = x1, .., Xn = xn is the setting of the variables
in the contextualized model 〈M, ~u〉 iff X1 = x1 ∧ ... ∧ Xn = xn is true in 〈M, ~u〉. Hence, a vector of
primitive events ~X = ~x corresponds to a conjunction of those primitive events
∧
Xi = xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let us now evaluate a conditional with disjunctive antecedent in the causal model of Sartorio’s
Switch. We check whether or not 〈M, t = 1〉 |= [F = 1 ∨ R = 1]D = 1. Let φ1, φ2, φ3 express
the disjunctive situations of F = 1 ∨ R = 1. According to clause (e), we need to check whether
v(D = 1) = 1 in each 〈Mφi , t = 1〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Figure 6.2 depicts the causal network of the submodel
Mφ1 for the disjunctive situation φ1. Mφ2 and Mφ3 look the same for φ2 = (F = 1) ∧ (R = 0) and
φ3 = (F = 0) ∧ (R = 1).
T
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Figure 6.2: The causal network of Mφ1 for φ1 = (F = 1) ∧ (R = 1).
As D = max{F,R} remains unchanged in each 〈Mφi , t = 1〉, we obtain for the three submodels:
(i) 〈Mφ1 , t = 1〉 |= D = 1
(ii) 〈Mφ2 , t = 1〉 |= D = 1
(iii) 〈Mφ3 , t = 1〉 |= D = 1
Hence, v(D = 1) = 1 in each 〈Mφi , t = 1〉, and thus the model M satisfies the conditional [F =
1 ∨ R = 1]D = 1 in context t = 1.10
6.3.2 A Refinement of Halpern and Pearl’s Definition of Actual Causation
Now that we can evaluate disjunctive antecedents in extended causal models, we propose a refinement
or amendment of Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) definition of actual causation. As we have observed at
the beginning of Section 6.3, Sartorio’s disjunctive causes of the form A = a ∨ B = b require that the
conjunction A = a ∧ B = b actually obtains, and if one of A = a or B = b would obtain but not the
other, the effect would still follow.
Definition 36. Actual Causation Refined
Let ψ∨i = (~Xi = ~xi) denote the i-th disjunct of the finite formula ψ which is in disjunctive normal
form.11 ψ is an actual cause of φ in 〈M, ~u〉 iff the following three conditions hold:
10Our extended semantics may also be used to express incomplete information. Even if we only know that one of F = 1
and R = 1, but not which one, we can use the disjunction F = 1 ∨ R = 1 of our semantics to obtain useful information as to
whether or not the person dies. Here, however, we are not interested in incomplete information.
11The restriction of ψ to formulas of disjunctive normal form is no proper restriction, since all arbitrary Boolean formulas
can be converted into an equivalent disjunctive normal form. See, e.g., Papadimitriou (1994, pp. 75-76).
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AC1R. 〈M, ~u〉 |= (∧ψ∨i) ∧ φ for all i.
AC2R. There exists a partition 〈~Z, ~W〉 of V with ~Xi ⊆ ~Z and some setting 〈~x′i, ~w′〉 of the variables
in 〈~Xi, ~W〉 such that if 〈M, ~u〉 |= Z = z∗ for all Z ∈ ~Z, then both of the following conditions
hold:
(a) 〈M, ~u〉 |= [∧ ~Xi = ~x′i, ~W = ~w′]¬φ for all i.
(b) 〈M, ~u〉 |= [∨ ~Xi = ~xi, ~W′ = ~w′, ~Z′ = ~z∗]φ for all subsets ~W′ of ~W and all subsets ~Z′ of
~Z, and for all i.
AC3R. ψ is minimal; no subsets of the disjuncts ψ∨i = (~Xi = ~xi) satisfy conditions AC1R and
AC2R, and no disjunction of the form
∨
(~Xi = ~xi) ∨ ~Y = ~y with ~Y ⊆ ~Z, ~Y ∩ ~Xi = ∅ (for all i)
and ~Y , φ satisfies AC1R and AC2R.
AC1R requires that each disjunct of the actual cause ψ and its effect φ are true in the actual
contextualized model. Note that this is equivalent to the big conjunction of all disjuncts φ∨i and the
effect φ being true in the actual contextualized model. (The need for the big conjunction directly
follows from Sartorio’s first condition necessary for disjunctive causes.)
AC2R requires that each disjunct ψ∨i = (~Xi = ~xi) of ψ satisfies AC2. That is: (a) setting ~Xi = ~x′i
(for all i) changes φ to ¬φ, if the variables ~W not on the active causal path(s) take on certain values; (b)
guarantees that the disjunction
∨
(~Xi = ~xi) alone is sufficient to change ¬φ to φ. Note that AC2R(b) is
quite demanding: setting
∨
(~Xi = ~xi) results in one submodel for each disjunctive situation of ψ, and
under all of these submodels φ needs to be satisfied.
AC3R extends the motivation behind AC3, which is to “prune inessential elements” from the
actual causes. The extension demands that if we have another actually occurring disjunct that would
alone be sufficient to result in the effect, we need to add it to the disjunctive cause. Correspondingly,
we obtain that a formula of the form (~X = ~x) ∧ (~Y = ~y) for ~X ∩ ~Y = ∅ is more specific and less
minimal than ~X = ~x, which is in turn more specific and less minimal than (~X = ~x) ∨ (~Y = ~y). Assume
this disjunction is an actual cause of some effect. Then the disjunction strips the “overspecific detail”
which specific disjunct is causally efficacious (both are!) from the actual cause.12
We show now that in the contextualized causal model 〈M, t = 1〉 the disjunction F = 1∨R = 1 is an
actual cause of D = 1 according to our refined definition. AC1R is satisfied, as 〈M, t = 1〉 |= (F = 1 ∧
R = 1)∧φ. AC2R is satisfied as well. To see this, let ~Z = {F,R,D}, and thus ~W = ∅. Clearly, F,R ⊆ ~Z.
But then (a) 〈M, t = 1〉 |= [F = 0∧R = 0]D = 0. Furthermore, (b) 〈M, t = 1〉 |= [F = 1∨R = 1]D = 1,
as we have seen in the previous section. Finally, AC3R is satisfied: no subsets of the disjuncts F = 1
and R = 1 satisfy AC1R and AC2R. Moreover, there exists no further disjunct satisfying AC1R and
AC2R, because the effect D = 1 is identical to φ and ~Z \ {F,R} = {D}.
According to our refined definition, F = 1 does not count any more as an actual cause of D = 1.
(The same holds mutatis mutandis for R = 1.) The reason is AC3R: F = 1 is not minimal. Why?
Because there is a disjunction F = 1 ∨ R = 1 with R ⊆ ~Z, R ∩ F = ∅ and (R = 1) , (D = 1) satisfying
AC1R and AC2R. Hence, F = 1 is “inessential” for D = 1 in the sense that it is not required for D = 1
to obtain. The reason is that the actual event R = 1 alone would also be sufficient for D = 1 to obtain.
Finally, note that the refined definition of actual causation is a proper generalization of Halpern
and Pearl’s definition: the refined definition reduces to Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) if no disjunctive
12If we have a simple causal chain from a cause C over intermediates B1, B2, ... to an effect E and nothing else, then the
refined definition says that the big disjunction
∨
Bi ∨ C is a cause of E. Hence, we can use the refined definition to detect
causal chains. Alternatively, we could amend the refined definition further to exclude the intermediate Bi’s. This amendment
would use the fact that the Bi’s are themselves effects of C.
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formulas are considered. In this case, we retain all the characteristics of the Halpern-Pearl defini-
tion, in particular with respect to the problematic examples in the literature. Of course, unlike the
Halpern-Pearl definition, the refined definition counts the disjunction of overdetermining causes as an
actual cause, but not the indvidual overdetermining causes. We postpone an analysis of the difference
between cases of overdetermination and cases like Sartorio’s Switch to another occasion.
6.4 Conclusion
We have generalized Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) causal model semantics to allow disjunctive causes of
the type found in Sartorio’s (2006) Switch. These disjunctive causes have an actual part, that is both
disjuncts actually occur, and a counterfactual part, that is each disjunct would be sufficient for the
effect to occur. Based on the causal model semantics extended by disjunctive antecedents, we refined
Halpern and Pearl’s definition of actual causation. Halpern and Pearl’s original definition qualifies
Flipper’s flipping the switch as an actual cause of the captivated person’s death and does not allow for
disjunctive causes. In contrast, our refined definition does not count the individual disjuncts as actual
causes but makes Sartorio’s disjunction “at least one of Flipper flips the switch and Reconnecter
reconnects” an actual cause of the person’s death. Our refined definition, therefore, implements the
observation of Sartorio (2006, p. 530) that “there is no general motivation for believing that, when (if)
a disjunctive fact is a cause, at least one of its disjuncts must also be a cause.”
We showed that a refined Halpern-Pearl definition can capture disjunctive causes in Sartorio’s
sense. We make now a big jump from analyses of causation to the question of mental causation.
More specifically, we will have a look at mental causation from the viewpoint of Woodward’s (2005)
interventionism blended with the assumptions and methods of cognitive neuroscience.
Chapter 7
Interventionist Mental Causation and the
Methods of Cognitive Neuroscience
How can the mind interact with the body? This is a big puzzle when you believe that mental states
are fundamentally different from physical bodies. Descartes (1641/1978), for example, believed that
there are two substances, viz. res cogitans and res extensa.1 While the latter are spatially extended
things, incapable of feeling or thought, the former are unextended things that think and feel such
as immaterial souls. Despite believing in a radical distinction between these substances, Descartes
accepted the common belief that mind and body causally interact. However, if minds and bodies
belong to so radically different substances, it is not easy to see how they could interact. On his view,
minds are immaterial and have no spatial location, so how could they causally affect bodies? This
question expresses the problem of mental causation for Descartes.
A dualism of two distinct substances is not the main source of our contemporary worries about
mental causation. Most of us, and in particular scientific-minded people, reject the immaterial mind as
res cogitans. Rather the mind somehow depends on the brain: without brain no mind.2 Like Descartes,
we still take mind-world interactions for granted in everyday experience and in scientific practice. The
pain you feel when you twist your knee is taken to cause you to open the freezer in search of an ice
pack. Mental images, so tell us psychologists, enable us to navigate our surroundings in an intelligent
way. Economists explain fluctuations in financial markets by citing the beliefs of traders about the
price of oil next month. In each of these examples, some mental properties (‘pain’, ‘mental images’,
‘beliefs’) appear to cause complex and coordinated bodily motions (‘open the freezer’, ‘navigate our
surroundings’, ‘consumer decisions’).
The question is now: how does the mind depend on the brain? All physicalist accounts claim
that the mind supervenes on a physical entity.3 A particularly strong mind-body supervenience is
proposed by Smart’s (1959) mind-brain identity thesis: mental states are identical to brain states.
This reductionist physicalism is a limiting case as there is no difference between the mental and the
physical left, and so we may say that the identity theory posits only one kind of states. Like the
monistic identity theory, any functionalist view is – at least – committed to a supervenience relation.
Systems that have a similar physical make-up, typical functionalists believe, must be alike regarding
their mental states. The reason to expect this be that identically constituted physical systems satisfy
1Descartes (1641/1978) stipulates another substance, namely God. To be precise, he believes that there are two sub-
stances apart from God. For the sake of presenting a clear-cut dualism, we omit God from Descartes’s metaphysics.
2In many societies, the ‘no-brain, no mind’ slogan is taken quite literally: a person is declared dead if her brain has
stopped working.
3Of course, there are many ways how to spell out a supervenience relation. See McLaughlin (1995).
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the same causal roles in all physical and behavioral contexts. The pain when you twist your knee, for
example, causes certain overt responses: you moan, you aim to repair the damage, you belief that you
are in pain, you desire to alleviate the pain, and so on. To be in pain is functionally equivalent to a
state that has certain causal roles: it is caused by tissue damage and it causes certain overt responses.
Functionalists hold against the identity thesis that, for instance, being in pain cannot be identi-
fied with a particular neurological state. The reason is that there be not one neurological state that
corresponds to pain but many. Let alone other creatures such as octopodes to which we attribute
pain despite a vastly different physical make-up. Still, functionalism allows that mental states are
‘higher-level’ states which occur in virtue of, and are optionally reducible to, ‘lower-level’ states,
their realizers. In a nutshell, functionalists claim that mental states are mutliply realizable, and thus
there cannot be type identity between mental states and physical states.
Fodor (1974) put forth a strong challenge for any reductive physicalism. He argued that multiple
realizability plausibly rules out the reduction of higher-level states to lower-level states. Fodor’s func-
tionalism is an example of state (or property) dualism: mental states (or properties) are not reducible
to physical states (or properties). Other examples of non-reductive physicalism are emergentism, that
is the claim that there are physically irreducible emergent states, and Davidson’s (1963) ‘anomalous
monism’. And non-reductive physicalism seems to be what common-sense demands. Although men-
tal states are not reducible to, and are not identical with, physical states, the former still depend on the
latter. Non-reductive physicalism allows for a certain autonomy of the mental. Your mental states such
as desires can move you to do something. In contrast, if reductive physicalism got it right, desires for
chocolate could not induce you to ransack your child’s Halloween bag, but only neural activity could.
This stands in open contradiction to the mainstream opinion in the philosophies of psychology and
neurophilosophy: their explanations hinge on the possibility of mental causation. If your mind and
its states, such as your beliefs and desires, were causally isolated from your bodily behavior, then
what goes on in your mind could not explain what you do, only other physical states could (see, for
example, Davidson (1963) and Mele (1992)).
Nowadays, the focus has shifted away from mental states to mental properties. The problem is
then often put as follows: How could mental properties be causally relevant to bodily behavior? The
question might seem to be a bit odd. After all, we just have observed that non-reductive physicalism
seems to allow for a plausible answer. However, Kim (2005) put forth an argument that excludes
the causal efficacy of mental properties if we assume non-reductive physicalism. As he puts it, non-
reductive physicalists subscribe to three tenets:
(i) Mental properties supervene on physical properties.
(ii) Mental properties cannot be reduced to physical properties.
(iii) Mental properties are causally efficacious.
Independent of non-reductive physicalism, Papineau (2000) gives us good reasons to accept the fol-
lowing, already plausible metaphysical postulate:
(P1) Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause.
Now, one way to spell out Kim’s (2005) causal exclusion argument runs roughly as follows. Suppose
a mental property M is causally efficacious by causing another mental property M∗.4 By (i), there is
a physical property P∗ on which M∗ supervenes. Given that M∗ has a supervenience base P∗, M∗ is
4To be precise, it should say the instantiation of the mental property M causes the instantiation of another mental property
M∗. We leave the instantiation part implicit in the argument.
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there independent of M, unless M caused P∗. A way out of this tension is to say that M caused M∗
by causing its supervenience base P∗. By (i) again, M has a supervenience base P. Since M causes
P∗ and P is sufficient for M, Kim (2005, p. 41) thinks there “are strong reasons” that P causes P∗.
By (P1), there is in any case some P that is sufficient for P∗. So we obtain that M causes P∗ and
P causes P∗. By (ii), M is not identical with P. Crucially, Kim assumes that P∗ cannot be causally
overdetermined by M and P. By (P1), P∗ is rather caused by P than by M. Hence, M is excluded by
the causal efficacy of P.
In Kim’s exclusion argument the mental property M was chosen arbitrarily. Therefore, it applies
to any such property. Notice that this generalization would lead to ‘systematic’ overdetermination
when we allow that P∗ can be causally overdetermined by M and P. Hence, the causal efficacy of M
is inconsistent with the joint acceptance of (i)-(iii) and (P1).
In general, causal exclusion arguments assume non-reductive physicalism and conclude that men-
tal properties supervening on physical properties cannot cause physical or other mental properties, at
least in the presence of further premises. By excluding the causal efficacy of mental properties, these
arguments can be read as support for epiphenomenalism, the view that the mental cannot affect the
physical, or else as an attack on non-reductive physicalism.
Causal exclusion arguments suggest that giving up the Cartesian conception of minds as non-
physical substances in favour of a more materialist ontology does not make the problem of mental
causation go away. Rather the widely-shared physicalist commitment that the mental somehow de-
pends on the physical but cannot be reduced to it, as expressed by (i) and (ii), seems to be one of the
new sources of the mental causation problem. Property dualism seems to be not much better off than
substance dualism. Or, as Kim (2005, p. 158) puts it:
[t]he demands of causality do not tolerate duality of properties any more than duality of
substances, and both Cartesian substance dualism and contemporary property dualism
run aground on the rocks of mental causation.
Interestingly, Kim appeals here to the ‘demands of causality’. The concept of causation used in the
causal exclusion arguments is, however, typically left implicit. Nevertheless, as Hitchcock (2012)
points out, the validity of these arguments may depend on the specific account of causation assumed
in the background.5
The metaphysics of event-causation suggests that events occur or not. In modern science, how-
ever, the relata of causation seem to be random variables rather than binary variables. This difference
is grounded in a different interest of scientists: while philosophers are primarily interested in analysing
causation as a (metaphysical) concept, scientists want a concept of causation that fits their experimen-
tal practice. Normally, the variables an empirical scientist measures are not binary but many-valued,
and often enough these variables take probabilistic values. In an experiment, scientists typically ma-
nipulate the values of some random variables and measure how some dependent variables are affected.
Cognitive neuroscientists are, among other things, interested in manipulating mental variables and
measuring the ensuing effect on neural activity. Perhaps, the problem of mental causation is often
enough treated as a problem of applied metaphysics.
5Recently, Gebharter (2017) investigated the validity of causal exclusion arguments using the concept of causation as
provided by the theory of causal Bayes nets. Interestingly, he argues that supervenience relations within this theory would
behave just like causal relations. As regards ‘higher-level’ special sciences, this seems somewhat mistaken. Psychology and
cognitive neuroscience, for example, assume the ‘formal’ characteristic of causation that a cause precedes its effect in time.
A mental property and its supervenience base, in contrast, seem to be instantiated simultaneously. If not for the metaphysics
of causation, this difference between the two kinds of relations seems at least highly relevant for the scientific practice.
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In this chapter, we will have a look at the actual scientific practice rather than the metaphysics
of mental causation. Our aim is to determine what exactly is required for acceptable causation as
regards the mind-brain interaction. More specifically, we aim to make the characteristics of causation,
as assumed in cognitive neuroscience, explicit. Subsequently, we impose these ‘demands of causality’
upon the account of interventionism put forth by Woodward (2005) and Woodward (2015). Within the
resulting framework, we investigate to what extent we are justified to derive causal relations between
mental properties and properties of the brain, depending on which scientific methods are used in the
neuroscientific studies.
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7.1 Introduction
Should cognitive neuroscientists interpret the results of their studies as establishing genuine causal
relations? Well, the answer depends (at least) on three factors.
1. What does ‘causal relation’ mean?
2. Which methods are employed in the studies?
3. How is the relation between the mental and the brain?
Woodward’s (2005) interventionist notion of causation captures, or so we argue, the notion of cau-
sation employed in cognitive neuroscience quite well. Furthermore, we coarsely distinguish between
two methods: one manipulates a mental property and measures a property of the brain, the other
proceeds vice versa.
The search for the neural correlates of mental functions is premised upon the idea that there is
some dependency between mental properties and properties of the brain.6 For reasons of cautiousness,
we assume a minimal dependency relation in this chapter, which we call minimal supervenience.7 We
represent properties by variables, as in the following definition.
Definition 37. Minimal Supervenience
A variable M minimally supervenes on variable P (for M , P) iff
(i) M and P occur synchronically, and
(ii) any change of the value of M necessarily changes the value of P.
Minimal supervenience is defined by the conditions that are common to most supervenience re-
lations. Hence, it expresses necessary conditions for supervenience, which are – depending on the
philosophical view – not necessarily sufficient. Nevertheless we use ‘minimally supervenes’ and ‘su-
pervenes’ interchangeably, unless noted otherwise.
Finally, we assume that brain properties are causes of other brain properties. We obtain the picture
of Figure 7.1, which resembles Kim’s (2005) canonical diagram. Given the depicted assumptions,
we argue that cognitive neuroscientists should interpret the findings of their studies as establishing
genuine causal relations.
M1 M2
P1 P2
Figure 7.1: A causal network extended by minimal supervenience relations. The undirected edges
stand for these supervenience relations. Note that there is a causal relation between brain property P1
and brain property P2.
6Cf. Squire et al. (2008, Ch. 53).
7Of course, a complete picture would require that we investigate what happens to the results obtained here if different
relations between the mental and the brain are assumed, such as identity, functional reduction, causal relations, etc. We need
to leave this more comprehensive investigation for future research.
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In Section 7.2, we introduce the notion of causation assumed in cognitive neuroscience and the two
methods we distinguish. In Section 7.3, Woodward’s (2005) interventionist account of causation for
models of exclusively causal relations is presented. In Section 7.4, we review Baumgartner’s (2009)
causal exclusion argument for the first method and Woodward’s (2015) reply. In Section 7.5, we
find that Baumgartner’s argument does not apply with respect to the second method on Woodward’s
original account. We discuss the results in Section 7.6.
7.2 Causation and Methods in Cognitive Neuroscience
The research in cognitive neuroscience assumes a certain notion of causation. This notion is char-
acterised by a temporal order: a cause precedes its effect in time. By Definition 37, condition (i), if
a variable M supervenes on P, then neither M is a cause of P, nor P is a cause of M. For neither
temporally precedes the other. Furthermore, causal relations are assumed to generate statistical de-
pendencies. According to this theoretical assumption, if a cognitive neuroscientist manipulates the
cause of an effect, she enforces a statistical dependency between them. Textbooks on experimental
research widely agree that two conditions must be met to show a causal relation between the variable
X and the variable Y:
(ci) A systematic variation of X’s value changes Y’s value, and simultaneously
(cii) all other variables are controlled for to exclude other possible causes of Y .8
On the face of it, the notion of causation assumed in cognitive neuroscience, including the correspond-
ing experimental practice, seems to be well-captured by Woodward’s (2005) interventionist account
of causation. We will have a closer look at this claim in the next section.
Many of the currently conducted studies in cognitive neuroscience adhere to one of two methods.
Method I : Manipulate a mental property of a participant and measure, subsequently, one of
her brain properties.
Method II: Manipulate a brain property of a participant and inquire, subsequently, one of her
mental properties.
In studies employing Method I, the mental property of a participant is manipulated by presenting dif-
ferent task conditions. Afterwards, the changes in the participant’s neural activity are measured. Ex-
amples are studies in which changes in neural activity are measured by means of Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) or Electro-Encephalogram (EEG). Method I studies are often interpreted
to merely show a correlation rather than a genuine causal relation.
In studies employing Method II, a brain property of a participant is manipulated by brain stimu-
lation techniques. Thereafter, the changes in the participant’s mental property are inquired (or ‘mea-
sured’). Examples are studies in which the electrical activity of the brain is directly manipulated by
brain stimulation techniques such as Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) and Transcranial Magnetic Stim-
ulation (TMS). DBS has been used, e.g., to treat a variety of intractable pain syndromes, including
neuropathic pain, phantom-limb pain, failed low back pain, and cluster-headache pain.9 We take the
pain relief to be a mental variable, which we can simply ‘measure’ by a participant’s report. TMS
8See, for example, Carter and Shieh (2015); Gravetter and Forzano (2011); Squire et al. (2008); Windhorst and Johansson
(1999)
9See Perlmutter and Mink (2006).
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is a noninvasive procedure that uses magnetic fields to stimulate nerve cells in the brain. Like DBS,
TMS can be used to improve symptoms of depression.10 We take the mood reported by a participant
to be an inquirable mental variable. In contrast to Method I studies, Method II studies are normally
interpreted as establishing causal relations.11
Whether we are allowed to derive causal relations from studies in cognitive neuroscience depends
on the question what causal relations are. We turn now to a recent answer due to Woodward (2005).
7.3 Woodward’s Interventionist Account of Causation
Woodward (2005) provides the following definitions of direct and contributing cause, which we
slightly rephrased.
Definition 38. Direct Cause (cf. Woodward (2005))
The variable X is a direct cause of the variable Y relative to a variable set V iff there is a possible
intervention on X that changes Y’s value, presupposed the values of all other variables Vi in V are
kept fixed.12
We observe that an intervention on X that changes the value of Y corresponds to (ci), and the
presupposition that the values of all other variables Vi in V are kept fixed formally implements (cii).
Hence, Woodward’s definition of direct cause formally captures the necessary conditions of cognitive
neuroscience’s notion of causation.
Definition 39. Contributing Cause (cf. Woodward (2005))
The variable X is a contributing cause of Y relative to a variable setV iff
(i) there is a directed path from X to Y such that each link in this path is a direct causal relation and
(ii) there is some intervention on X that changes Y , presupposed the values of all variables in V
that are not on the path are kept fixed.
From now on, we say that X is a cause of Y iff X is a contributing cause. Note that direct causes
are a limiting case of contributing causes for a path of length 1.
Both of the definitions cite the term ‘intervention’. In the context of experimental design, an
intervention is a manipulation that changes the value of the (independent) variable X. Woodward
defines interventions by means of an intervention variable.
Definition 40. Intervention Variable (cf. Woodward (2005))
Let I, X,Y be variables and {I, X,Y} ⊆ V be a set of variables. I is an intervention variable for X with
respect to Y relative toV iff
(1) Setting I = i determines X = x.13
(2) I breaks X’s causal dependences on all variables inV \ I.
(3) Any directed path inV from I to Y includes X.
10See George et al. (2003).
11See Sack (2006).
12For simplicity, we omitted “or Y’s probability distribution” after “Y’s value”. We continue to do so as no argument here
hinges on it.
13Corresponding to the previous footnote, we omit “or P(X = x), where P is a probability measure” here.
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(4) I is statistically independent of any variable V ∈ V \ I that is
(a) a cause of Y , and
(b) on a directed path not including X.
An intervention is thus, according to Woodward’s formalism, a setting of the intervention variable
to a value I = i that changes the value of the variable X. By the conditions (1) and (2), I is the
only and a direct cause of X. Furthermore, Woodward demands that such an intervention must satisfy
the conditions (1)–(4) to establish a causal relation. We visualize an intervention variable and its
properties in Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3, respectively.
I X
Y
?
Figure 7.2: A directed acyclic graph G = 〈V,A〉 representing a causal network, whose sets of vari-
ables and arrows are V = {I, X,Y} and A = {〈I, X〉, 〈X,Y〉}, respectively. Each directed arrow rep-
resents a causal relation, or equivalently causal dependency. A directed arrow with question mark
indicates which potential causal relation is investigated. Here the candidate under investigation is the
relation between X and Y . By Definition 40, I is an intervention variable for X with respect to Y
relative toV.
I X
V
Y
?
(a)
I X
Y
?
(b)
I X
V Y
?
(c)
Figure 7.3: (a), (b), and (c) illustrate the conditions (2), (3), and (4) of Definition 40, respectively.
A crossed arrow represents that a causal dependency cannot exist, if the respective conditions are
satisfied. A dashed line stands for statistical independence. Note that no question mark arrows,
crossed arrows and/or dashed lines are elements of basic causal networks. Those types of edge serve
illustrative purposes only.
Definition 40 is meant to exclude potential confounding variables, which need to be controlled
for in an experiment. This intention behind an intervention variable will be crucial to the debate on
which variables ought to be controlled for in assessing causal relations, especially with respect to the
causal efficacy of mental properties. If Definition 40 is modified with respect to the set of variables
that should be kept fixed, we obtain a different (but still interventionist) notion of cause.
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Woodward’s framework is intended for models of exclusively causal relations, i. e. the variables in
such a model may be causally related or correlated, but they do not stand in a supervenience relation.
In such a model, each represented variable is independently fixable, i. e. it is possible to set the value of
each variable independently of the other represented variables. In a model including a supervenience
relation, independent fixability is violated. For an intervention on the supervening variable necessarily
changes its subvenient variable. This prompts the question how to read the Definitions 38, 39, and 40
for models including causal and supervenience relations.
7.4 Method I, Baumgartner’s Causal Exclusion Argument and Wood-
ward’s Reply
We model now Method I under Baumgartner’s (2009) reading of Woodward’s (2005) interventionist
account of causation extended by minimal supervenience relations and show that Method I falls prey
to Baumgartner’s (2009) Causal Exclusion Argument.
We extend Woodward’s interventionist account by including supervenience relations, as defined
by Definition 37. The result are models containing two types of relations: supervenience relations
between properties of an event (e.g. between M1 and P1) and causal relations between events (e.g. the
event M1/P1 is a cause of M2/P2.) For such models, Baumgartner does not modify the Definitions
38, 39, and 40.
Method I studies examine the effect on brain state P2 after manipulating the mental state M1 (see
Figure 7.4). Typically, a cognitive neuroscientist, let’s call her Pat, manipulates the mental state M1
of the participant in an experiment: the subject faces different task or stimulus conditions which are
supposed to induce changes in M1. Then, Pat investigates the effect of her manipulations by measuring
the participant’s brain state P2 in all conditions. Using controls like randomization of subjects, our
ideal neuroscientist Pat ensures that the conditions only differ on the manipulated mental variable. If
Pat finds a significant difference in brain activity between the conditions, she derives that M1 has had
an effect on P2.
M1 M2
P1 P2
?
Figure 7.4: The relation investigated by studies of cognitive neuroscience using Method I.
However, Method I studies are normally interpreted to show a correlation only. Are we justified
in deriving a causal relation from Method I studies within the framework of Woodward’s extended
interventionism? Baumgartner (2009) says no. More specifically, Baumgartner (2009) provides a
causal exclusion argument that says: we are not allowed to derive a causal relation between M1 and
P2, if we assume Woodward’s interventionism extended by supervenience relations.
Baumgartner’s (2009) causal exclusion argument runs as follows. Woodward’s interventionism
entails the implication if M1 is a cause of P2 relative to V = {M1,M2, P1, P2}, then there is an
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intervention variable I possible that changes the value of M1 and is statistically independent of any
variable V ∈ V \ I that is (a) a cause of P2 and (b) on a directed path not including M1 (compare p.
170). But such an I is impossible. Since M1 minimally supervenes on P1, any I that changes the value
of M1 also changes the value of P1. Hence, I is statistically dependent on P1. Moreover, P1 is (a) a
direct cause of P2 by assumption and (b) on a directed path not including M1. If I is an intervention
variable, then – by condition (4) of Definition 40 – I is required to be statistically independent of P1.
Therefore, I is no intervention variable. By modus tollens on Baumgartner’s implication, M1 is not a
cause of P2.
In natural language, if Pat intervenes on a participant’s mental state, she simultaneously intervenes
on the physical state due to the supervenience relation between M1 and P1. Because of this non-
causal relation, Pat cannot control the effect of P1 on P2 when manipulating M1. By condition (i) of
Definition 39, M1 is also no contributing cause of P2, since the link between M1 and P1 is no causal
relation. Poor Pat, P1 is a confounding variable for which she cannot control. Baumgartner’s reading
of Woodward’s extended interventionism recommends that we should not derive a causal relation
between M1 and P2 – quite in agreement with the current interpretation of Method I studies.
In reply to Baumgartner’s argument, Woodward (2015) provides an interventionist framework for
causal relations in the presence of supervenience relations. He emphasizes that Woodward’s (2005)
interventionist account of causation, as given by Definitions 38, 39, and 40, is intended for models of
exclusively causal relations. If we want to include non-causal relations, such as the minimal super-
venience of Definition 37, we need to modify the interventionist account. In light of Baumgartner’s
argument, Woodward’s (2015) modification idea is to relax the requirement, or presupposition, to
keep the variables fixed. In models including non-causal relations, only ‘appropriate’ variables need
to be fixed for establishing a causal relation. When assessing a causal relation between a superven-
ing variable and another variable, for example, it be not appropriate to keep fixed its supervenience
base(s). In the modified framework, he claims, supervening properties can be causally efficacious.
To be more precise, Woodward (2015) modifies the notion of an intervention variable. Such an
intervention variable I∗ on X with respect to Y (relative to V) (a) respects the supervenience relation
between X and its supervenience base SB(X), if there is one, and (b) requires that the conditions
(1)-(4) of Definition 40 are restricted to causally related or correlated variables, but do not apply to
supervenient and subvening variables. By (a), an I∗-intervention on X is thus at the same time an
I∗-intervention on SB(X), if such a supervenience base exists.
Consider Figure 7.4 again. Applying the modified Definition 38, we obtain that M1 is a direct
cause of P2 relative toV = {M1,M2, P1, P2} iff there is a possible I∗-intervention on M1 that changes
the value of P2, presupposed the values of all other appropriate variables in V are kept fixed. Since
P1 is the supervenience base of M1, P1 is not one of the appropriate variables to keep fixed. Hence,
M1 can be a cause of P2 according to Woodward’s modified account.
As we have seen, Baumgartner’s (2009) causal exclusion argument entails that his reading of
Woodward’s (2005) original interventionism does not recommend to interpret the results of Method
I studies as establishing causal relations. In contrast, Woodward’s (2015) modified interventionism
allows us to derive causal relations between mental states and brain states from Method I studies –
somewhat at odds with the current interpretation in cognitive neuroscience.
7.5 Method II and Causal Exclusion
We revisit now Baumgartner’s (2009) Causal Exclusion Argument for his and Woodward’s (2015)
reading of interventionism (both extended by minimal supervenience relations) with respect to Method
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II studies. Those studies examine the effect on mental state M2 after manipulating the brain state P1
(see Figure 7.5). Our ideal cognitive neuroscientist Pat manipulates the physical state P1 of the par-
ticipant’s brain by directly intervening upon the electrical activity in the brain using brain stimulation
techniques. Then, Pat investigates the effect of her manipulations by inquiring the participant’s mental
state M2. Using controls like sham stimulation, she ensures that the experimental conditions – often
stimulation vs. no stimulation – only differ with respect to P1.14 If Pat finds a significant difference in
the participant’s mental state, she derives that P1 has had an effect on M2.
M1 M2
P1 P2
?
Figure 7.5: The relation investigated by studies of cognitive neuroscience using Method II.
Method II studies are often interpreted to show a proper causal relation.15 Are we justified in
deriving a causal relation from those studies according to Woodward’s original account? As it turns
out, yes.
We obtain an implication similar to Baumgartner’s (2009): if P1 is a direct cause of M2 relative to
V = {M1,M2, P1, P2}, then there is a variable I possible that changes the value of P1 and is statistically
independent of any variable V ∈ V that is (i) a cause of M2 and (ii) on a directed path not including
P1. This time such an I is possible. The reason is that there is no variable apart from P1 that can
be a cause of M2 and is on a directed path not including P1. Since there is a supervenience relation
between M2 and P2, the only other candidate cause for M2 is M1. But Baumgartner’s reading denies
that M1 can be a cause of M2. For an intervention on M1 does not allow to keep fixed its supervenience
base P1, as required by Baumgartner. Pictorially speaking, P1 is on any directed path to M2, if there
is one.16 Hence, a causal exclusion argument in Baumgartner’s style does not apply with respect to
Method II such that his reading of Woodward (2005) allows us to derive causal relations from studies
using brain stimulation.17
Interestingly, Woodward’s (2015) reading faces a putative problem with respect to Method II
studies. The potential problem is that P1 gets a competitor candidate cause of M2, viz. M1. Recall that
Woodward’s modification implies that supervenience bases need not be kept fixed. According to the
modified account, we obtain the implication: if M1 is a cause of M2 relative toV = {M1,M2, P1, P2},
then there is a variable I∗ possible that changes the value of M1 and is statistically independent of any
appropriate variable V ∈ V that is (i) a cause of M2 and (ii) on a directed path not including M1. Since
the supervenience bases of M1 and M2, i. e. P1 and P2 respectively, do not belong to the appropriate
14Sham stimulation is a generic term to indicate an inactive form of stimulation (e.g., a very brief or weak one) that is
used in research to control for the placebo effect. The subject believes he/she is being stimulated normally, but there should
not be any real effects.
15See, for example, Martin and Gotts (2005) and Romei et al. (2012).
16Notice that the possible intervention on P1 does not necessarily change M1 due to the supervenience relation, but
this possible intervention may change P2 by the assumed causal relation. However, P2 is not a cause of M2 due to their
supervenience relation, and thus P1 is a direct cause of M2, given a change of M2’s value has been detected.
17This argument has been put forward by Dijkstra and de Bruin (2016) in a slightly different context.
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variables, there is such an I∗ possible that changes the value of M1 and, perhaps, ‘miraculously’ results
in a change of M2. Hence, M1 is an alternative candidate cause of M2. The putative problem on the
modified account is thus that we cannot know from a Method II study whether P1 or M1 is the cause
of M2.18 We briefly discuss this issue in the next section.
7.6 Discussion
Consider again Figure 7.4. Woodward’s (2015) account draws an arrow from M1 to P2 in addition to
the assumed arrow from P1 to P2, if the value of P2 changes when intervening on M1. However, the
arrow from M1 to P2 does not mean that M1 has an effect on P2 over and above P1’s effect on P2.
Similarly, if interventions on M1 change M2’s value, then Woodward (2015) draws an arrow from M1
to M2 but also from M1 to P2, as P2’s value will change under an intervention on M1 that changes M2.
It seems that Baumgartner’s (2009) Causal Exclusion Argument rests on the intuition that M1 can
only be causally efficacious, if it has a causal influence on M2 or P2 which is separate from P1’s
causal influence on those variables. Due to this implicit premise, or so it seems, Baumgartner thinks
P1 should be kept fixed in order to test the ‘independent’ causal influence of M1. Woodward (2015)
simply does not share this intuition and Baumgartner does not provide any argument why we should
adopt it.
The question which variables should be controlled for when assessing the causal efficacy of the
mental is at the heart of Baumgartner’s (2009) Causal Exclusion Argument. Should a cognitive neuro-
scientist adopt Baumgartner’s intuition and control for P1 when intervening on M1? No, we shouldn’t
ask scientists for the impossible. Instead, we should encourage neuroscientists to shed light on the
relation between the mental and the physical. The more they know the specific relation, the clearer
they can see that an intervention on M1, for instance, is ‘automatically’ an intervention on its superve-
nience base P1. In this sense, an intervention on Mi should respect the supervenience relation between
Mi and SB(Mi) = Pi, i. e. setting Mi = mi specifies Pi = pi that is consistent with Mi = mi according
to the supervenience relation.
To figure out the details which mental properties supervene on which physical properties is of
utmost importance, as the following consideration suggests. In Figure 7.1, M1 supervenes on P1.
Hence, it is possible to change the value of P1 without changing the value of M1 (but not vice versa).
Thus we may empirically figure out the values of P1 under which M1 remains invariant in order to test
whether M1 is a cause of M2 in a sense, in which P1 is not. If we intervene on P1 such that M1 keeps
its value and M2 as well, but intervening on M1 changes M2’s value, then M1 is a cause in a sense in
which P1 is not.19
Consider again Figure 7.5. Assume it is empirically found that P1 is a cause of M2 and further
empirical investigations establish that M1 is a cause of M2. This is a putative problem for Woodward’s
(2015) account. The cause of M2 is underdetermined: M1 is a cause of M2 and P1 is a cause of
M2. However, this is only a putative problem. According to Definition 39, both M1 and P1 may
qualify as contributing causes. Furthermore, Woodward (2005, 2015) explicitly states that arrows do
not necessarily correspond to (physical) causal mechanisms which can be distinguished. Hence, the
underdetermination problem is no problem for Woodward’s formalism.
18Notice the possibility, however, that an intervention on M1 changes the value of P2 without changing the value of M2.
In such a case M1 disqualifies as a cause of M2, while M1 is still a cause of P2.
19Note that the possibility to experimentally distinguish the causal influence of P1 and M1 depends on the possibility to
change the supervenience base P1 without changing the supervenient variable M1. These considerations become especially
pertinent when relations of multiple realizability are considered. For an attempt in this direction, see List and Menzies
(2009).
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Apart from the misunderstanding of Woodward’s formalism, the underdetermination raises the
question whether there are reasons to distinguish between the supervenient variable Mi and its su-
pervenience base Pi with respect to causal efficacy. After all, Mi/Pi is one event. Perhaps, causal
relations hold only between events. Then the different ‘properties’ of the same event have the same
causal effects. Importantly, this consideration illustrates that we should have the reasons in mind why
we distinguish between mental and physical properties in cases of mental causation. Moreover, the
consideration once more points to the importance to positively characterise the relation between the
mental and the brain.
7.7 Conclusion
We imposed properties of causation, as assumed in cognitive neuroscience, upon Woodward’s ac-
count of interventionism, and extended it by minimal supervenience relations. Within the resulting
framework, we investigated to what extent we are justified to derive causal relations between mental
properties and properties of the brain from methods used in studies of cognitive neuroscience.
The results of Baumgartner’s (2009) reading of Woodward’s (2005) interventionist framework ex-
tended by a minimal supervenience relation fits the current interpretations of the results in cognitive
neuroscience. Correspondingly, studies that manipulate mental properties and measure properties of
the brain do not allow us to derive causal relations. In contrast, Baumgartner’s (2009) reading jus-
tifies to derive causal relations from studies which manipulate brain properties and inquire mental
properties. These results agree with the current interpretations in cognitive neuroscience. If Baum-
gartner’s (2009) reading is correct, this provides support for the interpretations. If the interpretations
of cognitive neuroscientists are justified, this provides support for Baumgartner’s (2009) reading.
Woodward (2015) modifies his original framework to include non-causal supervenience relations.
On this account, we are allowed to derive genuine causal relations from both methodological kinds
of study. We have seen that the idea behind Baumgartner’s (2009) causal exclusion argument is if
the property M1 is a cause of P2 (or M2), then M1 must have a causal impact on P2 (or M2) while
keeping fixed P1’s causal impact on these variables. However, as Woodward (2015) notes, it seems
inappropriate to control for the supervenience base SB(M1) = P1 when assessing the causal efficacy
of M1. We side with Woodward, as it doesn’t seem to be a necessary condition for a cause that
we can intervene upon it while keeping fixed its supervenience base. The reason is simply that this is
impossible. If it were a necessary condition for causation, then we would never have mental causation,
which is absurd.
So far we see no reasons why we should not adopt Woodward’s (2015) extended interventionism,
enriched by properties of causation as assumed in cognitive neuroscience, as the theoretical frame-
work for determining whether the corresponding studies establish genuine causal relations. On the
one hand, Baumgartner (2009) does not provide any positive argument against Woodward’s (2015)
account. On the other hand, our resulting framework is formally precise and provides unique answers,
is easily applicable and fits nicely to the experimental practice of cognitive neuroscientists. There-
fore, we recommend – against the current interpretations – that cognitive neuroscientists should dare
to interpret both methodological kinds of studies as establishing genuine causal relations.
The results and our recommendation depend on our assumption of a minimal supervenience rela-
tion between mental properties and brain properties. While most cognitive neuroscientists agree that
there is at least such a minimal dependence relation between mental processes and brain processes,
there could also be a stronger relation such as multiple realizability, functional reduction, or even type
identity. Of course, minimal supervenience provides no satisfaction in contrast to a more detailed ac-
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count of the relation between the mental and the brain. The investigation of how the obtained results
change when we spell out the mind-brain relation is left for future work.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
We have put forth a method of learning conditional information, a strengthened Ramsey Test seman-
tics, an analysis of an (almost) asymmetric natural language usage of ‘because’, and two analyses of
causation. We review the main results in turn, and point to just a few of the many limitations of our
achievements.
In Chapter 2, we have considered the question how a rational agent learns “If A, then C?” We
have proposed that she images on the minimally informative meaning of Stalnaker’s (1968) condi-
tional A > C (given a default assumption). Unlike extant methods of learning conditional information,
such as the ones found in Douven (2015) and Hartmann and Rad (2017), our method generates the
correct predictions for Douven’s (2012) benchmark examples. We have generalised Lewis’s (1976)
imaging to Jeffrey imaging. The generalisation makes our method applicable to the learning of un-
certain conditional information, which we have illustrated with Van Fraassen’s (1981) Judy Benjamin
Problem.
We adapted our method of learning conditional information to a method of learning causal in-
formation. Causal information has been modelled as causal dependence in Lewis’s (1973c) sense.
We have simply replaced Lewis’s two counterfactuals in his definition of causal dependence by the
two corresponding Stalnaker conditionals. (We have also replaced the default assumption by a causal
difference assumption.) Within the method of learning (uncertain) causal information, we have im-
plemented Douven’s (2012) idea: upon learning a conditional, the probability of the antecedent is
determined by how well the antecedent explains the consequent. The two methods form a unified
framework for the learning of certain and uncertain factual, conditional, and causal information.
Furthermore, we have sketched an amendment to Stalnaker’s semantics which gives us reasons to
conjecture that our framework might also be applicable for the learning of subjunctive conditional
information. We leave it to future research whether or not we can uphold our conjecture.
We have not yet provided an in-depth comparison of our framework to the account of Hartmann
and Rad (2017). They make external information available to the epistemic agent, viz. information
about independence relations as suggested by a Bayesian network. Thereby, they confer conditionals
a causal reading. (The same applies to Douven’s (2015) account, if explanatory considerations are
closely tied to causal relations.) However, as Edgington (2008, p. 18) puts it:
No conditional that does not explicitly use causal language like ‘produce’ or ‘make’,
‘result’ or ‘outcome’, forces a causal reading, though of course it is very often rightly
presumed to be asserted on causal grounds. ‘If A happens, B will happen, but A won’t
cause B to happen’ is never contradictory.
In light of Edgington’s view, we can turn the table on Hartmann and Rad (and presumably Douven) by
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asking: how do their account(s) deal with conditionals that express merely conditional information?
In Chapter 3, we have strengthened Ramsey’s (1929/1990) test by a suspension of judgment:
First, suspend judgment on the antecedent A and the consequent C. Second, add A hypo-
thetically to your stock of beliefs. Finally, test whether you can infer C.
Based on this evaluation recipe for conditionals, we have worked out a strengthened Ramsey Test
semantics. Extant Ramsey Test semantics, like Stalnaker’s (1968), Lewis’s (1973a), and Gärdenfors’s
(1988), have not sufficiently considered that changes of belief and the plausible acceptance of condi-
tionals come apart. A mere revision of ones belief state by the antecedent is not sufficient to establish a
relation of relevance between the antecedent and the consequent. Such a relevance relation, however,
seems to be called for when plausibly accepting a conditional.
Unlike Rott’s (1986) Strong Ramsey Test, our strengthening requires a relation of relevance be-
tween antecedent and consequent that is asymmetric for a wide variety of cases, at least if we model
an agent’s epistemic state by a prioritised belief base. Relative to an agent’s epistemic state after
the suspension of judgment, the antecedent A is necessary and sufficient to infer the consequent C,
whereas the consequent C is typically not sufficient to infer A. Only if both implications A → C and
C → A are non-trivially believed after suspending judgment, our strengthened Ramsey Test condi-
tional is symmetric. This result is desirable because we do not want to preclude the possibility that,
for instance, both conditionals “If A ∧ B, then A and B” and “If A and B, then A ∧ B” are acceptable.
We have used our strengthened Ramsey Test semantics to provide an analysis of one usage of
‘because’ in natural language. Inheriting the asymmetry expressed by the strengthened conditional
, the analysis has allowed us to validate in a context, where the sun is shining, that ‘there is a
shadow because there is a tower’, while it invalidates the converse ‘there is a tower because there
is a shadow’. Hence, our analysis of ‘because’ can be used to capture explanatory directions. We
have generalised the tower-shadow scenario in an attempt to provide a notion of explanation that is
likewise relative to an epistemic agent. The rough idea has been that A inferentially explains C just
in case the agent believes generalisations G and literals L such that C follows logically from A,G, L,
but C does not follow logically from G, L. Our notion of inferential explanation thus looks a lot like
a regularity analysis of causation, as outlined in the Introduction. We have shown that an agent a
accepts ‘C because of A’ iff A inferentially explains C relative to a.
Our work centering around the strengthened Ramsey Test is limited in many ways. We have not
achieved a full positive characterisation of the logical theory governing our new conditional connective
. In future, we hope that we can provide a sound and complete axiom system for our strengthened
Ramsey Test semantics. Moreover, our strengthened Ramsey Test is so far limited to the domain of
non-probabilistic applications. A probabilification of the strengthened Ramsey Test faces the problem
that there are many ways how to suspend judgment on a given probability function. (For the expert
reader, this is similar to the problem of inverse Bayesian conditionalization.) We would need some
criterion to single out a unique resulting probability function after the contraction required by our
suspension of judgment. Alternatively, we might go imprecise in the sense that we consider the set of
all possible probability functions that result from the required contraction. Perhaps, a middle-ground
in between these alternatives is the only reasonable option.1
In Chapter 4, we have proposed an analysis of actual causation in terms of our strengthened
Ramsey Test conditional. The previous chapters suggest that our strengthened Ramsey Test ex-
presses an (almost) asymmetric relation of bringing about or production. We have supplemented
1For preliminary work towards probabilistic belief contraction, see for example Gärdenfors (1988) and Ramachandran
et al. (2012).
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our Strenghthened Ramsey Test conditional  by the notion of a forward-directed proof and im-
posed the Humean constraint that a cause temporally precedes its effect. Thereby, we have solved
the problems of joint effects, overdetermination and conjunctive scenarios, as well as (early and late)
preemption. We have achieved to solve the problems posed by switches and scenarios of double pre-
vention by adding a weak condition of difference-making. The condition requires that the absence of
an actual cause does not also bring about its effect, which seems to be a truism about actual causation.
Finally, we have supplemented the analysis by a best system account of generalisations in order to
tackle the problem of spurious causation. If this way to deal with spurious causes works, we have
provided a reductive analysis of actual causation. This reductiveness is arguably a major advantage
over contemporary ‘definitions’ of actual causation in the causal modelling literature.2
In Chapter 5, we have carried over our analysis of causation to the framework of causal models
due to Halpern and Pearl (2005). We have extended their causal models semantics in order to be able
to define our strengthened Ramsey Test for causal models. As a result, our analysis simplified signifi-
cantly on pain of losing its reductiveness. Unlike the definitions of actual cause put forth by Halpern
and Pearl (2005) and Halpern (2015), our analysis satisfactorily solves the problems of overdetermi-
nation and conjunctive scenarios at the same time. In particular, their analyses do not admit that the
conjunction of lightning and a preceding drought is an actual cause of a forest fire. Moreover, the two
definitions (of Halpern, and Halpern and Pearl) do not agree on which events are causes in scenarios of
overdetermination. A minor limitation of our analysis within the framework of causal models is that
we have not yet treated the problematic cases of double prevention, switches, omissions, and others.
However, such a treatment is already underway.
In Chapter 6, we have generalised Halpern and Pearl’s (2005) causal model semantics to allow
disjunctive causes of the type found in Sartorio’s (2006) Switch. These disjunctive causes have an
actual part, that is both disjuncts actually occur, and a counterfactual part, that is each disjunct would
be sufficient for the effect to occur. Based on the causal model semantics extended by disjunctive
antecedents, we refined Halpern and Pearl’s definition of actual causation. Unlike Halpern and Pearl’s
original definition, our refined version allows for disjunctive causes in the sense specified above.
In Chapter 7, we have tackled the question “Should cognitive neuroscientists interpret the results
of their studies as establishing genuine causal relations?” We have done so by enriching Woodward’s
(2005) interventionist account of causal explanation with the assumptions about causation typically
made in cognitive neuroscience. Within the resulting framework, we have investigated to what extent
we are justified to derive causal relations between mental properties and properties of the brain when
two different classes of methods are used in studies of cognitive neuroscience. Unlike Baumgart-
ner’s (2009) reading of Woodward’s (2005) account, our result has been that cognitive neuroscientists
should dare to interpret both methodological kinds of studies as establishing genuine causal relations.
The result is predicated on the assumption of a minimal supervenience relation between mental and
brain properties. How the obtained results change when we spell out the mind-brain relation differ-
ently is left for future work.
Let us end by reconsidering the conditional from the Introduction: “If Paris shoots his fatal arrow,
Achilles dies young.” Achilles just killed Hector, and, as the legend has it, Achilles is fated to die
young if he kills Hector. Fate, at least in the ancient Greek sense, does not determine every action,
incident, and occurrence, but it does determine the outcome of life. So, if Paris had not shot the fatal
arrow, Achilles would have died young anyways – just in another way. Lewis’s (1973c) analysis of
2More generally, our analysis is meant to be a competitor to contemporary accounts of causation, such as the ones
proposed in Halpern and Pearl (2005), Halpern (2015), Hitchcock (2001, 2007), Hall (2007), but also in Ramachandran
(1997), Paul (2000), Yablo (2002), and Schaffer (2005).
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causation in terms of counterfactual dependence does not count Paris’s shooting as an actual cause.
The reason is that there is a myriad of possible ways to seal Achilles’s fate. Hence, we just cannot
figure out an event strictly in between Paris’s shooting and Achilles’s death, after which Achilles
would not have died young, because there is none. Fate finds always a way to fulfil destiny. Hence,
Achilles untimely decease is, so to speak, preemptively overdetermined by his fate, and by whatever
actual circumstance kills him.
The example illustrates the source of the problem for counterfactual accounts of actual causation:
counterfactual difference-makers depend on events that would be actual causes of an effect, but in
fact, are not. Such would-be or back-up difference-makers come to the surface in cases of preemp-
tion. Even if Paris had not been the actual cause, fate would still have had many of these would-be
difference-makers left up her sleeves. The problem of the counterfactual criterion for actual causation
is that it takes the would-be difference-makers into account, and in doing so, allows them to mask the
difference-making of the actual causes. In contrast, our analysis does not suffer from this drawback.
Our analysis requires either to suspend judgment on would-be difference-makers, or else allows to
retain an actual belief blocking the efficacy of would-be difference-makers. In brief, taking the pre-
sumed cause and putative effect ‘out of the picture’ leads to a less informative but actual situation,
in which we can test whether the presumed cause is an actual cause of the putative effect. Suspend
judgment on Paris shooting the arrow and Achilles dying young. As a consequence, you have no infor-
mation left regarding whether or not Achilles is fated to die young and whether or not Achilles killed
Hector. Assume Paris shoots the arrow fatal to Achilles. Infer that Achilles dies young. Hence, Paris
shooting the fatal arrow is an actual cause of Achilles’s early decease, independent of any would-be
difference-makers. This is just one difference between counterfactual dependence and the ‘agnostic
dependence’ expressed by our strengthened Ramsey Test. We hope it became clear that a detailed
comparison between agnostic and counterfactual dependence deserves future consideration. This is
but one of the stories that remain to be told.
Appendix A
A Possible Worlds Model of the Jeweller
Example
Following the presentation in Douven and Romeijn (2011), we consider the Jeweller Example.
Example 12. The Jeweller Example (Douven and Romeijn (2011, p. 654))
A jeweller has been shot in his store and robbed of a golden watch. However, it is not clear at this point
what the relation between these two events is; perhaps someone shot the jeweller and then someone
else saw an opportunity to steal the watch. Kate thinks there is some chance that Henry is the robber
(R). On the other hand, she strongly doubts that he is capable of shooting someone, and thus, that he
is the shooter (S ). Now the inspector, after hearing the testimonies of several witnesses, tells Kate:
If Henry robbed the jeweller, then he also shot him. (1)
As a result, Kate becomes more confident that Henry is not the robber, while her probability for Henry
having shot the jeweller does not change.
We model Kate’s belief state as the Stalnaker modelMS t = 〈W,R,≤,≤′ V〉 depicted in Figure A.1.
W contains four elements covering the possible events of R,¬R, S ,¬S , where R stands for “Henry is
the robber”, and S for “Henry has shot the jeweller”. The example suggests that 0 < P(R) < 1 and
P(S ) = ε for a small ε, and thus P(¬S ) = 1 − ε. The prescribed intuitions are that P∗(R) < P(R) and
P∗(S ) = P(S ). We know about Kate’s degrees of belief before receiving the conditional information
that 0 < P(w1) + P(w2) < 1 and P(w1) + P(w3) = ε, as well as P(w2) + P(w4) = 1 − ε. Note that Kate
is ‘almost sure’ that ¬S , and thus we may treat ¬S as ‘almost factual’ information.
Kate receives certain conditional information. She learns the minimally informative proposition
[R > S ] = {w1,w3,w4} such that P(R > S ) = PR(S ) = 1. By the law of total probability, P(R > ¬S ) =
PR(¬S ) = 0. Taking her uncertain but almost factual information into account, Kate learns in total
the minimally informative proposition [(R > S ) ∧ ¬S ], which is identical to {w4}. By P(R > S ) = 1,
P((R > S )∧¬S ) = P(¬S ) = 1− ε. Note the tension expressed in P((R > S )∧¬S ) = 1− ε. It basically
says that S is almost surely not the case and, under the supposition of R, we exclude the possibility of
¬S . Intuitively, the thought expressed by this statement should cast doubt as to whether R is the case.
By ¬((R > S ) ∧ ¬S ) ≡ (R > ¬S ) ∨ S , we also know that P(R > ¬S ) ∨ S ) = ε. Note that
the proposition [(R > S ) ∧ ¬S ] = {w4} (interpreted as minimally informative) specifies a similarity
order ≤ such that w(R>S )∧¬S = w4 for all w. In contrast, the proposition [(R > ¬S ) ∨ S ] is minimally
informative in a strong sense, since it does not exclude any world w. Hence, the ‘maximally inclusive’
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w1 w2
w3 w4
1 − ε
ε
R
¬R
S ¬S
Figure A.1: A Stalnaker model for Kate’s belief state in the Jeweller Example. The blue arrow
indicates the unique w((R>S )∧¬S )-world under ≤. The red arrows indicate that each world is its most
similar ¬((R > S )∧¬S )-world under ≤′. The teal arrows represent the transfer of (1− ε) ·P(w), while
the violet arrows represent the transfer of ε · P(w).
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proposition [(R > ¬S ) ∨ S ] = {w1,w2,w3,w4} specifies a similarity order ≤′,≤ according to which
w(R>¬S )∨S = w for each w.
We apply now Jeffrey imaging to the Jeweller Example, where k = 1 − ε.
P(R>S )∧¬S1−ε (w
′) = P∗(w′) =
∑
w
(P(w) ·
{
1 − ε if w(R>S )∧¬S = w′
0 otherwise
}
+
P(w) ·
{
ε if w(R>¬S )∨S = w′
0 otherwise
}
)
(2)
We obtain the following probability distribution after learning:
P∗1−ε(w1) = P
∗
1−ε(R ∧ S ) = ε · P(w1) P∗1−ε(w2) = P∗1−ε(R ∧ ¬S ) = ε · P(w2)
P∗1−ε(w3) = P
∗
1−ε(¬R ∧ S ) = ε · P(w3) P∗1−ε(w4) = P∗1−ε(¬R ∧ ¬S )
= (1 − ε) · (P(w1) + P(w2) + P(w3)+
P(w4)) + ε · P(w4)
(3)
The results almost comply with the prescribed intuitions. The intuition concerning the degree
of belief in R is met: P∗(R) < P(R), since P∗1−ε(w1) + P
∗
1−ε(w2) < P(w1) + P(w2). The intuition
concerning the degree of belief in S is ‘almost’ met: P∗1−ε(S ) ≈ P(S ), for P(w1) + P(w3) = ε and
P∗1−ε(w1) + P
∗
1−ε(w3) = P(w1) · ε + P(w3) · ε ≈ ε. In words, the method gives us the result that Kate is
now pretty sure that Henry is neither the shooter nor the robber.
Appendix B
Proofs of Chapter 3
Proposition 2. Let K be a non-absurd belief set and γ a non-tautology. Then (UPC) and α, γ ∈ K
implies (BecauseR).
Proof. The proof presents the simplification of (UPC) to (BecauseR). Assume K , K⊥ (K is not
the absurd belief set) and γ is not a tautology. Further, suppose α, γ ∈ K. Then, by Gärdenfors’s
contraction postulate (K−4), γ < K − γ. Moreover, since γ ∈ K and K , K⊥, ¬γ < K. By (K−3) this
implies that ¬γ < (K − γ). By Proposition 1, γ < (K − γ) implies γ < (K − γ) ∗ α or γ < (K − γ) ∗ ¬α,
and ¬γ < (K − γ) implies ¬γ < (K − γ) ∗ α or ¬γ < (K − γ) ∗ ¬α. Hence, (i) γ < (K − γ) ∗ α or
γ < (K −γ) ∗¬α and (ii) ¬γ < (K −γ) ∗α or ¬γ < (K −γ) ∗¬α. (i) implies that (iii), if γ ∈ (K −γ) ∗α,
then γ < (K − γ) ∗ ¬α. (ii) implies that (iv) if ¬γ ∈ (K − γ) ∗ ¬α, then ¬γ < (K − γ) ∗ α. From (iii),
(iv), and (UPC), we can infer (BecauseR). 
Proposition 3. Let α and γ be literals or conjunctions of literals. Further, α, γ ∈ K. Suppose that
α → γ is a non-trivial implication in K and Assumption 1 holds for α → γ. Then, α a⇒ γ ∈ K and
γ a⇒ α ∈ K.
Proof. (α a⇒ γ ∈ K) Suppose α → γ is a non-trivial implication in K. Then, by Definition 13 and
Assumption 1, α→ γ is a non-trivial implication in K−γ. By Definition 13, (K−γ)−¬α ` α→ γ. We
obtain, by the deduction theorem, (K−γ)−¬α, α ` γ, which we can rewrite as ((K−γ)−¬α)+α ` γ. By
the Levi identity, we obtain γ ∈ (K − γ) ∗ α. Using α, γ ∈ K, we can infer therefrom that α a⇒ γ ∈ K.
(γ a⇒ α ∈ K) Suppose α→ γ is a non-trivial implication in K. Then, by Assumption 1, α→ γ is
a non-trivial implication in K − α. By contraposition, ¬γ → ¬α is a non-trivial implication in K − α.
By Definition 13, ¬γ → ¬α is a non-trivial implication in (K −α)− γ. Via the deduction theorem, we
obtain (K − α) − γ,¬γ ` ¬α. By the Levi identity, we obtain ¬α ∈ (K − α) ∗ ¬γ. Using α, γ ∈ K, we
can infer therefrom that γ a⇒ α ∈ K. 
Proposition 4. Assume a (BecauseR) agent accepts all facts and the generalisation of the tower-
shadow scenario, i. e. t, s, sh, t ∧ s → sh ∈ K, where the order of epistemic entrenchment is t, s, sh <
t ∧ s→ sh. Then, t a⇒ sh ∈ K if t ≤ sh and sh a⇒ t ∈ K if sh ≤ t.
Proof. By (BecauseR):
t a⇒ sh ∈ K iff sh ∈ (K − sh) ∗ t or ¬sh ∈ (K − sh) ∗ ¬t
and t, sh ∈ K.
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t, s, sh ∈ K holds by assumption. We show that (a) t a⇒ sh ∈ K if t ≤ sh. Let us assume t ≤ sh. By
(G-), (EE2), (EE1), this implies (i) t < K − sh. By the recovery postulate
If α ∈ K, then K ⊆ (K − α) + α (K−5)
t ∈ (K−sh)∗sh. By the Levi identity, the deduction theorem, and (i), this implies that sh→ t ∈ (K−sh).
Hence, ¬t → ¬sh ∈ (K − sh). Using t < K − sh and the Levi identity, we can infer therefrom that
¬sh ∈ (K − sh) ∗ ¬t. This entails (a) in light of (BecauseR).
The proof of (b) sh a⇒ t if sh ≤ t is completely analogous to that of (a).

Proposition 5. Assume a (BecauseR) agent accepts all the formulas in K(H, <) = K(S ) for H =
{t, s, sh, t ∧ s → sh}, where the order of epistemic priority is t ∼ s ∼ sh < t ∧ s → sh. Then t a⇒
sh < K>(S ) and sh a⇒ t ∈ K>(S ).
Proof. t a⇒ sh and sh a⇒ t remain well-defined, when replacing K with K(S ):
t a⇒ sh ∈ K>(S ) iff sh ∈ K((S − sh) ∗ t) or ¬sh ∈ K((S − sh) ∗ ¬t)
and t, sh ∈ K(S )
sh a⇒ t ∈ K>(S ) iff t ∈ K((S − t) ∗ sh) or ¬t ∈ K((S − t) ∗ ¬sh)
and sh, t ∈ K(S ).
t a⇒ sh < K>(S ), where S = (H, <): t, sh ∈ K(S ) is satisfied by assumption. By Definition 41, the
remainder set H⊥sh contains three sets, H′ = {t∧s→ sh, s}, H′′ = {t∧s→ sh, t}, and H′′′ = {s, t}. By
Definition 12, H′ ≤ H′′ and H′′ ≤ H′, but H′ 6≤ H′′′. Hence, by (Def σ), both H′ and H′′ are selected
for the partial meet base contraction (PMBC) which yields H − sh = ⋂σ(H⊥sh) = {t ∧ s→ sh}.
By (PMBR), (H − sh) ∗ t = ⋂σ((H − sh)⊥¬t) + t. Since ¬t < Cn(H − sh), by Definition 41,
H − sh is the unique member of (H − sh)⊥¬t. By Definition 12, (H − sh) ≤ (H − sh) and by (Def σ),
the partial meet base contraction (PMBC) yields (H − sh) − ¬t = ⋂σ((H − sh)⊥¬t) = {t ∧ s → sh}.
Notice that when ¬t < H− sh, then (H− sh)−¬t = H− sh. By (H + α), (H− sh)∗ t = {t∧ s→ sh}∪{t}.
Hence, (S − sh) ∗ t = ((H − sh) ∗ t, <′), where <′ is such that generalisations have strict priority over
literals. Then sh < K((S − sh) ∗ t).
By (PMBR), (H − sh) ∗ ¬t = ⋂σ((H − sh)⊥t) + ¬t. By similar reasoning as above, t < H − sh
and thus (H − sh) − t = H − sh. By (H + α), (H − sh) ∗ ¬t = {t ∧ s → sh} ∪ {¬t}. Hence,
(S − sh) ∗ ¬t = ((H − sh) ∗ ¬t, <′), where <′ is such that generalisations have strict priority over
literals. Then ¬sh < K((S − sh) ∗ ¬t).
sh a⇒ t ∈ K>(S ), where S = (H, <): t, sh ∈ K(S ) is satisfied by assumption. By Definition 41,
the remainder set H⊥t contains only H′ = {t ∧ s→ sh, s, sh}. By Definition 12, H′ ≤ H′ and by (Def
σ), the partial meet base contraction (PMBC) yields (H − t) = ⋂σ(H⊥t) = {t ∧ s → sh, s, sh}. By
similar reasoning, (H− t)− sh = {t∧ s→ sh, s}. By (H + α), ((H− t)− sh)+¬sh = {t∧ s→ sh, s,¬sh},
which is by (PMBR) (H − t) ∗ ¬sh. Hence, (S − t) ∗ ¬sh = ((H − t) ∗ ¬sh, <′), where <′ is such that
generalisations have strict priority over literals. Then ¬t ∈ K((S − t) ∗ ¬sh).

Proposition 6. Assume a (BecauseP) agent accepts all facts and the single, more entrenched gener-
alisation of the tower-shadow scenario, i. e. t, s, sh, t ∧ s → sh ∈ K, where the order of epistemic
entrenchment is t ∼ s ∼ sh < t ∧ s→ sh. Then t P⇒ sh ∈ K> and sh P⇒ t ∈ K>.
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Proof. t P⇒ sh ∈ K>: The agnostic belief set is K′ = K − (t ∨ sh). By (G-), t, s, sh < K′, but by
recovery (i) (t∨ sh)→ sh ∈ K′. By assumption, ¬t < K and so by (K−3), (ii) ¬t < K′. Using t ` t∨ sh
and the Levi identity, we can infer from (i) and (ii) that sh ∈ K′ ∗ t.
sh P⇒ t ∈ K>: The agnostic belief set is, again, K′ = K − (t ∨ sh) such that t, s, sh < K′, but by
recovery (t ∨ sh)→ t ∈ K′. Using sh ` t ∨ sh, we infer that t ∈ K′ ∗ sh. 
Proposition 7. Assume a (BecauseP) agent accepts all the formulas in K(H, <) = K(S ) for H =
{t, s, sh, t ∧ s → sh}, where the agent may assume whatever epistemic ordering <. Then t P⇒ sh ∈
K>(S ), but sh P⇒ t < K>(S ).
Proof. t P⇒ sh ∈ K>(S ), where S = (H, <); < remains unspecified: t, sh ∈ K(S ) is satisfied by
assumption. By Definition 41, the remainder set H⊥(t∨ sh) contains only H′′ = {t∧ s→ sh, s}. Since
H′′ ≤ H′′ and by (Def σ), the partial meet base contraction (PMBC) yields the agnostic belief base (i)
H′ = H − (t∨ sh) = ⋂σ(H⊥(t∨ sh)) = {t∧ s→ sh, s}. By (PMBR), H′ ∗ t = ⋂σ(H′⊥¬t) + t. Using
¬t < Cn(H′), we obtain H′ ∗ t = H′+ t. Together with (i), this implies that H′ ∗ t = {t∧ s→ sh, s}∪ {t}.
Hence, sh ∈ K>(S ) − (t ∨ sh) ∗ t so that t  sh ∈ K>(S ).
sh P⇒ t < K>(S ), where S = (H, <); < remains unspecified: as just shown, (i) H′ = H− (sh∨ t) =
{t ∧ s → sh, s}. By (PMBR), H′ ∗ sh = ⋂σ(H′⊥¬sh) + sh. Using ¬sh < Cn(H′), we obtain
H′ ∗ sh = H′ + sh. Together with (i), this implies that H′ ∗ sh = {t ∧ s → sh, s} ∪ {sh}. Hence,
t < K>(S ) − (sh ∨ t) ∗ sh so that sh  t < K>(S ).

Proposition 8. Let α and γ be literals. Epistemic states are represented by prioritised belief bases
with two levels: an upper level G of generalisations and a lower level L of literals, as explained in
Section 3.2.6. A (BecauseP′) agent accepts ‘γ because of α’ with respect to (H, <) iff α inferentially
explains γ – in the sense of Definition 16 – in the eyes of the agent accepting all members of H.
Proof. Suppose (i) γ because of α is verified by an epistemic state (H, <) (in the sense of (BecauseP′)).
Let G be the set of generalisations of H, while L is the set of literals of H. Hence, (ii) there are
(H′′, <′′) and L− such that (H′, <′) = (H, <) −∨ L− and α  γ ∈ K>(H′, <′). Therefore, (iii) there is
(H′′, <′′) = (H′, <′)−α∨γ such that H′′ = G′′∪L′′, G′′ = G∩H′′, and L′′ = L∩H′′. Hence, the pair
(G′′, L′′) satisfies conditions (1), (2), and (4) for an agent who accepts all members of H. Moreover,
(ii) and (iii) imply that G′′ ∪ L′′, α ` γ. Hence, Condition (5) is satisfied as well for (G′′, L′′). Finally,
Condition (6) holds for (G′′, L′′) because of (ii) and (iii). (i) implies that Condition (3) of Definition
16 is satisfied for an agent who accepts all members of H. Hence, all conditions of this definition are
satisfied for such an agent. Thus, α inferentially explains γ – in the sense of Definition 16 – in the
eyes of an agent who accepts all members of H.
For the other direction, suppose (i) α inferentially explains γ in the eyes of an agent a, in the sense
of Definition 16. Hence, there is a set G of generalisations and a set L of literals such that conditions
(1) – (6) of Definition 16 are satisfied for a. (ii) H := G ∪ L ∪ {α}. < is such that generalisations
are prioritised over literals. Obviously, (iii) α ∈ K(H). By Condition (5) of Definition 16, (iv)
γ ∈ K(H, <). We show that α ∨ γ < Cn(G ∪ L). Suppose, for contradiction, α ∨ γ ∈ Cn(G ∪ L).
This implies that (v) ¬α → γ ∈ Cn(G ∪ L). By Condition (5) of Definition 16, we know that (vi)
α→ γ ∈ Cn(G∪L). Since α∨¬α ∈ Cn(G∪L), (v) and (vi) imply that γ ∈ Cn(G∪L). This contradicts
Condition (6) of Definition 16. Hence, α ∨ γ < Cn(G ∪ L). Therefore, σ((H, <)⊥α ∨ γ) := {G ∪ L},
where σ is defined by (Def σ) and Definition 12. Using Condition (5) of Definition 16, we can infer
therefrom that α  γ ∈ K>(H, <). Using (iii) and (iv), we can infer therefrom that ‘γ because of α’ is
verified by the epistemic state (H, <) (in the sense of (BecauseP′)). 
Appendix C
Defining Belief Changes
In view of the Levi identity, we can focus on belief base contractions and set specific belief base
revision schemes aside. A contraction by A can be defined using the notion of a remainder set H⊥ A.
Recall that the contraction of K(S ) by A yields a belief set K(S ′) that does not contain A. The
remainder set H⊥ A, consequently, contains all maximal subsets of H that do not entail A. In formal
terms:
Definition 41. H⊥ A (Hansson, 1999, p. 12)
Let H be a set of formulas and A a formula. H′ ∈ H⊥ A iff
(C1) H′ ⊆ H
(C2) A < Cn(H′)
(C3) there is no H′′ such that H′ ⊂ H′′ ⊆ H and A < Cn(H′′).
Cn stands for the consequence operation of classical logic.
The next step is to define the contraction of the belief base H by A:
H ÷ A =d f
⋂
H⊥ A. (FMB Contraction)
This way of defining a contraction is also referred to as full meet base contraction.
⋂
H⊥A designates
the intersection of the members of the remainder set H⊥A.
Full meet base contractions are motivated by two ideas. First, the conservativity principle: when
forced to change our beliefs, we should retain as many as possible of the present beliefs (Harman,
1986, p. 46). This is the motivation for Condition (C3) in the above definition of H⊥ A. Second, if
we have no reason to prefer one way of retracting A over another, we retain only those beliefs that
are preserved in all possible ways of retracting A. Since any member of H⊥A represents a logically
possible way of retracting A from H, we retain only those beliefs that are in the intersection of the
members of H⊥A.
If combined with the idea of different levels of epistemic priority, full meet base contractions yield
intuitive results. Such a combination is therefore assumed to define the suspension of judgement in
our strengthened Ramsey Test.
To define full meet revisions for a prioritised belief base, we merely need to extend the definition
of a remainder set H⊥A to the prioritised case. Let
H = 〈H1, . . . ,Hn〉
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be a prioritised belief base. That is, H1, . . . ,Hn are sets of formulas that represent explicit beliefs, and
the indices represent an epistemic ranking of the beliefs. H1 is the set of the most firmly established
beliefs, the beliefs in H2 have secondary priority, etc. We define the remainder set of such a prioritised
belief base as follows:
Definition 42. H⊥A
Let H = 〈H1, . . . ,Hn〉 be a prioritised belief base and A a formula. H′ ∈ H⊥A iff (i) H′ = 〈H′1, . . . ,H′n〉
and (ii) for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), H′1 ∪ . . . ∪ H′i ∈ (H1 ∪ . . . ∪ Hi)⊥A.
Any member H′ of H⊥A is thus itself a prioritised belief base preserving the epistemic prioritisa-
tion of H, i. e. any H′ has the same structure of epistemic levels (1 to n) than H . The union of the
epistemic levels of such a base H′ – the set H′1 ∪ . . . ∪ H′n – does not entail A by classical logic.1
The next step is to define the contraction of H by A in terms of the componentwise intersection of
the members of the prioritised remainder set:
H ÷ A =d f
⋂
H⊥A (Def ÷)
The componentwise intersection of H⊥A is defined in the obvious way: the set of the i-th level of⋂
H⊥A (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is given by the intersection of the i-th levels of the members of H⊥A. Note that
we use
⋂
in a context-dependent manner; it means different things when applied to a set and to a
sequence of sets.
It remains to define expansions for prioritised belief bases H = 〈H1, . . . ,Hn〉. Two types of
definitions suggest themselves:
H + A =d f 〈{A},H1, . . . ,Hn〉 (Def +)
H +i A =d f 〈H1, . . . ,Hi ∪ {A}, . . . ,Hn〉 (Def +i)
For non-iterated revisions (where further revisions that follow upon a primary revision are not con-
sidered), the two definitions are equivalent as regards the resulting belief set. That is, K(H + A) =
K(H +i A) for all levels i. As we do not use iterated revisions, we chose the first definition, for the
sake of simplicity.
Once expansions and contractions have been explained for prioritised belief bases, we can define
revisions using the Levi identity in a straightforward manner:
H ∗ A =d f (H ÷ ¬A) + A = (
⋂
H⊥¬A) + A. (Def ∗)
The last step is to define the belief set K of a prioritised belief base H by the inferential closure of
some suitable logic. We simply take the consequence operation of classical logic:
K(H) =d f Cn(H1 ∪ . . . ∪ Hn). (K(H))
Once K(H), H + A, and H ∗ A are defined, we can readily define the revision and the contraction
of the belief set K(H) of the belief base H:
K(H) + A =d f K(H + A)
K(H) ∗ A =d f K(H ∗ A).
1The definition of H⊥A is inspired by the construction of a preferred subtheory in Brewka (1991).
Appendix D
Proof of Chapter 4
We show that, within the original AGM belief revision theory, Lewis’s (1973c) notion of counterfac-
tual dependence is sufficient for causation as understood by our analysis when the cause temporally
precedes its effect. Specifically, if C, E ∈ K for contingent propositions C, E, and counterfactual de-
pendence is transcribed into the AGM framework as ¬C > ¬E ∈ K, it follows that C is a cause of
E according to our analysis, where the epistemic state S is a classic belief set K, as opposed to a
prioritised belief base H.
Proposition 9. Assume (i) C, E ∈ K for contingent propositions C, E, and (ii) ¬C > ¬E ∈ K. Then C
is a cause of E relative to K in the sense of the following conditions that mirror (C1), (C3), and (C4)
of definition 22:
(C1’) C, E ∈ K,
(C3’) C  E ∈ K, and
(C4’) ¬C  E < K.
Proof. (C1’) is satisfied by assumption. First, we show that (C3’) is satisfied. From (ii), we obtain by
(RTG): ¬C > ¬E ∈ K iff ¬E ∈ K ∗ ¬C. By the Levi identity, we have ¬E ∈ (K − C) + ¬C. But then
E < (K −C). For suppose it were. Then (K −C) +¬C would be inconsistent, because it would contain
both E and ¬E. (The inconsistency is excluded by the assumption in (i) that C and E are contingent
propositions.) Since K − (C ∨ E) ⊆ (K − C) and E < (K − C), E < K − (C ∨ E). By the recovery
postulate, however, C∨E → E ∈ K − (C∨E), and thus, by closure, C → E ∈ K − (C∨E). Therefore,
E ∈ K − (C ∨ E) + C, and so C  E ∈ K.
It is left to show that (C4’) is satisfied. Again, from (ii) by (RTG) and the Levi identity, we obtain
¬E ∈ (K − C) + ¬C, and thus E < (K − C) + ¬C. Since (K − (C ∨ E)) + ¬C ⊆ (K − C) + ¬C, we
obtain that E < (K − (C ∨ E)) + ¬C. Hence, ¬C  E < K. 
Observe that we have not considered here the requirement of forward-directedness and (C2), that
is t(C) < t(E). Otherwise, however, counterfactual dependence as encoded in ¬C > ¬E ∈ K and
actuality as encoded in (C1’) are sufficient for causation according to our analysis within the AGM
framework. If we switch to our framework, using prioritised belief bases, (C1), (C3), and (C4) are
satisfied just in case the generalisation C → E is in K(H) and ¬C → E is not. Of course, if the
‘counterfactual’ ¬C → ¬E is in K(H) as a generalisation, ¬C → E is not.
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als, Causation” selbstständig angefertigt habe, mich außer der angegebenen keiner weiteren Hilf-
smittel bedient und alle Erkenntnisse, die aus dem Schrifttum ganz oder annähernd übernommen
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